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ABSTRACT
Stephen A. Hammer 
“Urban Policy for Renewable Energy: Case Studies of New York and London”
Despite growing attention to the issue of urban ‘sustainability’ and steady increases in 
the overall use of different renewable power technologies around the world, cities 
tend to have very low levels of ‘green’ power use or renewables technology 
deployment within their borders. Through field interviews and literature reviews, this 
thesis examines the factors that both help and hinder this situation, using New York 
City and London as case studies. New institutionalism and urban regime theories 
provide the analytical lenses through which the empirical research is viewed. Each 
theory examines this issue from a different perspective, with new institutionalism 
particularly adept at identifying explanations linked to the electric power sector’s 
highly regulated policy environment. Urban regime theory (URT) emphasizes 
understanding who is involved in the policy-making and implementation process, and 
how their involvement influences any outcomes. Originally, URT was developed to 
analyze urban growth coalitions and other urban economic development activities, 
although researchers have more recently posited its applicability to a wide range of 
fields, including urban environmental policy-making. When examining energy 
policy-making in both London and New York, however, a traditional URT approach 
falls short because it does not easily accommodate the influence of formal regulatory 
mechanisms in shaping outcomes. By modifying URT, however, so it adopts aspects 
of a new institutionalist approach, highly compelling and comprehensive explanations 
for local energy policy and program decisions can be obtained. This thesis concludes 
by detailing circumstances under which this type of “Constrained” regime analysis is 
appropriate, and how its methodology differs from that of traditional urban regime 
theory.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the logic of renewable electricity policy-making in two world 
cities, New York City and London. Although mankind has harnessed natural energy 
flows for thousands of years, interest in the use of renewable power in urban areas has 
dramatically increased during just the last 10-15 years. One explanation is growing 
attention to the larger issue of urban sustainability, a subject highlighted at the 1992 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. One policy initiative coming out of Rio was Local 
Agenda 21, which specifically focused on the role cities can play in reversing global 
climate change (UNCED, 1992). Groups like Energie-Cites and the International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives have taken up the banner of local action 
and are fostering information sharing between communities interested in enacting 
more ‘climate-friendly’ policies.
Policy-makers, energy system developers, and consumers are looking at renewably- 
generated power in cities for other reasons as well. Over the past few years, the 
damaging financial consequences of energy price volatility have led many cities to 
fear for their local economy (Benson, 2002). Energy diversification through the 
deployment and use of renewable power can provide a hedge against price spikes 
(Wiser, Bolinger, & St. Clair, 2005), particularly during peak electricity demand 
periods. Other cities are responding to concerns about energy security, believing it 
makes sense to generate power locally using technologies that do not rely on imported 
fuel sources. Post-September 11th fears of terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants 
and liquid natural gas terminals near cities raise a completely different set of energy 
security and public health concerns (Hall Hayes, 2005; Hebert, 2005; Lyman, 2004). 
Finally, cities are also concerned about the localized emission impacts of power 
production, including air quality in the vicinity of power plants. In many cities, these 
facilities are found near low income or predominately minority communities, giving 
rise to claims of environmental racism. (For example, see Living on Earth, 2005). 
Renewables thus represent a more acceptable way of generating power because they 
emit zero or low levels of pollutants (Boyle, 2004).
The decision to explore renewable energy policy agendas and practices in cities was 
originally driven by my parochial interest in environmental policy-making in New
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York City. For many years prior to beginning my doctoral research, I was an active 
participant in this policy arena, focused primarily on waste policy matters. This is a 
very contentious policy area given that waste management facilities -  like electric 
power plants -  are rarely seen as desirable neighbors. Exploring how a city like New 
York approaches policy-making related to newer, cleaner, and ‘sexier’ power 
generation technologies thus provides an interesting analogue to my previous 
professional work. London is paired with New York City in this analysis because of 
the obvious parallels between the cities. Both enjoy ‘world city’ status (Sassen,
2001), are roughly the same size, and represent financial and cultural powerhouses 
that hold considerable sway over the countries and continents where they are located.
There is a much broader value to a focus on cities than my parochial interests, 
however, borne out of the fact that cities are an important part of the global energy 
equation. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
estimates cities account for 60-80% of the total energy demand in OECD-member 
countries (Capello, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1999). As the world is growing increasingly 
urbanized (United Nations, 1999), the proportion of global energy use consumed in 
cities will likely rise as well. Improving our understanding of the dynamics of local 
energy policy-making takes on new relevance given these trends. Policy-makers and 
practitioners seeking to expand the deployment and use of renewable power in other 
cities can gain insights from how things work -  or don’t work -  in London and New 
York. Local circumstances will inevitably be unique, meaning policy or market 
responses may need to differ. Nonetheless, this analysis will highlight the types of 
questions that must be asked in cities to fully understand which market, political, or 
policy forces have the greatest influence on local renewables deployment and use 
decisions. Any progress on renewables deployment and use in these world cities can 
have a ripple effect, influencing behavior in other urban areas near and far.
Urban energy policy-making also commands our attention because growing interest in 
renewable power and other forms of distributed power generation raises comparisons 
with the earliest days of electricity generation and electricity market development. It 
was at this time, during the late 19th century, when local authorities were directly 
involved in the development and oversight of the industry. Because of the power 
generation technologies in use at the time, electric utilities were essentially
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neighborhood propositions (Hyman, 1985), and multiple systems were required to 
serve an entire city. Within two decades, however, a backlash against local control 
had occurred, prompted by the actions of corrupt local officials seeking to personally 
cash in on their ability to grant rights to provide electric service in a designated 
geographic area (Schap, 1986). First in New York, and then elsewhere, local 
regulatory control of the electric industry was eliminated and shifted to state and 
national government, lessening the potential for corruption. As the technology used 
by the electric industry evolved, facilitating larger service territories, state and federal 
control also facilitated interconnections between cities, creating ever-more complex 
networks and market structures.
Today, renewables are shifting the energy discussion back to a very local perspective, 
focused on generation at or near the point of energy use. Does this mean that local 
policy-makers are adjusting their policies to reflect a new or shifting paradigm? 
Perhaps more appropriately, are local policy-makers even capable of adjusting energy 
policies and markets to accommodate renewables, given the type of regulations, 
market structures, and political coalitions that have been built up in support of the 
electric power industry for the last century? This final question is important as 
communities seek to develop local sustainability plans. They must recognize which 
policy-making capacities are clearly within their control, and where their behavior 
may be constrained by state or federal level policies and programs. State and federal 
level officials seeking to pursue progress on climate change and other energy-related 
issues can also learn from an urban-level analysis, as it can highlight areas where state 
and federal laws and programs can or should be changed to enhance local 
performance.
I must be clear in emphasizing that my research is not intended to be normative in that 
regard, however. Devolving authority from the state or federal level to local 
authorities also brings with it some risks. Local authorities are electorally 
accountable to local interests, so their policies may take on a very parochial tint. One 
of the benefits of state or national level action is that it can rise above these 
neighborhood-level concerns to enact policies and programs beneficial to much larger 
populations and geographic areas. State and federal level action can also be important
15
to ensure market players face a level playing field, rather than a hodge-podge of rules 
that vary from one locality to another.
Theoretical Approach
The analytic approach employed in this thesis has been heavily influenced by the 
work of Gibbs and Jonas (2000), the first researchers to posit in a meaningful way the 
idea that urban regime theory (URT) can be applied to the subject of environmental 
policy-making in a city. For nearly twenty years, URT has been recognized as a 
technique adept at dissecting urban governance, aiding our understanding of how 
policy decisions are made at the local level. Central to URT is the idea that there is a 
coalition of public and private interests -  a regime -  that dominate the local policy 
arena. Thanks to the knowledge, financial or other resources coalition members have 
individually and collectively, URT argues the regime shapes local policy-making and 
program activity in a very observable direction (Brown, 1999; Mossberger & Stoker, 
2001). Urban regime theory was first applied to examine the actions of business-led 
coalitions in US cities, but since then the technique has been used to explicate local 
decision-making on a range of policy topics in cities around the world.
Gibbs and Jonas note the lack of empirical work applying regime theory to energy and 
environmental policy-making, however, and this thesis thus serves to fill this research 
gap. Beyond merely employing the technique, however, I will also seek to interrogate 
three questions posed by Gibbs & Jonas (2000) that would broaden our understanding 
of how regimes form and operate. These questions are:
• Can environmental regimes operate separately from pro-development regimes?
• How has policy localization activated processes of regime formation around 
environmental issues?
• Under what conditions do local interests mobilize around environmental policy, 
and how does this shape the character of a governing coalition or partnership?
The first question is perhaps the most important, as it seeks to clarify whether 
multiple policy coalitions drive agenda-setting in a city, or whether a single
16
hegemonic regime covers multiple policy areas. This question is important from a 
theoretical perspective because regime analyses have traditionally examined a single 
policy area in isolation, ignoring who dominates the debate on other important policy 
matters in a city. If multiple regimes do exist, this gives rise to questions of how they 
carve up policy responsibilities, and what occurs if regimes clash on the direction or 
implementation of new policies. Gibbs and Jonas’ other questions are important to 
researchers seeking to distill fundamental lessons about regime behavior across 
geographic or temporal contexts, or across different policy arenas. This thesis will 
not pursue this type of comparative analysis, but will answer these questions based on 
what we observe in New York and London.
One weakness of Gibbs & Jonas’ article was its failure to discuss how researchers 
should address one of the chief complaints about URT -  its localist nature, meaning 
its failure to account for larger or extra-local cultural, political, or policy influences on 
decision-making (Ferman, 1996; Lauria, 1994). In the area of energy and 
environmental policy, market regulation is a common methodological approach so it 
is important to recognize the extent to which extra-local regulatory influences shape 
local regime behavior. In this thesis, I offer guidance on this subject, suggesting how 
the standard URT model could be changed to better accommodate such 
circumstances. A second theoretical approach, new institutionalism, provides the 
foundation for these changes. New institutional analyses focus on formal and 
informal rules, standard operating procedures, cultural norms and religious beliefs that 
can influence behavior (Alt & Shepsle, 1998; Lowndes, 2001; Weber, 1978). By 
blending a systems-oriented new institutional approach with the more overtly political 
focus of URT, I end up with an analytic model that should identify the full range of 
factors influencing local agenda-setting and program behavior. I field test this 
blended model in both case studies, assessing what improvements it offers over the 
traditional URT model.
Structure of this Thesis
This thesis starts with a broad, macro-level picture of electricity markets and 
regulation in the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) and then narrows its 
focus until we achieve a ground-level perspective on energy policy and deployment
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decisions in New York City and London. As part of the macro-level portrait in 
Chapter 1, the development of the electric power industry is profiled, as is the history 
of electric utility regulation.1 There have been several important changes along both 
paths, some caused by technological factors, and others more political in nature, that 
have influenced the shape of today’s electricity marketplace. These changes were 
critical in defining who has responsibility for policy-making, oversight, or the 
delivery of electric services to customers. Given the growing emergence of the 
European Union (EU) as a policy-making force that influences UK regulations and 
policies, EU rules are also discussed.
The role of cities in the overall energy policy and market picture is also introduced in 
Chapter 1. It is here that we see our first evidence that cities can have a limited 
capacity to act on electricity issues, as authority once the province of local 
government was usurped by state or federal level authorities for the sake of greater 
market coherence or to combat political corruption. This theme that local authorities 
have constrained powers becomes increasingly prevalent and important over the 
course of this thesis.
Because my research question focuses on local renewable energy policy-making, 
Chapter 2 then shifts the discussion to provide a similar high-level portrait of 
renewable power markets, technologies, and trends. Although ‘new’ renewable 
power technologies (Grubb, 1995) such as solar, wind, small hydro, biomass, and 
tidal and geothermal power systems currently provide but a small fraction of global 
electricity supply, policy and business trends point toward improving prospects for 
these technologies. The technologies best suited to urban deployment are discussed, 
as are the strategies cities employ to expand their use of renewable power. This 
chapter provides context for the situation in New York City and London by creating a 
baseline for deployment and policy trends against which each city can be measured.
Chapters 1 and 2 lay bare the fact that cities engaged in renewable energy policy­
making face a difficult task, given the multiple tiers of stakeholders and the complex 
regulatory and market environment. Techniques well-suited to exploring complex
1 This thesis covers the historical record up through approximately March 2005.
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systems of urban governance are thus called for in this analysis. Chapter 3 explains in 
detail why my decision to blend regime theory with new institutionalism makes sense, 
referencing specific facts in the first two chapters that support the choice of these two 
analytic approaches. Chapter 4 builds on this, discussing the specific methods I 
employed to complete each case study, and explaining why these are the most 
appropriate techniques for my research. In general, each case study relies on 
literature reviews tailored to each city, and lengthy telephone conversations and in- 
person, semi-structured interviews with policy elites. The focus of the literature 
review was on the energy policy track record in each city; information on or analysis 
of the local political environment; and background information describing state and 
federal policies and programs relevant to each city’s energy market. Interview 
questions were tailored to reflect the unique knowledge of each expert. In some cases 
the interviews preceded portions of the literature review, meaning the interviews 
provided important background information that was then pursued further with a 
detailed literature search. In other cases, interviews were used to synthesize or clarify 
information found in the literature review. Finally, interviews were used to obtain 
original insights into local politics, policies, or energy markets in each city. A total of 
86 interviews were carried out between the two case studies.
Chapters 5-7 and 8-10 represent the heart of this thesis, detailing energy policy­
making practices in New York City and London respectively. Each case study 
consists of three parts. The first section moves beyond the macro-level portrait 
presented in Chapters 1 and 2 to detail the energy landscape in each city. Topics 
covered include the history of local electricity development; fuel sources, including 
the current role of renewables; pricing trends; and how the local electric grid operates. 
The second section of the case study emphasizes policy, reviewing local, state, and 
national regulatory structures, policies, and funding schemes that specifically impact 
energy decisions in each city. The second section also identifies key stakeholders 
involved in local energy decision-making. The final chapter of each case study 
applies my theoretical model to examine which factors have most significantly 
influenced -  either positively or negatively -  the direction of renewables policy­
making and the deployment and use of renewable power in each city. This third 
section ties together all of the information previously presented to attempt to deduce 
the ‘logic’ of local action.
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In Chapter 11,1 recap my findings from each case study, and draw more general 
conclusions that may be of interest to future policy-makers and researchers. Key here 
is my review of the modified regime model, where I discuss how well the model 
worked; where changes should be made to clarify or further enhance its applicability; 
and what future researchers should look for when applying the model to their own 
work. I also revisit the questions posed by Gibbs and Jonas and suggest new avenues 
for research that build on my work in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 1 
Electricity Markets and Policy -  The Big Picture
Electric Utilities -  An Early History
The modem electric utility industry has its origins in the 1880s. Although its New 
York cousin tends to get more credit, the first steam-powered utility designed to serve 
multiple customers was established by the English Edison Company at 57 Holbum 
Viaduct in London. Equipped with generators designed by Thomas Edison, and using 
a direct current (DC) system design licensed from Edison, the facility commenced 
operations on 11 April 1882, lighting streetlights, hotels, stores, restaurants and other 
private buildings in central London (Hughes, 1983). Using similar equipment, Edison 
followed this a few months later with a facility near Wall Street in New York City. 
Strategically located to attract the attention of the nearby financial community and the 
New York Times newspaper, the Pearl Street facility began operation on 4 September 
1882, supplying power to 85 customers using 400 lamps (Hyman, 1985).
For the next few years, electric service remained largely a “community affair” 
(Smeloff & Asmus, 1997, p 9). This was due to the use of low-voltage DC 
technology, which could transmit power up to two miles (Hyman, 1985). In addition, 
power companies could not yet “step up” or “step down” the voltage on their lines, 
meaning that different generators and wiring systems were used for street lighting 
(which relied on arc lights) and home and office lighting (which used incandescent 
fixtures.) Westinghouse’s invention of single-phase alternating current (AC) in the 
late 1880s changed this, meaning that power plants no longer needed to be built 
adjacent to large individual or sets of users (Jacobson, 2000). First in Germany and 
then at Niagara Falls on the US/Canada border, AC power systems were established 
that transported power from remote locations to the central city, and interest in these 
systems spread quickly.
Utilities operating DC plants worked hard to maintain their market stake, arguing that 
low voltage made their systems safer. The debate was amplified by the use of 
alternating current in the first publicly sanctioned execution by electrocution at a New 
York State prison in 1890. A publicity campaign backed by Edison and other DC-
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powered utility owners following this event raised the question: “Do you want the 
executioner’s current in your home and running through your streets?” (Hughes,
1983, p 108).
The growth in electrical demand ultimately helped settle the question of which 
technology would win out. Early users tended to be wealthy individuals who installed 
lighting for its prestige value. Gordon (1981, p 23) notes that party invitations often 
touted electric light as an enticement, a treat on par with dinner and dancing. Wealthy 
homeowners and businesses also preferred the “clean” light offered by the new 
technology. Gas lighting was explosive and gave off smoke, acidic fumes, and 
humidity that harmed fabrics and furnishings. Lighting was only the start, however, 
and Edison and others spent a great deal of time conjuring new ways to encourage the 
public to consume electricity.
Demand really didn’t build until street railway systems were electrified (Smeloff & 
Asmus, 1997). Battery-powered trolley systems had been created in the 1830s, but 
they worked poorly, and horse-drawn railways dominated the local transit scene in 
many cities for decades. Electrification changed everything. By the early 1890s, 
electric trolleys were operating in 850 cities across the US (Smeloff & Asmus, 1997), 
reshaping the urban landscape by allowing the development of “streetcar suburbs” 
that were now only a manageable trolley ride away from the city center, rather than a 
full day’s travel (Nye, 1990).
Electrical demand by these transit, or “traction,” systems played a critical role in 
changing the shape and nature of the utility industry. Originally, many streetcar 
companies operated their own power generation plants rather than purchasing power 
from local utilities. Samuel Insull, who ran Edison Electric in Chicago, found that 
traction loads peaked at different times from his residential and business customers, 
meaning he could use his existing generators to provide power more cheaply than the 
streetcar companies could produce it for themselves (Nye, 1990). Insull’s technique 
of “load balancing” residential and business demand was soon widely replicated 
across the US and Europe.
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As the price of electricity came down, demand increased, creating a spiral effect that 
forced utilities to invest in new equipment and then work to build demand to ensure 
that the system was fully utilized. In the US, many utilities and transit companies 
invested in amusement parks, which were large users of electricity at night and on 
weekends and holidays, periods when surplus capacity typically existed in the power 
system (Nye, 1990).
In the 1890s and early 1900s, utilities also worked to build household demand for 
electricity. Commonwealth Edison opened an “Electric Shop” in downtown Chicago, 
showcasing domestic appliances on the first floor and motor-driven industrial 
machinery in the basement (Hughes, 1983, p 223). Displays included such new 
appliances as electric irons, electric stoves and ovens, vacuum cleaners, electric 
refrigerators, and washing machines, all of which were invented between 1893 and 
1908.
On both continents, many cities featured large lighting spectacles designed to attract 
customers to certain businesses or business districts (Nye, 1990). World’s fairs and 
other large public exhibitions also proved to be important showcases for electricity. 
Nye (1990, p 34) notes these events profoundly affected the middle class of America, 
“providing a model for the transformation of their own communities, which could 
only seem dark and drab when they returned home.”
The Early 1900s -  The Push for Government Intervention Begins
Although the industry had always required some measure of government oversight, 
the level of intervention by different government agencies increased dramatically in 
the early 1900s. This involvement manifested itself in many different ways. In both 
the US and the UK, World War I brought significant changes as larger power plant 
projects were initiated to feed the wartime demand for electricity. In the US, the War 
Industries Board ordered individual utility networks to interconnect to help raise the 
load factor in certain regions where wartime industries were prominent (Hughes, 
1983). In the UK, the Department of Electric Power Supply, a division of the 
Ministry of Munitions, decided which power plants could expand, and where
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interconnections could occur. The department also authorized loans to help 
companies expand capacity exclusively for war-related purposes (Hannah, 1979).
Outside the context of war, there grew a social agenda. In the 1930s, US President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt pushed for large-scale hydropower systems in response to 
concerns about price gouging by private utilities, and in an effort to bring power to 
rural areas. The distances between rural customers often made it unprofitable for 
companies to extend service there, so Roosevelt called for public subsidies, 
proclaiming “Electricity is no longer a luxury, it is a definite necessity” (Nye, 1990, p 
304).
A third reason for government involvement was economic. For instance, in 1917, the 
UK Board of Trade realized the electric supply system -involving 438 individual 
power plants -  had to be completely reorganized, as it was hampering both the war 
effort and national economic growth. The Electricity (Supply) Act 1919 and the 
follow-up Electricity (Supply) Act 1926 standardized voltage, phase, and frequency 
along distribution and transmission systems across the UK, and authorized the 
development of new generation capacity. Creation of a national grid began in 1929 
and was largely completed in 1934, with impressive results. By 1938, generation 
costs had fallen 24%, and the amount of unprofitable, unused capacity had declined 
dramatically.
The Origins of Government Regulation
Any discussion of government involvement in the early history of the electric utility 
industry would be incomplete without addressing government regulation. The unique 
characteristics of the early technology and its status as a natural monopoly were 
responsible for the imposition of regulation in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
Economists explain natural monopolies occur where there is declining marginal cost 
for each additional unit of output, meaning costs are minimized by having a single 
firm operate the system or provide the service (Surrey, 1996). In practical terms, this 
means it doesn’t make sense to allow many firms to compete in the electric 
marketplace because it is inefficient to have anyone other than a single firm run
24
wiring around a city and into the homes and businesses of end users. Changing 
service providers would conceivably require the constant digging up of streets to lay 
new electrical cable, or the stringing of new electrical wiring above the street on tall 
poles. Similarly, electric generation equipment is hugely expensive, and most electric 
supply firms would be unwilling to invest in new or bigger technology designed to 
lower operating costs without some guarantee that they have the customers lined up 
to buy their power.
Electric utility regulations therefore bring order to the marketplace by limiting the 
number of firms allowed to deliver electric services in a community, and by imposing 
operating requirements on them to ensure that service quality remains high.
The early days of electric utility regulation in the US, however, were less about 
marketplace coherence and more about trying to eliminate corruption and price 
gouging. The first attempt at regulation, imposed at the municipal level, established a 
franchise system. Designed to limit the number of companies operating in a 
geographic area, the system also provided fertile ground for graft. Franchises “were 
often drafted by political bosses in such a way as to favour the franchisee at the 
expense of ‘consumer interests’; these favourable provisions were offered in 
exchange for kickbacks to politicians under a wave of corruption that touched 
virtually every major city in the nation” (Schap, 1986, p 21).
State-level regulation was needed, and Edison Electric’s Insull was among its earliest 
proponents. Insull recognized the industry was best treated as a natural monopoly, as 
competing power lines and plants increased the cost of delivering electricity (Smeloff 
& Asmus, 1997). In 1898, he argued state oversight would legitimize the status of 
utilities as natural monopolies; lower the cost of borrowing money by eliminating 
fears that utilities would lose market share; lessen competition for capital; and lessen 
or eliminate kickbacks to local politicians over franchise rights (Hirsh, 1999).
In 1907, an influential report endorsing state regulation of electric monopolies was 
issued by the National Civic Federation, a group that included Insull and the well- 
known American banker J.P. Morgan (Smeloff & Asmus, 1997). Progressive Era 
politicians jumped on the bandwagon, envisioning regulatory commissions “manned
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by politically neutral experts who could administer laws using rational and scientific 
approaches” (Hirsh, 1999, p 30). The idea also was endorsed by investment bankers, 
manufacturers of electrical equipment, and other stakeholders who could benefit from 
a continued and rational expansion of the electric utility industry. That same year, 
New York and Wisconsin imposed state regulation, and by 1935, electric utility 
regulations existed in 37 of the 48 states and the District of Columbia (Jacobson, 
2000, p 76).
The federal government played only a modest role in regulating public utilities, 
passing no significant legislation until the 1935 Federal Power Act created what is 
today known as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC’s 
forerunner was focused largely on hydropower development and its role in promoting 
rural electrification.
The earliest efforts to regulate the industry in the UK predate the industry itself. In 
1881, Minister of Trade Joseph Chamberlain proclaimed, “The supply of gas and of 
water, electric lighting, and the establishment of tramways must be confined to very 
few contractors. They involve interference with the streets, and with the rights and 
privileges of individuals. They cannot, therefore, be thrown open to free competition, 
but must be committed under stringent conditions and regulations, to the fewest 
hands” (Hannah, 1979, p 23). Accordingly, the Electric Lighting Act 1882 
empowered Chamberlain’s Board of Trade to issue a license or provisional order 
authorizing the supply of electricity to any area by any local government authority or 
company; and to grant powers to install a supply system, including breaking up 
streets to lay electrical wiring. The law also established price ceilings.
Licenses and the erection of overhead wiring could be granted only with local 
authority consent (Chesshire, 1996; Electricity Council, 1977). Licenses were for a 
period not to exceed seven years, although they could be renewed. The most 
controversial aspect of the law was a reversionary purchase clause that entitled local 
authorities to purchase utility systems at a written-down value after a period of 21 
years. This clause was blamed for retarding development among speculators 
concerned about investing in short-term enterprises (Hannah, 1979). These 
arguments proved persuasive to Parliament, which subsequently extended the
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purchase clause provision to 42 years in the Electric Lighting Act 1888, after which 
the rate of utility development jumped considerably.
The previously mentioned 1926 Electricity (Supply) Act was the next significant 
piece of legislation in the UK The regulatory board it created, the Central Electricity 
Board (CEB), forced many uneconomical utilities out of business, and determined 
many other aspects of their operation, including the voltage, phase, and frequency at 
which their systems generated power. Smaller systems that generated power strictly 
for local use, however, remained beyond its control. And even though the CEB had 
shown that rationalization of the system could bring significant benefits, municipal 
and private owners remained skeptical that mergers were in their best interest. As a 
result, immediately after World War II, the incoming Labour government faced a 
quandary.
With many of the franchises guaranteed by the 1888 Act coming to an end, Central 
Government faced the prospect that franchises would simply be renewed by local 
authorities, tying government’s hands as it sought to rebuild the country. Because a 
rational electric system was seen as an important precondition to rebuilding and 
economic expansion (Chesshire, 1996), the government decided to nationalize the 
electric power industry, believing that “public ownership at the national level was.. .a 
superior alternative to public ownership at the municipal level” (Newbery, 1999, p 
111). The Labour Party had proposed nationalization in 1932, but World War II 
impeded implementation. With Labour’s return to power in 1945, they were now in a 
position to put the idea into effect.
Under the Electricity Act 1947, the British Electricity Authority (BEA) was 
established with responsibility for central coordination and policy direction of the 
industry. The BEA also assumed control of the 297 power stations feeding 560 
different utility operations then in place in England, Wales, and southern Scotland. 
Fourteen independent Area Electricity Boards (12 in England and Wales; two in 
southern Scotland) were created with responsibility for planning and operating the 
distribution system, which included supply, metering, billing, and customer service.
In 1955 the system was changed slightly, as the BEA was replaced by two statutory 
bodies, the Electricity Council, with responsibility for research and development,
27
finance, policy coordination, and advising Central Government; and the Central 
Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), responsible for power station operation, the 
construction of new facilities, and management of the high-voltage (above 132 kV) 
national grid. Under the structure of this system, the CEGB and area boards were 
autonomous of the Electricity Council (Chesshire, 1996; Gordon, 1981). This new 
system largely remained intact until the late 1980s.
Restructuring the Marketplace -  Liberalization Comes to the Electric Utility 
Industry
Between World War II and the 1970s, market trends in the US and in the UK were 
relatively similar. Post-war economic expansion fueled dramatic growth in electricity 
demand. In the US, the demand for electricity grew at twice the rate of the economy 
(Hyman, 1985). High-voltage transmission systems expanded their reach, and power 
plants grew ever larger. Technical progress on both counts led to a steady decline in 
the price of power. The mix of fuels powering these plants also began to change, as 
nuclear power technology came on line in the 1950s and 1960s, and was viewed as a 
potentially revolutionizing technology.
The ground shifted under the industry in the 1970s. Technological stasis was one 
important reason (Hirsh, 1999). For nearly 90 years, engineers steadily increased the 
efficiency of the generation systems, capturing ever-higher proportions of the 
chemical energy embodied in the fuel powering the generators. By the 1970s, 
efficiency increases were leveling off, and the economies of scale offered by ultra- 
large (1200+ megawatt) power plants began to disappear as the cost of operating and 
maintaining these high-tech facilities grew faster than the value of the additional 
energy production.
In the US, the Arab oil embargo and the resulting price shock on many oil-based 
electrical generation systems also had a big impact, prompting the public to rethink 
their electrical consumption. The conservation message was amplified by the nascent 
environmental movement, which stressed the environmental benefits of reduced 
energy use. Although the overall rate of electrical use did not decline, the rate of
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growth did, and many utilities responded by cutting back on their plans for new or 
expanded facilities (Grubb & Vigotti, 1997).
New environmental laws in the US and many European countries also increased costs 
at many power plants, as pollution restrictions forced generators to add expensive 
emissions control equipment. Some environmental laws made the siting of new 
power plants more difficult, with complicated environmental impact reports slowing 
down the approval process and creating new opportunities for public input. Finally, 
the accident at Three Mile Island raised questions about the safety and environmental 
impacts of nuclear power technology, upending expansion plans that were only 
beginning to see fruition.
In the United States, the first step toward market liberalization came in 1978, when 
President Jimmy Carter signed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), a 
law designed to reduce electricity use and open the market to new sources of electric 
power. Section 210 of PURPA, Cogeneration and Small Power Production, had the 
greatest impact on the industry, ending monopoly control of electrical supply. The 
electric generation market was opened to independent producers, and regulated 
utilities were required to buy all of the electricity sold by these firms.
PURPA also established a fee structure, requiring utilities to pay for this power at a 
rate not to exceed the “incremental cost” of the power, defined as how much the 
utility would pay to generate the power itself or purchase it from another source 
(Hirsh, 1999). Although the total contribution to the national electricity supply 
remained relatively small, PURPA has had a significant effect on independent power 
generation. Between 1978 and 1995, independent power contributions to the 
transmission and distribution grid increased by 3,600%. Perhaps the most significant 
impact of PURPA, however, was how it weakened the justification for the special 
natural monopoly status granted to electric utilities (Hirsh, 1999). PURPA did so by 
spurring development of new technologies and systems that came to be seen as 
comparable or superior to the old-style, large, centralized power production facility. 
By the early 1990s, policy-makers began to reconsider the wisdom of granting unique 
status to regulated utilities.
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The 1992 Energy Policy Act took the first step, opening the marketplace even further 
by eliminating restrictions that inhibited independent generators and existing 
regulated utilities from competing in certain markets. Since then, 22 states and the 
District of Columbia have taken the next step and adopted retail competition statutes, 
although two subsequently repealed these programs (Edison Electric Institute, 2003). 
Worth noting is that these efforts to open markets have focused only on the 
production of electricity, while delivery via transmission and distribution lines 
remains a regulated natural monopoly, under the control of the FERC.
By leaving deregulation to the states, however, the 1992 Energy Policy Act has left 
the US with a hugely complicated marketplace. The market in some states looks 
much as it did in the early 1990s, while others have essentially the same generation 
capacity but new ownership of these facilities, as many utilities sought to voluntarily 
divest themselves of their power plants. In other states, divestiture was forced upon 
utilities as a way of ensuring that they did not gain undue advantages for power 
generated by their own facilities. In still other states, there has been a surge in the 
number of independent power producers selling to the grid, some of whom utilize 
renewable energy technologies.
The future of deregulation in the US was thrown into flux by the 2000-2001 energy 
debacle in California. Although California’s 1996 deregulation law was designed to 
lower prices, which historically were 40% higher than the rest of the country, the 
outcome has been far different. During 2000-2001, a confluence of events conspired 
to result in rolling power blackouts, bankruptcy filings by the state’s largest utilities, 
and institutional chaos that will take years to untangle (Jurewitz, 2002; Woo, 2001). 
Regulatory rules were quickly rewritten, and then rewritten again, as policy-makers 
and energy planners tried to stave off financial disaster.
California’s problems began after a dry winter in the Pacific Northwest limited the 
amount of hydropower available. But that was only one of several factors. Years of 
divestiture in plant capacity by local utilities, combined with a lack of new 
construction by independent providers, exacerbated the problem. So did surging 
natural gas prices, complex wholesale market rules, gaming by market players 
seeking higher returns, and political battles between state and federal officials. Since
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then, considerable time has been spent analyzing what happened, who (or what) was 
at fault, and how the system must be changed to prevent a recurrence and to deal with 
financial aftershocks. The answers are still not clear, but observers say the California 
crisis has significantly slowed the pace of deregulation in many states, as well as in 
many countries around the globe (Navarro & Shames, 2003).
Market Liberalization in Europe -  It All Begins With the UK
The UK was the first country in Europe to undertake a restructuring of the electricity 
marketplace. Long a goal of the Conservative Party, privatization of state industries 
had been under way since Margaret Thatcher assumed power in 1979. It was her 
belief that state ownership stifled innovation and allowed managers to use outdated 
business practices, harming their competitiveness in the global marketplace (Thomas, 
1996). Electricity privatization first was proposed in 1987, after some of the other 
major British utilities already had been liberalized, including the state-run telephone 
and gas systems. There was widespread recognition that electricity market 
liberalization would be more challenging, however, as the industry was four times 
larger than the total asset base of all industries privatized by the Thatcher 
administration to that point (Thomas, 1997).
Adding to the challenge was the fact there were no good models to follow. What was 
known was that the UK wanted to avoid simply transferring assets from public to 
private ownership, without establishing any competitive mechanism (Thomas, 1996). 
There were other goals as well, less explicitly stated, including raising cash for the 
Treasury, giving the public the opportunity to make money, breaking the power of the 
coal mining unions (who could bring the electricity industry to its knees with a work 
stoppage), and giving the industry the capacity to borrow freely on the capital 
markets. Publicly-owned industries could not borrow money on their own, because it 
was seen as virtually the same thing as government borrowing (Thomas, 1997;
Young, 2001).
A 1988 government white paper laid out the first details of how the system would 
work. The twelve existing distribution and supply operations in England and Wales 
would be sold intact, but they would be forced to separate distribution from supply.
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The CEGB was to be divided into three parts: a high-voltage transmission operation, 
which would operate as a separate company known as the National Grid Company; 
and two companies (National Power and PowerGen) that would divide up the existing 
generation capacity and compete with one another.
National Power would assume control of 70% of the generation capacity, including 
all nuclear power plants. PowerGen would operate the remaining 30%. National 
Power was given greater control of non-nuclear facilities in order to offset the high 
cost of nuclear power operation and ensure survival in the market (Thomas, 1997; 
Young, 2001).
The proposal included four other important elements:
• An Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) would be created to initially oversee 
supply issues and permanently oversee distribution and transmission.
• A Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) would require that distribution companies 
purchase non-fossil fuel power. Theoretically, this was designed to promote 
renewable energy, but it also could be used to support the purchase of nuclear 
power.
• A Fossil Fuel Levy of 10% would be assessed on all power sales in the UK to 
compensate nuclear power plants for the high cost of operation.
• A Power Pool would be created to achieve production at the lowest cost. Each 
day, power generators would submit information specifying how much they 
would charge to provide power during each 30-minute block of time the following 
day. Power supply companies also would be asked to project their demand over 
the course of the day, and the Pool then would select among the bids to ensure the 
best price for a full 24-hour period. Each generator then would be notified how 
much power to generate the next day.
By the time the Electricity Act 1989 was approved, most of the initial proposal had 
been agreed upon -  the exception being ownership of nuclear power plants. It had 
become clear that these facilities would not sell without the government agreeing to 
cover their long term liability risk (Thomas, 1996). An agreement was reached to
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place all 12 nuclear power stations under the control of a fourth firm, Nuclear 
Electric, which would be a 100% government-owned company. Once this change 
was made, it was necessary to adjust the generation plant allocation between National 
Power and PowerGen, resulting in a 60/40 split (Newbery, 1999). Had more time 
been available, the overall system may have been structured differently, but the 
Thatcher government was under pressure to complete privatization before the next 
general election. Dividing power generation among more competitors would have 
taken too long, so the three-firm system was adopted (Young, 2001).
In March 1990, the newly revamped marketplace began operation, and since then it 
has achieved many of its original goals. In real terms, the rates charged to both 
domestic and industrial users have declined between 25% and 40%. The sale of 
system assets brought the Treasury roughly £12.7 billion between 1990 and 1995.
The influence of the mining unions has been diminished, as the reliance on coal-fired 
power plants has dropped dramatically. Today, more than 35% of all power in the 
UK is generated using combined-cycle gas turbines, a technology that didn’t even 
exist in the late 1980s. Coal’s share dropped from 63% in 1989 to 35% in 2000 
(deOliveira & Tolmasquim, 2004, p 13).
In the two years after retail competition was fully implemented, more than 38% of all 
domestic customers had switched suppliers at least once (Electricity Association,
2002). There also have been dramatic changes in how the marketplace operates and 
is regulated. As of 2003, no single player controlled more than 25% of total capacity, 
a function of an increase in the number of independent power producers, increased 
electricity imports from Scotland and France, and regulatory rulings that forced 
PowerGen and National Power and the Regional Electricity Companies to divest 
themselves of generation capacity (Woo, Lloyd, & Tishler, 2003).
Given the growing use of natural gas as a fuel source in power plants, in 2000 the 
government merged OFFER with OFGAS, the gas regulator, to create the Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM). In 1998, subsidies to the nuclear power 
industry from the Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL) were eliminated. Monies from a reduced 
FFL are now used to support power generation from renewable sources.
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Perhaps most importantly, the Utilities Bill (2000) that created OFGEM also scrapped 
the Power Pool, replacing it with the New Electricity Trade Agreement (NETA). 
Whereas the Pool relied on centralized decision-making about plant dispatch, or 
which plants would be used to generate power for the grid, NETA relies on direct 
bilateral agreements between power supply companies and power plant operators to 
govern most planning decisions. NETA operates like other commodity markets, 
trading electricity in forward, futures, and short-term markets. Contracts can be 
structured to cover almost any period of time, ranging from a single day to several 
years, greatly enhancing financial stability. As with the Pool, NETA participants 
must notify the National Grid about their planned generation output or expected 
demand for the next day, in 30-minute increments. Participants must submit a final 
estimate 3.5 hours ahead of when the power is actually needed or produced, along 
with a description of the level of payment they would accept to deviate from this 
demand or output (Electricity Association, 2002). Suppliers and customers may offer 
load reductions in direct competition with power generators. The Grid then makes 
adjustments totaling less than 2% of the overall demand to ensure the system remains 
in balance. To prevent gaming and to promote improved plant operations, the Grid 
operator can penalize participants for using (or generating) more or less power than 
expected. Since NETA became operational, it has been credited with reducing both 
base load and peak pricing by more than 20% (OFGEM, 2002b).
Electricity and Electric Utilities -  A Municipal Perspective
The record in both Europe and the United States makes clear the close links among 
the early history of electric utility development, regulation, and urban-level politics 
and policy-making. Utilities first were created in cities, reflecting both the 
limitations of the direct current technology in use at the time and the desire to 
maximize profits by minimizing wiring long distances between customers.
Cities exerted influence over the industry in many different ways. Local-level 
regulation, generally in the form of exclusive geographic service rights, was one of 
the earliest influences, required to manage the wiring of homes and businesses in a 
way that protected public safety and the integrity of public thoroughfares. Local 
eminent domain powers were frequently exercised on behalf of utilities attempting to
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reduce costs by stringing wire across private property rather than following 
established public thoroughfares (Schap, 1986).
The profit and price controls that came with the awarding of exclusive geographic 
franchises helped reduce corruption, but did not eliminate it entirely. Instead, new 
avenues for corruption were established, this time by public officials eager to grab 
some of the financial reward that came with awarding exclusive service rights. Some 
municipalities opted for city-run utilities, believing they minimized the opportunity 
for corruption and provided cost savings to local consumers, otherwise known as 
voters.
The prominence and impact of municipally-run systems has differed between the US 
and UK. In the US, the number of municipal electric systems peaked at nearly 3,100 
in the early 1920s, far outpacing the number of privately managed utilities, but 
ultimately serving fewer customers. Shortly thereafter, as efforts were made to link 
transmission networks, many municipalities found that local energy costs could be 
reduced by relying on larger privately run systems, and the number dropped to 
approximately 1,900 utilities, where it remained roughly constant between 1930 and 
1980 (Schap, 1986, p 11). Today, the American Public Power Association claims 
more than 2,000 local utilities as members, serving nearly 20 million customers 
(APPA, 2005). Although municipal systems continue to serve some large cities -  
including Los Angeles, San Antonio, Sacramento, Seattle, and Austin, Texas -  most 
utilities serve small towns, with nearly 60% serving fewer than 3,000 customers 
(APPA, 2003).
Originally, most public systems were in the power generation business, but over time, 
it became increasingly common for utilities to simply act as conduits selling power 
generated by federal, state, and privately-operated power generation facilities. This 
trend continues today, as more than two-thirds of the public power systems in the US 
are distribution-only utilities, purchasing power at wholesale rates for resale to the 
general public. Research by the US Department of Energy has found that residents 
and businesses served by public power systems generally pay rates averaging 15% 
less than those paid by private utility customers (APPA, 2003).
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The impact of municipal electric utilities has been felt more significantly in the UK, 
where local authorities a century ago moved quickly to establish their own power 
generation and distribution operations. In many cases, they saw how profitable 
private electricity ventures could be, and they used the powers granted them by the 
1882 and 1888 Electricity Acts to take over franchises operating in their areas.
Leslie Hannah, author of the authoritative history of the pre-1948 UK electric 
industry, notes that “provincial civic pride” and the need to fund increasingly 
complex local government operations were the principal driving factors behind the 
public utility movement, along with the desire to keep voters happy by creating 
government employment opportunities and ensuring the lowest possible electricity 
pricing (Hannah, 1979, pp 23,215). During the years between the two world wars, 
public utilities were handling two-thirds of electricity sales nationwide; at the end of 
the 1930s, there were only four cities or towns in the United Kingdom with 
populations exceeding 60,000 that did not have municipally owned utilities.
Municipalities also were moving aggressively to protect their “milch cow” (Hannah, 
1979, p 216), scheming to increase residential demand while opposing private 
undertakings in outlying communities that might someday be annexed by the city. 
However, the parochial interests of each municipality ultimately drove the push for 
nationalization in the mid-1940s, as local employment considerations, the availability 
of local fuel sources, and the power needs of local traction systems or industrial users 
led to individual, and often incompatible, system designs. Once the system was 
nationalized, the 600+ municipal and private operations in the UK were bought out by 
Central Government, bringing to an end the era of municipally-run utilities.
Because the industry had been nationalized, the UK avoided the difficult question of 
how to treat municipal utilities under market liberalization. In the US, for instance, 
municipal utilities don’t pay taxes; they have access to lower-cost, tax-exempt debt; 
and they have preferential access to cheap power from federal hydropower facilities. 
As states grapple with how to change the marketplace, private utilities argue 
municipal operations should be forced to forgo these advantages, placing them on an 
equal footing with privately run utilities (Moore, 2000).
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It is perhaps too soon to conclude that deregulation favors municipal systems. Still, 
there is a slight trend toward municipalization over the past decade, with twelve new 
municipal utilities serving communities previously served by private utilities, and 
only two examples of the opposite. In addition, as o f2002, more than 100 
communities were analyzing the switch to public power (APPA, 2002).
Private-sector critics charge that this reflects a desire by many cities to gain access to 
a new revenue stream, and in some cases is an attempt to evade responsibility for 
stranded costs of the old privately owned system. Advocates of municipalization 
counter that deregulation is forcing private utilities to focus less on their customers 
and more on their investors, and any trend toward municipalization is simply an 
attempt by local governments to preserve quality for their constituencies (APPA,
2002; Moore, 2000).
Conclusion
Any analysis of urban energy policy-making must begin with a review of the larger 
energy marketplace, because the macro-level dynamics of this industry ultimately 
influence the direction and type of policy responses developed by local authorities.
We will very clearly see this in both the New York and London case studies.
To begin, we must recognize that for the better part of a century, the electric power 
industry has been predicated upon several basic principles, all of which are closely 
linked. First, the system operates in a highly regulated manner, under the auspices of 
state or national level officials. It wasn’t always this way, however. In the early days 
of the electric power industry, electric power generation and distribution systems were 
small in scale and cities had significant total control over the conduct of the local 
marketplace. To limit the tangled web of electric wires above and below the ground, 
local authorities placed strict limits on who had the right to operate a utility in a given 
neighborhood. The right to grant or sell franchise rights also created conditions ripe 
for corruption, however, and pressure built to consolidate oversight powers at the state 
or federal level. Although there have been some significant course corrections along 
the way, this regulatory schema has survived largely intact for the better part of a
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century. Even in cities with municipal utilities, many fundamental powers over rate- 
setting and service obligations rest with the state or national-level regulators.
Second, as a natural monopoly, cost efficiencies have long been a goal of this sector. 
By building bigger power plants, and by balancing loads from larger and larger 
groups of customers, utilities and regulators alike worked to deliver ever-cheaper 
electric power to consumers. Until the 1960s, these results were achieved on a fairly 
consistent basis, arguably becoming a societal norm. For the 20-30 years after that, 
however, prices began to inch upwards, as power plant designs simply couldn’t 
deliver the same efficiency gains as they had in the past. When combined with oil 
price shocks, the imposition of new environmental controls, and more-expensive- 
than-expected new nuclear power technologies, the stage was set for a significant 
market restructuring, which was delivered in the 1990s with the promise -  yet again -  
of lower electricity prices.
Third, grid ‘coherence’ was an important precursor to the cost efficiencies. After 
much debate, the industry and regulators finally settled on certain system 
characteristics (AC power, fixed voltage and frequency levels, etc.) that allowed grids 
operated by different utilities to interconnect with one another. Grid coherence also 
presumed a standardized operating model, involving the one-way flow of electricity 
from large central station power plants to end-users. Market structures and 
regulations built up around this operating paradigm, which went virtually 
unchallenged until the 1970s and 1980s when distributed power systems returned to 
the scene. These had first been deployed in the early days of the electric power 
industry, with systems located on-site at the point where the electricity was needed.
What do these underlying principles have to do with renewable energy policy-making 
in cities? Plenty! In the case studies that follow, I argue that the regulated market 
environment in both London and New York actively disempowers local policy­
makers, limiting their ability to develop or implement policies that could increase the 
deployment or use of renewable power. This outcome should come as no surprise, as 
a lessening of local control was the specific intent of those seeking to vest regulatory 
powers at the state or national level back in the early 1900s. Market restructuring
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efforts during the 1990s may have shifted certain responsibilities around to different 
stakeholders, but they did nothing to enhance the powers of local policy-makers.
Second, as I discuss more fully in Chapter 2, electricity from renewable sources tends 
to cost more than power from large central-station nuclear or fossil fuel-fired power 
plants. To the extent society has grown accustomed to and prefers cheaper forms of 
power, then renewables may face an inherently uphill battle in the marketplace. In 
my two case studies, we’ll see how both New York and London seem vexed by the 
cost of renewable power. London is moving to actively promote its use, but the 
Mayor’s new energy strategy is largely silent on the cost issue, simply recommending 
that householders and developers avail themselves of subsidies from Central 
Government. In New York City, similar subsidies are available, but the cost of 
renewable power nonetheless appears to loom as a more overt impediment, dissuading 
policy-makers from giving these technologies more active consideration.
Finally, the grid design issue has presented a challenge to the renewables industry 
since the 1970s, and continues to this day. In Chapter 7 ,1 posit how technology 
‘lock-in’ has occurred, slowing renewables deployment in New York City and 
perhaps influencing how policy-makers view renewables as a local energy solution.
In other words, in all of these cases, we begin to see links between the larger 
electricity policy and market landscape and the logic of local action. In the next 
chapter, we’ll continue this macro-level view, narrowing our scope to focus more 
explicitly on how renewable power fits into the overall energy picture.
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CHAPTER 2 
Focus on the Future -  Renewable Sources of Power2
Introduction
Chapter 1 was technology agnostic, focusing on general electricity market conditions 
rather than the landscape facing any specific type of power generation technology.
The goal of this thesis, however, is to analyze decision-making related to renewable 
power system deployment and use in urban areas. This chapter therefore looks at the 
current policy and market environment related to ‘new’ renewable power 
technologies, explicitly examining: why and the extent to which renewable energy 
has gained a foothold in the energy supply picture; what policies have been 
promulgated at the macro level in the US and the EU that will affect renewable 
electricity development ; how the liberalization of electricity markets affect the 
prospects for renewables; and how municipalities view renewables from a policy 
perspective. This information provides key background context for the case studies, 
as several of the issues introduced here take on particular urgency as factors 
influencing local decision-making in London and New York City. The cost of power 
has already been noted as one important issue. Another is the way state and national 
renewables support programs have been structured. Both issues receive considerable 
attention in Chapters 6 and 9, as the failure of these programs to account for 
differences between the technologies deployed in urban and rural areas ultimately 
proves problematic for urban policy-makers and system developers.
The Rise of Renewables
Mankind has relied on naturally occurring phenomena to provide mechanical power 
for over 2,000 years. Windmills and watermills were used for grain grinding, as well
2 For the purposes of this research, I am using a modified version of the definition developed by the UK 
Renewable Energy Advisory Group, which defined renewable energy as “the term used to cover those 
energy flows that occur naturally and repeatedly in the environment [that] can be harnessed for human 
benefit” (Alexander, 1996). As I am more narrowly focused on renewable forms of electric power 
generation, rather than all forms of renewable energy, I will limit my research to electricity produced 
by technologies harnessing energy flows that occur naturally and repeatedly in the environment, 
including solar, wind, and tidal power; small hydro systems; geothermal; and biomass-based power 
sources, all of which are well-suited to an urban context
3 UK-level renewables policies are dealt with in depth in Chapter 6 as part of the London case study.
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as for textile production as early as 4,000 years ago. With the advent of electricity, 
however, only hydropower was able to make the switch and effectively compete 
against fossil fuel-based electrical generation systems during the 20th century. The 
intermittency of wind and the relatively small scale of the wind turbines available 
early in the century meant these systems could not compete economically, and wind 
power schemes were largely extinct in most industrial countries by the middle of the 
20th century (Cassedy, 2000).
Circumstances were different for hydropower systems, which over the course of the 
20th century gained a prominent place in the world’s electricity supply picture.
During the 1920s and 1930s, hydropower systems supplied fully 43% of the world's 
electricity (United Nations, 1952), and even today, large-scale hydropower 
contributes 16% of the world's supply (IEA, 2004c, pp 193, 234). Large-scale 
hydropower is extremely cost effective, producing some of the least expensive 
electricity available today. Hydro dams also are credited with reducing flooding risks, 
creating recreational opportunities, and storing water for public water supply or 
agricultural purposes. It is therefore somewhat ironic that as renewable power 
systems are growing in favor, large-scale hydropower is not. New projects such as 
the Three Gorges Dam in China are criticized for the threats they present to 
ecosystems and areas of great natural beauty, as well as the problems associated with 
the displacement of communities located in the eventual flood plain. In an era when 
terrorism concerns are heightened, large dams also are seen as an inviting target, 
because of the havoc dam failure can wreak downstream.
Instead, since the 1980s, attention has increasingly focused on generating electricity 
from new types of highly efficient wind turbines, small-scale (or mini) hydro projects, 
and newer technologies, including solar photovoltaics, tidal power systems, 
geothermal power, and biomass-based electricity schemes. The drive for these “new” 
renewables (Grubb, 1995, p xi) stems from a variety of explanations:
• Environmental and public health concerns: Concerns over excessive pollution 
from electric power plants have been around for decades. The Great London 
Smog in December 1952 sparked changes in power plant management practices
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after it was determined that coal burning was the culprit (Nagoumey, 2003). The 
environmental movement that gained steam in the 1970s brought many of these 
same concerns to a head in other countries, resulting in air quality rules that forced 
electric utility operators to clamp down on smokestack emissions. Despite 
reductions in emission levels, the impacts are still significant, with one recent 
study estimating that coal- and oil-fired power plant emissions in the European 
Union cause an estimated $70 billion of harm to human health, buildings, and 
food crops each year. Most of the damage comes in the form of respiratory 
illnesses and deaths attributable to airborne particles released by these facilities 
(Krewitt, Heck, Trukenmuller, & Friedrich, 1999). Renewable power sources are 
seen as one way around such problems, as they represent “cleaner” forms of 
technology that produce electricity with little or no emissions.
• Climate change concerns: Completely separate from public health issues has 
been a growing scientific anxiety about the gradual warming of the earth’s 
atmosphere. These concerns have grown from the analysis of data systematically 
collected since the late 1950s, and the results were conclusive enough by 1990 
that a UN-convened Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued a call for 
international action to address the problem (Grubb, Vrolijk, & Brack, 1999). At 
the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the first step was negotiated, asking industrialized 
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the end o f2000. 
As a result, many countries implemented energy efficiency measures, promoted 
renewable power use, and shifted to higher levels of natural gas use (Geller,
2003). It quickly became clear that the targets called for would not be achieved, 
however, and efforts were launched to obtain legally binding, quantifiable 
commitments by industrial countries. Issued in 1997, the so-called Kyoto 
Protocol established a reduction target for a “basket” of greenhouse gases to be 
achieved by the years 2008-2012. Although individual countries are free to 
choose the best way to achieve such reductions, in industrialized countries it will 
inevitably include changes in electric power-generation practices, as this sector 
generates roughly one-third of all greenhouse gas emissions, primarily from the 
burning of fossil fuels in large-scale power plants (Grubb et al., 1999). The 
agreement, an amendment to the United Nations Framework Convention on
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Climate Change, came into force in February 2005, following formal ratification 
by Russia, the 141st country to do so. Notably absent from the list is the United 
States, which has argued the agreement is flawed and that changes necessary to 
achieve suggested reduction levels are too costly (BBC, 2005).
• Security Risks: The 1973 Arab oil embargo was just one of 14 significant oil 
supply disruptions to occur worldwide in the last 50 years (Geller, 2003). But it 
was one of the most noteworthy in terms of reminding industrialized western 
nations of the extent to which their economy is dependent upon a steady flow of 
oil and gas from sources over which they have little control. Since then, political 
turmoil and wars in the Middle East have only exacerbated these concerns. 
Although many countries are now exploring ways to exploit domestic oil, gas, and 
coal reserves to offset imported fuel sources, renewable electricity systems are 
increasingly seen as a way to enhance a nation or region's economic security.
During this same period, public opinion has been broadly supportive of renewable 
electricity technologies. The most definitive research in this area has occurred in the 
US, where researchers at the US Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) analyzed more than 700 public opinion polls carried out between 
1973 and 1996. Particularly since the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power 
plant, the NREL has found consistent public support for renewable energy, 
characterizing it as one of the strongest patterns identified in the entire data set of 
public opinion surveys on energy and the environment (Farhar, 1996).
In Europe, there has been less systematic analysis of opinion survey results over the 
same period, but such surveys nonetheless show similar trends. Since the early 1990s, 
the Eurobarometer studies commissioned by the European Commission have 
surveyed residents of EU-member countries on various energy-related issues. The 
most recent report, issued in 2002, found almost universal support for immediate 
action to address the problem of climate change. The survey also found that 75% of 
Europeans believe that fossil fuels contribute significantly to climate change; that 
energy imports create economic security problems, and that switching to renewable 
energy technologies will ultimately be best for the environment. Nearly 70% of all
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Europeans also endorse an expansion of research into renewable energy. The 
Eurobarometer reports break down the results by country, and these views generally 
hold constant across the then EU-15 member countries (EORG, 2002).
Policy Framework Affecting Renewables
Policies promulgated at the national and international levels have had a considerable 
impact on renewables development both in the United States and Europe. Policies 
generally fall into two areas: those focused on overall climate change, and those more 
narrowly focused on renewables development. By necessity, the former must 
consider a broader range of issues, such as the climate change impacts of 
transportation and residential, business, and industrial heating schemes. Most climate 
change plans nonetheless include some focus on electricity generation and strategies 
that can reduce the electric power sector's greenhouse gas contributions. Policies 
specifically focused on renewables development, on the other hand, have emphasized 
not just the greenhouse gas benefits of such development, but also the payoff in terms 
of public health, economic development, and security of supply.
As early as 1986, the Council of European Energy Ministers listed the promotion of 
renewable power sources among its energy objectives (EC, 1997). The first effort to 
formally establish renewable electricity production targets was made in 1993 by the 
ALTENER program, an EU environmental research initiative that called for a tripling 
of electricity production from renewable sources by 2005 (Grubb, 1995).
In 1995, the EU released An Energy Policy for the European Union, a white paper 
considered the foundation of all current energy planning in Europe. The white paper 
identified three key overarching objectives (EC, 1985):
• Promote competitiveness, both of the European energy industry and of Europe in 
general
• Improve the security of Europe's energy supply
• Protect the environment
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The first objective was the primary driver behind Directive 96/92/EC, which 
liberalized the electricity marketplace around Europe. One aspect of the directive was 
specifically designed to accommodate renewable energy: a provision allowing 
transmission system operators to grant priority grid access to renewable sources as 
part of a wider public service obligation (Vrolijk, 2002). The second objective 
culminated in another policy document, the November 2000 Green Paper, Towards a 
European Strategy for the Security o f Energy Supply. Among its recommendations, 
the report called for increasing the percentage of electricity derived from renewable 
sources from 14% in 1997 to 22% by 2010 (EC, 2000).
The third objective was addressed in the November 1997 White Paper on Renewable 
Energy, best known for setting the ambitious target of doubling the contribution 
renewable energy makes to the EU's gross energy consumption4 by 2010, and 
mandating status reports on progress toward this goal every two years. To ensure that 
the target is achieved, the plan established targets for different renewable technologies 
in the belief that each technology must contribute if the overall goal is to be achieved. 
In the “Campaign for Take-Off’ portion of the report (EC, 1997), the EU laid out 
several goals to be achieved by 2010:
• Installation of 1 million new photovoltaic systems, half in the EU, and half in 
other countries
• Installation of 10,000 megawatts (MW) of power from large wind farms
• Installation of 10,000 MW of combined heat and power systems powered by 
biomass
• Integration of renewables in 100 communities, regions, cities, and islands, where 
the goal is to install enough renewable energy capacity to meet 100% of the area’s 
electric power needs.
4 Note that this goal focuses on total energy consumption in the EU, including fuel used for 
transportation and natural gas used for heating purposes. By contrast, the 22% target identified in the 
Green Paper on Energy Security emphasizes the percentage of the electricity supply obtained from 
renewable power. Since approximately 40% of all energy sources consumed in Europe are used to 
generate electricity, a higher rate of renewables penetration must be achieved in the electricity supply 
sector if Europe is to attain the 12% renewables consumption target identified in the 1997 White Paper 
on Renewable Energy.
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The next major policy step was taken by the Green Electricity Directive 
(2001/77/EC), which established a legal framework for developing renewable 
electricity markets across the EU. Under the directive, member states were obliged to 
establish national targets for the consumption of renewable electricity, and the 
directive provides reference values for what these targets should be (EC, 2001a). 
Although the country targets are indicative rather than obligatory, they nonetheless 
reinforce the idea that each country can capitalize on natural attributes (e.g., sunny 
weather, strong off-shore breezes, large quantities of farmland that can be dedicated to 
biomass production, etc.) to help achieve the overall target. The Directive abstained 
from proposing Community-wide support schemes for renewable energy, leaving it 
up to individual countries to experiment with approaches they feel are best suited to 
their own circumstances5. However, if by 2005 this hands-off approach does not 
appear to be working, the Directive obliges the European Commission (EC) to 
develop a harmonized approach that takes into account the experiences of member 
states (Hanreich, 2002).
A second relevant EU directive, on the energy performance of buildings, derives from 
the EC's Action Plan on Energy Efficiency. Most of the directive focuses on ways to 
cost-effectively enhance energy performance in European buildings. One goal is to 
promote the convergence of building standards among member states, including those 
that deal with passive solar design and the integration of renewable electricity 
technologies into building design.
The final major piece of European policy framework is the EU's Climate Change 
Programme (ECCP). The ECCP was established in June 2000 to help identify the 
most environmentally and cost-effective measures to help the EU achieve the 8% 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions called for under the Kyoto Protocol (EC, 
2001b). ECCP authors analyzed 40 different policy and programmatic measures that 
might reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These measures then were rated as “at an 
advanced stage of preparation,” “in the pipeline,” or something for which “more work 
is needed.” In the area of renewable electricity, the ECCP has merely embraced many 
of the policies and research agendas described above, reporting on their status in
5 Currently, these include feed-in tariffs, fiscal incentives, competitive tender schemes, voluntary green 
pricing, and mandates such as renewables obligations.
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annual reports that cover a wide range of issues related to greenhouse gas emission 
reductions.
In the United States, renewable electricity first gained prominence in the post-oil 
embargo era of the mid-1970s. Congress authorized programs to promote renewable 
power sources, including income tax credits for residential installations of solar and 
wind systems and business investments in solar, wind, geothermal, and ocean thermal 
projects. At the same time, California created the world's first large-scale wind farms 
and awakened the public to the potential of the technology.
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), discussed previously in Chapter 
1, played a big role in helping renewables gain access to the transmission and 
distribution grid. In the early 1980s, however, as memories of the embargo dimmed, 
so did support for these projects. The Reagan administration, with its opposition to 
government support of technologies that could not gamer private funding, ended 
many of the tax credit programs and slashed federal research funds from roughly $1 
billion in 1981 to just over $100 million by 1989 (Rowland, 1997, p 20). Many 
renewable projects shut down, no longer able to compete with fossil fuel-based 
electricity.
The next major policy change came in 1992, when President George H. W. Bush 
signed the Energy Policy Act. EPACT, as it was known, included several important 
renewables initiatives. First, it established a goal of increasing the percentage of total 
energy derived from renewable resources by 2005, compared to a baseline period in 
1988 (Pace Energy Project, 2001b).
Second, EPACT created two important new financial incentives designed to promote 
renewables deployment, including a Production Tax Credit (PTC) of 1.50/kilowatt- 
hours (kWh) for electricity produced by wind and closed-loop biomass systems. The 
second was the Renewable Energy Production Incentive (REPI), which authorized 
payments of 1.50/kWh to public utilities and non-profit electric cooperatives for 
power generated by biomass, geothermal, and wind and solar power systems. The 
PTC has expired and then been reauthorized three times, and now applies until the
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end of 20056. REPI expired in September 2003 and has yet to be reauthorized. Thus 
far, the record of the two tax credits has been mixed. A 1999 study of the REPI found 
its impact in promoting electrical generation from renewable sources has been 
“minor” (EIA, 1999). By contrast, the PTC is considered to play a very important 
role in improving the economics of renewable power projects (Owens, 2002; Steve, 
1999), but it has also been criticized as contributing to a boom-and-bust mentality 
among wind project developers. Figure 2-1 shows how expiration of the PTC has 
been followed by a huge slowdown in wind system deployment levels, which then 
jump once the PTC has been restored (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004).
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The 1998 Comprehensive National Energy Strategy offered but a single renewable 
energy goal -  to double the nation’s non-hydroelectric renewable generation capacity 
to 25,000 MW by 2010. The most recent plan, articulated by President George W. 
Bush in 2001 Energy Bill and again in his 2005 Energy Bill7, sets no targets, and 
efforts to establish a national renewable portfolio standard were defeated in
6 The 2004 law extending the PTC also expanded its coverage to other forms o f biomass-based power, 
geothermal power, solar power, small irrigation power, and municipal solid waste. Due to an inflator 
built into the law, the PTC now stands at 1.80/kWh.
7 The National Energy Policy Act was first proposed in 2001, but early versions were defeated in 
Congress. In the wake o f  his re-election victory in 2004, President Bush reintroduced an amended 
version o f  his 2001 proposal, winning approval in the House o f  Representatives in April 2005. At the 
time o f  this writing, the legislation has yet to be acted on by the Senate.
Figure 2-1
US Wind Power Capacity Additions (1999-2005)
Source: (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004)
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committee before it could be voted on by the full Congress (Evans, 2005). The Bush 
plan goes on to propose the development of new gasoline refineries on closed military 
bases, federal risk insurance for nuclear power plant developers, and the opening of 
federal lands for fossil fuel exploration (Blum, 2005).
If there is one area where the US’ approach to renewables has been fairly consistent, it 
is a record of financial support for research and development on different renewable 
technologies. Despite the cutbacks in the 1980s, over the last 20 years, the US has 
spent more than $14.2 billion (in constant 2003 dollars) on basic and applied 
renewables research and development, commercialization of different technologies, 
technology transfer, and information dissemination (Sissine, 2003).
As in Europe, the US has had a separate, broader-focused climate change policy since 
the early 1990s. And as in Europe, these policies have been of little consequence in 
advancing the cause of renewable electricity. In 1992, Congress passed a law 
requiring the president to prepare a climate-change strategy for the nation, and 
President Clinton released the first Climate Change Action Plan in 1993. The plan 
was best known for its goal of returning US greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels 
by the year 2000.
The second Bush administration’s attempts at managing climate change policy have 
principally been focused on moving away from commitments made by President 
Clinton, who signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. Clinton never brought the Protocol 
before Congress for ratification, however, and in 2001 President Bush announced he 
would not do so, expressing skepticism that the Protocol would address the root 
causes of climate change. In July 2003, the US government announced a new 10- 
year, $130 million research agenda focusing on the contribution of natural causes to 
climate change (Gugliotta, 2003).
Impact of Electricity Market Liberalization on Renewable Power
Since electricity markets were first restructured in the United States and Europe, there 
has been a dramatic increase in the supply of electricity from renewable sources. 
Linking this growth to market liberalization is tricky, because there have been many
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other intervening events and policies that make it difficult to definitively establish a 
causal link. Some conclusions can be drawn, however, highlighting ways that market 
restructuring has both helped and hindered the advance of renewable power.
On the helpful side, new requirements opening up transmission and distribution grids 
to all electricity generators have been essential to the advancement of the renewables 
industry. Such requirements have been a basic element of most market liberalization 
plans. In the past, failure to gain grid access forced electricity generators to line up 
users at or near the point of generation, a difficult task that precluded most large-scale 
renewables development.
Post-liberalization, the question of who will buy the power still exists, but now project 
developers must simply focus on identifying a few large utility buyers, rather than 
many small individual users. Part of the growth of the renewables sector also can be 
attributed to the characteristics of most renewable technologies. Compared to large, 
fossil-fuel based power plants, renewable power systems typically come on line 
faster, at a much lower capital cost, and can be scaled up or down in size relatively 
easily. Such flexibility is highly valued in a more competitive marketplace 
(International Energy Agency, 2002a).
A more competitive marketplace may also influence the supply portfolio decisions of 
utilities. In the past, power-sourcing decisions were of little consequence to utility 
marketing campaigns, as they had a captive audience of customers. Today, however, 
utility executives can use a renewable power supply as a marketing tool, appealing to 
niche customers who care about the environmental and public health consequences of 
how their power is produced (Pollitt, 1999).
Conversely, there are several areas where market liberalization can hurt the renewable 
power industry. Because there is a heightened emphasis on profitability, in recent 
years renewables have had difficulty competing with new natural gas-fired power 
plants, which benefit from the ready availability of cheap gas supplies from Russia 
and the North Sea (Pollitt, 1999). As electricity begins to be traded across national 
boundaries, power plants that have benefited from years of subsidies or national 
infrastructure investment (such as the French nuclear power industry) have other cost
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advantages that may take years to overcome. Such subsidies may no longer be 
allowed under new market rules -  a fact that could benefit the renewables industry -  
but, by the same token, policies preferential to renewable power may not be allowed 
either.
This was the case in Italy, where a national directive mandating favorable prices for 
renewable energy and other independently generated power for the first eight years of 
a plant’s operation was rescinded (International Energy Agency, 1997). In a related 
case, in 2001, the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg was asked to examine 
whether a German law mandating payments to renewable energy generators violated 
the EU’s competitiveness rules. Although the court ruled that policies protecting 
public health and the environment take precedence over rules levelling the economic 
playing field, it is worth recalling that under the terms of EU’s Green Electricity 
Directive, the EU retains the right to forbid the use of specific renewables support 
policies after 2005.
Market liberalization also is having technology-specific impacts. As the companies or 
agencies responsible for managing the transmission grid have refined their operations, 
one of the effects has been a heightened emphasis on the accuracy of power demand 
and supply projections made by local and regional utilities and power generators. 
However, because wind farms are dependent upon natural systems, over which 
operators have little or no control, projections of available supply can be difficult to 
forecast. For instance, in the UK, power output from wind farms can vary up to 40- 
50% from what was forecast -  a high rate compared to the 5% variability typically 
achieved by the operators of fossil fuel- or nuclear-based power plants (International 
Energy Agency, 2002a). As failure to provide the projected supply can result in 
sizable financial penalties, wind farms are at a significant disadvantage compared to 
less-variable technologies. To succeed, wind farms may need to reduce variability by 
partnering with other renewable-energy system operators, or with wind farms in other 
locations.
The growing use of tradable “green” or renewable energy certificates (RECs) is one 
post-liberalization innovation that undoubtedly will affect the future prospects of 
renewable electricity. Certificates essentially are efforts to document the generation
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and use of renewable power, as well as capture the market value of the environmental 
attributes, or “greenness,” of this type of electricity supply. This value is typically 
equal to the difference in cost between the market price of electricity and the cost of 
obtaining electricity from renewable sources (Mitchell & Anderson, 2000).
Renewable power projects developed in locations with favorable wind, hydro, or solar 
resources typically will result in less costly certificates, as the cost differential 
between the market price and the cost of production from these systems tends to be 
lower (Bird, 2003). Certificate prices also can vary according to their availability -  if 
there is a high demand for green energy, but little supply, the price of the certificates 
can be bid up, creating an incentive for new firms to enter the renewable electricity 
market.
Interest in these certificate systems is growing in both Europe and the United States, 
particularly as countries begin to import or export power to each other. In a typical 
certificate system, each unit of electricity (usually one megawatt-hour) produced by a 
renewable electricity plant is given a unique identification code, which is tracked by a 
central registry. Suppliers seeking to provide renewable power to their customers can 
purchase this certificate, thereby gaining credit for that designated quantity of 
electricity. They can redeem this credit immediately, or hold onto it for future use. 
Once redeemed, the certificate’s value is exhausted, and the registry will not allow 
anyone else to claim credit for that specific unit of renewable power (Ecofys BV, 
2002).
Of course, because an electron obtained from a renewable power system is identical to 
an electron produced by a fossil fuel or nuclear power plant, the certificate is simply a 
proxy. There is no guarantee that the supplier redeeming a certificate actually sent 
any electricity from a renewable source to the electrical outlets at the consumer’s 
location. The certificate therefore creates the equivalent o f‘Virtual” green electrons 
that allow utilities to increase their supply of renewable electricity beyond what they 
currently produce.
In Europe, national green certificate systems already have been established in several 
countries, including Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands, and work has been under way 
to develop a Europe-wide system since 1998. The logistics are tremendous, as
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detailed records must be maintained to ensure that energy is produced and 
“consumed” only a single time (Platts, 2003). In the US, so-called “compliance” 
certificate trading markets have been formally established only in Texas and in the six 
states that make up the Northeast Power Pool (i.e., Massachusetts, Maine, New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont) although other states are 
moving to establish programs. A California-based NGO is currently working to set 
up a national certificate system, and utilities in 13 states have thus far established 
tracking systems that will allow them to utilize this national registry in the near future 
(Evolution Markets, 2005; Green-e, 2003).
Current State of Renewable Power Use and Prospects for the Future
There are many ways to assess the current state of renewables use. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) reports on the installed electricity generation capacity in OECD
O
countries around the world. Other IEA data tracks actual electricity generation using 
renewable sources. Both datasets show growth over the past decade. For instance, 
among OECD countries, gross electricity production from renewable sources grew at 
an average annual rate of 1.4% between 1990 and 2002. Contradicting this growth 
pattern, however, is a simultaneous decrease in the share of electricity derived from 
renewable sources from 17.4% of total supply in 1990 to 15.0% in 2002 (IEA, 2004b, 
pp 39-40). [See Figure 2-2]
The IEA attributes this decline to a rising demand for electricity, which is largely 
being met by fossil-fuel based facilities; and decreased output by hydropower 
facilities, which suffered from precipitation shortfalls in many major hydropower- 
producing countries during the latter part of the ’90s. From a statistical perspective, 
the latter factor has an exaggerated impact because conventional hydropower has 
historically provided the vast majority of the global renewable energy electricity 
supply (International Energy Agency, 2002b).
8 IEA data on OECD countries covers Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, The Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Figure 2-2
Share of Electricity Production from Renewable Sources
Source: (IEA, 2004b)
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The IEA attributes this decline to a rising demand for electricity, which is largely 
being met by fossil-fuel based facilities; and decreased output by hydropower 
facilities, which suffered from precipitation shortfalls in many major hydropower- 
producing countries during the latter part of the ’90s. From a statistical perspective, 
the latter factor has an exaggerated impact because conventional hydropower has 
historically provided the vast majority of the global renewable energy electricity 
supply (International Energy Agency, 2002b).
The downward trends are not universal, however. As shown in Figure 2-2, 
renewables provided an increasingly larger share of Europe’s electricity supply during 
the 1990s, contrasting with a rather steep decline in the US. The increase in Europe 
stems from a large increase in wind system development, while in the US, rainfall 
deficiencies in the Northwest resulted in a 1/3 decrease in conventional hydropower 
generation during the last half of the ’90s (EIA, 2002; International Energy Agency, 
2002b).
To eliminate the distortion caused by the inclusion of data from conventional 
hydropower generation plants, Figures 2-3 & 2-4 display generation data related to 
what some observers term “new” renewables (Grubb, 1995, p xi), which include solar 
photovoltaic systems, wind power, biomass facilities, and tide/wave/ocean power 
systems (IEA, 2004b, pp 76-77, 187-188). As these graphs indicate, non-hydro
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“new” renewable sources contribute only a fraction of the overall electricity supply in 
both the European Union and the United States, cumulatively totaling less than 2% in 
each region. The similarity ends there, however, as in Europe trends are clearly on 
the upswing, with steady increases in almost every source category except 
tide/wave/ocean power. The wind industry’s dramatic increase stands out, as does the 
steady progress made by biomass systems.
Figure 2-3
Contribution of “New Renewables” to EU Electricity Supply
Source: (IEA, 2004b)
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By contrast, in the United States, levels appear relatively stagnant, with only wind 
power making any demonstrable upward change. (See Figure 2-4). It is only when 
one examines the US data in absolute terms that the renewables picture begins to 
brighten. Because there was a 24% increase in overall electricity generation during 
the period 1990-2002, it is easy to overlook that wind power’s contribution jumped 
131% during that period or that biogas combustion increased 55% during between 
1999 and 2002 (IEA, 2004b, p 187).
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Figure 2-4
Contribution of “New Renewables” to US Electricity Supply
Source: (IEA, 2004b)
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Growth in global electricity demand and renewables use is expected to continue over 
the next few decades, although projections are that renewables will continue to make 
only a minor contribution to the overall electricity supply, growing at a rate slower 
than overall electrical demand (IEA, 2004b). This is not to say that the growth of 
renewable electricity is slowing -  indeed, the IEA projects electricity generated by 
non-hydro renewable power systems to increase its share of global electricity supply 
by between 50-125% by 2025. Increasing a small number does little to change the 
overall supply picture, however, and coal and natural gas are expected to continue to 
provide the lion’s share of the world’s electricity supply in 2025. [See Table 2-1.] 
Even under the US Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) more optimistic “High 
Renewables” scenario, the contribution of renewables remains quite marginal.
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Table 2-1
Major Sources of Global Electricity Generation 
"Reference" vs. "High Renewables" Scenario
Extrapolated from EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2005 tables A8 and E7
2003 2010 2020 2025
Reference
High
Renewables Reference
High
Renewables Reference
High
Renewables Reference
High
Renewables
Coal 52% 52% 50% 50% 48% 48% 52% 51%
Petroleum 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%
Natural Gas 15% 15% 19% 19% 24% 24% 22% 22%
Nuclear 20% 20% 19% 19% 16% 16% 15% 15%
Conventional
Hydro 7% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Municipal Solid 
W aste 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
"New"
Renewables 1.63% 1.63% 2.29% 2.39% 2.51% 3.15% 2.75% 3.68%
Among individual renewable technologies, wind and biomass power systems are seen 
by both the IEA and the EIA as having the greatest growth potential, continuing 
current trends. Wind industry generation is expected to increase by 250% between 
2003 and 2025, ultimately delivering 0.74% of worldwide electricity supply. (In the 
EIA’s High Renewables scenario, wind system generation is projected to increase by 
nearly 350% during this same period.) Biomass also is expected to do well, 
quadrupling its supply levels to provide roughly 0.80% of global power supply by 
2025 (EIA, 2005, p 205). The EIA has been much less sanguine about the prospects 
for solar power, noting that “solar technologies ... are not expected to make 
significant contributions to US grid-connected electricity supplies through 2025,” 
ultimately delivering just 0.07% of total electricity generation by that date (EIA, 
2003a, pp 73, 222). The EIA’s 2005 Annual Energy Outlook shows little change in 
its assessment of the global prospects for solar deployment (EIA, 2005).
Thanks to the 2001 Green Electricity Directive, the prospects for renewable electricity 
in the European Union are much better (IEA, 2004c), although there remains concern 
the current pace of progress is too slow to achieve the Directive’s goals. Research 
funded by the European Union and carried out by the Energy Research Centre of the 
Netherlands in 2003 examined current and anticipated member state and EU policies, 
applying them to a mathematical model designed to forecast the growth potential of 
different renewable technologies. Their research concluded the EU would fall short 
of its 22% by 2010 target, increasing the proportion of electricity derived from 
renewable sources from 14% to roughly 20.6% (Uyterlinde, 2003). Just one year
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later, however, the Commission issued a formal communique stating the situation on 
the ground was even worse than anticipated, and that the best that could be hoped for 
was a 18% renewables generation level. Although Germany, Denmark, Spain, and 
Finland were expected to achieve their indicative targets, none of the other EU-15 
countries were expected to do so. Much of the blame was attributed to slow progress 
deploying large scale biomass schemes, which had been expected to shoulder much of 
the renewables power generation load required to meet the various national targets 
(ENDS, 2004; European Commission, 2004).
One way to explain these conclusions is to analyze the industrial maturity of 
individual renewable technologies. Shell Renewables has done just that as part of 
their research into which, if any, technologies the company should pursue as part of a 
long-term business strategy. In Figure 2-5, the primary renewable energy 
technologies are plotted on a curve representing the life cycle of a typical 
manufacturing industry.
Figure 2-5
Renewable Technology Industry Maturation Levels
. . . Source: Extrapola ted  from Kleiberg 2003Investment in
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In this diagram, technological investment levels and time represent the Y and X axes, 
respectively. At the top of the industrial life-cycle curve sit geothermal and large 
hydro operations, representing industries that are fully mature and extensively
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commercialized around the world. Both of these technologies have enjoyed 
significant capital investment and have long been exploited for electricity generation.
To the left of these and halfway down the curve are wind, biomass, and solar 
photovoltaic systems. According to the logic of the diagram, these technologies enjoy 
widespread deployment, but still require considerable investment before they 
command the level of market share currently achieved by geothermal and large hydro 
systems. Because they are located higher on the curve, wind and biomass can be 
expected to achieve widespread commercialization before photovoltaics.
On the far left (i.e., immature) end of the scale are wave and tidal systems, which are 
slowly moving out of the laboratory and computer modeling stage to deployment on a 
pilot basis. Considerable investment must yet occur before these technologies begin 
to generate any demonstrable amount of electricity production.
The Cost of Renewable Electricity
One factor that will significantly affect the prospects of renewable electricity is its 
cost competitiveness compared to electricity generated by fossil fuel or nuclear 
sources. Historically, large-scale hydropower met this challenge quite well, 
generating some of the cheapest power available in the marketplace (International 
Energy Agency, 2002b). Among “new” renewables, however, the story is more 
complicated. Different renewable technologies have different cost structures, a 
function of the maturity of the technology, the availability of the natural resource 
(e.g., wind, sun), and the level of competition in the marketplace. These factors mesh 
in different ways, meaning there is great variability in the cost of electricity produced 
by different renewable technologies. As shown in Table 2-2, pricing variability can 
be quite pronounced, as in the case of solar photovoltaics. (The large spread often is 
attributed to latitudinal differences in the amount of sunlight available in a region over 
the course of the year.) The discount rate used in the calculations also has a 
significant effect on the relative price of different technologies. Because renewable 
power systems are installed rather quickly, and tend to require less upkeep, their high 
upfront cost can disproportionately affect their price per kWh compared to
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technologies which take longer to build and which have significant on-going 
operations and maintenance costs.9
Table 2-2
Cost of Electricity from Different Power Sources
Source: IEA 2005
Level ized cost of power 
production (0 per kWh)
Power Source
5%
discount
rate
10%
discount
rate n
Coal 2 .5 -6 3 .6 -6 27
Natural Gas 3 .7 -6 4.3 - 6.3 23
Nuclear 2.1 -3.1 3 - 5 13
Wind 3.5 - 9.5 4 .5 -1 4 19
Small Hydro 4 - 8 6 .5 -1 0 8
Solar PV 1 5 -3 0 2 0 -3 0 6
Biomass 3.7 - 8.5 5 - 1 0 2
Geothermal 2.7 4.2 1
Avg. retail price of 
electricity in U.S. 8.30/kWh
Avg. retail price of 
electricity in U.K. 13.40/kWh
Table 2-2 also shows the typical prices for electric power against which renewables 
must compete. In the US, the average residential price of electricity is just over 
80/kWh, while the rate in the UK is over 130/kWh. In general, retail residential 
electricity prices in Europe are much higher than in the US, ranging from 70/kWh in 
Norway to 28.50/kWh in Denmark (IEA, 2004a, p 43).
Although renewable electricity today may cost more than electricity from fossil fuel 
or nuclear sources, it is not expected to stay this way. Prices have dropped 
significantly over the past two decades, and according to the US National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory, will keep trending in this direction over the coming decades 
(NREL, 2003). There are several reasons for the projected price drop: improved 
manufacturing methods; economies of scale as demand increases; and technological
9 This is because net-present value calculations will “discount” out-year costs significantly, meaning 
they do not weigh as heavily in any cost calculation as current-day construction costs. The use of a 
10% discount rate makes this comparison even more pronounced, as most costs occurring after 10 
years diminish dramatically in value.
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gains that increase the conversion rate of wind, sunshine, or wave power into 
electrical energy.
Figure 2-6 
Renewable Power Cost Trends
Source: (NREL, 2003)
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While the first two explanations relate to reductions in the cost of manufacturing, the 
latter links to the revenue side of the equation -  each machine is generating more 
kilowatt hours of power than it could previously, creating greater economic value. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion reached by the NREL is their estimate that 
each of the five technologies displayed in Figure 2-6 will achieve a price point of less 
than 10 cents per kilowatt hour by 2020, a level below the current cost of power in the 
UK and within striking distance of the average retail electricity rates in the US
Complicating the entire cost picture are findings by EU-funded researchers that the 
market prices currently charged for electricity do not accurately reflect the full cost to 
society of that power. In particular, this research concludes market prices fail to 
account for several economic externalities: the cost of damage to the natural and built 
environment from the harvesting of these energy sources and from the energy 
production process; public health impacts from airborne particulate matter released 
during the energy production process; occupational disease and accidents at the power 
plants themselves; and visual impacts in the form of reduced visibility due to smog 
from power plants (EC, 2001c). The value of the external cost varies widely, by
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technology. For example, the EU has found that current market prices for electricity 
produced by coal and oil understate their true economic cost by 5.7 €/kWh . By 
comparison, the current market price of electricity from renewable technologies do 
internalize most external costs -  hydro power prices fail to reflect external costs of 
just 0.4 €/kWh, and the external costs of solar photovoltaics (PV) total roughly 0.6 
€/kWh . Wind power has the lowest external cost of any electricity source, totaling 
just 0.1 €/kWh (ENDS, 2001). The bottom line of this research is clear — if these 
external costs were incorporated into market prices, then most renewable power 
technologies would quickly find themselves in a highly competitive position (Geller, 
2003).
The Municipal Perspective on Renewable Power
There are three overarching strategies guiding city-level action on renewables: 
actions aimed at influencing the local production of renewable electricity; actions 
aimed at procuring renewable electricity for local use, and actions aimed at using 
renewable energy as an engine for local economic development. Ravetz (2001) 
suggests that cities should deploy different options in different areas of the city, 
mixing and matching them based on local neighborhood conditions or zoning 
regulations. Ravetz also notes it makes sense to coordinate energy planning on a 
regional basis, as this will allow cities, suburbs, and rural areas to utilize the fullest 
range of renewable power policy, technology, and economic development options, as 
each area can pursue the strategies to which it is optimally suited.
Promoting Local Renewables Deployment
Policies to promote renewable power production can take many forms. One of the 
most aggressive is the imposition of a “renewables obligation” or “renewables 
portfolio standard.” Under the terms of these standards, power suppliers in a 
specified region are forced to procure some minimum percentage of their power from 
renewable sources. What constitutes a renewable source is typically defined in the 
authorizing legislation (Berry & Jaccard, 2001; Espey, 2001). Utilities are thus given 
a menu of process options, allowing them to select the mix of technologies that make 
the most sense given their location, the cost of energy produced by each technology,
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etc. Renewables portfolio standards (RPS) have been implemented in many countries 
around the world, including the US, the UK, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Australia, with the renewables target ranging between 2% and 30% 
(Berry & Jaccard, 2001; Grubb, 1995). In the U.S., twenty states have established 
RPSs, including New York state (Interstate Renewable Energy Council, 2005).
As noted previously, electric utility regulation is generally a state or national function, 
and to date most RPS proposals and laws mimic the spatial focus of the regulatory 
scheme. It is possible, however, for smaller entities to establish RPS programs, as has 
been done in Austin, the capital of Texas. In 1999, Austin adopted rules requiring 
that 5% of all local electrical demand must be supplied by renewable sources by the 
end of 2004. In 2003, the City increased the requirement to 20% by 2020 (ICLEI, 
2005). The City of Los Angeles has established an identical target that its municipal 
utility must achieve by 2017 (Cleanedge, 2004). Neither of these rules requires the 
power to be produced within the city, and most is expected to come from large wind 
projects located far outside the city limits.
Building codes and zoning restrictions are regulatory approaches used by cities 
seeking to actively promote the in-city deployment of renewable power systems.
These rules can require or facilitate the use of renewable electricity technologies by 
individuals or developers proposing new projects or significant modifications to an 
existing structure. The Dutch Optimum Energy Infrastructure program is one 
example of a state law giving local governments significant leverage over new 
building design. Under this program, local authorities can dictate the Energy 
Performance of the Location (EPL) for a multi-unit development or individual 
building site. This EPL may consist of a requirement that the building tie into a 
communal heating network or that the building generate some proportion of its own 
energy through renewable sources (CADDET, 2001; Fuchs & Arentsen, 2002). In 
1997, Germany amended its Federal Building Code so local planners must consider 
environmental protection in municipal development plans, “including the use of 
renewable energies” (Gutermuth, 2000, p 210). There is evidence from both countries 
that local communities now look for both active and passive solar use in designs 
submitted for planning approval.
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In the United States, the cities of Boulder and Aspen, Colorado both incorporate 
renewable energy requirements into their local building codes. Boulder requires 
sensitivity to the ‘solar envelope’ (Knowles, 2003) of a structure so passive solar 
design and photovoltaic systems can achieve their maximum performance. Aspen, a 
mountain resort community, requires structures with a high energy load due to 
excessive size or other amenities (e.g., pools, spas, snow melting systems) to offset 
part of their grid burden through the installation of on-site renewable power systems. 
As an alternative, homeowners can pay a one-time mitigation fee to buy their way out 
of this obligation (ICLEI, 2002b).
Oakland, California’s approach focuses on the permitting process rather than design 
requirements. Implemented during the state energy crisis in 2001, the city promotes 
renewable power system installations by streamlining the permitting process for new 
photovoltaic and small wind turbine systems. All reviews by city building department 
staff must occur within a five-day period, and property owners are given a self- 
certification checklist to document compliance with local codes. Proposals deemed in 
compliance with local codes will be approved and have all application fees waived 
(ICLEI, 2002a). Another move that should facilitate renewables development is a 
Dutch mandate that municipalities delineate appropriate sites for future wind parks in 
their structure plans (Beatley, 2000). By essentially ‘pre-zoning’ these locations for 
such facilities, delays in permitting development should be reduced.
Financial assistance programs are one non-regulatory approach many cities have 
adopted to promote local renewables deployment. In Los Angeles, the city-owned 
utility offers homeowners and businesses a rebate of between $3.50-$4.50/watt on 
new PV systems. The higher rate applies to systems manufactured in Los Angeles. 
Demand for the rebates has recently outstripped available funds, and it is unclear 
when or if more funds will be made available (LADWP, 2005). In Saarbrucken, 
Germany, the city subsidizes consumers DM1000 ($550) per installed kilowatt 
beyond the generous subsidies provided by the state. The city-owned utility 
{Stadtwerke) also provides an operating subsidy of 55 pfennigs per kWh produced. 
Low interest loans (2.9% for 5 years) are available through the Stadtwerke and a city- 
owned bank to help homeowners finance new photovoltaic system purchases
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(Beatley, 2000). The city-owned utility in Austin, Texas offers low interest loans of 
up to $20,000 for the same purpose (Keith, 2003).
A second non-regulatory approach involves public education. Examples of local 
agencies disseminating information about renewable power are ubiquitous. In 
Chicago, the City has funded the Chicago Centre for Green Technology, a showcase 
building that displays information on the benefits of renewable electricity and how 
local residents can install such systems themselves. Docents are available to answer 
questions for visitors, and training sessions are held on a regular basis (Middendorf, 
2002). The City of Chicago also publicizes city-funded solar installations on a local 
website which includes real-time meters that display how much power is being 
generated by each of the PV systems profiled (Chicago Solar Partnership, 2002). In 
1989, the City of Saarbrucken created ARGE Solar, a nonprofit technical assistance 
and solar promotion company. Jointly funded by the city, the state Ministry of the 
Environment, and regional energy companies, the company provides technical 
assistance to solar consumers and promotes its use among local residents (Beatley, 
2000).
Procuring Rather Than Making Green Electricity
Some cities find it logistically and politically easier to sidestep issues related to the 
local deployment of renewables, choosing instead to buy and resell power from 
privately managed renewable power plants or encouraging the local utility to do so. 
Three California cities with municipally-owned utilities, Los Angeles, Palo Alto, and 
Sacramento directly procure green power from privately-run renewable electricity 
plants and promote its use among local customers. Customers opting for these 
different power schemes -  Palo Alto Green, SMUD Greenergy5111, and LADWP Green 
Power -  all pay a small price premium over what “standard” residential utility 
customers pay. In Sacramento, electricity is obtained from companies capturing and 
combusting methane gas from local landfills. In Palo Alto, the power comes from 
wind turbines around the western U.S. and from large photovoltaic projects in 
California (CPAU, 2003; LADWP, 2003; SMUD, 2003). Other cities are doing more 
than simply advocating its use locally -  they are making large green power purchases 
themselves, often to power municipal government operations. The City of Chicago
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has been very aggressive at building demand for green electricity, working with 47 
other Local Authorities around the area to issue a request for roughly 400 MW of 
electric power services, stipulating that by 2005, 20% of the power must come from 
green sources. This agreement amounts to one of the largest green power purchase 
agreements ever made in the United States (ICLEI, 2003).
Renewables-related Economic Development
Besides the local and global environmental benefits of renewables use, many cities 
are finding that renewable energy can be an important engine for local economic 
development. Freiburg, Germany has been one of the most aggressive in pursuing a 
reputation as a city at the center of the renewable energy universe. The city donated 
space to house a leading trade group, the International Solar Energy Society, and is 
home to the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems, a research and 
development organization. Freiburg is also home to 450 small and medium-sized 
companies involved in the solar industry, collectively employing 10,000 workers and 
generating $1.1 billion in annual revenues. Because Freiburg has gained a reputation 
as one of world’s leading ‘solar cities,’ it also benefits from solar-related tourism 
visits by government and industry officials from around the world coming to learn 
more about city’s solar strategies (Beatley, 2000).
In the U.S., Chicago is working hard to become the nation’s center for green 
technology and manufacturing (Wilmerding, 2001). The City of Chicago partnered 
with the Spire Corporation to build a new solar panel factory on a former brownfield 
site. To jumpstart the operation, the City agreed to purchase $2 million of solar 
panels from Spire during its first few years of operation; Commonwealth Edison, the 
local utility, committed to $6 million in solar panel purchases during this same time 
period (Middendorf, 2002). The City has also partnered in a project sponsored by the 
Chicago-based subsidiary of a French wind turbine manufacturer to explore the 
feasibility of a windfarm on the shores of Lake Michigan (Moffett, 2003). This pilot 
project is the first wind system installed in Chicago, an ironic fact given Chicago’s 
nickname -  the windy city.
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Conclusion
Over the last 10-15 years there have been a huge array of policies and programs 
implemented that were designed to foster the deployment of ‘new’ renewable energy 
technologies. Driven by concerns over energy security, climate change, and other 
emission impacts, these techniques vary widely. Financial incentives, the 
development of deployment targets, and eliminating impediments restricting 
interconnections to the electricity transmission and distribution grid are just a few of 
the strategies being used to help expand renewables use in the US and Europe. These 
efforts have improved the prospects for this sector, although given the current low 
level of deployment it will be some time before new renewables make much of a dent 
in the overall supply picture. Technologies like wind and biomass combustion are 
expected to provide the bulk of most new renewable supply capacity during the next 
5-10 years, by which time other technologies may also have proven their technical or 
economic viability. The extent to which the technologies currently deemed most 
viable by the marketplace are suitable for urban deployment is an issue discussed in 
both case studies.
Efforts to restructure the utility marketplace have also had a very direct influence on 
the renewables industry, amplifying the need to be cost-competitive with power 
generated by nuclear or fossil fuel-fired power plants. Because of current cost 
differentials between renewables and other power generation technologies, research 
and development programs, price subsidies, tradable ‘green’ credits and tax credits of 
various kinds are increasingly important in building demand for and lowering the cost 
structure of renewable power systems. In both New York City and London, those 
deploying renewable power systems count heavily on these subsidies, the receipt of 
which often determines whether a project moves forward.
The urban context for renewables is an interesting one. Cost may indeed be an 
impediment, but there is nonetheless a long list of cities which are buying green 
power or promoting the in-city deployment of renewable power systems. In both 
Europe and the US cities are using zoning rules and permitting systems to mandate or 
incentivize the installation of renewable power systems in new construction projects. 
The provision of direct financial support to such installations by local authorities is
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less common, as cities may be wary of allocating scarce tax dollars for this purpose. 
Education programs are a lower cost and relatively easy means of promoting 
voluntary action while other cities are content to ignore in-city deployment issues 
altogether and simply advocate the purchase of green power from sources outside the 
city. This can be an effective technique because it allows cities to exploit the cheapest 
forms of renewable power, whatever those might be in that region. The downside, of 
course, is that on issues of energy security and localized emission impacts, cities may 
not realize the same benefits as if those systems were deployed within the city limits.
The bottom line is that there are many ways cities can engage on renewable power 
policy, and what’s key is understanding which strategies are most effective. In the 
London and New York case studies, I’ll build on the general information provided in 
this chapter to develop a more localized policy context for renewables deployment 
and use. Part of this story will involve inventorying what each city is currently doing 
with regards to renewable power in Chapters 6 and 9, and then examining the policy­
making and political landscape in Chapters 7 and 10 to see if we can explain the logic 
behind these decisions.
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CHAPTER 3
Urban Renewables Policy-making -  Alternative Theoretical Approaches 
Introduction
The issue of renewable power use in urban areas is a complex matter, involving a 
multitude of actors. As noted in the first two chapters, there are government 
regulators, who may sit at the local, state, and/or national level. There are existing 
power plant operators, whose facilities may involve thousand megawatt systems; at 
the other end of the spectrum are local residents and businesses with a few solar 
panels on their rooftop. Local policy-makers may be highly engaged in this issue, or 
they may have a very hands-off approach to the matter. Those seeking to install 
renewable power systems may need to involve architects, installers, planners, 
government inspectors, or market regulators. Economic development agencies 
promoting the creation of energy-related jobs must understand private sector needs, 
and then work with those firms and educational institutions to structure training 
programs capable of satisfying those needs.
In other words, regardless of how you look at this issue, there are many stakeholders 
whose involvement is integral to the success of any policy or program. Thus, urban 
renewables policy-making is a good example of urban “governance” in action. Once 
considered a synonym for government, governance is now widely recognized as 
having a distinct meaning, “referring to a new process of governing” (Rhodes, 1996) 
that involves the “blending and coordinating” of public and private interests (Pierre, 
1999, p 374). The shift away from a state-centered and formal process of decision­
making is central to the notion of urban governance. Governments may continue to 
try to manage the policy and decision-making process, but boundaries have become 
“permeable” (Stoker, 1998, p 38) to the point that governments no longer exert 
sovereign authority (Rhodes, 1997).
In this chapter, I lay out the analytic approach that I believe is best suited to this 
complex policy environment. My approach has been heavily influenced by Gibbs & 
Jonas’ work positing the application of urban regime theory to local environmental 
policy-making. URT has previously not been employed for such a purpose, so this
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thesis stands as its first real test in this regard. However, because URT has been 
criticized for failing to account for the larger policy and regulatory milieu at work in a 
city, I move beyond Gibbs and Jonas by also suggesting that regime theory could 
benefit from some type of modification that captures the influence of this milieu.
New institutionalism is a complementary theoretical approach recognized for its skill 
in this area, and in this chapter I devise a modified regime approach that blends both 
theories into a single, coherent methodology. By deploying it here, I hope to ascertain 
a comprehensive explanation of the ‘logic’ of local energy policy-making in both 
New York City and London. Because there are other policy realms similarly bound 
up in state or national government-led regulatory schemas, the blended approach may 
have applications to situations beyond environmental policy-making. I therefore 
spend some time in this chapter and in the conclusion of this thesis offering 
suggestions for researchers interested in applying this model to their own analytic 
work.
The Shift to Urban Governance
There are several reasons behind the shift to urban governance, including:
• the link between globalization and loss of local economic control;
• changing expectations and demands on local government;
• emergent philosophies regarding the role of government; and
• the usurpation of local authority by semi-autonomous public agencies.
Thanks to globalization, cities see state and national governments as less helpful. 
Trade pacts have loosened constraints on corporate decisions regarding outsourcing, 
the location of manufacturing facilities, and the establishment of trading partners 
(Keams & Paddison, 2000). As a result, cities now engage in “place wars” (Haider, 
1992), directly competing against each other to attract and retain businesses. Public 
and private interests close ranks, as each group finds they “empower themselves by 
blending their resources, skills, and purposes” (Keams & Paddison, 2000, p 847). 
Cities also are directly entering the international arena through cross-border co­
operation with supranational organizations such as the European Union (EU), and
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through networking with other cities (Church & Reid, 1996). Such tactics typically 
require resources far beyond the capacity of a local bureaucracy.
A second justification for governance focuses on the breakup of the Fordist system of 
production and consumption, forcing local government into new roles and 
responsibilities (Stoker, 1998). Under the old Fordist model, local government had a 
well-defined but narrow set of responsibilities, including the provision of basic 
infrastructure to support the flow of goods in and out of large industrial plants, and the 
provision of basic education, health, and housing services for plant employees. But in 
the post-Fordist era, plant closures, coupled with the rise of the service sector and 
information-based industries have dramatically changed expectations and demands on 
local government. Now services are privatized as a means of supporting local firms. 
In addition, the trend to part-time and contract workers means fewer individuals and 
families have health benefits or can afford child care. To manage these problems, 
local governments are increasingly turning to NGOs and the private sector for 
assistance (Healey, Cars, Madanipour, & de Magalhaes, 2002).
Changing philosophies about government’s role in society is a third factor in the 
emergence of urban governance. Driven largely by the success of conservative 
political coalitions in the US and Europe, bureaucracy-driven models reliant on 
government-based service delivery are being abandoned, replaced by an emphasis on 
entrepreneurial forms of governance (Short & Kim, 1999). Support for change in 
government’s role also has come from the Left, which has been forced to rethink its 
support of bureaucracy in light of the political success of the Right (Wainwright, 
1994). In cases where traditional government functions have been privatized, 
government has also entered collaborative relationships as a means of ensuring that 
the public interest is protected (Healey et al., 2002).
A final set of explanations has centered on the “hollowing out” (Healey et al., 2002, p 
11) of local authorities, pointing out how power has been usurped by the EU and a 
range of semi-autonomous public agencies established by state and federal authorities. 
Frequently these agencies focus on single issues, such as waste management, air 
quality, or coastal protection, with independent sources of revenue over which local 
authorities have no control. These new bodies make policy coordination more
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complicated at the same time they decrease the capacity of local government to 
provide such coordination (Peters, 1996). Rhodes (1996) also notes the influence of 
“new public management,” where the emphasis on managerial accountability limits 
the discretion of public servants in policy-making and program administration.
From a pragmatic perspective, the shift to governance has many virtues. For 
government, the diffusion of responsibility can alleviate some of the risk of failure, as 
risk now is shared. Also, governance in the form of partnerships can help leverage 
resources far in excess of what government might be able to provide on its own 
(Jewson & MacGregor, 1997). From the general public’s perspective, governance can 
provide additional opportunity to influence decision-making, giving citizen groups the 
chance to influence the world-view of stakeholders with whom they previously had 
little contact (Elander, 2002). From a private-sector perspective, governance creates 
“dialogic processes” (Healey et al., 2002, p 13) that can transform what would have 
been a “win-lose” scenario under a state-driven process into an opportunity more 
likely to create “win-win” outcomes.
There can be pitfalls, of course. Allowing more groups into the policy-making 
process does not necessarily mean all voices will gain access, or that certain voices 
will give up their position of dominance (Jewson & MacGregor, 1997). There also 
are concerns that issues formerly under the control of the state may be lost to the 
private sector, with less opportunity for accountability (Bassett, 1996; Jewson & 
MacGregor, 1997; John & Cole, 2000). Given scarce public resources, this can be a 
real issue, particularly if the public becomes convinced that private interests are 
taking precedence over public interests, or that the return on investment achieved by 
private interests is excessive when compared to public gains. Finally, inviting in 
private partners to work on an issue doesn’t guarantee they’ll invest any resources in 
the project beyond their own time. Like all investors, they must evaluate the risk and 
potential reward before deciding to invest their own limited funds in a project.
In the past, the traditional choice for analyzing decision-making at the local level 
would have involved theories of pluralism, corporatism, and urban elites, ultimately 
focusing on which individuals or groups have the power to govern (Hall & Hubbard, 
1996; Stoker, 1998). However, in an era where governance is the central means of
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local action, these models prove too narrow, unable to address the fact that no single 
group is likely to dominate (Stoker, 1998). More robust models are therefore required 
to untangle the complexities of local policy networks and to understand the 
fragmentation of institutions, the capacities of various stakeholders, and the values 
that drive them (de Magalhaes, Healey, & Madanipour, 2002; Newman & Thomley, 
1997; Pierre, 1999).
Two different analytic models that appear to meet this challenge are new 
institutionalism (NI) and urban regime theory (URT). Although other analytic 
frameworks are available -  Stoker (1998) cites rational choice theory and literature on 
policy networks and communities as two other options -  new institutionalism and 
urban regime theory are both commonly identified as theories better suited for 
dissecting urban governance systems (Harding, 2000; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; 
Newman & Thomley, 1997; Pierre, 1999; Rhodes, 1997). Both examine issues in a 
specific spatial context. Both excel at dissecting what Healey et al (2002, p 15) refer 
to as the keys of governance behavior: “dynamics, [or] changes through time”; 
“relations, [or] the links, gaps and boundaries in social relations which embed 
governance processes in the wider society,” and “capacity, [or] what particular 
configurations of governance relations can do and what they seem unable to 
accomplish”. Both also pay attention to the values and objectives driving local 
networks and individual actors, and the organizational arrangements that may shape 
these values or other patterns of behavior (Pierre, 1999).
New Institutionalism -  An Overview
Institutions have been a subject of inquiry by philosophers, economists, political 
scientists, and other academics for hundreds of years. Aristotle and other political 
philosophers were concerned with the relationship between institutional form and 
successful governing (Peters, 1999). At the beginning of the 20th century, Durkheim 
(1982) proclaimed that sociology is nothing less than the science of the genesis and 
functioning of institutions. Within economics, institutional concepts such as markets, 
the firm, and market regulation serve as the basis for much neoclassical theory. Given 
my interest in understanding the role regulation can play in shaping urban energy
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planning, it is useful to understand the different perspectives on how institutions can 
influence behavior.
These perspectives have changed over time, as in the past, institutions were seen 
primarily as official structures, formal rules, and organizations (Lowndes, 2001), and 
institutionalism tended to be very legalistic, normative, and structuralist (Peters,
1999). Facts and values were taken for granted, with the analytic approach 
emphasizing “common sense” (Lowndes, 1996, p 181) links between formal 
structures and policy outcomes. Today, institutions are seen more abstractly as 
“humanly devised constraints on social action” (Nee & Strang, 1998, p 706). 
Institutions also are seen now as coming in many different forms, with these 
constraints defined broadly to include formal and informal rules (Lowndes, 2001); 
procedures, norms, or conventions (Alt & Shepsle, 1998); religious and cultural 
beliefs (Weber, 1978); and “supra-individual abstract ideas, devices and guidelines” 
(Edeling, 1998, p 730). Changing the focus from formal structures to more abstract 
ideas and values is a logical switch given the change in focus from government to 
governance. Relying on an analytic approach that focuses solely on formal rules and 
formal organizations could cause us to miss many of the larger structural factors and 
values currently driving local policy-making.
The idea that institutions constrain action is critical, as these constraints create 
regularities in human behavior that reduce uncertainty (Peters, 1999) and help 
individuals determine “who has the power to do what when” (Alt & Shepsle, 1998, p 
735). One can look at electric utility regulation as an institution that similarly 
embodies social norms, including equity (e.g., ensuring individual customers are not 
price-gouged and that all customers receive the same reliable service), environmental 
protection (e.g., ensuring that power plants operate within agreed-upon pollution 
limits), and public safety (e.g., ensuring that workers installing or repairing electrical 
systems are not endangered by random power spikes.) Society also agrees to 
constrain behavior involving the generation and distribution of electricity because this 
helps achieve other desirable goals, including the ability to buy goods known to 
operate at a set voltage and to use these goods wherever electricity is delivered in a 
form that meets these voltage standards.
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Along with defining what institutions are, it may be useful to distinguish what they 
are not. Individuals and organizations are not institutions, as institutions “provide the 
‘rules of the game,’ while organizations -  like individuals -  are players within that 
game” (Lowndes, 2001). Idiosyncratic behavior also does not constitute an 
institution, as patterns of behavior must be stable over time (Jessop, 2001). Referring 
back to the electricity example, electricity market regulations are the overarching 
rules that have remained generally consistent over time, and power generators and 
power users are the players subject to these rules.
Alternate Forms of New Institutionalism
There are a range of academic disciplines where institutionalism has been revisited in 
recent years, including history, sociology, economics, political science, and social 
theory (Goodin, 1996). Because my interest is in understanding the policy-making 
process, I have chosen to emphasize literature that lends itself to explaining how 
institutions affect political and policy-making behavior. Several researchers have 
tried to weave the many theoretical and empirical threads into thematic categories. 
Below I explore the three primary types of new institutionalism theory, and how each 
might approach issues related to local renewable power policy-making.
• Rational choice institutionalism, or, as DiMaggio (1998) calls it, rational action 
neoinstitutionalism, is a derivative of the economic theory that posits each of us is 
assumed to have exogenously formed and stable preferences or tastes, and we act 
strategically to maximize the attainment of our preferences. Institutions thus are 
seen as intervening variables that can affect our options and actions, but not 
determine them (Koelble, 1995). Institutions affect decision-making by providing 
information and enforcement mechanisms that lead us to prefer certain outcomes 
(Hall & Hubbard, 1996). Individuals calculate which actions to pursue by using 
tools such as game theory, evolutionary modeling, and transaction-cost analysis 
(DiMaggio, 1998).
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A rational choice institutionalist would look at the issue of distributed electricity 
generation10 in cities as a classic example of a utility trying to ‘protect its own.’ 
Because most network grid systems are designed for the one-way flow of 
electricity from the grid into a home or business, the idea that homeowners with 
solar panels may now feed electricity back into the grid can impose costly 
equipment and logistical burdens for the utility. Distributed generation is still a 
relatively new concept, and many state and national energy regulators have not yet 
developed formal policies addressing this issue. If they have promulgated rules, 
then the utility’s behavior is constrained, and it likely will pursue strategies aimed 
at maximizing the economic return on its new investment. If rules have not been 
developed, then the utility must calculate how best to optimize its situation. Does 
it simply ban homeowners from feeding power into the grid, thereby foreclosing 
the need to make any new investment? Or does the utility hedge its bet by 
voluntarily making changes in return for higher connection fees than regulators 
likely would propose on their own? Such are the game theory questions that 
individuals and organizations face when looked at from a rational choice 
perspective.
• Sociological or social construction neoinstitutionalism subscribes to the same 
decision-making logic that says utility maximization guides behavior, but differs 
from rational choice institutionalism by arguing that preferences and tastes are 
“constructed” by endogenous social forces rather than individual perspectives 
(DiMaggio, 1998). Behavior therefore results from our efforts to define and 
express our identity in legitimate and socially appropriate ways (DiMaggio, 1998; 
Hall & Taylor, 1996). Indeed, our entire concept of what constitutes “acceptable” 
behavior is based on habituation (Peters, 1999), or the regular feedback we receive 
from those with whom we interact. It is only when others accord our behavior 
respect or scom that we gain social context, guiding us towards acceptable 
behavior. In the case of urban renewables, one example is corporate efforts to
10 Distributed generation (DG) involves the production of power on-site or near the point of 
consumption, rather than relying on power generated elsewhere and delivered to the user via 
transmission and distribution wires. Electricity can be generated by a variety of sources, including 
renewable power technologies. DG is more complicated in an urban environment because the network 
distribution grid found in most cities may require technical upgrades to allow it to accept any power 
exported by the DG system. This is less of a problem in rural areas where the grid systems are less 
complex.
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procure green power. Researchers have found the most important driver behind 
these procurement efforts is pressure to be seen as civically responsible by 
attempting to minimize the firm’s impact on the local and global environment 
(Wiser, Fowlie, & Holt, 2001). Purchasing green power is one way to fulfill 
societal expectations.
• The concept of path dependency lies at the heart of historical institutionalism. 
From a policy-making perspective, this means choices made early in an 
institution’s life cycle or when a policy is created can have a continuing influence 
over the policy for years to come (Peters, 1999). Although this seems intuitively 
logical, and in fact there are historicist tendencies in both rational choice and 
sociological institutionalism, there are also some difficulties with this approach 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996). First, historical institutionalism is considered to have 
“post-dictive” (rather than predictive) powers (Peters, 1999). Knowing what has 
happened in the past doesn’t always help us understand how future behavior will 
be influenced, absent some other type of decision-making rule, such as utility 
maximization or adherence to some other set of norms. Second, claims of the 
influence of historical institutions maybe difficult to falsify, failing Popper’s test 
for sound scientific theory (Peters, 1999). By this I mean it is difficult to identify 
the exact point at which one must discount the influence of history on behavior.
Despite these criticisms, historical institutionalism does have value as a research 
approach, and one can identify a situation where the institutional influence on 
urban renewables policy-making behavior is clearly historical in nature. Let’s 
return to our earlier cited example about a societal norm that has developed 
regarding the electrical supply in urban areas. Although the early history of 
electrical generation was one of sporadic supply, technology eventually advanced 
to a point where service quality in the US and Western Europe became quite 
consistent, available 24 hours per day. Regulations followed insisting on this as a 
minimum performance standard. However, as interest in renewable power grows, 
this institutional standard is being used (often by nuclear power advocates) to fight 
plans to increase society’s overall reliance on renewables. The argument is made 
that because certain renewable technologies are innately or potentially subject to
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intermittent supply, working only during daylight hours or on windy days, 
excessive reliance on renewables threatens overall system reliability. Because 
electricity is the lifeblood of a city, historically derived norms can lead local 
policy-makers to view intermittency as an unacceptable situation, thus potentially 
influencing which energy options they are willing to consider.
Do these Differences Matter?
There are a variety of institutions I examine in my research on urban renewables 
policy-making. Some are formal in nature (e.g., energy regulation schemes, 
mechanisms for public input in local policy-making, mechanisms to educate the 
public and policy-makers on renewables issues) while others are decidedly informal 
(e.g., societal norms related to service quality and equity or environmental 
protection). Both types have relevance for my work, meaning the new institutionalist 
approach lends an important perspective. Whether I am better served by a narrowly 
constructed sociological, rational choice or historical approach is less clear. My work 
examines a long-regulated industry, meaning historical new institutionalism appears 
tailor-made for this research. Similarly, I just pointed out how historical influences 
can influence expectations of how the electricity supply system should operate. I 
have also shown that certain policy behaviors could be explained in rational choice 
terms. In other words, I could likely conduct research on urban energy policy-making 
from any of these new institutional perspectives, and find examples where such 
influences appear to provide explanatory value.
Ultimately, however, the real question is whether it is important to follow a specific 
theoretical model, or whether a more ‘generic’ new institutionalist approach will 
suffice. The specific approaches add value by guiding researchers to unique lines of 
inquiry. For example, rational choice institutionalism focuses attention on what 
individual actors perceived as their options, how institutional forces colored their 
calculation of the ‘value’ of each option, and which option they ultimately saw as 
maximizing their utility. Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, teaches us to 
diagram the policy-making process with an eye to how prior decisions may have 
influenced the range of options available to decision-makers or the choice ultimately 
selected. One also could argue that a generic analysis forces the analyst to pay
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attention to too many dimensions of the problem at one time, making it very difficult 
to uncover the specific factor(s) most responsible for the outcome.
Other commentators label this a straw argument. After reviewing how perspectives 
on institutionalism have changed in five academic disciplines, Goodin (1996, p 19) 
concluded “variations on new institutionalist themes are essentially, and importantly, 
complementary.” Neither Pierre (1999) nor Lowndes (2001) mentions the need for 
analyses specifically geared along rational choice, historical or any other lines, instead 
simply focusing on the value a new institutionalist approach can bring to the study of 
urban governance.
Figure 3-1 diagrams the logic of a generic new institutional approach. Implicit in its 
structure are the following assumptions:
1. Policy outcomes (i.e., behavior) flow directly from a process embedded in new 
institutionalist influences. These influences subtly or overtly affect all aspects of 
the policy-making process. Social norms, values, formal and informal rules, and 
history are among the key factors that serve as new institutional influences.
2. Stakeholders in the policy-making process are embedded in a series of institutions 
that affect the values and perspectives they bring to an issue, their level of 
involvement in the policy-making process, and the power they exert over agenda 
setting and policy implementation.
3. ‘Policy soup’ (Kingdon, 1995) represents the competing and complementary ideas 
and agendas put forward by different stakeholders. Some of these ideas taste bad, 
and are never consumed. Others simmer for long periods before making their way 
to the policy table, where they are hungrily devoured. Soup is also an apt analogy 
for policy-making because when different ideas are all bubbling in the same pot, 
they may soften, change texture, or adopt flavors and aromas introduced by other 
ingredients (i.e., policy proposals).
4. The policy or policies ultimately selected become part of the institutional 
landscape affecting the policy-making system. The dashed line implies an indirect 
and not necessarily equal influence between different outcomes and the larger 
institutional landscape.
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The generic approach does not divorce itself from concepts espoused by specific new 
institutional approaches, and researchers will by necessity borrow research strands 
from each. These include tracking policy changes over time (e.g., historical), 
exploring organizational value structures (e.g., rational choice), and exploring local 
attitudes about environmental protection (e.g., sociological).
Figure 3-1
Influence of New Institutional Pressures on the Policy-making Process
New Institutional influences
(values, norms, form al 
and inform al rules, history)Government
Private
sector
Policy
outcomes
(behavior)
Policy Soup
NGOs
General
public
Urban Regime Theory -  An Introduction
An alternative analytic approach is provided by urban regime theory, which over the 
last two decades has gained popularity as a tool for analyzing systems of urban 
governance. Originally used to explain public- and private-sector relationships in US 
cities, URT has now shed these geographic limitations and been used by political 
scientists, geographers, and others to examine urban level decision-making around the 
world (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). In doing so, regime theory is considered to have 
brought new vigor to the study of urban politics (Brown, 1999).
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a regime as “a system or institution having 
widespread influence or prevalence” (Simpson & Weiner, 1989, p 508), and an urban 
regime is the coalition of public and private interests that dominate the local policy­
making arena. Regime analysis attempts to understand this system: how policy
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decisions are made at the local level, who makes them, whether these decisions 
involve formal or informal networks of decision-makers, how the regime was formed, 
and what is its capacity to act (Brown, 1999; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). Regime 
theory also helps explain how certain problems rise to become policy priorities in a 
city (Stone, 2002). Stone’s study of governance in Atlanta is considered a classic 
early example of urban regime analysis, tracking the influence of Atlanta’s business 
and middle-class black community over the city’s political and policy agenda during a 
40-year period that spanned several different mayoral administrations (Stone, 1989).
As an analytic concept, URT has many theoretical antecedents. The notion of a 
regime has its roots in international affairs literature (Krasner, 1983). Brown (1999) 
considers regime theory an outgrowth of liberal political theory, which emphasizes 
the tensions between the sovereignty and power of the state and private freedoms and 
interests. Sites (1997) offers a slight variation on this same theme, viewing regime 
theory as a bridge between Marxian and state-centered theories because regime theory 
focuses on how power is shared between the public and private sector.
Several authors bring the focus down to the local level by noting how URT’s 
emphasis on forming coalitions and sharing power echoes, and ultimately advances 
beyond, the debate of elites vs. pluralists that dominated community power studies of 
the 1950s and 1960s (Clark, 2001; Dowding, 2001; Hall & Hubbard, 1996; Smith & 
Beazley, 2000; Stoker & Mossberger, 1994). It does so by focusing not just on who 
has the most power, but why this is the case, and what this means in terms of 
outcomes. Stone (2002) differentiates regime theory from conventional [old] 
institutional analysis by emphasizing the role of non-governmental actors and the lack 
of any formal command structure. He goes to the heart of the nature of governance 
by pointing out that if government alone can set and maintain a particular policy 
direction, there is no regime, and traditional organizational analysis will suffice. For 
the same reason, regime theory can be distinguished from classical studies of policy 
networks, which focus on intra-govemmental linkages as a determining factor in 
policy development. (For example, see Bassett, 1996).
Much of the literature discussing URT explains private-sector involvement in local 
decision-making as a resource issue -  the private sector has access to much greater
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amounts of capital and technical expertise than the government (Brown, 1999; Clark, 
2001; Davies, 2002; Stone, 2002). The private sector’s control of these productive 
resources therefore gives it “privileged influence on the urban power structure” 
(Davies, 2002, p 3). As Harding (1994, p 361) puts it, “When it comes to urban 
development projects, votes count, but resources decide.” This may explain why 
most of the early theoretical and empirical literature on urban regime theory focused 
on the pro-business agenda of many cities, concluding this was a logical outcome of 
situations where public- and private-sector participants were trying to maximize their 
own self-interest. (For example, see Elkin, 1987b; Stone, 1989.)
Over the years, URT has broadened considerably from its economic development- 
centered roots to examine a wide range of issues. Brown’s study of AIDS policy in 
Christchurch, New Zealand, focused on the important role non-governmental 
organizations played in the development and implementation of local health and 
education policies targeting sex workers (Brown, 1999). Gladstone and Fainstein’s 
study of the tourism industry in New York City and Los Angeles came to the 
conclusion that one should not think of a monolithic “business regime” in a city, 
pointing out different business sectors can have very different interests and differing 
levels of access to local decision-makers (Gladstone & Fainstein, 2001). Other 
regime analyses have examined the role of women, gays, and African-Americans in 
governing coalitions, and the role regimes have played in urban school reform and 
crackdowns on obscenity (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001).
Regime Typologies and Characteristics
There are numerous views, all apparently based on US case studies, on the types of 
regimes that exist. Although different researchers have given their typologies 
different descriptive names, they tend to fall into two different thematic categories: 
how active or aggressive the regime is in promoting new policies, and who benefits 
from these policies. Most typologies have an activist orientation, which makes sense 
given that regimes are seen as a form of governance responding to some policy or 
programmatic shortcoming. There is greater divergence in identifying the intended 
beneficiaries of regime agendas, ranging from business interests to neighborhoods in 
need of revitalization to taxpayers decrying high tax rates.
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Table 3-1 
Urban Regime Typologies
Thematic characteristics
Fainstein & 
Fainstein 
(1986)
Elkin
(1987a)
Stone
(1993)
Dowding
(1993)
Clark
(2002)
Activist (pro-growth) Directive Pluralist Development Development Entrepreneurial
Activist (community focus) Concessionary Federalist
Middle-class
progressive
Middle-class
progressive Progressive
Working
class Working class
Activist
Demand side
Activist (fiscal restraint/ 
government accountability) Conserving Entrepreneurial Service Stewardship
Non-Activist (status quo) Maintenance Maintenance Caretaker
Fainstein & Fainstein (1986) were among the first to posit different regime types.
They identified three, each reflecting a different approach and time period. Directive 
regimes occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s, and are typified by urban 
redevelopment schemes largely sponsored by the state. These were followed by 
concessionary regimes placing greater emphasis on civil rights and class inequities, 
responding to the social pressures that dominated public debate in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The third model, known as the conserving regime, occurred between the 
mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, placing a renewed emphasis on growth and local fiscal 
stability. The conserving regime differed from the directive regime, however, in its 
attempt to address pressing social problems at a greatly reduced level of spending. 
Fainstein & Fainstein believe their model categorizes governance efforts during this 
time period in most large US cities with a significant minority population.
Elkin’s (1987a) three-tiered model revolves around a political equation involving 
bureaucrats, local politicians, and business leaders all trying to maximize their own 
domain. Although he did not see his three regime types -  pluralist, federalist, and 
entrepreneurial -  as exhaustive typologies, he did see them as capturing the essence 
of the change occurring in most US cities. Elkin’s regime types are very similar to 
those proposed by Fainstein & Fainstein (i.e., pluralist = directive, federalist = 
concessionary, entrepreneurial = conserving), with each occurring in roughly the same 
period as the Fainstein version. Key differences include Elkin’s emphasis on 
geography -  he claimed the first two models dominated in the northeastern and 
midwest US, while the third was typical of governance taking place in the rapidly
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expanding southwestern US. Another difference is Elkin’s entrepreneurial model 
places greater emphasis on power sharing between the public and private sectors, 
involving more active use of partnerships and a bureaucratic style that today might be 
characterized as ’new public management.’
Both Stone and Dowding have posited descriptive models that stand independent of 
any specific time frame. Dowding’s (2001) five-regime system largely overlaps 
Stone’s (1993) four-model version. Stone identified maintenance regimes, which 
seek to preserve the status quo; development regimes, which seek to promote growth 
and halt economic decline in various parts of the city; middle-class progressive 
regimes, which seek to manage growth and promote a variety of social causes, 
including environmental and historic preservation, affirmative action, and affordable 
housing; and working-class regimes, which try to expand education, job training, 
home ownership, and other opportunities for lower-income individuals and families.
To these four, Dowding adds service regimes, which stress professionalizing 
government service delivery in a city through operational improvements or 
privatization. There are several points worth noting about these new models. First, 
by jettisoning any temporal link, the typologies are more widely adaptable to non-US 
locales, where economic and social changes may have occurred within a different 
time frame. Second, both Dowding and Stone include what is essentially a “non­
activist” regime agenda (i.e., maintenance regimes), while Dowding posits a regime 
focusing largely on issues already under government’s control (i.e., service regimes). 
Neither Elkin nor Fainstein saw these as possibilities, either because they were locked 
into a specific time-frame reference, or because they were simply tying to see regime 
analysis as a tool for explaining variations among different pro-growth agendas, rather 
than as a generic tool for explaining different approaches to governance.
Clark (2001) extended the range of activist regime typologies with a six-regime 
model. While most of her models describe traits already identified by other 
commentators, the exception is her stewardship regime concept. This refers to a 
regime that imposes quid pro quo requirements on the recipients of government 
investment as a means of protecting the public interest. This new typology blends the 
characteristics of regimes focused on protecting scarce public resources with those
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interested in supporting pro-growth policies. Clark fails, however, to provide any 
means of evaluating when a stewardship regime exists. Does a single attempt to 
wring concessions from a private firm mean an otherwise entrepreneurial or 
progressive regime should be reclassified, or is a track record required?
Clark’s omission begs the larger question of how researchers can identify whether a 
regime exists. Stone (2002, p 3) provides only partial guidance when declaring, “The 
test for regime analysis is the proposition that no strong capacity to govern in a 
direction-setting manner exists outside regime arrangements.” Other commentators 
provide more direction by arguing that outcomes are the key to identifying a regime’s 
existence. For instance, tax breaks, the use of eminent domain powers, and an 
increase in police presence in certain commercial districts could all be interpreted as 
evidence of a regime’s work (Gladstone & Fainstein, 2001). Clark (Clark, 2001)goes 
so far as to identify specific characteristics for each of the six regime typologies she 
proposed. For example, the presence of her caretaker regime might be tipped off by 
substantial local membership in environmental groups, or by the presence of 
campaigns against corporate welfare. Similarly, Clark argues a minority mayor, fair 
wage rules, and a focus on rebuilding areas of deprivation are characteristics of cities 
with progressive regimes.
Dowding’s (2001) approach is far less focused on outcomes, emphasizing instead the 
importance of structural evidence. Dowding describes an eight-point checklist of 
things to look for: 1) the presence of a distinctive policy agenda; 2) the policy agenda 
should be relatively long-lived; 3) the regime must consist of a coalition of interests 
that are not institutional in nature; 4) regime member interests should be cross- 
sectional or cross-institutional; 5) the agenda must survive changes in political 
leadership; 6) mobilizing non-governmental resources should be central to the success 
of the regime; 7) the regime must have strong, visionary leadership; and 8) there 
should be an emphasis on public-private partnerships that bridge institutions and 
community interests. According to Dowding, the first four characteristics are of 
critical importance, while the ability to survive changes in political leadership is 
perhaps the key defining characteristic of a successful regime.
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Stone’s definition and Dowding’s checklist fit neatly with the explanations given for 
focusing on city governance rather than city government. Broad participation, 
involving relationships that extend beyond those called for by statute or regulation, is 
a notion central to governance, as is the mobilization of resources outside 
government’s control. What are unique about these definitions are the issues not 
previously raised in the discussion on urban governance: the long-term nature of the 
governing regime’s relationship and its coalescence around a distinctive policy 
agenda. Examination of these factors is therefore critical when distinguishing the 
existence of a regime from a simple network analysis (Rydin, 1998).
Criticism of Regime Theory
Although urban regime theory has grown in popularity over the last decade, it is not 
without its critics. Objections generally fall into two categories: the localistic nature 
of the concept, and its provincial origins.
Complaints about the localistic nature of regime theory stem from its origin as a 
means of analyzing the politics and relationships that guide policy-making in an urban 
area. Decisions are seen as the outcome of negotiation between actors and 
institutions (Brown, 1999). But this overly simplistic view ignores other factors that 
can affect decision-making in urban areas, including local culture (Ferman, 1996), 
electoral politics (Lauria, 1994), and state and federal policies. For example, Jonas 
recounts the dramatic impact cutbacks in federal defense spending had in Southern 
California. Decisions made in Congress ultimately had huge impacts on local tax 
revenues, land use decisions, and economic development policies (Jonas, 1997). As 
regards the issue of urban renewables, the absence of any systematic method for 
incorporating the effect of regulatory structures is particularly problematic, as these 
regulations can dramatically limit the energy policy options available to decision­
makers. This issue is addressed at length below
Electoral politics is another issue that cannot simply be dismissed -  situations arise in 
the course of urban life to which government must respond or risk ejection from 
office. Because some powers cannot be devolved to a larger governing coalition, 
decisions by government may shift the short- and long-term landscape in which
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regimes operate. Similarly, culture plays a huge role in determining political roles 
and the local power structure, as Stone (Stone, 1989) so clearly showed in his study of 
Atlanta politics.
Because regime theory was originally used to explicate local politics and decision­
making in the United States, there have been concerns over its applicability in 
countries where the national government plays the central role in funding local 
development schemes (Bassett, 1996; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Newman & 
Thomley, 1997; Sites, 1997). This contrasts sharply with circumstances in the US, 
where funding for local projects is generally dependent on taxes and other forms of 
financial support from the local business community. Keeping business interests 
satisfied by collaborating with them in a governing coalition can therefore be very 
important, and regime analysis follows as a useful tool for analyzing this situation. 
Franz also notes that, funding issues aside, many European countries have a tradition 
of strong and effective local public administration. As a result, “the idea that 
circumstances might force the municipal authorities to lose part of their decision­
making power to other urban groups or coalitions with a formally less legitimized 
status, seems prima facie implausible” (Franz, 2000, p 315).
Attempts at regime analysis in a European context have nonetheless been completed. 
John and Cole (1998, p 387) report this typically has been accomplished by placing 
greater importance on the role of public-sector actors in the regime, and by viewing 
regimes not as a necessary condition for local governance “but as a form of 
governance that can emerge if given favourable conditions.” As examples of the 
former, they cite Strom’s finding of the importance of the state and political parties in 
driving change in Berlin, and Valler’s study of Norwich in the UK, where local 
government was the key player (Strom, 1996; Valler, 1995). John and Cole’s own 
comparison of Leeds and Lille falls into the second category, as they found that 
although the politics of both cities shows regime-like qualities, it is not clear if they 
could be considered fully developed regimes. Franz (2000) came to a similar 
conclusion in examining cities in the former East Germany, seeing the potential for 
regime development but finding insufficient evidence to support their existence to 
date
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Environmental and Energy Regimes -  Another Appropriate Broadening of the 
Paradigm?
Despite the heavy emphasis on economic concerns in regime agendas, they need not 
have a hegemonic claim on the attention of regime members. Urban environmental 
issues can be analyzed using regime analysis, although to date, very little research has 
been done in this area (Clark, 2001; Gibbs & Jonas, 2000). This is somewhat 
surprising, given growing recognition of the link between environmental quality and 
the level of economic activity and development in a city. Stone’s regime typology 
specifically noted that one characteristic of a “middle class progressive” regime is an 
effort to limit growth due to concerns for the local environment (Stone, 1993). 
Conversely, one also can imagine a city’s environmental amenities being used as an 
extra-economic factor by pro-growth regimes attempting to attract businesses to an 
area (Gibbs & Jonas, 2000).
To the extent regime analysis can identify who is behind these decisions, why these 
groups or businesses are promoting this perspective, and what resources were required 
to turn this perspective into policy it serves an invaluable research function.
However, as noted above, one of the primary criticisms leveled against URT is its 
localism, ignoring larger structural issues such as the impact of social regulation on 
local governance decisions (Stone, 2002). This is critically important when dealing 
with environmental policy matters, because of the heavy reliance on regulation as a 
policy tool. Local land-use planning decisions are one area where regulations may 
exceed the political power normally deemed critical to regime analysis. Although the 
planning process is generally under local control, planning decisions can be 
circumscribed by state or federal regulations designed to protect greenbelts, 
endangered species, or water quality. Similarly, local transportation planning 
decisions may be proscribed to ensure compliance with state or federal air-quality 
guidelines. Addressing the impact of regulatory schemes must therefore be an 
important part of any environment-related regime analysis.
There are several observations one can make about the use of regime analysis to study 
the issue of renewable power issues in cities. First, given the highly regulated nature 
of the electric utility industry, the impact of such rules on local decision-making must
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be taken into account, as they may restrict real or perceived options for changes in the 
electricity delivery and supply system. Second, a regime’s perspective on renewable 
power use may hinge on who is involved in the local regime and their capacity to 
sway the opinions of other regime members. Utilities are important players in a city’s 
business community, given their key role supporting the operations of other 
businesses. Understanding the utility’s role in any regime, their policy perspective, 
and capacity to influence local policy-making, is therefore critical. The same holds 
true for any other energy-related firms or institutions in the area. Bums’ analysis of 
regime influences in Hartford, Connecticut, also points out the need to look beyond 
purely local-level actors for regime members. He found the Governor of Connecticut 
was an extremely influential regime member, working hand-in-hand with business 
interests in the city to promote an active economic development and education reform 
agenda (Bums, 2002). In the case of energy policy, there may well be non­
governmental organizations or actors at the state or federal levels which play an active 
role in promoting renewable power use in a specific city, and it will be important to 
identify who they are and what resources they bring to the table.
Finally, a regime’s perspective on renewable power use may hinge on its perceived 
impact on the overall business climate of the area. Opposition likely would be high if 
renewable power is seen as an obstacle to growth, or as something that will raise the 
cost of doing business in a city. Such criticisms have been leveled at new proposals 
to create a renewables portfolio standard in New York State, and to site wind farms 
offshore of heavily populated Long Island, directly adjacent to New York City 
(Keating, 2003). Proposals to change local building codes to require the installation 
of photovoltaic systems may similarly be opposed by a regime because it could 
increase the cost of real estate development in a city.
Conversely, regimes may be amenable to mandatory schemes if renewable 
technologies can be shown to hedge against utility price spikes or future price 
increases, or if the widespread adoption of renewable technologies helps address air 
quality problems in a region, thereby benefiting the overall business climate. A 
regime also may have no problem with efforts promoting the voluntary adoption of 
renewable technologies. These proposals could take the form of government-funded 
rebates to individuals or businesses installing such systems; or education programs
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and “model” buildings that showcase the use and benefits of renewable technologies. 
Such proposals would have negligible impact on the local business climate.
Both sets of scenarios point out the importance of understanding the regime’s role in 
the renewable-energy policy development process. Was the regime actively engaged 
on this issue, working to tone down or repress energy policy proposals considered 
anti-business? Or was the influence subtler, reflecting what Bachrach and Baratz 
(1963) referred to as non-decision making power, where the regime has shaped the 
policy-making landscape to a sufficient degree that certain proposals are dismissed 
out of hand, never even making it to the point of discussion among local policy­
makers? Finally, is this an issue on which the regime is totally disengaged, leaving it 
to local government officials to determine the scope and scale of the renewable- 
energy policy agenda? If so, it may be the case that government agencies and 
officials working on renewable power policies and programs are isolated from the 
government agencies and officials engaged in economic development issues. The 
latter is the group most likely to represent “government” perspectives in any pro­
growth regime (Gibbs, Longhurst, & Braithwaite, 1996).
Commentary
Renewable energy policy is an area that bridges public- and private-sector interests, 
and my research focus on urban level decision-making makes URT an obvious 
analytical framework to consider. Its focus on who is involved in the decision­
making process, the nature of relationships among different players, and how they 
manage to negotiate a mutually acceptable policy agenda means there is much to gain 
from its use. In particular, regime analysis may enlighten us about why different 
cities pursue different approaches when promoting renewables use, or why they 
ignore renewable power altogether.
The analysis, by necessity, will focus on any hegemonic regime’s perspective toward 
local environmental quality matters. Renewable power deployment can be seen as an 
economic development issue, but more likely it is emblematic of a regime’s overall 
approach toward environmental protection, and the city’s role or responsibility in 
achieving it.
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We must also ask, however, whether attention must singularly focus on the actions of 
the dominant regime in a city, or whether it is possible for a separate and distinct 
“specialized” regime to drive policy-making on local renewable power deployment or 
use. This is one of the key questions posed by Gibbs and Jonas that I intend to 
address in each case study. The current literature is silent on the idea that different 
regimes can co-exist in a city, either because the previous studies were narrowly 
focused on a single topic (e.g., economic development) or because this concept is 
implausible given that regimes are considered hegemonic. If a separate ‘sustainability 
regime’ does exist, one would expect to find it either opposing new energy sources 
(particularly if this regime is dominated by entrenched energy interests) or actively 
promoting their use.
One also must consider the possibility the regime approach is too robust for this type 
of research. By this I mean the model may best be suited to exploring very broad 
policy agendas, rather than the relatively narrow policy matter I have chosen to study. 
As Stone (2002, p 2) notes, “A regime is not a form of integrated guidance of the full 
range of policy activity. Instead, concerned actors, from both governmental and 
nongovernmental sectors, create arrangements (a regime) in order to act on a set of 
high-priority problems” [emphasis added]. Renewable power deployment or use 
simply may not fit this bill, even in cities where renewable power resources are 
plentiful or public support is strong. If this is true, then a research framework like 
new institutionalism may be more useful at explaining the state of renewable power 
policy and deployment in a city.
New Institutionalism and Urban Regime Theory -  A Blended Approach
Where does the preceding analysis leave us? Is one approach obviously superior to 
the other for my purposes? Or is it necessary to craft a third way?
NI and URT both excel at explicating the ‘who, what, when and how’ of urban 
governance. Both emphasize that government doesn’t act alone, and that informal 
structures and other influences are equally important. Both approaches stress the 
importance of history to the equation, either in terms of path dependency (new
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institutionalism) or in terms of the length of time the governing coalition has 
dominated local decision-making (regime theory). Both emphasize the role of shared 
values or interests, and the influence these values and interests have in influencing the 
behavior of others. When noting that “urban regimes are themselves informally 
constituted arrangements of rules that shape actor’s behavior,” (Lowndes, 2001, p 
1964) is using the language of new institutionalism to make her point, thus affirming 
the idea that urban regime theory and new institutionalism share many common traits.
They are not, however, two sides of the same coin, and each has its weaknesses, many 
of which are addressed by attributes of the other theory. Regime theory is very 
locally focused, looking for factors that are spatially bounded. To the extent 
explanatory factors extend beyond the city limits, URT may fail to identify them.
New institutionalism does a better job in this way, looking for larger sets of 
explanations. Ironically, however, new institutionalism’s big picture focus can mean 
that local details get ignored. URT emphasizes “high-priority” agenda setting, while 
new institutionalism accommodates the full range of policy issues occurring in a city, 
including those not yet on the radar screen of a ruling regime. Urban regime theory 
has been criticized for its weakness in comparing cross-boundary situations -  ‘old’ 
Institutionalism was one of the early analytic mainstays of political scientists making 
such comparisons, and new institutionalism retains this capacity. Urban regime 
theory emphasizes who is in the regime, while new institutionalism focuses less on 
that and more on the societal and structural context that influence regime membership 
and individual and collective agendas. Finally, as I have mentioned several times, 
New institutionalism excels at analyzing formal rules like those regulating the electric 
utility industry, a situation at which urban regime theory is far less adept.
I therefore see value in blending these two approaches to craft a new theory that 
retains the strengths and eliminates the shortcomings of each individual theory.
Under this blended approach, which I dub modified regime theory, urban policy­
making emanates from two policy spheres. [See Figure 3-2.] To the right are issues 
falling within a regime’s core agenda, reflecting Stone’s contention that regimes only 
tackle the ‘big’ issues facing the city. A second, larger, sphere encompasses the 
broader urban agenda, in which the lion’s share of policy-making activity within the 
city occurs. Issues tackled here represent those not on the regime agenda or about
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which the regime could not agree. In cities where no regime is present, it is this broad 
urban agenda policy sphere that provides critical policy leadership to the city. Cross- 
border analyses are also facilitated by this model, because differences in national 
government structures, societal values, or market mechanisms are explicitly 
accommodated by the model, reflected in the institutional backdrop in which policy 
decisions are debated and made.
Figure 3-2 
Modified Regime Framework
Regime Agenda
Broader Urban Agenda
Policy and 
Program 
outcomes 
(behavior)
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A gen d a  
se ttin g  p r o c e s s
New Institutional influences
(values, norms, formal and 
informal rules, history)
R eg im e
m e m b e r s
Local
S ta k e h o ld e r s
New Institutional influences
(values, norms, formal and 
informal rules, history)
Within the broader urban agenda policy sphere, stakeholders of all types and capacity 
compete to achieve their agendas. In cities where a regime is present, a smaller subset 
of local stakeholders participate as members of the hegemonic regime, reflecting 
some type of privileged status, assets, or knowledge of value to other regime 
members. The dashed line reflects the fact that regime members constitute a subset of 
the larger universe linking regime members to local stakeholders operating within a 
city.
In each sphere, policy-making occurs within a new institutional context, whereby 
values, norms, formal and informal rules, and history determining which stakeholders
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are involved, the values they hold, the options they consider, and their capacity to act. 
It is here that any electricity market regulations or other regulatory mechanisms are 
accommodated, along with other formal or informal rules that may influence 
renewables policy-making in a city. Through a feedback loop, policy and program 
outcomes eventually become part of this institutional fabric, changing or updating 
societal norms or rules and forming a new historical record. One could conceivably 
locate the two policy spheres within the same institutional environment, but I have 
opted to treat them as distinct to signify the separate but inter-related nature of the 
regime, and the fact that its presence and activity exerts unique influences on the 
broad urban agenda, and vice versa. (This influence can be seen by the two-way 
feedback loop situated between the two policy spheres.)
Although many research questions flow quite naturally from this model, in each case 
study I will attempt to answer two questions which are of primary importance. First, 
does a hegemonic regime exist within this city, and if so, does it engage on renewable 
power policy-making matters? If not, is there a policy-specific regime setting the 
local renewables agenda? Second, what are the key institutional influences that affect 
the shape of local renewable power policy-making in each city, and how do they 
manifest themselves in this model? Are they influences that shape policy-making or 
behavior only in the broad urban agenda, or do they affect regime behavior as well, 
influencing who is involved or which policy options are considered? In the final 
chapter of this thesis, I shall also examine the larger question of whether this modified 
regime theory model was a success, addressing shortfalls in the stand-alone new 
institutionalism and urban regime theory models, and whether its application in my 
empirical work produced any revelations worth noting prior to its application to other 
cities or policy contexts.
Conclusion
The new era of urban governance requires new tools for analysis. Urban regime 
theory has proven itself to be highly adept at explicating the underlying factors and 
stakeholders driving local decision-making. Gibbs & Jonas suggest URT can be 
deployed to examine environmental decision-making, something we’ve not seen to 
date in the literature. However, left unaddressed in their call to use URT in this way
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was any counsel on how to account for the larger policy and regulatory milieu tightly 
bound up with environmental policy-making.
Chapters 1 and 2 made it very clear that such factors must be taken into account in 
any analysis of urban energy policy-making, as they are so pervasive. These include 
the fact that cities are home to the bulk of all energy use, yet local authorities are 
typically not the source of the major decisions shaping the marketplace. Moreover, 
national and state stakeholders determine how electricity markets are structured and 
who plays which role in making the market work. State and national stakeholders 
also provide the overall policy direction for the industry, emphasizing the need to 
better take account of climate change concerns, energy costs, or the adequacy of the 
transmission grid. Subject to the rules of the game, market players then develop and 
implement their own preferred strategy.
Compounding the complexity of this issue is the fact that cities engage in energy 
policy-making and market activities in many different ways. Understanding the logic 
of their decisions requires the use of robust models that can help us untangle the 
influence of different stakeholder involvement and larger structural or systems- 
oriented explanations. My blended theory should prove helpful at analyzing both 
types of factors. In the case studies that follow, I’ll put this new model to the test, 
first examining whether an energy regime is at work in each city, and if so, how the 
larger policy and market environment is influencing its behavior. As part of this 
analysis I’ll also interrogate other questions raised by Gibbs & Jonas that offer 
insights into how and why regimes are formed, and how they operate. By doing so 
this thesis will expand our understanding of URT’s applicability to different policy 
contexts, and begin to flesh out how to improve its explanatory impact.
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CHAPTER 4 
Methodological Approach
Overview
Empirical work carried out in support of this thesis involved the development of two 
comprehensive case studies examining renewable power policy-making in New York 
City and London. Case study-based research is a common social science research 
methodology used when “’how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the 
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003, p i ) .  Regime analyses have 
long relied on case study analysis, profiling events, institutions, stakeholders, and the 
broad political and policy-making environment in each city under review.
Case study work has been criticized in the past as lacking the analytical rigor of 
statistical analysis or other forms of qualitative research (deVaus, 2001), but case 
studies are nonetheless widely used to broaden our understanding of complex 
phenomena that are not readily distinguishable from their context (Yin, 2003). In this 
thesis, the case studies were structured to emphasize areas suggested by my 
theoretical framework. Because regime analysis emphasizes the role of stakeholders, 
significant amounts of time were expended looking at who was involved in the 
crafting of different policies or programs, and what their participation meant in terms 
of outcomes. New institutionalism forced me to focus on larger sets of issues, such as 
the nature of local politics in New York City and London; the local policy-making 
process and the larger state or national regulatory framework; the status and structure 
of local energy markets; and the values or social norms held by different stakeholders 
or imbued into various organizations, institutions, or rule-bound processes.
Answering the critics of case study research, it is clear that such an analysis would not 
easily lend itself to statistical techniques that try to isolate the relative influence of one 
or more of these factors by holding them ‘constant’ across the two cities.
To obtain this information, the case studies relied heavily on literature reviews and 
telephone and in-person interviews with local policy elites. Given their long and 
storied histories and status as two leading world cities, New York and London have
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both been the subject of much research examining their overall political and policy 
environment. There has been less work scrutinizing local energy and environmental 
policy-making, but I did uncover a rich array of newspaper and magazine articles 
documenting or commenting on these topics. In-person and telephone interviews 
were conducted with local policy elites and observers of the policy-making process. 
These sessions gave me an insider’s look into the genesis of many key policies, 
including the nature of any debates that occurred as the policies were first being 
negotiated. Interviews were tailored to reflect each person’s unique knowledge of 
these issues, and included questions soliciting both personal opinions and factual 
information.
In this chapter, I explain why I selected these research methods. I identify the 
categories of interviewees who I sought out in each city, and discuss the general lines 
of inquiry that were targeted at each group. I also discuss the dominant forms of 
written documentation that I relied on as part of my literature review, and explain why 
they were the most relevant. Finally, I discuss my experiences carrying out this work 
in each city, and offer observations relevant to others conducting similar research.
Research Plan
My research plan consisted of several different elements. The most important early 
decision was the selection of my case study cities. As a long-time observer of and 
participant in environmental policy-making in New York City, I believed my network 
of contacts and knowledge of local politics and policy-making processes could 
expedite the research process, so New York was an obvious choice. Even absent 
these parochial benefits, the city made for a good candidate for research on this topic 
because of its standing as a global city (Fainstein, 2001; Sassen, 2001); its reputation 
as a juggernaut of world finance and ‘headquarters for headquarters’ (Warf, 2000); 
and role as the center of a large and diverse regional economy, benefiting mightily 
from strong tourism, advertising, accounting, legal, media, and entertainment business 
sectors. To power this economy, New York City consumes vast quantities of power 
on a daily basis, enduring some of the highest electricity prices in the US. No large 
new power plant has been constructed in the city in many years, and because of this 
and constraints on the amount of electricity that can be imported to the city over
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transmission lines, the city has been at risk of blackouts and brownouts during peak 
demand periods since 2000 (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004). All of 
these facts appeared to make the city a good candidate for on-site renewable power 
deployment, and thus of interest from a research perspective.
London enjoys a similar high profile global status. Population levels are roughly the 
same as in New York, and it similarly enjoys a post-industrial economy that competes 
with New York City and leading European cities on financial services, fashion, and 
knowledge-based services (Greater London Authority, 2000b; Parkinson, 2001; 
Travers, 2004). At the time I began my research, London Mayor Ken Livingstone 
had announced plans to develop a comprehensive Energy Strategy for the city, thus 
affording me the opportunity to query decision-makers in a timely manner about the 
logic behind their decisions on the plan. Another benefit offered by the timing of the 
Energy Strategy development process was how it facilitated my identification of key 
stakeholders, an otherwise time-consuming step.
With this decision settled, I turned my attention to the design of my case studies. 
DeVaus (2001) suggests researchers keep in mind six key design considerations when 
developing case studies:
1. Single vs. multiple cases'. This element refers to the number of units of 
measure within the analysis. Both are equally valid, but as with statistical 
analysis, which prefers larger sample sizes, multiple case studies are seen as 
providing greater insight into an issue or more data points that can support a 
conclusion aimed at testing or building an explanatory theory.
2. Descriptive vs. explanatory case studies: Descriptive case studies primarily 
focus on communicating information in a non-judgmental or overly analytical 
way, while explanatory case studies attempt to use the information to answer 
some question pre-defined by the researcher.
3. Theory testing vs. theory building case studies: Explanatory case studies 
either test or build theories. A theory testing case study uses the information 
collected to determine which of several competing theories best explain a 
certain phenomenon. Theory building case studies use the evidence to create a 
new theory or theories that can explain this phenomenon.
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4. Parallel vs. sequential case studies: This element focuses on whether the case 
studies are completed sequentially or in roughly the same time frame.
5. Retrospective vs. prospective case studies'. A retrospective analysis involves 
reconstructing the historical record of the case, while a prospective study 
involves the monitoring of a case from now into the future. Retrospective 
analyses potentially can suffer if gaps exist in the historical record, whereas 
prospective analyses may suffer from a failure to fully consider the historical 
antecedents of the current situation.
6. Holistic vs. embedded case studies: Yin (1989) developed the concept of 
holistic and embedded case studies, identifying a holistic case study as one 
that dwells on information germane to the entire case, whereas an embedded 
case study tries to understand the whole situation by analysing the many levels 
or subunits of analysis that make up the larger case study.
My research design factored in all of these considerations; I will address each in turn. 
First, although New York City is so complex it could have potentially served as a 
standalone case study, I believed it was important to contrast the story in New York 
with the situation in at least one other city. By doing so, it allowed me to use the 
thesis as both a theory building and theory testing exercise. My primary goal was to 
understand the logic renewable energy policy-making in each city, meaning I would 
develop my conclusions based on the findings of two case studies, enhancing its 
generalizability to other urban contexts. A second city also provided another 
opportunity to apply my theoretical framework, helping to identify flaws or attributes 
in its design that may not have been apparent during a single application. The 
dramatically different political and regulatory contexts of London and New York City 
make this point particularly compelling.
The lengthy travel time and high cost of traveling between the two cities made it 
necessary to sequence my research. Field interviews in New York were conducted 
between October 2003 and January 2004 (and again in May 2005), while London 
field interviews were generally conducted between April 2004 and August 2004. 
Although sequencing complicated the writing phase of this thesis because important 
policy changes occurred in New York City while I was working in London, it also
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proved beneficial in that my London research benefited from insights gained and 
mistakes made in New York.
My case study design was by necessity explanatory in nature, given my focus on how 
and why policy is made on renewables in an urban setting. A descriptive case study 
would have simply presented facts about the history and current state of energy 
policy, regulation, and political affairs in New York City and London. This is 
potentially an interesting story, but one that provides few lessons for other 
municipalities seeking to expand their own deployment or use levels. Explanatory 
case studies dig deeper, using raw facts as grist for an analysis from which others can 
learn. The fact that I was looking to understand how past decision-making has shaped 
the current energy policy situation in each city made my work partly retrospective in 
nature. To ensure there were no significant gaps in the historical record, I spent a 
great deal of time digging for past energy policy documents that might provide some 
historical or causal link to current day policies. The timing of the London Energy 
Strategy, however, and the decision by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg to 
establish an energy policy task force in 2003 also gave me the opportunity to conduct 
a prospective analysis, in that my field research occurred shortly after the Energy 
Strategy was finalized.
Finally, my research design was structured as an embedded analysis, meaning I 
emphasized spending time with different stakeholders involved in and affected by the 
energy policy-making process in each city, in an attempt to develop a more complete 
picture of how decisions are made, who exerts power, and how or whether formal and 
informal rule structures influence the direction of local policy. I preferred this 
approach because of renewable power’s status as a relatively new and small player in 
the energy game. Understanding how new stakeholders gain standing with 
hegemonic energy interests offers insights into the structures dominating the industry, 
and the values permeating these structures and the entire energy policy-making 
process.
In crafting my research design, I also needed to keep in mind issues related to how the 
data will be interpreted and generalized for other locales, meaning dealing with issues 
of internal validity, external validity, construct reliability, and reliability (Yin, 1989).
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Internal validity relates to a researcher’s ability to accurately detect a causal 
relationship between earlier and later events. Lacking statistical measures such as t- 
tests or R values, techniques such as ‘pattern matching’ have been developed to help 
researchers ensure the validity of their conclusions. Dowding’s 8-point checklist 
(Dowding, 2001) and Stone (2002) and Clark’s (2001) more basic definitions serve as 
pattern matching templates I can use in my own research. No such framework has 
been posited in the case of new institutionalism, meaning I must either develop my 
own framework to justify any claim that institutional influences have driven a city’s 
energy policy-making in a certain direction, or exercise great care when making such 
assertions.
External validity focuses on the generalizability of the results to other situations. In 
my work, the issue is whether it will be reasonable to claim that lessons drawn from 
New York City and London can be generalized to other large urban areas. Given that 
political and regulatory systems can function very differently in different cities, this 
may be difficult. Construct validity relates to the breadth and depth of the research 
design -  whether data gaps exist, or whether the research uncovered all factors 
relevant to the case. This is particularly important when examining institutional 
influences on the energy policy-making process, as the sources of these influences can 
be quite diverse. Moreover, some factors may only be known by a limited group of 
insiders, meaning a careful research design involving a wide range of sources 
becomes all-important. Finally, reliability refers to the replicability of the findings by 
another investigator following the same research design and conducting exactly the 
same research as the initial investigator. In defining reliability, Yin (1989, p 45) 
draws a parallel between case study research and the work of a bookkeeper. The 
latter knows they are subject to an audit, where an outsider comes in to validate the 
original calculations. Although the likelihood that another researcher would replicate 
this study is slim, the point is the same, leading me to update my research design on a 
regular basis and keep comprehensive records detailing my research results as they 
occurred.
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Data Sources
My research drew on four of the six sources of evidence commonly used in case 
studies (Yin, 1989, p 84): written documents, archival records, interviews, and direct 
observation. Evidence based on participant-observation and physical artifacts proved 
irrelevant to my work. Archival records provided valuable historical information 
about old city energy policies; comments submitted by different stakeholders on 
regulatory proposals; and minutes from legislative and regulatory hearings. In the 
New York case study, I also obtained copies of old government contracts through the 
filing of Freedom of Information Law requests, which give the public access to 
certain types of government documentation.
The majority of my research, however, involved the review of written documentation 
and the use of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with key policy and decision­
makers in each target city. Written documentation generally fell into two key areas:
• Articles/reports documenting local politics and policy-making practices: The 
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3 detailed the importance of the 
political dynamics of local policy-making practices in each city. Therefore, it was 
essential to review academic journal articles, books, news reports, and other 
documentation discussing the history and process of policy-making in each city, 
as well as which stakeholders were seen as driving local politics and policy 
development. There tended to be far less information specifically focused on 
local energy policy-making, so as a proxy I frequently referenced information 
about other environmental policy issues in that city.
• Energy policy studies: Although the sources differed widely, several key reports 
were available detailing the status of current energy systems in each city, along 
with the potential for alternative supply strategies. Authors ranged from local 
government itself; the local distribution utility and other electricity suppliers; 
local, state, and national environmental organizations; business and trade groups; 
and academic researchers. Reports focusing on similar issues at the state or
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national level were also helpful at explaining the broader policy context in which 
each locality operates.
Interview Strategy
This information was nicely complemented by face-to-face, semi-structured, ‘expert’ 
(Flick, 2002, p 89) interviews with key stakeholders who offered their on- and off- 
the-record perspectives on local energy issues. For the purpose of this thesis, 
interviewees were treated as ‘representative respondents’ (Gorden, 1975, p 188) 
because their answers served as proxies for the larger array of stakeholders around 
each city. Face-to-face interviews were pursued wherever possible because they 
facilitated audio-taping and verbatim transcripts that could be reviewed months after 
the original interview took place.
Semi-structured interviews were used because they allowed me to cover a wide range 
of pre-planned topics as well as new lines of inquiry arising in the course of an 
interview. Questions were generally open-ended in nature, allowing the interviewee 
to respond in whatever manner they wished, or provide nuanced answers to complex 
questions. Formal questionnaires and structured interviews both suffer from this 
problem because they are generally pre-designed with specific answers or categories 
of answers in mind. Such categories may or may not fully capture the range of 
answers respondents can provide on an issue, particularly because in their role as 
expert, the respondents may have insights I had not anticipated (Fontana & Frey, 
1994). Open-ended questions were also useful when I was unfamiliar with a topic, as 
the responses provided fodder for follow-on questions. As my familiarity with a topic 
increased, questions became more structured to elicit more narrowly focused 
responses. Questions were designed to elicit factual information, interpretations of 
policies and other formal and informal rules, and personal perspectives on different 
matters. Examples of questionnaires used to interview two different types of policy 
experts are attached as Appendix 3.
Most interviews were conducted with individuals who could be categorized as ‘elites,’ 
as they held privileged positions in terms of local policy-making or business decision­
making (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). These individuals had many demands on their
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time, which occasionally forced them to limit the time they could schedule for an 
interview. Most people were generous with their time, however, and the majority of 
my interviews lasted between 45-60 minutes. On a few occasions, my interview 
requests were turned down, generally by people who claimed they did not have the 
time or had a policy of not conducting interviews with students. These setbacks did 
not adversely affect my research, as in every case I was able to replace these 
individuals with others equally knowledgeable about the subject.
Interviews were conducted with a very large number and wide range of stakeholders 
knowledgeable about energy or political topics in each city to ensure construct 
validity. Six broad categories of potential interviewees were targeted: government 
officials; the local advocacy community; the energy industry; the local business 
community; observers of local politics; and the local building design and construction 
community. Several of these groups were broken down into subcategories, 
particularly the government sector, where a wide range of organizational interests 
were targeted. The type of information targeted from each group included:
Government
• Energy utility regulators -  With responsibility for oversight of the electric 
utility industry, this group plays a key role in rate-setting decisions; ensuring 
renewable power generators have access to the transmission and distribution 
grid; and managing inquiries into other aspects of electric utility operations. 
An important line of questioning in these interviews involved how the 
regulatory system is currently structured.
• Energy and environmental policy-makers -  These are the politicians and 
agency officials responsible for molding the local, state, and national energy 
landscape. Questions focused on the logic of past decisions and expectations 
for future policy.
• Land-use planning/Building Department -  Decisions made by these agencies 
can facilitate or hinder the installation of renewable technologies on private 
property. Interviews explored staff level knowledge of different technologies, 
and agency views on mandatory vs. voluntary regulatory approaches.
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• Economic development agencies -  These agencies play a key supportive role 
in helping to build or sustain a local renewable power industry. Using their 
industrial bonding powers, they can help businesses obtain less expensive 
financing for equipment related to renewable power system installations.
They can also make direct investments in or provide subsidies to renewable 
power technology manufacturers wishing to establish a business in the city, 
and develop training programs designed to develop a workforce trained to 
work in this industry. Finally, because they are in regular contact with the 
local business community, they can play a key outreach role in educating 
businesses and commercial property owners about the benefits of installing 
renewable power systems in their facilities. Questions focused on all of these 
issues, and what agency officials see as trends for the future.
Environmentalists/Other policy advocates
• Organizations focused on state, national, or international energy and 
environmental policy -  These groups focus on very high-level policy-making, 
and may or may not pay much attention to what is occurring at the local level. 
They also may or may not have a specific emphasis on energy issues or 
specific energy technologies, but will tend to have useful perspectives about 
the political dynamics of environmental and energy issues at the state and 
national level. Interviews focused heavily on identifying key stakeholders on 
energy and environmental topics, along with their perceptions of how policy is 
made in that city.
• Community-focused advocacy organizations -  These groups may or may not 
have an environmental or energy focus, but emphasize local level action. 
Interviews again emphasized the political and policy dynamics of the city, 
including which groups exert more or less influence over local policy-making.
• Energy policy specialists -  These groups or individuals tend to have strong 
viewpoints on specific energy technologies, both pro and con. Questions 
focused on market trends, issues related interconnections between renewable 
power systems and the grid, and their perspective on local energy policy­
making efforts.
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Energy Industry
• Renewable energy technology manufacturers -  These firms may or may not be 
located in the cities targeted by my research, but they nonetheless have a 
perspective on the viability of the urban market for their systems. Interviews 
focused on market trends, their familiarity with local energy policy issues, and 
how they work with policy-makers at all levels to create a more friendly 
business and policy landscape for their products.
• Renewable power technology installers -  These individuals or firms all had 
experience installing systems in New York or London, thereby providing first­
hand knowledge of any regulatory or market impediments in these cities. 
Questions also explored how their business has changed over time, and 
whether they saw links between business levels and certain policy initiatives.
• Renewable power technology trade organizations -  These groups are typically 
very active on policy issues, representing the business interests of system 
manufacturers and installers before different government agencies. Questions 
therefore examined their perspective on specific regulatory, economic, and 
political factors that have influenced renewables markets; their perspective on 
local, state, and national policies; and who they see as key stakeholders on 
these issues.
• Transmission and distribution system operator(s) — Stakeholders from these 
groups provided valuable information about the current state of electricity 
markets; how the marketplace has changed due to liberalization; what it is like 
to work with the state or federal utility regulators; and how efforts by 
renewables system operators to enter the marketplace is affecting their 
operation.
• Local electric utilities -  As the firm or firms responsible for delivering power 
into homes and businesses in New York and London, these utilities offered a 
crucial perspective on interconnection issues; how the marketplace has 
changed due to liberalization; and the nature of their relationship with state or 
federal regulators and local policy-makers.
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Other Business Community
• Business organizations -  These state or local organizations are typically 
focused on improving the local business ‘climate,’ and were able to provide a 
useful perspective on how energy issues are perceived by local businesses. 
Given issues raised in Chapter 2, understanding what role individual business 
leaders and local business organizations play in driving local policy making 
was also an important focus of my research with these groups.
Observers/Commentators
• "Good government ” groups -  Protecting the local ‘public’ interest is the 
primary focus on these groups, who regularly look for examples of political 
deals that unduly benefit or burden certain individuals or groups. Questions 
thus focused on their familiarity with local energy policy matters, and broader 
questions focused on who holds the greatest sway over the local policy­
making process.
Design/Build Community
• Architects/Engineer/Developers -  These groups exert a great deal of influence 
over the extent to which new buildings take responsibility for generating a 
portion of their own power supply. Interviews focused on building codes, the 
permitting process, the influence of historic preservation rules, the industry’s 
awareness of sustainability matters, and their views on the effectiveness of 
different mandatory and voluntary policy approaches.
• Unions/Building Trades groups -  In New York in particular, this group 
prepared several policy papers over the last few years emphasizing how 
energy shortages can damage the local economy, thereby harming the 
economic interests of their members. Questions therefore emphasized whether 
they endorse specific types of energy technologies over others, their 
involvement in the policy process, and who they saw as key agenda setters on 
these issues.
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A complete list of those individuals interviewed by telephone and in-person can be 
found in Appendix 1. Individuals with whom I corresponded via e-mail to satisfy 
very specific information needs are also listed.
General Observations of the Research Process/Conclusion
I undertook this thesis after many years in government and consulting, during which 
time much of my work focused on policy research on various environmental topics. 
Thus, the research process was familiar territory for me, although the scale of this 
work was much greater than work undertaken previously. There were few surprises 
along the way, and at no time did I find it necessary to dramatically alter my research 
plan. The case study design proved to be an appropriate methodological choice, 
allowing for a flexible yet comprehensive review of the factors influencing energy 
policy-making in each city. Because of my contention that state and national level 
policies are important considerations, I did spend a significant amount of time 
pursuing this information. As I explain in Chapter 11, some of the factors I ultimately 
found to be influencing local policy were expected, while others were more of a 
surprise, as they lacked any immediate connection to energy policy matters. This was 
particularly true in London, where budgetary powers retained by Central Government 
and land use planning powers granted to Local Authorities proved to be key 
influences on the policies the GLA could ultimately attempt to pursue.
Despite my overall satisfaction with my research design, I nonetheless have several 
observations related to the research process that are worth noting.
First, familiarity with a topic or city is a two-edged sword. Although I had originally 
assumed that my large network of environmental policy and government contacts in 
New York City would expedite my research, there was a downside as well. Knowing 
many stakeholders from past research projects, I felt compelled to interview more 
environmental group stakeholders than I otherwise would have because I felt it 
important to understand their nuanced differences of opinion on this topic. These 
nuances ultimately proved less enlightening than I had hoped, meaning time spent 
arranging, interviewing, and preparing transcripts from these conversations could 
have been used in a more worthwhile manner. It is difficult to know this in advance,
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however, and because I wanted to err on the side of thoroughness, it may be difficult 
to prevent this problem from recurring.
Second, audio taping of my interviews created problems on only a handful of 
occasions, primarily among lower level government officials wary of speaking for the 
agency in the absence of a designated public affairs officer. In general, I believe most 
interviewee concerns were allayed by my use of a confidentiality policy allowing 
them to review in advance any direct or indirect quotes of theirs that I wished to use 
in my case studies, a strategy suggested by Odendahl and Shaw (2002). In the end, I 
send out e-mails detailing my intention to reference statements made by 
approximately twenty interviewees, the majority of whom authorized my use of their 
quotes. Two interviewees did not respond, despite repeated attempts on my part to 
obtain their approval. Whether they were too busy or deliberately chose not to 
respond was not clear. Because I found I was able to make similar points using 
alternative data sources, the impact on my work was negligible.
On some occasions -  and this was especially true in London, where I interviewed nine 
officials affiliated with the GLA -  there appeared to be more hesitancy about 
speaking ‘on the record.’ Fortunately, many of these individuals sanctioned the 
anonymous use of their quotes, and I employed this technique when I felt it was 
necessary to present this information but was unable to obtain it from another openly 
documentable source. The vast majority of these quotes are found in Chapters 7 and 
10. A copy of the confidentiality statement used in my interviews is attached as 
Appendix 2.
My third general observation is that it was a challenge to remain a neutral observer 
during the research process. Given the similarities between New York and London, 
and an informal interest by many policy-makers to ‘outperform’ the other city when it 
came to the deployment and use of renewable power, there was tremendous interest in 
my research findings. Londoners wished to know what was happening in New York, 
and vice versa. I was given several opportunities along the way in both cities to 
report on my findings, which I took, but thus far, I have avoided invitations to 
prescribe solutions as to what each city might do to improve their current situation.
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As a long-time consultant and policy-maker, it was very tempting to engage in this 
activity, but I am confident there will be ample opportunities for this in the future.
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CHAPTER 5 
New York City case study: Background
Introduction
New York City is a city in love with electricity. The home of Thomas Edison’s first 
electric utility back in 1882, and the current home of Times Square with its fantastic 
“spectacle” lighting, New York City owes its reputation as a city that never sleeps to 
its electricity supply. Although the city has suffered a handful of high profile service 
disturbances, such as the blackouts of 1968,1977, and 2003, the local electric system 
has generally provided a highly reliable, albeit somewhat expensive supply of power 
to the thousands of businesses and millions of people that make the city their home.
The power supply in New York City is largely generated within the city limits from 
fossil-fuel based sources. Renewable power schemes are almost non-existent -  of the 
roughly 13,000 MW of electricity required at peak summertime demand periods (Con 
Edison, 2005a), only approximately 2-3 MW of power comes from in-city renewable 
sources such as solar power. This number is expected to grow in the next few years, 
but only marginally. Why is this the case, and what does this say about the state of 
renewable energy policy-making in New York City?
Over the next three chapters, this case study will examine this question. Going 
beyond the macro-level picture drawn in Chapters 1 and 2, in this section I explain 
how technology shaped the development of New York City’s grid, and how 
corruption linked to the granting or selling of franchise rights ultimately led to the 
development of the New York State Public Service Commission, the country’s first 
state-level electricity market regulator.
The sources of New York City’s electrical power and its situation as a load pocket are 
also reviewed, leading to a discussion of what role renewables can and do play in this 
supply picture. Of particular interest here is the growing recognition that New York 
City may soon suffer from a serious electricity supply shortfall. The demand for 
power has steadily increased in recent years, while the supply infrastructure has 
stayed relatively constant and may potentially shrink as plants are closed. On the
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surface, this implies that renewables have the potential to grab market share, 
something verified by a State-funded consultant’s report, which found the city enjoys 
high levels of solar power resources. Finally, the structure of the city’s electricity 
marketplace is reviewed, including a short discussion of how market liberalization 
efforts in the mid-1990s changed Con Edison’s role in the local marketplace and 
created new opportunities for other firms, including renewable power system 
developers.
The Local Picture: A Brief History of Electricity Generation in New York City
The opening of Edison’s Pearl Street substation in lower Manhattan in 1882 was the 
beginning of New York City’s love affair with electricity. Powered by six of what 
were then the world’s largest electromagnets, the Edison Electric Illuminating 
Company provided power and incandescent bulbs to illuminate the office of 59 
customers in and near the city’s financial district (Lurkis, 1982). Local newspapers 
waxed poetic about the superior quality of electric light over gas light (Moran, 2002), 
and public interest in the new technology grew dramatically with the 1883 opening of 
the Brooklyn Bridge, which featured decorative lights (Collins, 1934).
By the 1890’s, spectacle lighting in the form of illuminated advertising along 
Broadway earned the street the nickname “Great White Way,” a moniker that survives 
to this day (Nye, 1990, p 50). During this period, electricity was also credited with 
changing architecture in the city, powering the elevators that made skyscrapers 
possible and relieving engineers and architects from the “burden of having to locate 
and design buildings for maximum exposure to sunlight” (Talbot, 1972, p 59). Even 
today, spectacle lighting is considered to be a fundamental and beloved attribute of 
the city. After the collapse of the World Trade Center, a temporary “Tower of Light” 
was erected to memorialize the victims (Goldberger, 2002). When the 2003 
municipal budget crisis forced the City of New York to temporarily turn off the 
decorative lights on the Brooklyn and other East River Bridges to save money, local 
businesses stepped forward to pay the lighting bill, arguing that without these lights, 
the Manhattan skyline had lost some of its magic (Feuer, 2003).
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This love affair with electricity creates a massive electrical demand, however. New 
York City is considered to be the most energy efficient large city in the US, a side 
benefit of the small quarters in which most New Yorkers live (Resource Insight Inc.,
2003). Collectively, however, New Yorkers still consume lots of electricity. In 1960, 
New York City used 17.3 million megawatt hours of electricity. By 1970, that figure 
had risen to 28.8 million megawatt hours (Regional Plan Association/Resources for 
the Future, 1974, p 38). In 2002, Con Edison, the local distribution utility, delivered 
approximately 53.4 million kilowatt hours of power to users in New York City (Con 
Edison, 2004).
The entities responsible for delivering this power have changed dramatically over 
time. In March 1881, fully 18 months before the Pearl Street substation began 
operation, the New York Board of Alderman granted a franchise to the Edison 
Electric Illuminating Company to “lay wires, tubes, and conductors for supplying 
electricity in all the city streets” (Myers, 1974, p 184). This franchise was awarded 
over the objection of the Mayor, who protested the low rate of compensation the city 
was to receive for the franchise. Within days, the Board of Alderman overrode 
another mayoral veto of a second electrical franchise, this time awarded to the Brush 
Electrical Illuminating Company. These firms held exclusive monopolies in 
Manhattan for several years, although other franchises were granted in Brooklyn, 
Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island, which at this time were still separate cities. 
When the Greater New York City Charter was approved in 1897, merging the five 
separate cities into one large city, it included a provision limiting the lifespan of any 
franchise to no more than twenty-five years. Before the Charter went into effect on 
January 1, 1898, there was a rush by the Board of Alderman to issue other franchises 
that would last in perpetuity (Myers, 1974).
The need for multiple franchises was partially explained by the limitations of the 
technology in use at the time. As Edison imagined it, 28-30 small power houses 
would be required to serve Manhattan, each designed to provide direct current power 
to a one square mile service area (Collins, 1934, p 264). Edison’s technology was not 
the only one in the marketplace, however, and at one point, a survey found 296 
separate electricity generating and distribution systems servicing New York City in 
1900, many of which were operated by a single franchise (Talbot, 1972, p 60). As
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time went on, pressure built to consolidate these operations. The Consolidated Gas 
Company of New York, backed by some of the leading financiers and industrialists of 
the day, moved quickly to roll-up their competition. Using the vast amount of capital 
at their disposal, Con Gas engineers designed and built ever larger turbines, high 
tension transmission lines, transformers, and rotary voltage converters that made it 
possible to transmit alternating current power over distances far in excess of that 
achieved by Edison’s DC-powered system (Talbot, 1972). Such roll-ups did little to 
enhance competition, however. In 1910, after control over electricity franchises in 
New York City was taken over by the New York State Public Service Commission, a 
study found there were 92 different electrical franchises in the five boroughs of New 
York City. These franchises were controlled by just nine holding companies, none of 
whom actually competed with each other (Lurkis, 1982, p 26; Read, 1998, p 37).
The PSC took a lead role in attempting to bring order and fairness to the city’s 
electricity markets, but City officials also tried to do their part by advocating for the 
development of public-owned electric utilities to power municipal operations. Such 
efforts proved difficult, however. A 1905 proposal to build a municipal plant to 
provide street lighting and power all public buildings was defeated by the Board of 
Alderman. In 1908, the City constructed a waste-to-energy plant to power a nearby 
bridge’s lighting system but it was abandoned after five years due to its high operating 
costs. In 1913, the City built a coal-fired steam plant to provide heat and power for a 
new Hall of Records, but that also shut down for cost reasons (Nye, 1990). In the 
mid-1930’s, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia announced he had negotiated a loan deal with 
President Franklin Roosevelt to finance a municipal power plant, but Consolidated 
Gas fought and defeated this plan in court, arguing the Mayor was tampering with 
franchise rights given to the company in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Lurkis, 1982; 
Talbot, 1972).
The End of Consolidation and the Beginning of Real Growth
In 1936, Consolidated Gas formally changed its name to Consolidated Edison 
(hereafter, Con Edison or Con Ed), reflecting the key role electricity played in the 
fortunes of the company. Over the next few years, the company set out to consolidate 
the final pieces of the gas distribution and electricity generation and distribution
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systems it did not control in New York City (Lurkis, 1982). It was also during this 
period that Con Edison built the first high voltage transmission line into the city, 
allowing the utility to bring upstate power into New York during peak summer 
periods, and allowing power to flow northward during winter months, when upstate 
areas experienced their peak demand.
Like other utilities around the country, Con Edison made a major push to build 
consumer demand for electricity in the post-World War II period. Company sales 
representatives promoted the all-electric home, including electric heating systems. A 
special operating division was created to encourage the rewiring of commercial 
buildings and residences to accommodate air conditioning systems, dishwashers, and 
freezers (Lurkis, 1982). Con Ed also benefited from a rate structure designed to 
promote greater electricity use, with rates declining as a customer’s demand grew.
For all of these reasons, demand soared, growing at a rapid 5.8% rate each year 
between 1948-1968 (Fabricant & Hallman, 1971, p 164). This rapid growth led to 
problems, however. The adequacy of Con Ed’s power supply came into question, as 
demand growth exceeded Con Edison’s ability to site and bring new power plants on 
line. Population growth in suburban areas near the city also hampered the utility’s 
ability install additional transmission capacity bringing power from outside the area 
(New York City Department of City Planning, 1974). In the 1960s, for the first time, 
New York City became known as a ‘load pocket,’ meaning power generation capacity 
in the city was insufficient to meet local peak demand, a problem that continues today 
(New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004).
Unlike the early part of the century, when the company was known for its 
technological prowess, from the late 1950’s to the late 1970’s, the company became 
increasingly known for its technological failings. High profile service outages, 
including an infamous 25-hour blackout in 1977 when widespread looting occurred 
and thousands of people were trapped in subways and on gridlocked streets, took the 
sheen off of the utility’s long record of reliable service. Con Ed’s attempt to site the 
Ravenswood nuclear power plant right in the middle of Queens earned it a reputation 
for a political deaf ear. Con Ed’s sixteen-year battle to develop a pumped storage 
facility at Storm King, upriver of New York City on the Hudson River, also earned it 
a reputation as a company that claimed to care about the environment, but ultimately
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tried to deploy technologies that would harm it. (For a good description of the Storm 
King project, see Lurkis, 1982; Talbot, 1972). Despite these shortcomings, by the 
1990s Con Edison ran one of the largest and most technically complex urban utilities 
anywhere in the world.
Impacts of Market Restructuring on New York City’s Electricity Picture
Before New York State’s electricity markets were restructured in the mid-1990s, Con 
Edison was a vertically integrated company responsible for all aspects of electrical 
generation, adequacy of supply, and electric power distribution in New York City.
The State Public Service Commission’s 1997 restructuring agreement changed all 
that, calling on the utility to sell off at least 50% of its power plants around New York 
City (New York State Public Service Commission, 1997). By August 1999, Con Ed 
had done so, auctioning off more than 5,500 MW of power plant capacity to other 
companies. Con Ed did choose to retain ownership of the large steam generating 
plants which supply its massive steam distribution system in Manhattan. Today, five 
entities own or control the majority of the 8,760 MW of power plant capacity in New 
York City (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004, p 16). Con Ed serves as 
the distribution conduit for power sold by these plants and imported from outside the 
city. Con Ed is responsible for all aspects of operation and maintenance of the 
distribution system, and all residential, commercial and industrial customers in the 
city must be allowed to hook into and receive power from Con Ed’s grid, should they 
so choose.
Any power these customers receive through Con Ed’s system need not be purchased 
from Con Ed, however. As part of the restructuring agreement retail customers are 
free to procure power from other Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) authorized by 
the Public Service Commission to sell power in New York City. Currently, ten 
ESCOs sell power to residential customers in the city, while commercial customers 
can select from among 21 different providers (New York State Public Service 
Commission, 2005b). Access to alternative suppliers has not necessarily led to 
widespread switching, however. As of February 2005, of the 3.1 million customers in 
New York City and Westchester County who are served by the Con Ed grid, only 
3.6% actually buy power from another service provider. This number is somewhat
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deceptive because these 3.6% include some of the largest power users in the city, and 
overall, more than 33% of the power that Con Ed used to sell directly to customers is 
now sold by other ESCOs but still delivered over Con Ed lines (Con Edison, 2004; 
New York State Public Service Commission, 2005c). It is no surprise that large 
power users were among those finding alternative service providers -- even cost 
savings amounting to no more than a fraction of a cent could equal sizable operating 
cost reductions for companies that consume tens or hundreds of thousands of kilowatt 
hours each month.
New York’s Energy Supply -  the State and Local Picture
For the first half of the 20th century, New York State largely relied on coal and oil 
sources to power electric generation facilities. This supply mix began to change in 
the 1960s, as nuclear power plants came on line around the state. There were 
expectations that nuclear plants would soon dominate the state power picture 
(Fabricant & Hallman, 1971), but geopolitics and the environmental movement of the 
1970s lead to a shift to other ‘clean’ fuel sources, such as natural gas. Today, natural 
gas power plants provide 25% of New York state’s power, and by 2020, natural gas 
facilities are expected to provide nearly 40% of the state’s electricity supply (New 
York State Energy Planning Board, 1998, p 3-104). This gas is delivered to New 
York state through a series of pipelines starting at gas fields in the southern US, the 
Gulf of Mexico, and Western Canada (New York City Energy Policy Task Force,
2004). Several proposals have been made to site new liquid natural gas terminals in 
Canada, New England, and in the Long Island Sound, any of which could add to the 
region’s security of supply by introducing new gas resources from Africa and Asia. 
These proposals have proven contentious, however, due to public opposition to where 
these facilities would be sited, and their development prospects are uncertain (Fagin, 
2005; Hall Hayes, 2005; Hebert, 2005).
New York City’s story is very similar to the statewide picture. For much of the first 
half of the 20th century, coal was king, supplying nearly all of the City’s power needs. 
By the 1960s, imported oil was a major fuel source at power stations around the city. 
The picture changed yet again in the 1970s, as the Arab oil crisis and declining local 
air quality conditions, exacerbated by the high sulphur content fuels burned at Con Ed
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power plants, forced the utility to begin looking for ‘cleaner’ sources of power 
generation. Nuclear power was one such source, but concerns over its safety and the 
growing use of natural gas by the power industry in the US led Con Ed to greater 
reliance on natural gas as a fuel source. During this period, Con Ed installed more 
than 2,100 MW of gas fired capacity at various facilities around New York City, a 
trend that continued into the 1980s and 1990s (Resource Insight Inc., 2003, p 38).
Table 5-1
Source of Electricity Supply in New York City
Source: (New York State Department of Public Service, 2002, 2003, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e; Regional Plan
Association/Resources for the Future, 1974)
Fuel Source
Biomass
Coal_______
Gas
Hydro
Nuclear
Oil
Solar
Solid Waste 
Wind
Con Edison
1960 1970 2000 2002 2003 2004
— — <1% <1% < 1% < 1%
56% 17% 20% 16% 13% 13%
16% 21% 51% 43% 40% 40%
— — 6% 5% 5% 4%
— 1% 12% 30% 33% 33%
29% 61% 9% 4% 8% 9%
— — — - — —
- — 1% 1% 1% 1%
- - <1% <1% <1% < 1%
KeySpan Econnergy
US Energy 
Partners
2003 2003 2003
— <1% 2%
— 32% 78%
51% 23% 7%
— 9% 3%
— 17% 5%
49% 18% 6%
— — —
— <1% <1%
— <1% <1%
Con Edison’s forced divestiture of its power plants has resulted in the company’s 
reliance on a more diverse fuel supply than when they supplied most of their own 
power needs. Con Ed’s use of nuclear power as a fuel source reflects the power 
purchase agreement negotiated when Con Edison sold off its Indian Point nuclear 
power plants north of the city in 2000. Under the terms of that agreement, Con Ed 
agreed to buy the entire 1015 MW output of the plant at an annual average price of 
3.9 cents/kWh through the end of 2004, a price below anticipated market rates (Con 
Edison, 2000).11 Equally interesting to note is the variation in the fuel sources of the 
power provided by ESCOs operating in the city, which reflect individual strategies 
over fuel sources and the long-term and spot market purchase agreements each has 
negotiated.
In the future, New York City will likely experience a big increase in the amount of 
natural gas used to power in-city generation facilities, as there are seven power plant
11 In 2004, Con Edison signed a new agreement with Entergy committing to the purchase of the full 
1015 MW capacity through the end of 2006, after which time Con Ed will ramp down its purchases. 
By 2009, Con Edison will no longer have any long-term agreement to buy power from Indian Point, 
although Con Edison may still end up buying its power on a spot or short-term basis.
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projects totaling over 4,000 MW of power that are proposed, under construction, or in 
the certification process, that all rely on natural gas. [See Table 5-2 below] Although 
it is unlikely that all of these proposals will be built, any of these facilities would 
increase the fuel allocation described above by at least a few percentage points, 
particularly for Con Edison. There is no guarantee that ESCOs operating in the city 
would opt to purchase this power, although there would likely be cost advantages to 
doing so as line efficiency losses and transmission charges from transmitting power 
long distances would be eliminated.
Table 5-2 
New York City Power Plant Projects
Source: (NYISO, 2005, p 16)
Location/Sponsor Size Fuel source
Under construction: Ravenswood (Keyspan) 250 MW natural gas
East River (Con Ed) 125 MW natural gas
SCS Astoria (#1) 500 MW natural gas
Poletti (NYPA) 500 MW natural gas
Article X certified Reliant Astoria (1+2) 540 MW natural gas
SCS Astoria (#2) 500 MW natural gas
In Article X certification p ro cess TransGas 1100 MW natural gas
A Precarious Supply Picture?
In spite of the large amount of in-city generation capacity proposed or under 
construction, the electricity supply picture in New York City has been portrayed by 
many as quite precarious. Since early 2001, six major reports have been issued that 
raise concerns about the adequacy of the city’s power supply. Many of the reports 
reference what is informally known as New York City’s “80% rule,” or more 
formally, the Locational Installed Reserve Requirement (NYISO, 2001, p 16). The 
rule requires that 80% of the projected peak load demand in New York City be met by 
in-city power plants or power generated elsewhere that is linked directly (and only) to 
the city’s grid. The 80% number is calculated based on statistical estimates of the 
likelihood that in-city generation capacity and transmission lines coming into the city 
will simultaneously suffer catastrophic failure. Above-ground transmission lines 
bringing power from outside of the city are seen as particularly vulnerable to failure 
from natural phenomena such as lightning strikes. This 80% figure is not cast in 
stone, however, and should there be no increase in available generation resources in
119
the city, ever-increasing electricity demand will likely force the Requirement to rise to 
a level closer to 85% (NYISO, 2001, p 17). The New York State Reliability Council 
is charged with the responsibility of assessing and recommending changes in the 
reserve requirements, although responsibility for codifying any changes lies with the 
New York State Public Service Commission.12
With overall responsibility for the integrity of the grid in New York State, and 
because a system failure in New York City can have implications for the rest of the 
state’s grid, the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) has been very 
vocal on this issue, issuing Power Alert reports in 2001, 2002, and 2003 and Power 
Trend reports in 2004 and 2005. Interestingly, the 80% rule was not the only 
explanation offered in the Power Alert reports of why New York City needed 
additional power plant capacity. In the NYISO’s view, equally important were 
benefits that additional capacity could bring in terms of lowering prices (potentially 
by as much as 28% in New York City) and reducing sulphur dioxide and nitrous 
oxide emissions in the city (NYISO, 2001, p 5). In Power Alert III, the NYISO also 
suggested that in a post 9/11 era, New York City’s electric system was a potential 
terrorist target, and risks would be buffered by additional in-city generation capacity 
(NYISO, 2003b). Both NYISO Power Trend reports noted recent improvements in 
the current situation, thanks primarily to demand reduction efforts. Nonetheless, 
NYISO continues to express concerns about the adequacy of the city’s power supply 
after 2009, and will conduct a special Reliability Needs Assessment of this situation 
by September 2005 (NYISO, 2004, 2005).
Reports issued in 2001 and 2002 by the Energy Committee of the New York Building 
Congress (NYBC), and a 2004 report issued by the New York City Energy Policy 
Task Force were all more explicit in noting how much additional power generation 
capacity was necessary to achieve different goals. The first Building Congress report 
preceded the release of the ISO report, but it too concluded 2000-3000 MW of 
additional in-city power capacity was necessary by 2005. As shown in Table 5-3, 
approximately 30-35% of this amount was believed necessary to satisfy demand 
growth needs, while 40% was needed to ensure pricing stability. Unlike the NYISO,
12 One of the most recent PSC documents to formally note the requirement was the market restructuring 
agreement with Con Ed (Case 96-E-0897) issued in 1997.
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the Building Congress report was not as confident that additional capacity would lead 
to price reductions. Instead, the NYBC believed that a shortage of supply had lead to 
pricing volatility, which additional capacity would eliminate. Finally, the NYBC 
noted that nearly 6,900 MW of the in-city supply was produced at plants that 
exceeded 30 years of age, and that 500-900 MW of capacity would likely be retired in 
the next five years (New York Building Congress Energy Committee, 2001). The 
2002 report offered the same explanations, albeit with slightly different numbers.
T able  5-3
R ecen t S tu d ie s  A nalyzing NYC E lectric  S y s tem  C ap ac ity  N eeds
Report Title
Issuing
organization
Total
Capacity
Needed
Amount needed 
to reduce costs 
or eliminate price 
volatility
Amount needed 
to achieve 80% 
Rule or address 
increased 
demand
Amount needed 
to replace 
old/retiring 
facilities
Power Alert: New York's 
Energy Crossroads (Mar-01) NYISO
2 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0  
MW 
by 20 0 5
8 0 0 -1 2 0 0  MW 7 0 0 -9 0 0  MW 5 0 0 -9 0 0  MW
Power Alert II: New York's 
Persisting Energy Crisis (Mar- 
02)
NYISO
2 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0  
MW 
by 20 0 5
did not specify
Power Alert II: New York's 
Energy Future (May-03) NYISO
did not 
specify  
(provided  
statew ide  
capacity
did not specify
Power Trends: New York's 
Success and Unfinished 
Business (May-04)
NYISO
did not 
specify
28 0  MW by 
2 0 0 9
Power Trends 2005 (Apr-05) NYISO did not did not specify
Electricity Outlook 2001: A 
Matter of Urgency (Jan-01)
N ew  York 
Building 
C on gress
2 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0  
MW 
by 20 0 5
8 0 0 -1 2 0 0  MW 7 0 0 -9 0 0  MW 5 0 0 -9 0 0  MW
Electricity Outlook 2002: A Call 
to Action
N ew  York 
Building 
C on gress
2 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0  
MW 
by 2 0 0 5
8 0 0 -1 0 0 0  MW 60 0 -8 0 0  MW 7 0 0 -1 8 0 0  MW
City Energy Plan for the City of 
New York (working draft 2003, 
not released)
R esou rce  
Insight Inc.
3 0 0 0  MW 
by 20 0 8
did not specify
New York City Energy Policy: 
An Electricity Resource 
Roadmap (Jan-04)
N ew  York City 
Energy Policy 
T ask F orce
3 7 8 0  MW 
by 2 0 0 8
1 00 0  MW 6 6 5  MW 2 1 1 5  MW
In early 2004, a Task Force convened by Mayor Michael Bloomberg concluded that 
“New York City has adequate electricity resources today, but only by a slim margin. 
A projected increase in electricity demand in the next five years will necessitate new 
generation and transmission facilities and expanded distributed resources measures. 
Additional resources will be required to assure market price stability, and old power 
plants will need to be retired and/or replaced with cleaner, more efficient facilities by 
2008” (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004, p 9). The Task Force
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concluded that 3,780 MW of power were required, of which more than 55% arose 
from the need to replace anticipated power plant retirements. Other than noting one 
facility closure which has been planned for some time, however, the Task Force offers 
no written evidence that this assumption is anything more than a guess.
Similarly, the Task Force cites the need for 1000 MW of power to hedge against price 
volatility, referencing work of an outside energy consultant and concluding the 1000 
MW figure is “prudent for planning purposes” (New York City Energy Policy Task 
Force, 2004, p 10). However, the original consultant’s report offers no clear 
delineation of what an anonymous 1000 MW of power would bring to the city, as 
their report was focused on modeling the financial and environmental benefits of very 
specific actions, such as the construction of a new 1000 MW gas plant in Queens or 
the development of a new 500 MW transmission line from New Jersey. The 
consultant’s report did conclude the City “should be working toward the addition of at 
least 1,500 MW of new resources by 2008, beyond the 1,500 MW of resources the 
authors consider to be committed,” and that failure to do so “might well increase 
power-supply costs to City consumers by $600-$800 million in 2008, or roughly 20- 
25%” (Resource Insight Inc., 2003, p 1). The final 665 MW of power recommended 
by the Mayoral Task Force was aimed at addressing likely demand growth, with an 
eye towards meeting the 80% in-city generation requirement.
In-city generation is supplemented by the transmission system that imports power to 
New York City. Three sets of lines -  one from New Jersey, one from the north, and 
one from Long Island have been collectively capable of delivering approximately 
5,000 MW of power to the city since the 1980s. Efforts to expand this amount have 
floundered, however, for several reasons. First, transmission links coming from other 
states must obtain the approval of regulatory authorities in those states as well as New 
York, and many agencies are hesitant to incur any political heat or environmental 
impact for systems that don’t directly benefit residents of their state (McNamara, 
2001). Second, suburbs around the city are very congested, making it difficult to find 
the room for underground transmission lines. At the same time, overhead 
transmission lines are disliked for aesthetic reasons, for their perceived health risk 
(from electro-magnetic radiation emitted from the lines), and for the impact these 
problems have on local property values (Griscom, 2001). Several developers have
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proposed new underground and underwater transmission line projects in recent years, 
but none of these has yet come to fruition.
A Role for Renewables?
Renewable power systems may be one solution to the city’s supply problems. 
Politicians around the state have looked to renewable power sources to address
thpressing state electricity needs since early in the 20 century, when efforts began to 
harness rivers in upstate New York to generate inexpensive hydropower. It wasn’t 
until the 1950’s that these dams were actually built, however, one just a few miles 
downstream from Niagara Falls and another along the St. Lawrence River. Today, 
these large public hydropower systems contribute more than 4,400 MW of power to 
the state’s 30,200 MW of installed electric generation capacity.
Table 5-4
Contribution of Renewable Energy Sources to New York State Electricity Supply
Source: (New York State Energy Planning Board, 2002)
#of
installations
statewide
Total
generation
capacity
%of
total
Hydroelectricity 347 4442.7 MW 97.1%
Wood and wood 
waste combustion 4 38.5 MW 0.8%
Agricultural Residue 
combustion 4 0.3 MW 0.0%
Landfill Gas 19 46.0 MW 1.0%
Solar photovoltaics 47 1.2 MW 0.0%
Wind 27 48.3 MW 1.1%
4,577.0 MW 100.0%
As Table 5-4 makes clear, the contribution of “new” renewable power technologies is 
currently quite low. This situation is expected to change dramatically in the next 20 
years, however. According to a study commissioned by the New York State Energy 
Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), the total amount of new installed 
renewables capacity from just four technologies could skyrocket by 2022. In both 
cases, these figures refer to the ‘technical’ potential for growth, or the upper limit of
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what could be brought on line during each period “without regard to cost, market 
acceptability, or policy constraints.” Estimates of what will actually be achieved are 
much lower, approaching only 10-50% of the technical potential estimates (New York 
State Energy Planning Board, 2002, p 3-58). Key limiting factors that could or will 
inhibit the attainment of the technical potential include land use patterns in or near 
areas with high resource availability, grid availability in those areas, permitting and 
financing problems, and technical issues unique to each type of renewable power 
technology.
Table 5-5
Technical and Economic Potential for New Renewables Deployment in New York State
Source: (Optimal Energy Inc., American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Vermont Energy Investment 
Corporation, & Christine T. Donovan Associates, 2003)
StatewideT echnical Economic
Potential in Potential in
2012 2022 2022
Biomass 3,269 MW 5,527 MW 100%
Small hydro 300 MW 408 MW 90%
Solar photovoltaics 784 MW 33,001 MW 0%
Wind power 890 MW 17,085 MW 84%
Total 5,243 MW 56,021 MW
The greatest gains are technically possible in the areas of wind and photovoltaics 
development, although continued high costs are expected to dramatically dampen the 
amount of photovoltaics development that actually occurs. [See Table 5-5.] The far 
right column of that table, Economic Potential in 2022, refers to the percentage of this 
potential power that is expected to be available at costs below that of conventional 
generation technologies. Biomass, hydropower, and wind power are all expected to 
be highly cost competitive by 2022. By contrast, power from solar photovoltaic 
technologies is still expected to exceed the cost of power from fossil-based power 
sources, despite the expectation that the price of PV systems will decline dramatically 
by 2022 (Optimal Energy Inc. et al., 2003, p 4-189).
Renewable Power for the Big Apple?
New York City’s involvement with renewable power dates back to the time of the 
earliest Dutch settlers of the city, who lined the shoreline of the city with windmills
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that were used to grind flower and saw timber (Energy Task Force, 1977). The 
Official Seal of the City of New York, which has been in use for over 200 years, 
honors that legacy by placing windmills prominently in the center of the seal (Cogne,
2003). That early history was quickly forgotten, however, with the advent of the coal, 
oil, and natural gas-fired boilers that have provided the bulk of the city’s power needs 
for the last 120+ years. New York City has attempted to procure renewable power 
from upstate hydro sources on several occasions, most recently in 1986, taking 
advantage of an opening offered by the expiration of long-term power purchase 
agreements between the New York Power Authority and other utilities and 
municipalities around the state. New York City even went so far as to establish its 
own distribution utility, the New York Public Utility Service, but like past attempts 
this effort also failed (Barbanel, 1984; Greene, 1988).
Today, New York City draws very little of its power from renewable sources. Table 
5-1 shows that Con Ed (by far the dominant electricity supplier in the city) and others 
buy small amounts of power from renewable sources, but these are all located far 
outside of the City limits. In-city renewables generation is extremely low, amounting 
to approximately 2-3 megawatts of power out of the nearly 11,000 MW that New 
York City requires on peak-demand days. Table 5-6 details the largest renewable 
power installation in the city, most of which involve the use of photovoltaic panels.
This small number of installations belies the fact that renewables projects have 
occasionally enjoyed a high profile in New York City. In 1977, for instance, urban 
homesteaders occupying a vacant tenement in Manhattan installed the country’s first 
modem urban windmill (Energy Task Force, 1977). This two-kilowatt system, which 
cost $4,000, was momentous because its installation led to the first net-metering 
system in the US. Con Edison had originally forbidden the owners to connect into 
their distribution system, fearing power surges from this two-kilowatt system would 
damage Con Ed’s ten million-kilowatt system. After a long back-and-forth debate, 
the State Public Service Commission finally took up the case, ultimately ruling that 
Con Ed must allow this windmill and up to 24 others to connect to its grid. Con Ed 
was also ordered to purchase any excess electricity generated by the windmill at the 
price Con Ed would otherwise have paid for fuel to generate that electricity 
(Greenhouse, 1977).
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Table 5-6
Large Renewable Power System Installations in New York City
Source: original research, March 2004
Name Developer/Host Location
Type of 
System
Size 
(in kW)
Completion
Date
Maspeth Warehouse New York Transit Authority Queens Solar PV 16 1993
Gun Hill Rd. Bus Depot
New York Power Authority 
and New York Transit 
Authority
Bronx Solar PV 300 1996
Rikers Island Composting Facility
New York Power Authority 
and New York City 
Department of Sanitation
Rikers Island Solar PV 36 1996
Conde Nast Building (4 Times Square) Durst Organization Manhattan Solar PV 15 1997
Greenpoint Manufacturing and Design 
Center
Greenpoint Manufacturing 
and Design Center Brooklyn Solar PV 59 2002
The Solaire Battery Park City Authority Manhattan Solar PV 33 2003
Museum of Jewish Heritage Museum of Jewish Heritage Manhattan Solar PV 36 2003
NYC DEP Wastewater Treatment 
Facilities
New York Power Authority 
and NYC Dept of 
Environmental Protection
Brooklyn, 
Staten Island, 
Bronx
Anaerobic 
Digestor + 
Fuel Cell
1600 2004
Whitehall Ferry Terminal New York City Department of Transportation Manhattan Solar PV 60 2005
Stillwell Ave. Terminal Train Shed New York Transit Authority Brooklyn Solar PV 145 expected2005
Roosevelt Ave./74th St. Subway Station 
and Bus Depot New York Transit Authority Queens Solar PV 57
expected
2005
Taino Plaza (affordable housing)
South Bronx Overall 
Economic Development 
Corporation
Bronx Solar PV 30 expected2005
Bronx High School of Science Board of Education/DDC Bronx Solar PV 35 expected2005
NY Hall of Science NY Hall of Science/DDC Queens Solar PV 15 expected2005
Queens Botanical Garden 
Administration Building Queens Botanical Garden Queens Solar PV 15
expected
2006
Brooklyn Children's Museum Brooklyn Children's Museum Brooklyn Solar PV 40
expected
2006
Corona Maintenance Shop New York Transit Authority Queens Solar PV 100 expected2006/7
Grand Ave. Bus Depot and Central 
Maintenance Shop New York Transit Authority Queens Solar PV 100
expected
2006/7
East River Underwater Turbines Verdant Power East River Hydroturbines
5000 to 
10000
expected
2008
Freedom Tower
Silverstein Properties/Port 
Authority of New York and 
New Jersey
Manhattan Windturbines unknown
expected
2009
1977 was also the year the 917 ft. Citicorp Tower was completed. The Tower, which 
includes a distinctive chamfered rooftop, was originally designed to face west. 
Halfway through the process, however, the design was changed to make the roof face 
south to allow for the installation of solar panels (Council on Tall Buildings and 
Urban Habitat, 2004). Studies completed at the time found a solar system would not 
be cost effective, increasing the bank’s costs by $3,000 per month (Tucker, 1977), a 
quite modest amount given the building’s original $175 million price tag. In 1983, 
Citicorp installed photovoltaic panels on 600 square feet of the rooftop, at a cost of $1
126
million, in a further attempt to gauge the cost effectiveness of urban solar energy 
systems (Associated Press, 1983; Corporate Design, 1984). These were removed in 
1987 and donated to the SUNY Atmospheric Science Research Center (ASRC) in
1 3Albany for testing purposes (T. Thompson, e-mail communication, 17 May 2005). 
More recently, New York has seen the completion of what have been billed as the 
country’s first “green” skyscraper and high-rise apartment buildings. The Conde 
Naste building in Times Square hosts 15 kW of solar panels and a fuel cell on its roof, 
while the 27-story Solaire, located on the Hudson River near the old World Trade 
Center site, features 23 kW of solar panels on its roof and 10 kW of panels integrated 
into its south-facing fa<?ade curtain wall (AltPower Inc., 2004; Astropower Inc.,
2002).
In the next five to seven years, New York City could also become home to one of the 
most high-profile urban renewables projects anywhere in the world. In the middle of 
the East River, Verdant Power, a merchant renewable power system developer, has 
successful tested an underwater turbine designed to capitalize on the East River’s 4- 
knot current during peak tidal conditions. Verdant is now planning to anchor several 
turbines to the floor of the river in 2006 to conduct additional environmental testing, 
after which they expect to install an underwater field of between 200-300 turbines 
capable of collectively generating 5-10 MW of power (T. Taylor, pers. comm.).
These projects are moving ahead despite questions about the availability of renewable 
resources in New York City (Resource Insight Inc., 2003). The State-funded studies 
examining the technical potential for various renewable technologies around the state 
were fairly consistent in their finding that New York City lacked significant 
renewable resources. For instance, in the case of biomass resources, in 2022 New 
York City was projected to have 83 MW in biomass power potential out of a 
statewide total of over 5,500 MW. In the case of new run-of-river hydropower 
potential, New York is anticipated to have just 2 MW of new technical potential by 
2022, compared to over 1,000 MW elsewhere around the state. By 2022, the methane
13 When ASRC moved to a new building several years ago, the panels were donated to the Northeast 
Sustainable Energy Association which arranged for their installation at the Greenfield Energy Park 
outside of Albany. Several of the panels were also sold to a non-profit organization headed by David 
Robinson, son of the late major league baseball player Jackie Robinson, who arranged for their 
installation in the rural village of Bara, in southwest Tanzania. These panels have thus been in constant 
use for more than 20 years.
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gas recovery potential from the City’s old landfills is expected to have nearly 
disappeared. Windpower potential in the city is also seen as very limited -  just over 
12 MW of capacity -  compared to thousands of megawatts of capacity on and off­
shore in other areas of the state (Optimal Energy Inc. et al., 2003, pp 4-34, 4-89,4- 
129,4-268). Large wind turbines typically require wind speeds averaging above 15 
mph to be considered economically viable (New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority, undated), while New York City’s are much lower (National 
Climatic Data Center, 1998). The State’s projections of future wind potential in New 
York City assumes development is limited to small wind turbines with lower “cut-in” 
speeds, or the wind speed required to cause the blades to begin spinning.
The study examining solar power potential had far more optimistic findings. Given 
the large amount of available rooftop space in New York City, the study found more 
4,300 MW of PV potential on commercial and industrial roof space and parking lots 
in the city. On residential buildings, another 3,800 MW of potential PV capacity was 
identified. South- and southwest-facing building sidings present another 400 MW of 
potential (Optimal Energy Inc. et al., 2003, pp 4-191,4-194,4-197). In addition to 
the large amount of space on which to mount photovoltaic cells, solar resources are 
plentiful. Researchers at SUNY Albany have found New York City enjoys fully 70% 
of the solar resources of the Arizona desert, an area well-known for its sunny climate. 
Perhaps more importantly, solar resources are at their peak at the same time as 
electrical demand in the city, during the hot summer months. Solar photovoltaic 
systems thus can potentially serve a peak load-shaving function (Perez, undated), 
reducing the peak demand charges14 that constitute a big piece of the electric bill of 
most commercial and industrial users.
New York City residents and businesses interested in buying renewable power rather 
than generating their own can do so by purchasing green power from a variety of
14 There are two parts to the average commercial and industrial electric bill: a basic monthly service 
charge and a demand charge tied to the peak level of energy consumed during the course of the month. 
(This demand level is assessed a per kWh fee, which is then multiplied by the total number of kWh of 
electricity consumed that month. In other words, customers are billed as if they continuously used 
energy at this peak demand rate, regardless of whether this is true or not.) Power generated on-site 
from a renewable power system generally will displace power purchased from the grid; if on-site power 
is available at the time the peak demand charge is set for that month, it can significantly cut a business’ 
total monthly electricity charges.
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vendors. Con Ed Solutions’15 Green Power plan derives 25% of its power from an 
upstate wind farm and 75% of the power from two run-of-river hydropower systems 
near Quebec. Consumers opting for this plan must pay a premium of roughly $0,005 
per kilowatt hour (Con Ed Solutions, 2005a). Interest in such programs has been 
low, however. News reports in July 2003 indicated that there were 300 Manhattan 
subscribers in Con Ed Solution’s Green Power program 18 months after the program 
began (Fairley, 2003); by March 2004 this had increased to just 600 subscribers 
(Blom 2004), although some of these customers have been rather large. The Ford 
Foundation, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Pace University, and Bank Street 
College are all among a group of fifteen ‘Green Power Pioneers’ that collectively 
purchase millions of kilowatt hours of renewable power from Con Ed Solutions. The 
Durst Organization, the developer of the first ‘green’ skyscraper in the United States, 
has made a similar arrangement to purchase 10.5 million kilowatt hours of renewable 
power from Con Ed Solutions and Community Energy Inc., which is enough 
electricity to supply 10% of the total energy demand at seven large office buildings 
owned by Durst in Manhattan (Community Energy, 2004). Green electricity has also 
been used to power one-time events in the city -  the famous New Year’s Eve ball- 
drop in Times Square and the 2004 Republican National Convention in Madison 
Square Garden being two of the more noteworthy events (Con Ed Solutions, 2002,
2004).
Like other consumers around the state, New York City (NYC) residents can also buy 
Renewable Energy Certificates from renewable power system operators selling their 
output directly to retail customers. Signing up with these firms typically will result in 
the receipt of two electricity bills -  one from the utility that actually provides the 
electricity service to their home or business, and a second bill from the firm selling 
the REC. As of May 2005, there were sixteen firms selling RECs on the retail market 
to New York state businesses, and ten firms selling RECs to New York state 
residential customers (Green-e.org, 2005). This is a fairly sizable increase from early 
2004, when there were ten firms selling RECs to businesses and six firms selling 
RECs to residential consumers (Green-e.org, 2004).
15 Con Ed Solutions is an ESCO structured as an unregulated subsidiary of Con Edison of New York. 
It has no business relationship with Con Edison, the distribution network operator for New York City.
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Electricity Prices
Electricity prices in New York state are among the highest in the US, with retail 
customers paying rates 72% higher than the national average (EIA, 2003b). There are 
several reasons why electricity prices are higher in New York state (New York State 
Energy Planning Board, 1998,2002):
• electricity is heavily taxed by both the State and localities;
• the fuel mix used in New York state is driven by air quality and environmental 
concerns, and this mix is more costly than that used by states who lack New 
York’s strict environmental controls;
• users are still paying for costly long-term power purchase agreements negotiated 
in the wake of the federal PURPA law, which mandated such agreements with 
independent power producers; and
• users are still paying off the stranded costs of two large nuclear power plants in 
the state that are no longer operational.
Prices in New York City are even higher than the statewide average, and since 
restructuring, have become highly volatile, jumping in some cases by as much as 60- 
70% over comparable periods in years pre-liberalization. There is also much less 
seasonal uniformity of pricing. These wild pricing gyrations have resulted in calls for 
some type of re-regulation from such disparate groups as Democratic members of the 
New York State Legislature (Tonko, 2002) and then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, a 
Republican, who in 2001 suggested the need for temporary wholesale price controls 
(Giuliani, 2001b). Since 2003, electricity prices have been more stable, but they have 
steadily increased, following general market trends.
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Figure 5-1
Retail E lectric ity  P rice s  in New York City 1997-2003
Source: (Miller, 2003)
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Data on the cost of renewable power in New York City was difficult to obtain. There 
are no permanent wind turbine systems currently in place on which to obtain any base 
any local price estimates, nor is there any biomass or geothermal power systems. 
Firms involved in the local installation of solar PV systems report that without taking 
any NYSERDA subsidies into account, solar power installations in New York City 
will generate electricity that is 2-6 times as expensive as the current retail cost of grid- 
based power. (D. Buckner, pers. comm., A. Pereira, pers. comm.). The developer of 
the East River tidal turbine project anticipates they will be able to generate power at a 
much lower cost, in the 5-7 cents/kWh range (T. Taylor, pers. comm.), although that 
estimate can only be validated once their system is in the water and fully operational.
Conclusion
This chapter revealed several important things about New York City’s energy 
marketplace that are important to our logic study. First, we know from NYSERDA’s 
analysis that the potential for renewable power system deployment in New York City 
varies widely by technology, but overall can be considered rather marginal. Because 
of the large quantity of flat roof space available around the five boroughs solar 
photovoltaic system development enjoys the greatest potential, theoretically capable 
of generating thousands of megawatts of power during exactly those periods when 
electricity demand in the city is at its highest.
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Second, the fact that New York City faces a projected supply shortfall should 
theoretically mean that policy-makers are actively looking to identify new in-city 
sources of power to fill that gap. The in-city preference derives from the 80% 
requirement imposed by State regulators, which reflects current limits on the amount 
of transmission capacity coming into the city. Third, New York City’s historically 
high energy prices should benefit renewables because they hasten the payback period 
on new system installations. For commercial power users, the payback on renewables 
systems can be even faster because of their peak load shaving benefits. Finally, 
renewables are being proposed for use in high profile development projects around 
the city, implying a greater awareness of their benefits by the real estate development 
community.
The news is not all good, however. Most important, of course, is that despite the fact 
many of these underlying conditions have been in place for years, renewables have 
yet to gain much of a foothold in the city’s supply picture, and we are not seeing any 
rush to deploy these systems. Moreover, the vast majority of the renewable power 
systems deployed around the city are found at government-owned facilities, meaning 
households and the private sector have yet to embrace these technologies in any 
meaningful way. Even when developers talk of incorporating renewables into an 
iconic project, when push comes to shove they often do not follow through, 
eliminating the renewables component when the project is redesigned.16
Is cost the dominant factor affecting the prospects for renewables? Possibly. 
NYSERDA’s consultants responsible for forecasting renewables potential in New 
York City certainly believe that project economics will influence future deployment 
levels. In the case of solar photovoltaics, their optimistic projections of how much 
power could be generated around New York are tempered just a few pages later, when 
they declare that none of these systems would be deployed if you factor cost into the 
equation (Optimal Energy Inc. et al., 2003). This analysis did not take into account 
any subsidies or tax breaks currently available for these technologies (a subject
16 The new Freedom Tower at the old World Trade Center site is a recent example: the original 2004 
design incorporated wind turbines into the superstructure at the top o f the building that were capable of 
providing roughly 20% of the building’s power demand (Dunlap, 2003). This feature was eliminated 
when the building was redesigned in 2005, however.
132
discussed in Chapter 6), but such a conclusion clearly implies a belief that cost is a 
critical determinant in deployment decisions. The East River tidal turbine project 
anticipates highly competitive pricing, but as this will be the firm’s first permanent 
deployed project, it is too soon to know how accurate their projections will be.
In the case of green power, or electricity derived from renewable power systems 
deployed outside of the city, the prospects also do not look very promising.
Consumer interest in these programs has been limited thus far, and to the extent 
consumers object to the current high cost of electricity from their regular service 
provider, signing up for green power will only make this worse, as most programs are 
structured as a surcharge on top of a consumer’s electricity bill.
In sum, New York City’s fundamental market conditions for renewables can generally 
be considered as somewhat favorable, but there are clear impediments to their 
deployment and use. In Chapter 6 ,1 will delve into the statewide regulatory and 
policy environment to examine whether or how they influence the market for 
renewables in New York City. I will also examine the City’s energy policy-making 
system, exploring what roles the City of New York plays on energy issues and where 
policy is formulated in local government. This information serves as a lead-in to 
Chapter 7, when all of this information will be scrutinized from a more theoretical 
perspective using my modified regime framework.
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CHAPTER 6
New York City case study -  Electricity Regulation and Policy 
at the State and Local Level
Introduction
This chapter continues the case study’s focus on the larger institutional environment 
for energy policy-making in New York City. In this section, the emphasis is on 
formal system structures, and I examine who is involved and how authority is vested 
in entities at the state government level. As a jumping off point, it retraces steps made 
earlier in Chapter 1 which focus on market regulation. Recall that New York was one 
of the first states to wrest control from local authorities and vest it in a state-level 
body. This chapter thus covers the period when control was first taken away from 
New York City officials all the way through to the 1990s, when the market was again 
restructured to promote greater competition. The emphasis of this discussion is on the 
overall electricity policy landscape, although this chapter also includes a lengthy 
review of State and local policies that deal specifically with renewable power.
One thing that bears examination is the level of State regulatory oversight and policy 
specifically focused on New York City. Thus far, my presumption has been that this 
would be substantial, because New York City is responsible for a large percentage of 
the state’s overall electric demand, imposing particularly heavy burdens on the 
NYISO transmission infrastructure during the summer months. It is in the State’s 
interest to insure that the electricity system is effectively managed in New York City, 
because the financial, health, and safety consequences of failing to do so are so 
dramatic. We saw that in the 20-hour blackout of 2003, when economic losses to 
businesses and individuals in the city were in the vicinity of SI billion (Teather, 2003) 
and riders were stuck below-ground in stranded subway cars and above-ground in 
elevators for many hours.
Also worth watching is the extent to which the policy-making landscape 
acknowledges the renewables market conditions described in the previous chapter. 
Given rising electrical demand, do State and city energy policies place a premium on 
renewables, or are there other electricity priorities? Chapter 5 left open the question
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of whether the higher price for renewable power is influencing deployment decisions 
or local policy. State or local efforts to subsidize deployment would likely indicate 
strong support for renewables, and the belief that their current high costs do have a 
deleterious effect on deployment levels.
All of these points are considerations that -  using terms from my blended regime 
model -  represent new institutional factors capable of influencing the direction and 
content of local policy. Information in this chapter thus plays a critical role in setting 
the stage for Chapter 7, when the theoretical model is formally applied to New York’s 
renewables policy picture.
New York State’s Electricity Regulatory Environment
In Chapter 1 ,1 detailed how utility regulation in the US changed from a locally-based 
system to one managed at the state level. This was also the case in New York, where 
local government officials dominated the utility regulatory scene until 1907, issuing 
franchises to large numbers of sometimes overlapping, sometimes exclusive 
geographic areas. Local power was usurped that year when newly-elected Governor 
Charles Evans Hughes, a reformer, created the New York Public Service Commission 
(Read, 1998). The Public Service Commission (PSC) was initially charged with 
insuring “safe and adequate service at just and reasonable rates” (Read, 1998, p 27), 
and for several decades it focused on utility merger issues and ending abusive pricing 
schemes by utilities around the state. In 1931, then-Govemor and soon-to-be-US 
President Franklin Roosevelt created the Power Authority of the State of New York 
(PASNY17), with a goal of further driving down utility rates by building large 
hydropower facilities in upstate New York. It took more than 20 years for these 
facilities to be built, but they succeeded in bringing low cost power to municipally- 
owned utilities and several privately-owned utilities, primarily in upstate New York.
The next significant change in the state electricity picture occurred decades later in 
1965, when the eight largest utilities in the state banded together to form the New 
York Power Pool. The Pool was their response to the 1965 blackout which darkened
17 Now known as the New York Power Authority, or NYPA.
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much of the northeastern United States for up to thirteen hours. Early on, the Power 
Pool was unsophisticated, with members using a telephone to notify one another of 
their need for additional power. By 1977, however, the amount of electricity flowing 
between utilities increased dramatically, and the Power Pool had developed fairly 
sophisticated computer controls that automatically brokered transactions over the 
statewide grid, reducing costs and enhancing system reliability (McCall, 2001; 
NYISO, 2003a). The Power Pool operation was independent of PSC control, 
reporting instead to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the US government 
agency charged with oversight of electric utility and transmission grid operations 
around the US
In 1994, the PSC began a multi-year examination of how it could change New York’s 
electric system to achieve greater competition. Ninety stakeholders, representing 
utility, consumer, and corporate interests around the state, registered with the PSC so 
they could formally participate in this regulatory proceeding. Early on, the PSC 
attempted to distill “consensus principles” that would guide future action, and after 
much give and take, and a dramatic policy reorientation once Republican George 
Pataki defeated incumbent Democratic Governor Mario Cuomo in 1995, “Vision 
Order” 96-12 laid out several overarching market restructuring goals (New York State 
Energy Planning Board, 1998; New York State Public Service Commission, 1996; 
Norlander, 2002):
• Lower consumer prices
• Increase consumer choice of service providers
• Continue and enhance service reliability
• Continue programs that were in the public interest
• Allay concerns about market power (i.e., re-monopolization of the industry), and
• Continue consumer protections and utility obligations to provide service to 
customers.
As part of the order, utilities were asked to file voluntary plans showing how they 
might restructure their operation to comply with the Vision Order.
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Prior to assessing the appropriateness of the voluntary plans, the PSC first had to 
decide between two competing models of deregulation. Under the first, known as 
wholesale competition, regulated distribution utilities buy power from competing 
generators, paying wholesale rates set by the market rather than by regulators. 
Consumers are still locked into their current service provider. The second model, 
known as retail choice, gives electricity users more flexibility by allowing them to 
select who supplies their power. Under the retail choice model, the rates consumers 
pay are largely deregulated, going up or down in response to market forces.
Ultimately, the PSC decided on the latter approach, believing consumer sovereignty 
was maximized by forcing suppliers to compete for customers on a range of different 
criteria, including supply sources, pricing, and service quality. To aid customers in 
their selection process, the PSC also required utilities to divulge the fuel mix used to 
generate their power and emissions information on a twice-yearly basis (New York 
State Energy Planning Board, 1998). [This data was used in the previous chapter in 
Table 5-1.]
By late 1997, the PSC had concluded their “voluntary” negotiations with the six major 
investor-owned utilities operating in the state. As part of these settlements, the 
utilities retained control of their local transmission and distribution system, but were
1 ftrequired to divest their power generation operations. The settlements also 
established timelines by which the old monopoly utilities (hereafter, distribution 
utilities) were forced to open up access to their distribution grid to new Energy 
Service Companies who could buy power from whomever they wished and sell 
directly to retail customers. Wholesale power could be purchased either on the day- 
ahead market or via long-term bilateral contracts that would provide more stable 
pricing over the long run. Customers opting to continue to buy power and billing 
services from their old distribution utility were free to do so (New York State Energy 
Planning Board, 1998; Tonko, 2002).
At the same time the PSC was contemplating how to restructure the marketplace, they 
were also taking steps to ensure that competition and its greater emphasis on profits 
didn’t mean the loss of important programs designed to serve low-income customers,
18 Recall the previous chapter’s discussion of the Con Ed settlement, where they agreed to divest at 
least 50% of their power plant capacity.
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promote energy conservation, and promote long-term environmental protection 
(McCall, 2001). In 1996 the PSC thus established a non-bypassable system benefits 
charge (SBC) on the transmission and distribution of electricity in New York State, to 
be levied for five years. Renamed the NY EnergySmart program in 1998, SBC fees 
were levied on each kilowatt of power transmitted by a distribution utility and are 
used to finance energy efficiency programs, energy technology and system research 
and development; support environmental monitoring and protection; and provide rate- 
relief to low-income customers (New York State Energy Planning Board, 2002). The 
SBC charge rate was set at approximately the same level utilities were spending on 
these programs prior to market restructuring. In 2001 the SBC was reauthorized for 
another five years, making approximately $150 million available each year for various 
EnergySmart program activities managed by NYSERDA.
Between 2001-2006, roughly 9% of the SBC money will be allocated to renewable 
energy-related projects (New York State Energy Research and Development 
Authority, 2002, p 13). Projects SBC funds have been spent on to date include:
• training photovoltaic system installers
• educating consumers on green power and renewable power technologies
• developing wind maps of the state to aid project developers
• subsidizing the development of wind farms and other renewable power systems 
through loans and direct grants
• analyzing interconnections between these systems and the state power grid, and
• funding research designed to aid renewable technology firms located or operating 
in the state.
The majority of NYSERDA monies are allocated through a competitive process, with 
firms and institutions responding to time and budget-limited Program Opportunity 
Notices (PONs). One PON reissued several times provides rebates to homeowners or 
businesses which install solar photovoltaic systems on their house or building.
Another PON provided up to 50% of the cost of the purchase and installation of small 
wind systems, while others made funding available for biomass power generation 
(New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 2005).
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Restructuring the Transmission and Distribution System
The State’s market reform efforts also brought change to the statewide transmission 
and distribution system. In the mid-90’s, as FERC was dealing with market changes 
in other states, it also sought to modify the New York Power Pool’s member-owned 
transmission and distribution system so it was more easily accessed by non-member 
power producers. A series of stakeholder meetings were arranged between Pool 
members and other interested parties, with a goal of establishing a new non-profit 
Independent System Operator. In addition to operating the state’s high-voltage 
transmission system, the FERC sought to have the New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO) administer a new wholesale electricity market (McCall, 2001;
New York State Energy Planning Board, 2002). In this marketplace, the NYISO 
would gather day-ahead demand estimates from distribution utilities, along with 
prices and supply estimates from electricity generators. The NYISO would then 
‘dispatch’, or schedule supply commitments from electricity generators for the 
following day, utilizing a ‘locational-based marginal pricing system’ to decide which 
generators will supply a designated amount of power to a specific location on the grid 
at a certain time the next day (ELA, 2001). Generally, scheduling decisions would be 
based on who can provide power at the least cost at a certain time of day, but to 
maintain system reliability, the NYISO would also pay attention to the capacity of 
each transmission line or substation to ensure the lines did not exceed their peak 
capacity and melt. Refinements to the scheduling system would also be made one 
hour ahead of time to reflect unanticipated demand changes or supply availability, and 
every six seconds the system would be fine-tuned to ensure that supply and demand 
were evenly balanced (Griscom, 2001).
The FERC approved the ISO framework in 1998, with the proviso that reliability 
standards under which wholesale electricity generators and the transmission and 
distribution system would operate must be independently established and monitored 
by yet another organization, a newly-created New York State Reliability Council 
(NYSRC). In the past, the Power Pool members and the PSC collaborated on the 
development of such standards, but FERC opted to give this responsibility to an 
independent organization managed by a 13-member Executive Committee, with the
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six major transmission system owners controlling less than 50% of the Board votes 
(New York State Reliability Council, 2003). Under the new structure, standards 
developed by the NYSRC applicable to distribution utilities and generators would be 
formally issued as policy mandates by the State PSC.
Figure 6-1
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In the years since market restructuring has been fully in force, the reaction to these 
changes has been quite mixed. Much of this is due to the fact that many of the most 
highly-touted reform goals simply have not come to pass. Perhaps because of inertia, 
and perhaps because big cost savings have not materialized [See Figure 6-1], only 
6.9% of retail customers around the state were being served by an electricity provider 
other than their local utility as of February 200519 (Alger, 2001; New York State 
Public Service Commission, 2005c; Pace Energy Project, 2001a). This is twice the 
rate achieved in New York City, but not as high as anticipated.
19 As was the case in New York City, this number is slightly misleading because it largely reflects low  
numbers o f residential users who have “migrated” to another service provider. Non-residential users, 
who represent a small percentage o f  the overall customer base, have switched at higher rates. For 
example, 53% o f Large Time-of-Use customers, who typically include savvy commercial or 
institutional energy users, are currently served by an electricity supplier other than their local utility. 
They are more likely to switch because their high energy usage gives them considerable negotiating 
leverage in dealing with electricity suppliers.
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Tight electricity supply conditions have been cited as one reason costs have remained 
high since restructuring began. Although the expectation was that forcing utilities to 
divest their generation capacity and opening the transmission system to new merchant 
generators would expand the state’s electric supply, to date that has not occurred. 
Several factors appear to be at the root of this problem. First, project developers have 
had a difficult time financing new projects over the last few years, the result of 
timidity on the part of investors scared off by the collapse of the energy firm Enron 
and other financial scandals that have tarnished the reputation of the industry 
(Clemence, 2004). One report examining the situation noted that “investors and 
lenders simply do not appear to trust what most of these [utility] companies tell them 
about their business and fear the companies have financial exposure because of their 
possibly illegitimate practices” (Tonko, 2002, p 8). Second, in the past, utilities were 
given approval to build new plants by regulators, who then established rate structures 
that guaranteed the utility would earn a profit on that investment. Today, that 
guarantee is gone, and developers are wary about investing in costly new plants that 
can take up to four years to build. By the time the plant is finally operational, market 
conditions may be very different.
One way around this problem is to line up long-term commitments to sell this power 
to ESCOs and other load-serving entities around the state (Miller, 2003), but here 
again, utilities are wary of deals that may end up being uneconomical years from now. 
This was the case with New York State’s post-PURPA “6-cent” law from the late 
1980s, which required utilities to purchase power from independent power producers 
for 60/kWh. Market prices subsequently plummeted to as low as 20/kWh, placing 
utilities around the state in a precarious financial position (Lentz, 2002b). Third, the 
regulatory and political environment in New York is not considered friendly to utility 
project developers. One attorney specializing in power plant permitting has noted that 
if you’re deciding between New York and another state, you’ll probably end up 
spending more money to get permitted in New York because the process is more 
cumbersome, and the political opposition is well organized (Griscom, 2001).
One issue yet to play itself out is the environmental impact of New York’s market 
restructuring. Originally, it was believed increased competition (and public 
notification of the fuel sources used by each utility) could lead power generators to
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switch to cleaner fuels to appeal to customers who care about such issues.
Conversely, it is also possible that as competition reduces profit margins, utilities in 
New York and elsewhere may switch to lower cost fuels that produce higher emission 
levels (New York State Energy Planning Board, 2002). Of greatest concern is if fuel 
switching occurs in midwestem states that lack New York’s strong air quality 
restrictions, as prevailing wind patterns would carry these emissions towards New 
York. To date, there has been little hard evidence that either of these benefits or 
problems are occurring, although the pursuit of greater system efficiency may be one 
of the reasons that is encouraging in-state power plant operators to ‘re-power’ older 
coal and oil plants with new natural gas-fired turbines.
State Energy Plan
In 1992, the New York State Legislature passed a law requiring the Governor to 
develop a State Energy Plan (SEP) every four years. Originally, the plan was used to 
lay out very specific government actions Governor Mario Cuomo hoped to pursue 
legislatively or through the regulatory process managed by the State Public Service 
Commission. Under Governor Pataki, however, the 1998 and 2002 energy plans have 
instead focused on providing overarching policy direction, serving as a “blueprint to 
inform energy decision-making” (New York State Energy Planning Board, 2002, p 1- 
2). The change in orientation was deemed necessary to allow the State plan to remain 
applicable in light of the rapid changes occurring in the marketplace.
In 1998, the SEP laid out three broad policy objectives: promote competition; ensure 
fairness, equity, and system reliability; and promote a clean and healthy environment. 
The last goal was explained to include promoting the development of clean, efficient, 
and sustainable energy systems (New York State Energy Planning Board, 1998). 
These goals echoed several of those used by the PSC a few years earlier to guide the 
market restructuring effort underway at the same time, and the 1998 plan gave an 
overview about how restructuring was expected to proceed. By 2002, with 
restructuring well under way, the new SEP articulated a more detailed policy 
framework that, while reflective of the issues raised and lessons learned during the 
early years of deregulation, offered little change of direction (New York State Energy 
Planning Board, 2002, p 1-18).
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The 2002 plan has come under severe criticism from environmental and consumer 
advocates who believe that the SEP’s “blueprint” approach is fundamentally 
incompatible with the State’s restructuring strategy. As one environmental group 
lamented, “the people of New York State, through their government and agencies,
.. .[have] ceded control over energy markets to corporations that are not answerable to 
the people” (Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, 2002, p 1). Clearwater goes on to 
declare the State Energy Plan needs to provide much clearer direction for the 
electricity market, laying out in definitive terms what outcomes should be pursued. 
Other advocacy and watchdog groups have clarified this to mean that the SEP should 
articulate the goal of preventing the clustering of power generation facilities in low- 
income and predominately minority communities (Masters, 2002), or the need to 
standardize and simplify the interconnection process to make it easier for renewable 
power systems to link into local distribution systems (Pace Energy Project, 2001a).
Article X -  New York State’s Power Plant Siting Law
The final major State energy policy of note is Article X of the New York State Public 
Service law, which deals with the contentious issue of large power plant siting. First 
passed in 1992, Article X created a single permit approval process, applicable to any 
proposed facility with a capacity of 80 MW or more. The Article X process 
consolidated many separate State and local government approvals into a system 
managed by the State Board on Electricity Generation and the Environment, also 
known as the Siting Board (New York State Energy Planning Board, 2002). By 
creating a single approval system, Article X was designed to fast-track the process, 
and overcome not-in-my-backyard opposition by local opponents of a project as well 
as local zoning and other restrictions that might prevent the siting of needed facilities 
(Angotti, 2003; Public Policy Institute of New York State, 2002). That’s not to say 
that local government and public input was not welcomed -  Article X included a 
Public Involvement Process that made funding available to local communities to 
allow them to hire experts to evaluate siting proposals and provide input into the 
review process (Pace Energy Project, 2001a). Under Article X, project approval was 
contingent upon a Siting Board finding that the proposed facility was compatible with 
public health, safety and the environment; compliant with State and local laws; and is
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in the public’s interest “or is reasonably consistent with the planning objectives and 
strategies contained in the latest State Energy Plan”(New York State Energy Planning 
Board, 1998, p 2-51).
Since the Article X law was passed in 1992, eleven different power plant proposals 
have been certified in New York State, of which six are currently under construction. 
Another thirteen proposals either withdrew from the process or failed to complete it 
before the law expired in January 2003 (New York State Public Service Commission, 
2003). Efforts to reauthorize Article X have failed on several occasions since early 
2003 due to disagreements between the Governor and the New York State Legislature 
over suggested amendments to the reauthorization measure. Its future prospects are 
uncertain.
Key State Renewable Energy Policies
Although the State Energy Plan architects big picture energy policy in the state, it is 
not the only vehicle doing so, particularly in the area of renewable power. Several 
key policies influencing the local renewables landscape have come about as a result of 
Executive Orders and legislative initiatives. These policies are in addition to 
renewables project subsidies and research and development efforts supported by 
NYSERDA using system benefit charge monies:
• Executive Order 111: In 2001, Governor George Pataki issued Executive Order 
111 requiring all State agencies, departments, and authorities to seek to reduce 
their power consumption by roughly one-third compared to 1990 levels and 
purchase 20% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2010 (New York 
State Energy Planning Board, 2002, p 3-56). The Order specifies which 
technologies qualify as renewable, including wind, solar thermal, solar 
photovoltaic, sustainably-managed biomass, tidal, geothermal, methane waste, and 
fuel cells. In fiscal year 2004,13,000 megawatt-hours (MWh) of renewable 
power was purchased by affected State entities (M. Brown, e-mail communication 
17 May 2005).
144
• Tax Credits: There have been two different tax credits relevant to renewable 
power system installations in New York State in recent years. The 1996 Solar 
Choice Act established a 25% tax credit on systems eligible for NYSERDA’s 
rebate/subsidy program. The maximum tax credit that can be received is $3,750, 
and it can be carried over for up to five years if the credit is more than the tax due 
(Fairley, 2003; Romano, 2002). A second tax credit applied to commercial 
buildings with fuel cells or photovoltaic arrays installed between January 2001 
and December 2004. Known as the Green Building tax credit, it was inspired by 
the efforts of the Durst Organization to build a “green” office tower in Times 
Square in Manhattan. The Dursts found it difficult to pass along to tenants the up­
front costs of many of the environmental features of their new building, and they 
lobbied the State to create this tax credit to eliminate similar financial barriers for 
any other developers contemplating such installations (Campbell, 2000). The tax 
credit, which expired in December 2004, was capped at $3 per watt of the 
system’s capacity, and project developers could apply for the credit for up to five 
years (New York State Energy Planning Board, 2002, p 3-57). At the time the law 
sunset, five buildings -  three of them in New York City -  had qualified for the tax 
credit (Salama, Schill, & Springer, 2005).
• Interconnect rules: The 1996 Solar Choice Act also mandated the development of 
interconnection standards requiring utilities to allow residential PV systems to 
hook into the local distribution grid so long as the systems meet safety and power 
quality standards established by the National Electrical Code and Underwriters 
Laboratory. Systems meeting such standards are not required to install additional 
controls, perform, or pay for additional tests, or purchase liability insurance 
(IREC, 1996). In 1999, the PSC issued standardized interconnection requirements 
for distributed generation systems (including renewable power systems) less than 
300 kW in size connecting to radial distribution systems. These requirements 
also included a process manufacturers can follow to test their equipment, after 
which it is automatically approved for use statewide (New York State Energy 
Planning Board, 2002, p 3-87). In 2002, a law was passed adding interconnect 
standards for on-farm equipment designed to produce up to 400 kW of power
20 The rule formally applies to systems less than 300 kVA, or kilo-volt amperes, a different unit of
electrical measurement that is roughly comparable to 300 kilowatts of power.
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(Office of the Governor, 2002). In November 2004, the PSC raised the limit to 
cover distributed power systems of up to 2 MW in nameplate capacity. The rules 
also broadened the scope of the requirement to cover network grids, such as that 
operated by Con Edison in New York City, arguing that since 1999 much had 
been learned about how to successfully interconnect systems without jeopardizing 
the integrity of a network grid. The PSC did, however, grant utilities the right to 
determine whether special equipment must be attached to the system to protect the 
grid if site-specific conditions warrant it (New York State Department of Public 
Service, 2004a). As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this last provision is critically 
important, as it has resulted in delays and cost increases for renewables projects in 
New York City.
• Net-metering law: The Solar Choice Act of 1996 added New York to the list of 
states that allow “net-metering” for the owners of residential solar photovoltaic 
systems. Under net-metering, the amount of electricity a grid-connected PV 
system feeds into the grid is compared to the amount of electricity that residence 
draws from the grid. The utility is obligated to pay the residence for any amount 
of power generated above the level consumed by that residence, valuing the power 
at the price currently charged to residential users. The 1996 law limited eligibility 
to residences with PV systems of less than 10 kW in size (DSIRE, 2004b; Office 
of the Governor, 2002). In 2002, the net-metering law was again amended to 
cover residential wind systems up to 25 kW and farm-based turbines up to 125 
kW. The 2002 law also amended net-metering rules to include farms generating 
power using anaerobic digesters less than 400 kW in size. Utilities are prohibited 
from imposing standby rates, back-up fees, and other charges on all net-metered 
systems. Payments to owners now vary based on system size, with systems under 
10 kW earning full retail credit, while larger systems receive credit at the utilities’ 
avoided cost (IREC, 2005). In all cases, New York’s net-metering rules limit the 
total amount of net metering a utility is required to provide.
• Renewable Portfolio Standard: In 2003, Governor George Pataki proposed a 
requirement that within ten years, 25% of the retail electricity sales in the state 
involve renewable power sources. After a lengthy public review process, the PSC
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issued final rules establishing such a Renewable Portfolio Standard in September 
2004. Because New York state already derives approximately 19% of its power 
from renewables -- primarily upstate hydro power21 — the RPS is expected to 
result in the development of an additional 3700 MW of additional renewable 
power capacity around the state (DSIRE, 2004a; New York State Public Service 
Commission, 2004). Unlike in other states, where the burden to comply with an 
RPS falls directly on utilities22, in New York NYSERDA will play the key 
procurement role, contracting with renewable power producers who will receive 
financial incentives to sell or deliver their power into the state’s wholesale energy 
market. NYSERDA also has the option to subsidize the installation of on-site 
renewable power systems that will displace electricity currently supplied by the 
grid, effectively achieving the same goal of increasing the rate of power supplied 
by renewable sources. Under the RPS formula established by the PSC, 
NYSERDA is responsible for increasing renewable power supply rates so they 
total 24% of statewide electrical demand. The remaining 1% of the 25% RPS 
requirement is to be achieved using a voluntary green electricity market approach, 
whereby voluntary consumer demand for renewable power will result in utilities 
seeking to procure this power of their own volition.
To comply with its procurement obligation, NYSERDA will issue requests for 
proposals on a regular basis, soliciting large amounts of renewable supply 
capacity under long term power purchase agreements. In early 2005, the first 
seven contracts were signed, totaling 820,000 MWh of renewable capacity which 
must be delivered beginning in 2006. Technologies eligible for the RPS include 
selected forms of hydro and tidal power23, biomass-based power24, large and small
21 It was noted in Table 5-1 that New York State has 4400 MW of installed hydropower capacity, or 
14.5% of the state’s installed electric generating capacity. Additional hydropower is procured from 
Canada, increasing the total proportion of power derived from renewable sources.
22 The reason for the difference in approach is the huge variation in the amount of renewable energy 
currently sourced by different utilities around the state. Because upstate utilities already purchase 
power from upstate hydro dams, many already exceed the RPS’ 25% requirement. Downstate utilities 
do not have such ready access to renewable power sources, however, meaning any excess cost burden 
may fall unduly on downstate customers. To remedy this problem, the PSC decided to focus instead on 
the total quantity of power consumed in the state, and structure a formula that evenly credits renewable 
power use across all utilities and customers.
Qualifying hydropower systems include upgrades that increase the power output at existing 
hydropower facilities, so long as they result in no new impoundment of water; low impact “run of 
river” systems rated 30MW or less; and small hydropower facilities rated at 10MW or less.
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wind systems, and solar photovoltaics (New York State Department of Public 
Service, 2004b). With limited exceptions, systems must be new or have come on­
line after January 1, 2003.
By 2013, the cumulative cost of procuring renewable power under the RPS is 
expected to total $179-323 million on a net present value basis. This amount 
represents costs above and beyond what consumers would otherwise incur if less 
expensive, conventional power technologies were used to supply this power. In 
individual consumer terms, cost impacts are forecast to range from -1% to +2%, 
depending on the sector (i.e., residential commercial, or industrial) and how much 
renewable power technology costs decline over time (New York State Public 
Service Commission, 2004).
Funds for NYSERDA’s procurement contracts are derived from an RPS fee 
attached to each kWh of electricity sold by utilities currently subject to system 
benefits charges. The RPS surcharge, which goes into effect in October 2005, will 
vary from utility to utility. Power delivered to utilities or consumers by the New 
York Power Authority is exempt from the RPS fee requirement.
Role of New York City in Energy Policy-making
Like most other municipalities, New York City has a limited role when it comes to 
energy policy matters. A variety of State laws, including the 1907 law creating the 
New York State Public Service Commission have seen to that, as was just discussed 
at length. New York City is not totally without leverage, however, as the recent 
Mayoral Energy Policy Task Force noted. In their report, the Task Force cited three 
important roles New York City plays when it comes to energy matters (New York 
City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004):
• Voice o f the people -  In regulatory and legislative proceedings, the City of New 
York regularly expresses opinions related to its interests on an issue. These
24 Biomass is generally defined as consisting of energy crops, waste wood, agricultural wastes, animal 
wastes, and food waste. Biogas includes landfill and sewage gas and gases formed through the 
anaerobic digestion of food or animal wastes. Because municipal solid waste includes non-biomass- 
based combustible materials, it was explicitly excluded from the RPS.
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opinions may be focused on the impact on city residents and businesses; the City 
government’s own financial, political, or regulatory interests; or that of the larger 
society. The City has actively fulfilled this role since the earliest days of 
regulation, appearing before regulatory bodies examining industry corruption, 
commenting on (and generally railing against) overcharging, and maintaining a 
formal presence on various advisory committees involved in energy-related 
matters (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004; Read, 1998). As might 
be expected, the City’s level of activism on energy issues has risen and fallen over 
time, a function of their prominence and the level of interest civic leaders had in 
these issues. For instance, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia’s active crusade to develop 
a municipal power system in the late thirties was influenced both by the high rates 
charged the city and the opportunity presented by federal efforts to promote 
hydropower development around the US (Lurkis, 1982). In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, when air quality problems in New York City were particularly 
severe, Mayor John Lindsay was actively involved in pushing Con Ed to reduce 
emission levels, as was his newly created City Environmental Protection Agency 
(CEPA). On the other hand, Mayor Abe Beame, who followed Lindsay into 
office, was much less personally engaged on these issues, and his cutbacks in the 
CEPA budget affected their ability to play much of an activist role (Axelrod, 
1982). More recently, several observers of local energy policy-making have 
commented that Mayor Rudolph Giuliani paid little heed to energy issues until 
2001, when the supply “crisis” noted in Chapter 5 first erupted (R. Anderson, 
pers. comm.; A. Gupta, pers. comm.; R. Miller, pers. comm.).
• Statutory Actor — The Task Force (2004) also noted that city zoning laws and 
permitting authority, along with its control of shorelines and streets, allows it to 
wield significant influence on the siting of major electric projects around the city. 
This statutory power will be put to the test at a waterfront parcel in Brooklyn, 
which the city is attempting to convert into a new park as part of a large rezoning 
of the area (Confessore, 2005; Yassky, 2005). The electric utility developer Trans 
Gas has been attempting to build a new 1,100 MW gas-fired power plant at that 
location. If the now-expired Article X power plant facility siting law is 
reauthorized, the Siting Board has the power to override local zoning restrictions
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if it deems it necessary (Cook, 2000; Public Policy Institute of New York State,
2002). If Article X is not renewed, standard State environmental permitting rules 
apply, giving the City far more leverage over the permitting process.
• Model and moral leader -  By itself, the government of the City of New York uses 
approximately 10% of all power consumed in the city (New York City Energy 
Policy Task Force, 2004). As a result, actions by the City to reduce power 
consumption or develop and use alternative power generation technologies can 
potentially place the City in a leadership role on these issues, providing a 
reference point for actions by households and businesses around the city. The 
recent announcement that the City would procure green power for two City- 
owned industrial centers in Brooklyn was made specifically with that point in 
mind (Con Ed Solutions, 2005b).
There are two other areas where the City plays in an important role on energy issues. 
First, the City has a long record of trying to bring rate relief to local electricity users. 
In the 1930s, 1970s, and 1980s, this took the form of efforts to establish a municipal 
utility that would either compete head on with Con Ed (with the expectation that 
competition would force Con Ed to reduce its rates), or simply obtain cheap power 
from non-Con Ed sources and pass the savings directly on to local customers 
(Barbanel, 1984; Lurkis, 1982; Pumick, 1982). Most recently, operating through the 
City’s Economic Development Corporation (EDC), the City has helped businesses 
apply for State and federal incentive programs that cut electricity prices for selected 
business sectors and neighborhoods in New York City. These programs reduce the 
cost of doing business in New York City, making firms more competitive and likely 
to remain in the city.
A final key role the City has played over the years is to conduct independent research 
on various energy policy issues and using these results to buttress the City’s advocacy 
before the State Legislature or PSC. The subjects of these analyses have varied 
widely. In 1971, the City’s Environmental Protection Administration undertook a 
study of State procedures for power plant siting, with an eye toward their likely 
impact on New York City (Fabricant & Hallman, 1971). Three years later, the New
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York City Department of City Planning coordinated a Metropolitan Energy 
Conference to investigate the current energy situation in the City and identify future 
needs (New York City Department of City Planning, 1974). In 1985, the City hired a 
consultant to analyze the common practice of electricity redistribution, whereby real 
estate owners buy power from Con Ed and then re-sell it to their tenants, often at 
significantly marked up rates (Urban Systems Research and Engineering Inc., 1985). 
That report was used by State legislators looking into the matter. In 2003, the City 
hired a consultant to examine alternative locations for a large gas-fired power plant 
proposed along the East River (Hu, 2003); in 2004, another consultant was hired to 
advise City officials on the renegotiation of the City’s electricity contract with NYPA 
and Con Ed’s application to the PSC to raise electricity prices for local customers 
(New York City Economic Development Corporation, 2004).
A diagram depicting the overall New York State energy policy-making picture, and 
New York City’s limited role in this process, can be found in Figure 6-2.
Figure 6-2
New York City and New York State Energy Policy-making Process
Source: Original Research, April 2004
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New York City Energy Policy-making Apparatus
Responsibility for policy-making and monitoring of energy issues has been vested in a 
number of different New York City government agencies over the past 120 years. In 
the earliest days of electricity, the New York City Board of Electrical Control, the 
Board of Electrical Subway Commissioners, and the Board of Street Lighting all 
shared responsibility for granting and monitoring different electrical franchises on 
behalf of the city. In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the Bureau of Gas and Electricity, 
part of the City’s Department of Water Supply, Gas, and Electricity, was responsible 
for policy and engineering analyses of the Con Ed system, including assessing what 
had gone wrong during different service outages (Lurkis, 1982). In 1968, Mayor 
Lindsay reorganized the government, creating a new Department of Public Works, 
and moving the Bureau of Gas and Electricity under its control (King, 1968).
Lindsay also created the New York City Environmental Protection Administration, 
which worked closely with the City’s Department of Air Resources to reduce power 
plant emissions from Con Ed facilities (Axelrod, 1982). Other energy-related 
responsibilities fell to the Municipal Services Administration, the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Public Utilities, and the Mayor’s Emergency Energy Supply Task 
Force. To try to rationalize and better coordinate policy under his administration, in 
early 1974 Mayor Abe Beame created a New York City Energy Office (Council on 
the Environment of New York City, 1974), but by the late 1980s, it had been merged 
with city offices responsible for other regulated utilities to form the Department of 
Telecommunications and Energy. Rudolph Giuliani dismantled this Department early 
in his first term, shifting responsibility for energy policy issues to a new Energy 
Department at the city’s Economic Development Corporation (EDC), where it has 
remained ever since.
Although this parentage is somewhat confusing, the current delineation of 
responsibility for energy-related policy is not. The Energy Department at EDC is 
responsible for advising the City on energy policy matters, developing long-term 
energy strategies, and administering the energy portion of local economic 
development initiatives (Van Wagner, 2002). Responsibility for energy procurement 
and use by City agencies is handled by the Office of Energy Conservation at the
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Department of Citywide Administrative Services. A third government agency, the 
Bureau of Electric Control at the Department of Buildings has responsibility for 
ensuring electrical code compliance and sanctioning the installation of new wiring or 
electrical systems, including new technologies such as renewable power and other 
distributed energy systems. This division of responsibility has come under criticism 
in recent years. One report by a leading good government group in the city concluded 
that the Office of Energy Conservation lacks the clout to effect much change in the 
government’s own energy use, resulting in over-expenditures amounting to millions 
of dollars each year (Van Wagner, 2002). Similarly, a top official who recently left 
the EDC’s Energy Department is reported to have criticized the placement of energy 
policy-making responsibility within the EDC, believing the agency’s pro-business 
focus isn’t necessarily compatible with the quest for a sound energy policy. The fact 
that the Energy Department was now a sub-cabinet agency was also seen as 
hampering its effectiveness, as it lacked the clout enjoyed by the office when it was a 
free-standing agency (Sargent & Benson, 2003).
Legislation to reconstitute a cabinet-level Energy Office was introduced in the City 
Council in 2004, one of a series of new proposals dealing with energy matters. These 
bills represent an energy legislation renaissance for the Council, which has taken a 
back-seat to Mayoral action on energy issues since at least the mid-1980s . When 
the Council has acted of late, it has focused on reducing energy use at City-owned 
facilities or lowering emissions of fleet vehicles over which the City has significant 
leverage, including government agency vehicles, taxis, and sightseeing buses 
operating in the city. (For example, see DePalma, 2005). Historically, the energy 
legacy of the Council is much broader, dealing with the issuance of franchise rights in 
the late 1800s, and the creation of a municipal utility that was intended to reduce 
power costs (Hughes, 1983; Pumick, 1982). Individual Council members have been 
vocal in their opposition to the proposed siting or repermitting of power plants in their 
legislative districts (for example, see Vallone Jr., 2002; Yassky, 2004), although the 
Council tends not to take collective action on specific siting proposals. The recent 
exception was the Council’s support of the Mayor’s proposal to rezone parts of
25 According to my review of the New York City Council’s on-line database, there have been a total of 
49 pieces of legislation dealing with ‘energy’, ‘electricity, and ‘emissions’ matters proposed since the 
mid-1980s, of which only a handful have actually been signed into law.
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Greenpoint and Williamsburg, where it was obvious that the rezoning plan would 
effectively kill the prospects for the TransGas facility proposed along the East River 
(Confessore, 2005).
The most recent policy-making efforts at the City level involved the work of an 
Energy Policy Task Force established by Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2003. Under 
the auspices of the EDC’s Energy Department, the sixteen member task force, 
composed of representatives of key businesses, utilities, environmental groups, 
community organizations, and statewide energy-related entities, assessed New York 
City’s electricity needs over the next five years and recommended specific policies 
and programs to meet those needs (Quiniones, 2004b). According to a City official 
knowledgeable with the origins of the Task Force:
“We realize a lot of the rules, policies and regulations related to local 
energy matters are set at the state and federal levels.. .there are some 
things that the City can directly influence and take affirmative 
actions on, but because of that reality, the City decided to form this 
coalition so we could be the hub in trying to either directly do 
something about an issue or lead this coalition to go to the 
appropriate agencies at the state and federal levels and say here are 
the things that we need to get done”
The Task Force’s 57-page report detailed 28 specific recommendations, ranging from 
legislative and regulatory policies the City will support at the state level; steps the 
City can take to “lead by example;” and strategies the City can pursue in collaboration 
with Con Edison and merchant power plant and transmission system developers to 
ensure the forecasted power supply gap is addressed (New York City Energy Policy 
Task Force, 2004). To ensure the City makes progress towards achieving these goals, 
the Task Force agreed to remain empanelled and to issue a scorecard twice yearly 
discussing the status of their on-going efforts. The first report was released in April 
2005, noting specific actions that had been completed, those which had been 
launched, and those which were still in the planning stages (New York City Energy 
Policy Task Force, 2005).
154
A Renewables Policy for New York City?
New York City’s approach towards renewable power can historically be characterized 
as passive, talking about the subject but taking no action likely to result in much
9 f \renewables deployment. The first-known instance of any City policy focus on 
renewables occurred in 1971, when the new City Environmental Protection 
Administration’s report on energy issues made passing mention of the role renewables 
could play in ameliorating the air quality impacts of power production in the city. 
Rather than stating how the City could facilitate their development or deployment, the 
report instead passed the buck, calling on the State and federal government to invest 
more in renewables research (Fabricant & Hallman, 1971). In 1974, the Council on 
the Environment, a citizen advisory committee to the Mayor’s office, developed a 
forward-looking report on energy issues in the city, but they too found no policy­
making role for the City in developing alternative energy sources, with the exception 
of solid waste incineration, which was seen to hold great potential for the city 
(Council on the Environment of New York City, 1974). Later that same year, the 
New York City Department of City Planning convened an urban energy conference, 
attracting experts from around the city and country. Despite a pessimistic talk by one 
scientist about the limited role renewable power sources could play in the city’s future 
energy picture, a working group convened near the end of the two-day conference 
concluded “regional policy should emphasize [the] development” of solar and wind 
power systems in the city (New York City Department of City Planning, 1974, p 116).
The City of New York did little to follow-up on this recommendation, however, a 
situation that has remained true for the 30 years (and four Mayoral administrations) 
since that conference. The Giuliani administration’s development of High 
Performance Building Guidelines in 1999 did mention renewables deployment, but 
even that was limited to a single line out of a 144-page document. At the time these 
guidelines were developed by a group of city officials, planners, architects, and 
energy and environmental experts, they represented cutting-edge thinking on how the 
City could incorporate environmental design features and construction practices into
26 There had been efforts decades earlier to procure hydropower from upstate projects, but that was 
done primarily for cost reasons rather than out o f a preference for the recognized environmental 
benefits of renewable power.
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future public building renovation and construction projects (New York City 
Department of Design and Construction, 1999). The guidelines are voluntary, 
however, and adoption of the ideas contained in the guidelines has been rather low.
As of February 2004, 16 capital construction projects funded by the City have 
incorporated some aspect of the High Performance Building Guidelines, two of which 
have included building integrated photovoltaic system on the roof and exterior walls 
(New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004, p 51). All projects involving the 
use of the Guidelines will be closely monitored for a few years to help document any 
operating cost savings or other benefits that might offset any additional up-front costs.
In 2003, two significant renewables policy-making opportunities occurred, and in 
both instances, the City of New York maintained its ambivalent stance towards 
renewables. The first came in the form of the Public Service Commission’s 
regulatory proceeding focusing on how the Governor’s Renewable Portfolio Standard 
should be structured. In its initial comments on the RPS, the City’s Energy 
Department expressed its support for the goals of the RPS, but also raised serious 
reservations that the RPS would result in higher electricity costs in New York City.
To address this problem, the City advised the PSC to consider including “non- 
traditional forms of renewable energy,” such as waste-to-energy facilities and steam
onair conditioning from modem combined-cycle gas power plants in its definition of 
what resources should be considered renewable (Delaney, 2003b, pp 5-6). The City 
also recommended that renewable power generated outside of the state, such as 
hydroelectric power from Canada, count towards the RPS requirement (Delaney, 
2003b, p 6). Six months later the City submitted followup comments that repeated 
many of the same points (Delaney, 2003a).
A separate set of comments submitted to the PSC by the New York City Council 
disagreed with the Energy Department’s conclusions, arguing that municipal solid 
waste incineration was too polluting to be considered a clean form of energy 
production, and thus should not be considered renewable unless the technology is 
greatly improved. The City Council’s comments also expressed reservations about
27 The City’s comments acknowledge that the latter is not strictly a renewable form of energy, but 
noted that District Heating Systems, such as the large steam heating and cooling system available in 
Manhattan south of 96th Street, have many environmental benefits and should thus be seriously 
considered.
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the inclusion of large scale hydropower projects in the definition of qualifying 
technologies because of their recognized adverse environmental impacts and because 
its exclusion would likely result in a decreased emphasis on newer renewable 
technologies. The boldest suggestion made by the Council was the PSC should 
incentivize renewables development in places like New York City because the 
distributed nature of these electricity systems could help alleviate the City’s load- 
pocket problem (New York City Council, 2003).
The second significant policy-making opportunity came with the formation of the 
New York City Energy Policy Task Force. Charged with assessing the current state 
of the City’s electricity situation and recommending actions to secure the City’s 
energy future (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004), the Task Force 
report could have been used to articulate very specific policy and funding initiatives 
supportive of renewables or explained why renewables were undeserving of any 
prominent place in the City’s near-term energy future. Instead, the report again opted 
to ignore renewables, stating “the scope of the report does not include such energy- 
related issues as ...sustainable energy, clean air, [or] climate change policy” (New 
York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004, p 8). The report does mention solar 
power on five occasions, as one of many types of clean on-site power generation 
strategies that can be pursued, but does nothing further to endorse its use.
At a public meeting one month after the Task Force report was released, the Task 
Force Chair explained there was a conscious decision to not make renewables a 
significant focus of the Task Force’s work, instead shifting responsibility for such 
issues to a proposed new task force that would explicitly look at ‘sustainability’ issues 
(Quiniones, 2004a). That Sustainability Task Force was formally appointed by the 
Mayor in November 2004, consisting of staff representing eleven different City 
agencies. The Task Force has a very inward focus, however, emphasizing the 
‘greening’ of internal city government operations. Thus far, Task Force members 
have been brainstorming different policy and program opportunities that the City 
could pursue. In the summer o f2005 the Task Force is expected to develop an action 
plan to guide agency action on sustainability issues over the next few years (R. 
Kulikowski, pers. comm.).
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Several subtle policy shifts that could benefit renewable power occurred in late 2004. 
As part of its renegotiation of its electricity services contract with the New York 
Power Authority, old contract provisions interpreted as obligating the City to use 
NYPA to help plan and install any renewable power projects on City-owned or 
supported facilities were eliminated. The City can now seek out other installers, some 
of whom may be less expensive than NYPA. Additionally, although the new NYPA 
contract continues to allow NYPA to retain full control over decisions on which 
power sources are used to meet its supply obligation to the City, the City must agree 
to any “contracts that add long term supply resources to the supply portfolio serving 
the NYC Governmental Customers” (New York Power Authority, 2005). This 
provision thus gave the City the opportunity to provide input into the way NYPA 
structured a recent Request for Proposals seeking 500 MW of power for the City 
contract. In this RFP, NYPA noted its principal goal was to procure “economical, 
stable, and predictable” power from sources located in the New York City powershed. 
The RFP also noted NYPA’s openness, however, to “newer, cleaner energy sources of 
generation and to other solutions, including generation produced by renewable 
sources, that improve the environment in New York City by displacing older, higher- 
polluting generation” (New York Power Authority, 2004, p 1). Ultimately, NYPA 
ended up procuring 20 MW of renewable power supply as a result of this RFP (A. 
Rosenberg, pers. comm.).
A second, potential policy shift came during the Con Edison rate case before the PSC 
in 2004. Con Ed’s proposal to raise prices for its customers was first submitted to the 
PSC in April 2004, and it was eventually settled as a result of direct negotiations 
between Con Ed, the City of New York (in its statutory role as an intervenor), and a 
multitude of other stakeholders. The negotiation process was overseen by the PSC, 
following the Commission’s standard settlement rules (Couch White LLP, 2004).
The give and take of the negotiation process was not documented, and participants 
were unwilling to fully divulge their negotiation positions with me, but comments 
submitted to the PSC by the City of New York in reaction to the original Con Edison 
rate proposal appear to have served as the foundation of the City’s negotiation 
strategy, as did the 2004 Mayoral Energy Policy Task Force report.
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Aspects of the settlement agreement include that could potentially benefit renewables 
deployment and use in the City include (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 
2005):
• A requirement that Con Edison pursue 675 MW of distributed resources in its 
New York City/Westchester County service territory over the next three years.
• A requirement that Con Ed work with the New York City EDC and others on 
energy infrastructure master plans for major redevelopment zones of New York 
City such that distributed resources could be used in lieu of traditional energy 
infrastructure upgrades, and
• Incentives encouraging Con Edison to promote higher retail migration rates to 
ESCOs serving the New York City market (including those selling green power).
Because the settlement language does not explicitly call for Con Ed to pursue 
renewables generation as an end goal in these efforts, it is not clear the extent to 
which the agreement will actually result in any new renewables system deployment in 
the city. The door has been opened, however, and it remains to be seen what will 
actually ensue over the next three years.
Conclusion
This chapter focuses on two key topics: the structure of the policy and regulatory 
system in New York State, and the content of the policies derived by this system.
Both are important elements of my logic study, and both link back to market and 
policy landscape issues first raised in Chapters 1 and 2.
The current energy policy system in New York is clearly State dominated. Between 
the Public Service Commission and NYSERDA -  and with strong input from the 
Governor -  the direction and content of State energy policy is established and 
implemented. This system structure has been in place for a century, and it still 
reflects the basic principles outlined in the 1907 law usurping local control of the 
electric power industry. In that law, the roles of State policy-makers, local officials, 
and utility managers essentially became codified, with each group allocated clearly
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defined roles. The State wrote policy, utilities implemented it, and local authorities 
reacted to these policies and programs when they believed their community would be 
adversely affected. Of course, local authorities did exert much control over their own 
electricity use, just as they had a much broader set of powers if they owned and 
operated their own public utility.
The market restructuring efforts in the mid-1990s changed some important rules 
regarding competition, but the fundamental system structure remained intact. Markets 
are still regulated by State officials, and the policy-making powers of local authorities 
continue to exist within confines dictated by State rules. That is not to say New York 
City’s policy-making powers are inconsequential. The City of New York’s 
governmental operations are responsible for roughly 3% of total statewide energy 
demand, while peak demand in the city amounts to nearly 40% of peak statewide 
electricity use (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004; New York State 
Energy Planning Board, 2002). Efforts by the City to procure green power or reduce 
electricity usage could have significant statewide consequences. Moreover, 
particularly on regulatory issues involving Con Edison, the City’s voice is an 
important one, because it is seen as representing the collective interests of three 
million Con Edison customers.
This chapter also contains several important policy threads continuing themes raised 
early in this thesis. First, New York State’s electricity market restructuring was 
intended to create opportunities for all types of technologies in the marketplace, 
including renewables. PURPA first opened this door back in the late 1970s, and New 
York’s mid-1990s restructuring efforts made clear its intent to ensure renewable 
power schemes retained their access to the state’s transmission and distribution grid. 
Restructuring also had cost containment and cost reduction in mind, however, and to 
the extent this is a primary goal of policy-makers and energy consumers -  a subject 
covered in Chapter 7 -  then renewables may suffer. One thing quite evident is the 
fact environmental gains expected to occur under restructuring have yet to come to 
fruition. Consumers are not flocking to ESCOs offering green power programs.
There is an overall trend towards cleaner energy supplies (in the form of natural gas), 
but this follows the national trend described in Chapter 1, and we have not seen a rush
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by merchant developers to build large renewable power systems around New York 
State.
Answering a question first posed at the beginning of this chapter, a second theme is 
that State policy is broadly supportive of renewable power. Between the system 
benefit charge monies available from NYSERDA for renewables projects, the green 
power mandates on State agencies, an RPS designed to jumpstart the statewide market 
for large scale renewable installations, and a series of initiatives (e.g., tax credits, 
interconnect rules, net metering) designed to facilitate smaller scale installations by 
homeowners and businesses, State policy has clearly been a friend to the renewables 
industry. The SBC and RPS programs in particular make renewables more cost 
competitive with existing power sources, and as will be discussed in the next chapter, 
they play a big role in determining whether a renewables project actually goes 
forward. Overall, New York State’s efforts in these areas place them at the forefront 
of State-level programs around the US.
By contrast, New York City is not among the vanguard of cities taking aggressive 
action on renewables. For thirty years now, local policy makers have acknowledged 
the benefits of renewable energy, yet done little to advance its use in any meaningful 
way. Most recently, the Energy Policy Task Force made almost no mention of 
renewables in their key report projecting a huge electricity supply shortfall in the city. 
The City of New York’s official comments on the RPS said nice things about 
renewable power, but then effectively undermined their argument by focusing on 
costs and alternative technologies that few consider to be “new” renewable sources of 
power. In fact, comparing New York City’s actions on renewables with the lengthy 
list of strategies employed by other municipalities -  mandates, tax incentives, 
expediting permit approval, etc. -  one sees the City’s nascent green power purchasing 
program and biogas recovery at local sewage treatment plants as the only real 
evidence that decision-makers are paying any attention to this issue. The distributed 
generation provisions negotiated by the City as part of the Con Ed rate settlement and 
the new electric services contract with NYPA may create opportunities for more 
renewables deployment around the city, but it is too soon to tell how successful they 
will be in this regard.
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Assessing why New York City is not following the pro-renewables path of other cities 
is the task of Chapter 7, where I try to explicate the logic behind local policy and 
deployment decisions. Regime governance will be a primary focus of the chapter, 
identifying the stakeholders most responsible for energy policy-making in New York 
City and examining what drives their behavior on these issues. I will also weave in 
new institutional themes from Chapters 5 and 6 when it is clear this information 
contributes to our understanding of local policy and deployment decisions.
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CHAPTER 7
New York City case study: Policy and Politics — A Modified Regime Analysis of 
Renewables Policy-making in New York City
Introduction
The previous historical, policy and regulatory system overviews laid the groundwork 
for this chapter. I build on this by reviewing previous regime analyses of New York 
City, which essentially conclude there is a business-led coalition that dominates local 
agenda-setting. I then examine the environmental policy landscape around the city to 
determine the extent of this regime’s involvement with local environmental issues. 
Recall that Gibbs and Jonas inquire about such issues, so this chapter explores this 
matter at length. The work of the New York Building Congress Energy Committee is 
key here as it provides an opportunity for business interests to engage in local energy 
policy issues at the highest levels.
This chapter also employs my modified regime approach to develop a comprehensive 
explanation of the logic of local energy policy-making. The key difference between a 
standard regime analysis and my modified regime approach is the latter’s focus on the 
new institutional influences that can affect the behavior of regime members and other 
stakeholders in a city. Given Chapter 6’s lengthy discussion of the energy policy­
making environment in New York State and New York City, there is much to discuss 
here. The structure of the State’s energy policy-making and regulatory system and 
issues of cost are two important areas of influence, so close attention will be paid to 
whether and how regime behavior is affected by these factors.
I conclude this chapter with several observations about the prospects for renewable 
power in New York City. In general, I am skeptical whether we will see a significant 
expansion of renewables use in either the near or long term. Renewables are not part 
of the City’s energy game plan right now, and State policy appears biased towards 
renewable power technologies better suited for more remote areas. Market conditions 
also do not appear conducive to large scale deployment, a situation that will not 
change until the cost of renewable technologies most likely to be deployed in cities 
decline significantly.
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New York City -  A Political Regime Overview
Much ink has been spilled over the years examining the question of who ‘runs’ New 
York City, a concept central to urban regime theory. Roberts (1985) notes that for 
much of the middle 20th century, tremendous power was wielded by a relatively 
narrow group of individuals -  the local Roman Catholic Archbishop, Tammany Hall 
political bosses, trades union officials, the wealthy Republican state governor, and a 
long-time bureaucrat named Robert Moses who could all change or shape important 
city policies with a single phone call or nod of their head. The deaths of these people 
and the city’s mid-1970s financial crisis changed things, however. Coalition 
government was now required, requiring significant cooperation of private sector 
leaders who were appointed by the State nearly 30 years ago to monitor the City’s 
fiscal health. Today, City leaders must also work with fluctuating coalitions, 
“inconstant constellations that form on single issues and then fall apart, only to come 
together in some new configuration when another cause becomes compelling” 
(Roberts, 1985, p 87). Such an analysis hardly fits within the traditional urban regime 
model, where a stable, long-lasting coalition exerts influence over the urban agenda 
for an extended time period. Two studies have looked at the historical record over the 
last 20+ years, however, and concluded that regimes do exist in New York City.
Gladstone and Fainstein’s (2001, p 35) analysis is primarily focused on the city’s 
tourism economy, but they nonetheless found considerable evidence that New York 
City is run by a pro-growth, corporate-led regime, citing instances where Mayors 
Koch, Dinkins, and Giuliani have worked closely with real estate developers to create 
an “engine for growth.” The use of tax breaks and eminent domain powers to benefit 
developers, and the implementation of aggressive policing strategies to ensure public 
and tourist safety in certain neighborhoods -  again benefiting developers with 
properties in those same neighborhoods -  was seen as proof of the power of the 
corporate-led regime. Sites (1997) primarily focused on analyzing the weaknesses of 
urban regime theory, but he nonetheless agreed that New York City government looks 
to the private sector to act, and that past Mayors have fit classic regime typologies:
Ed Koch was a pro-growth entrepreneur, David Dinkins ran a progressive, multi­
racial community-oriented coalition, and Rudy Giuliani oversaw a caretaker regime 
stressing budget stability. Sites offers up a great deal of evidence that the pro-growth
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regime, particularly real estate developers, were given incentives in the form of tax 
breaks and development opportunities to help the city achieve certain goals. For 
example, in 1986, Ed Koch outlined plans for a 10-year, 250,000 unit housing 
rehabilitation plan designed to benefit low and middle income households, a group for 
whom a significant housing gap was seen to exist. By the time Koch left office just 
two years later, however, fully “two-thirds of the housing slated for production under 
the plan was targeted for market-rate and upper-middle-income housing consumers”, 
a market segment that brought developers a much higher profit margin. Even David 
Dinkins, who came to office vowing to abolish or reform the Industrial and 
Commercial Incentives Program providing tax abatements to major corporations and 
developers, was forced to renew it after the business community announced its 
passage would be viewed as a key bellwether of the Mayor’s attitude towards the 
local real estate market. Other studies focusing on land-use planning practices in New 
York over the last 25 years have noted similar trends whereby tax breaks, zoning 
changes, and property condemnation powers have been exercised or proposed for use 
by the City on behalf of the local real estate community (Bogdanich, 1986; Fainstein, 
2001; Fainstein & Young, 1992; Rayman & Robin, 2004; Roberts, 1991).
The real estate community’s involvement in any regime makes sense given “real 
estate is to New York what oil is to Dallas” (Roberts, 1985). Manhattan’s real estate 
market alone was valued at more than $168 billion in 2003 (Real Estate Weekly, 
2003), real estate taxes constitute the largest source of city tax revenues (Samuels, 
1997), and real estate managers and developers have long been known for their 
generous donations to local political campaigns (Bogdanich, 1986; Lobbia, 2000). 
Fainstein and Young (1992, p 31) also see a logic to the real estate community’s 
involvement in that “New York City’s government is embedded in a number of 
structures that restrain its capacity to produce either an efficient or an equitable 
city.. .the governing regime can at best hope for improvement rather than 
transformation.” Policies that result in the construction of ever-larger buildings are 
thus a manifestation of Mayoral efforts to ‘improve’ the city.
Who else is in New York City’s dominant regime? NYC long been considered a 
strong union town (Hill, 2003) with more than 288,000 municipal union employees 
alone (Berkey-Gerard, 2004), not to mention tens of thousands of other trade union
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members around the city. One need only point to the tremendous city upheaval and 
political fallout that hurt Mayor John Lindsay after several municipal union strikes in 
the late 1960s (McFadden, 2000) to understand that local unions hold considerable 
clout (Malanga, 2003). Weikart (2001) says union power can be seen in how the 
municipal unions structured their new contracts early in Rudolph Giuliani’s tenure, 
when budget deficits threatened the City. By agreeing to a temporary salary freeze, 
the unions won a no-layoff pledge from the normally tough-talking Mayor. More 
peripherally, good government groups like the Regional Plan Association, the 
Municipal Art Society, Citizens Union, and the Citizen’s Budget Commission, all of 
whom have been around for decades, are still seen as having a place at the table and 
offering key commentary on planning and development issues (Fainstein, 2001).
Their voice is not as loud as it once was, when they fought for and won important 
changes in the city’s political and policy-making structure (Citizen's Union, 2004; 
Municipal Art Society, 2004), but they nonetheless still lend an important voice to the 
debate. Finally, Malanga (2003) sees non-profit organizations as having an ever- 
more-important role, given the City has followed post-Fordist trends of relying on 
non-government entities to provide important public services. Operating locally, 
these NGOs have built strong political constituencies that can be called on to combat 
proposed budget cuts.
Two other important players in the city are the civic group Association for a Better 
New York and the business group Partnership for New York City. In particular, the 
Partnership is seen as a voice of the business community on major civic issues 
(Waggoner, 1980). Established in 1980 by David Rockefeller, then-President of 
Chase Manhattan Bank, the Partnership has played important roles at many times in 
the city’s recent history, lobbying politicians in Washington on behalf of the city 
(Campbell, 1981; Kolker, 2001); working to develop housing for middle-income New 
Yorkers (Daniels, 1982); promoting reforms of the city’s public school system 
(Kennedy, 1998); creating summer job programs for city teenagers and a venture 
capital fund for start-up businesses (Kolker, 2001); and spearheading corporate 
energy conservation programs at a time when city power supplies were reaching their 
limits (Archibold & Fried, 2001). The Partnership’s influence has risen and fallen 
over the years, particularly as the city’s business community changed, with many 
Fortune 500 firms moving their headquarters out of New York City, replaced by
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international firms with “revolving door” executives who have less interest in getting 
involved in the “provincial” interests of the city (Fainstein, 2001, p 57). Nonetheless, 
the Partnership is still seen as having the capacity to command an audience with City 
and State politicians on short notice, an ability they aggressively employed to help the 
city recover from the impacts of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Center (Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, 2002).
Environmental Politics in New York City
New York City’s environmental movement has a very fragmented leadership 
structure, with no hegemonic regime broadly focused on the local environment (M. 
Bystryn, pers. comm.; A. White, pers. comm.; J. Babbie, pers. comm.). There are 
several well-known national environmental groups based in the city, namely the 
Natural Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense, which regularly 
weigh in on local environmental political issues. They are viewed as having a highly 
knowledgeable staff, and the groups enjoy good access to local and national political 
leaders (Johnson, 2000). New York City-based groups with considerable statewide 
influence include the New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG) and the 
New York League of Conservation Voters. NYPIRG is an advocacy organization 
with strong student involvement at college campuses around the state, while the 
League sees itself as the political arm of the state’s environmental movement, helping 
to identify and elect public officials with a commitment to a strong environmental 
agenda (M. Bystryn, pers. comm.). Citywide environmental groups include the 
Straphangers Campaign, a project of NYPIRG; Transportation Alternatives; and the 
New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYCEJA). Straphangers and 
Transportation Alternatives are issue-oriented groups, while NYCEJA is 
geographically focused, working on a range of environmental issues seen as 
disproportionately affecting low income, predominately-minority communities.
There are also scores of community groups who focus on environmental quality issues 
at the neighborhood level.
Given that New York City covers slightly more than 300 square miles of land, it is no 
surprise that leadership on issues related to the environment should be fragmented. 
Tripp (pers. comm.) believes there is a broadly construed “sustainability” agenda in
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the city, but more often environmental politics has a very localist form as groups 
attempt to address particular development proposals, transport problems, or the siting 
of specific waste or energy facilities. Johnson (2000) suggests turf battles are one 
reason environmental leadership is fragmented, as groups working to empower the 
local citizenry resent what they see as efforts by the larger environmental groups to 
‘speak for’ the community. These community groups want to be directly appointed to 
panels advising the City, State, or Federal governments, and thanks to the creation of 
some formal Environmental Justice Advisory Boards, they now have the right to do 
so. White (pers. comm.) also sees fragmentation as a “classic affliction of advocacy,” 
where groups have acknowledged expertise and contacts in one policy or geographic 
area but are less well-versed or networked in others. Recycling and waste 
management issues are one area where there have been noteworthy citywide 
campaigns over the years (Miller, 2000), but even here potential solutions have run 
into conflicts between local groups and the national environmental organizations 
working on the issue (Harris, 2003; Hershkowitz, 2002). A proposed water filtration 
plant in the Bronx and the development of a new riverfront park on the Hudson River 
in lower Manhattan are two other projects where conflicts have arisen between the 
different groups (Johnson & McKinley Jr., 2003; Martin, 1998).
As suggested by Gibbs and Jonas (2000) in Chapter 3, aside from examining whether 
there is a separate and distinct environmental regime, it is also it worth considering 
whether the dominant regime in the city is actively engaged on environmental issues. 
At first blush, this does not appear to be true, with environmental issues seen more as 
a peripheral issue than something that regularly attracts the attention of the existing 
pro-growth business-led regime. That is not to say they have been silent, as different 
regime members often take a prominent role in advocating for various environment 
related issues. The Partnership for New York City, for example, has been very vocal 
in its support for new subway lines in Manhattan and in suggesting economic 
recovery efforts in Lower Manhattan would benefit from the development of a new 
multi-mode transit hub (Associated Press, 2002; Rutenberg, 1999). The Partnership 
was also a leader advocating for the passage of brownfields cleanup legislation 
(Hammond Jr., 2003), and in 2005 began to seriously explore the viability of a 
congestion charge program for Manhattan modeled after London’s successful scheme 
(Chan, Marshall, & Rutenberg, 2005). The Real Estate Board of New York was one
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of the primary backers of the Green Building Tax Credit in 1999, seeing big benefits 
both for its members and the local environment (M. Davenport, pers. comm.). The 
Municipal Art Society created the Metropolitan Waterfront Alliance to help promote 
waterfront access and the increased use of ferries for transportation (Kilgannon,
2003).
Regime members have also adopted positions at odds with local environmental 
groups. Some believe development of a transit hub in Lower Manhattan could divert 
funding for the 2nd Avenue subway line extension, a proposal long supported by 
public transport advocates that only recently was included in the Transit Authority’s 
long-term capital budget plan (Lentz, 2002a). Real estate developers and labor unions 
were big fans of the “Westway” highway project in lower Manhattan that was 
strenuously opposed by environmental groups. Critics of the project claimed 
developers were behind Westway because it essentially represented four miles of 
choice, new developable land along the Hudson River (Baker, 1985). Labor unions in 
the city have been frequent supporters of projects opposed by environmentalists, 
arguing projects like Westway, the Bronx water filtration plant, or new power plants 
represent significant long-term employment opportunities for their workers and other 
city residents (Associated Press, 2001; Sargent, 2003; Waldman, 1999).
The New York Building Congress Energy Committee
In the course of my New York City fieldwork, I briefly explained my basic theoretical 
framework to most of the experts that I interviewed, and repeatedly was advised that 
the Energy Committee of the New York Building Congress was worth examining 
because of its interest in local energy issues. The Energy Committee’s parent 
organization, the Building Congress, was established in 1921 by members of the 
city’s architectural, real estate development, construction, and labor community to 
help “all branches of the building industry to work out together their common 
problems” (New York Times, 1921), and it still fulfills that same purpose today (R. 
Anderson, pers. comm.). The Building Congress is a voluntary membership 
organization with more than 350 corporate and trade group members.
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The Building Congress’ interest in energy issues dates back to its earliest days (New 
York Times, 1927), but the Energy Committee was not created in the mid-1970s, an 
outgrowth of concern about the potential impacts of the Arab oil embargo on New 
York City. Jack Rudin, one of the New York City real estate community’s ‘royals’ 
(Samuels, 1997), was the driving force behind its development. Due to his personal 
clout and network, the Energy Committee involves the highest level decision-makers, 
most of whom come personally to the meetings rather than delegating this task to one 
of their employees (R. Anderson, pers. comm.). The committee is currently co­
chaired by John Gilbert, the President of Rudin Management, a large real estate 
developer and management firm, and William Harkins, an independent consultant 
who until recently served as Vice President for Policy at Con Edison. Other 
committee members include individual companies and organizations involved in the 
local energy industry, key managers from the City’s Economic Development 
Corporation, and groups such as the Real Estate Board of New York, the Association 
for a Better New York, the Partnership for New York City, and the New York 
Building Trades Council. Some of these latter names are familiar since they include 
groups cited earlier as key members of the pro-growth business regime that helps run 
New York City.
Over the years the Committee has conducted research and staked out advocacy 
positions on a number of energy issues. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Committee 
spoke in favor of the development of waste-to-energy facilities around the city 
(Coletti, 1992; Newman, 1983, 1984). In 1994, in the wake of years of adverse 
publicity about the reliability of Con Edison, the Energy Committee undertook a 
study that concluded New York had the most reliable electrical service of any major 
urban area in the country (Real Estate Weekly, 1994). In late 2000 and early 2001, at 
the behest of the Energy Committee, the New York Building Congress Research 
Institute funded an energy ‘dialogue’ hosted by researchers from New York 
University to identify pressing energy-related issues in New York City (A. Zerkin, 
pers. comm.). Most notable, however, was the Committee’s research and advocacy in 
2001 and 2002 of potential electricity supply gap problems. These reports, discussed 
earlier in Chapter 5 and known as the Electricity Outlook reports, cemented the 
Energy Committee’s position as “strong, active” leaders on local energy issues (R.
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Miller, pers. comm.), significant players who have filled a void that previously existed 
on energy policy-making in New York City (R. Scanlon, pers. comm.).
The Electricity Outlook reports examined the city’s electric supply picture and 
concluded potential shortfalls threaten the reliability of the local electric system. This 
information was not necessarily new -  as noted in Chapter 5, Con Ed had been 
making public statements about a potential capacity shortfall for at least two prior 
years (Perez-Pena, 1999; Sherman, 2000) -  but the 2001 Electricity Outlook report 
was the first one to gain much traction among local officials. The report was released 
naming the Building Congress, the Association for a Better New York, the New York 
Building Construction and Trades Council, the Partnership for New York City, and 
the Real Estate Board of New York as signatories. On the 2002 report, a sixth name 
was added, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), one of the nation’s pre­
eminent environmental advocacy organizations, also based in New York City. Ashok 
Gupta, a former official with the New York City Energy Office, and the head of 
NRDC’s Air and Climate Program, was invited to join the Building Congress’ Energy 
Committee in late 2001, and his support of the Committee’s second study was seen as 
a big boost to its credibility (R. Anderson, pers. comm.).
The Energy Committee has unquestionably had a hand shaping the direction of New 
York City’s energy policies in recent years. During his eight-year tenure in office, 
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani made just one major direction-setting energy policy address 
(R. Miller, pers. comm.), after receiving a briefing from the Energy Committee on the 
results of their first Electricity Outlook report (R. Anderson, pers. comm.). The points 
raised in the Mayor’s speech clearly echo themes raised in the Energy Committee 
report (Giuliani, 2001a), and the speech attracted prominent coverage in local 
newspapers (Lipton, 2001). In July 2003, Mayor Bloomberg convened a roundtable 
discussion with the Energy Committee at which he announced the creation of an 
Energy Policy Task Force. Seven of the twelve task force slots were given to Energy 
Committee members, including the two co-chairs of the Energy Committee. The 
Task Force report, released in January 2004, repeated the Energy Committee’s call for 
the construction of more power generation and transmission capacity, the
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reauthorization of Article X, and endorsed the development of distributed resources28 
as a partial solution to the power supply gap (New York City Energy Policy Task 
Force, 2004).
Stakeholders Influencing Renewables Policy and Deployment Decisions in New 
York City -  A Modified Regime Analysis
On its own, the Energy Committee does not constitute a policy regime because it fails 
many of the conditions researchers have established as minimum criteria. For 
example, applying Dowding’s structural tests (Dowding, 2001), we see that the 
Energy Committee fails to satisfy the conditions that a regime must cross sectoral or 
institutional boundaries and bridge institutions and community interests. As an 
industry-dominated organization, focused on promoting the common interests of the 
architectural, construction, real estate, and building trades industries in New York, the 
Building Congress lacks other constituencies the Mayor’s office felt compelled to 
include when establishing its own task force on energy issues. The Energy 
Committee also fails Clark’s (2001) and Gladstone and Fainstein’s (2001) test 
emphasizing the importance of outcomes, as it has proven itself incapable of 
delivering on its major energy advocacy campaigns, including the renewal of Article 
X and its endorsement of waste-to-energy facilities.
That’s not to say that New York City lacks for a business-led group that could 
conceivably qualify as a hegemonic energy regime -  Mayor Bloomberg’s Energy 
Policy Task Force. With its clearly articulated vision and strong leadership, the Task 
Force satisfies many of Dowding’s regime requirements. [See Table 7-1.] From a 
regime perspective the Task Force’s failings are its young age -  it’s been meeting just 
over two years -  and the fact that it has yet to survive any change in Mayoral 
administration.
The policy agenda endorsed by the Task Force has both new and old elements to it. 
There is a tremendous amount of overlap between the Task Force report and the old 
Electricity Outlook reports. Both sets of documents have a strong economic
28 The Mayor’s Task Force defined distributed resources as “clean on-site generation and various 
methods of energy efficiency and demand reduction” (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 
2004).
172
orientation, arguing a supply gap could bring tremendous harm to the city’s fiscal 
health. Issues like climate change and public health near in-city power plants receive 
little or no attention in the Electricity Outlook reports, and they are similarly 
downplayed in the Task Force report. Both sets of documents prescribe similar 
solutions: reauthorizing Article X, building large new central station plant capacity in 
or linked to the city, and increasing reliance on distributed energy resources. Newer
Table 7-1
Dowding’s Regime Tests Applied to the 
Mayor’s Energy Policy Task Force
T e s t# Description
Energy Policy 
Task Force 
Test Result
1 D istinctive policy agenda Yes
2 Long-lived policy agenda No
3 M ust consist o f coalition o f interests tha t are  not 
institu tiona l in nature Yes
4 M em ber in terests should cross sectora l o r 
institu tiona l boundaries
Yes
5
Agenda m ust survive changes in political 
leadership No
6
Success depends on m obilization o f non­
governm enta l resources Yes
7 Has strong, v is ionary leadership Yes
8
Em phasizes pub lic-private  partnersh ips that 
bridge institu tiona l and com m unity  in terests
Yes
strategies endorsed by the Task Force emphasize the City leading by example, an 
unsurprising difference given that one document was written by a Mayoral task force, 
and the other was prepared by a largely private sector group that may have been 
hesitant to lecture the City about getting its own house in order.
The Task Force includes representatives of virtually every key electricity policy 
stakeholder group at the state or local level, thus satisfying Stone’s (2002) 
requirement that there is no capacity to govern in a direction-setting manner outside 
regime arrangements. The Task Force also passes Clark’s (2001) and Gladstone and 
Fainstein’s (2001) outcome-based test, as there is clear evidence the Task Force has 
shaped both the local energy agenda and the actions taking place on the ground.
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Agenda-setting is very easy to prove, as that was the original reason the Mayor 
convened the group.
Successful outcomes are also in plentiful supply. Because the group acceded to the 
Mayor’s request to continue its work on these issues, in the spring of 2005 the Task 
Force released a one-year status report, detailing progress on each recommendation. 
The Task Force does not claim credit for every new initiative, as much work has been 
undertaken independently by local and State stakeholders involved in the process. 
There are several instances, however, where the City has taken action, and there 
appears to be a strong correlation between these initiatives and policies endorsed a 
year earlier by the Task Force. Some of the most notable progress on renewables has 
occurred as a result of the new NYPA contract, which enhanced the City’s ability to 
buy green power. Since the contract was signed, the first major supply deal made by 
NYPA on the City’s behalf calls for the purchase of 20 MW of green power capacity, 
a massive increase over current supply levels (A. Rosenberg, pers. comm.). The 
NYPA contract also makes it easier for non-NYPA entities to get involved in 
renewables projects on City-owned property. Both ideas flow from the Task Force’s 
endorsement of a more diverse power supply and the deployment of clean on-site 
generation at City agencies (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004, pp 26, 
54).
Since the Task Force report came out, the City’s Energy Department also successfully 
inserted many Task Force recommendations regarding distributed resource planning 
and use into the Con Ed rate settlement that could help increase renewables 
deployment levels around the city. Of particular note here is the provision requiring 
Con Edison to pursue 675 MW of distributed resource capacity over the next three 
years, including 150 MW in load constrained areas of the city (New York State Public 
Service Commission, 2005a). Con Edison and others stakeholders are currently 
engaged in an assessment of how this capacity will be achieved -  new on-site 
generation, energy efficiency, peak load management, etc. (New York State Energy 
Research and Development Authority, working draft). A final plan was expected in 
late 2005.
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The Logic of Local Action
The Task Force’s many successes still leave open the question of how and why its 
members agreed to an action plan devoid of any substantive focus on renewable 
power. Moreover, because the Task Force was formed in mid-2003, there is also the 
question of why renewables have never seriously registered on the radar screen of 
local energy policy-makers, dating all the way back to the mid-1970s. Finally, there 
is the current sparse level o f deployment around the city. New Yorkers have known 
about renewable energy for hundreds of years -  so why don’t we see more renewables 
technology deployed around the city?
These are the fundamental questions my modified regime approach was designed to 
help answer. To set the stage for this analysis, let’s turn to Figure 7-1, which is a 
slightly modified version of Figure 3-2 from Chapter 3.
Figure 7-1
Modified Regime Framework -  Observations from New York City
Regime Agenda
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Distilling ideas presented earlier in the regime section and Chapters 5 and 6, several 
important things are happening in the grey boxes in this diagram that appear to be 
causal factors responsible for the absence of renewables from the local energy policy 
and deployment picture. First, formal rules dating back almost a century have 
privileged certain stakeholders, namely Con Edison, and disadvantaged others,
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including the City of New York and those wishing to deploy renewable power 
schemes around the city. These rules directly influence deployment decisions, as well 
as the type of policies stakeholders are willing to consider and pursue. Second, values 
permeate the energy policy process in New York City, with profound effects on 
deployment and use outcomes. The most critical values influencing local agenda- 
setting are a least-cost preference, a predilection for voluntary action rather than the 
imposition of mandates, and a desire for high levels of electric system reliability. I 
will address each of these below.
Advantage. Con Edison
The notion of privileged status in policy-making is not something people give much 
thought to because it’s often so fundamental, we have a hard time imaging life any 
other way. In the case of energy policy-making in New York City, Con Edison 
enjoys a privileged position thanks to the monopolistic nature of the electric power 
industry. More than a century ago, franchises were granted in specified geographic 
areas because of the economic and logistical efficiencies a single firm brought to the 
electricity supply and delivery business. As the industry consolidated, small disparate 
systems were cobbled together into a large unified network. Over time, technologies 
changed and demand grew, and the distribution system changed to meet these new 
circumstances. Occasionally, the old wires and substations failed and needed to be 
completely replaced; at other times, new systems were layered on top of old systems, 
creating a grid that is today so technically complex that only the engineers designing 
and fixing the system fully understand how it works. As the operator of this tangled 
web of wires and transformers, this detailed knowledge gives Con Edison a highly 
privileged position, allowing them to make claims that regulators and other 
stakeholders have difficulty disproving. Using terms from my modified regime 
methodology, formal rules give Con Edison the capacity to influence which policy 
options others are able to consider or implement. In Figure 7-1 above, this influence 
can occur at any of the points labeled ‘A’ or ‘B’.
Take the case of interconnections between renewable technologies and Con Ed’s grid. 
Con Edison has a policy (Con Edison, 2005b, pp 3-4) that expresses openness to
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distributed power schemes, but can nonetheless prove problematic for those seeking 
to deploy renewable technologies at their home or business. This policy states:
2.0 POLICY ON DISPERSED GENERATION - It is the policy of the 
Company to permit operation of on-site generating equipment in parallel with 
the Company’s electric system ... whenever there is no adverse affect on the 
Company’s other customers, equipment, or personnel, while maintaining the 
quality of service...
Con Edison may identify that a detailed Coordinated Electric System 
Interconnection Review (CESIR) is required ... to determine the impact of the 
customer’s generation on the Company system and any necessary upgrades 
or changes to the Company system needed to allow for satisfactory 
interconnection performance ... The customer is responsible for the cost of 
any additions and reinforcements to the Company’s distribution systems that 
are required ...I
2.1 PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITY - . . .  All protection equipment required 
to protect and coordinate with the Company’s distribution system will be 
specified by the Company ...
The keys are the yellow highlighted sections. Challenging Con Edison’s claims on 
the equipment necessary to protect the integrity o f the local grid can be time- 
consuming and expensive, harming or killing the project’s prospects or anticipated 
financial benefits (P. Parkhill, pers. comm.). Consultant engineers can be hired to 
argue or negotiate with Con Edison on the developer’s behalf, but even then, there is 
no guarantee Con Ed will change its mind. System developers can appeal to the PSC 
for intervention, just as the urban homesteaders did for their East Village wind turbine 
project back in the late 1970s, but this adds yet more time and expense to the process 
and there is still no guarantee the PSC will rule in the developer’s favor.
As an example, consider the case of the Greenpoint Manufacturing and Design Center 
(GMDC) in Brooklyn. In late 2002, their installation of a 59 kW rooftop PV system 
was announced with great fanfare (O'Brien, 2002). The system was not operational 
for another 18 months, however, the result of a dispute between Con Edison and 
GMDC over how to handle ‘backfeed’ from the PV system on weekends when the 
building was closed . Eventually, and at great expense, GMDC agreed to install a
29 On weekdays, the electricity generated by the PV system is completely used up by the electricity- 
hungry woodworking firms located at GMDC. On weekends, however, these shops are closed, and the 
power generated by the PV system can potentially exceed the entire electrical load in the building, 
meaning power can ‘leak’ back into the grid. Con Edison argued their system was not designed to 
accept backfeed at that point on their grid, and after much back and forth, it was agreed that the battery 
system would serve as an acceptable solution.
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battery system to absorb this power. The lengthy delay, the cost of the industrial scale 
batteries, and the cost of the engineers required to redesign, install, and test the new 
components greatly lengthened the PV system’s overall retum-on-investment (P. 
Parkhill, pers. comm.). As a result of this problem, GMDC also cancelled its plans to 
install a similar size PV system on another building that it owned in the 
neighborhood.
New York City: 2nd Class Policy-making Powers?
Contrasting with the privileged position of Con Edison is the regulatorily-weakened 
state of New York City’s policy-making powers. City officials comment as part of 
any PSC regulatory proceeding dealing with Con Edison or other electricity policy 
matters of interest to the City, but they do not control the outcome -  that authority 
rests with the PSC. In the case of the Renewable Portfolio Standard, the City’s 
recommendations regarding what should constitute qualifying renewable power 
sources were ultimately ignored by PSC staff.
Moreover, while Article X was in effect, the State Siting Board had final say over 
where power plants would be located in New York City, not local officials. A host 
city’s zoning preferences are factored into Siting Board decisions (Bahrampour,
2003), but recall that Article X was specifically designed to overcome local 
opposition to new plants, and the Siting Board had the authority to override local 
zoning restrictions if necessary. New York City’s recent rezoning of Williamsburg 
was partially done to influence the Siting Board, which was considering an 
application to build an 1100 MW power plant at a site on the East River. Because 
Article X expired before the TransGas permit decision was fully resolved, whether the 
City will ultimately prevail in preventing its construction is far from certain.
City officials are also at a disadvantage when it comes to dispatch rules and the 
emissions from power plant operations within the city. A prime example here is the 
800 MW Poletti power plant in Astoria, Queens. Recall from Chapter 6 that the New 
York Independent System Operator decides which power sources will feed the 
statewide grid based solely on day-ahead and hour-ahead price quotes submitted by 
power generators (New York State Energy Planning Board, 1998); power plant
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emission levels do not factor into this equation. Because of its low operating cost, for 
nearly 30 years the NYISO has dispatched power from Poletti to satisfy local demand, 
despite its acknowledged reputation as one of the dirtiest power plants in the United 
States (Perez-Pena, 2002). The Poletti plant was one of several in the city that was 
‘grandfathered,’ or allowed to continue operations despite its failure to comply with 
the 1990 Clean Air Act (Miller, 2003).30 If the City had more control over emission 
or dispatch rules, Poletti likely would have been forced out of business years ago. In 
Figure 7-1, limitations on the City’s capacity to act occur at point ‘A’, as City 
officials are structurally constrained in their ability to propose or implement utility 
operating rules beneficial to the city.
How has the City’s disadvantaged policy-making powers influenced the direction of
its renewables policy agenda? The reticence about renewables displayed by Mayor
Bloomberg’s Energy Policy Task Force is one example. In Chapter 6 I noted how
NYSERDA has lead responsibility for renewables planning in the state, and lots of
money to spend on them, thanks to a steady flow of system benefit charge monies. In
the future, NYSERDA’s renewables funding will grow again, due to the new
Renewables Portfolio Standard. Three different Task Force members expressed their
belief that because NYSERDA plays such a dominant role on this issue, it was not the
Task Force’s place to develop a renewables strategy until the PSC concluded its
11
proceeding on the RPS , at which point NYSERDA’s responsibilities and the City’s 
options would be clearer. In the words of one Task Force member, “Why waste time 
haggling over this only to find out our suggestions don’t fit with how the State is 
designing their program?” In other words, because of the City’s disadvantaged 
position, the Task Force believed its function was to react to leadership or action by 
others, rather than exerting leadership itself. In modified regime terms, formal rules 
have constrained the legal standing of the City, affecting its ability to enact certain 
policies.
30 The Poletti plant will close in 2008 as the result of an agreement between local environmental groups 
and its owners, the New York Power Authority, who agreed to replace the facility with a cleaner 
burning 500 MW combined cycle gas turbine plant that will generate emissions 99% lower than the old 
plant.
31 As noted in Chapter 6, the RPS proceeding was concluded in September 2004, eight months after the 
Mayor’s Energy Policy Task Force completed its work.
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Values-laden Policy-making
Values have also influenced renewables policy and deployment decisions in New 
York City in very clear ways. Three are particularly important in this case study: a 
least-cost preference penalizing more expensive forms of electricity; a preference for 
voluntary action on renewables deployment rather than the imposition of mandates; 
and a desire for high levels of electric system reliability which biases policy-makers 
against technologies that they fear may jeopardize current levels of reliability.
A least-cost preference is a widely accepted cultural norm that has influenced energy 
decision-making in New York state dating back to the earliest days of electric utilities, 
when technology and power plant sizing decisions were made with a goal of 
achieving economies of scale (Hirsh, 1999; Hughes, 1983). Today, we see the 
concept of cost minimization embodied in dispatch decisions made by the NYISO to 
feed the statewide transmission grid (New York State Energy Planning Board, 1998). 
We also saw cost reduction prominently articulated in the ‘vision’ document used by 
the Public Service Commission to guide the restructuring of the state’s electric 
industry (New York State Public Service Commission, 1996); in complaints by 
policy-makers that restructuring has failed to achieve this outcome (McCall, 2001); 
and in the goals laid out by NYPA in its 2004 request for proposals seeking new 
power sources for New York City (New York Power Authority, 2004). Finally, least- 
cost preferences underlie NYSERDA’s decision to subsidize renewable power 
systems around the state, as these subsidies make renewables more cost competitive 
with other sources of power.
Is cost minimization an important goal for local energy policy-makers? The cost of 
power was clearly on the minds of City officials commenting on the proposed 
Renewable Portfolio Standard, as they noted the RPS could have a ‘significant rate 
impact” on in-city consumers as suppliers pass RPS compliance costs on to them 
(Delaney, 2003b, p 5). More recently, the Mayor’s Energy Policy Task Force used 
the term ‘least-cost’ or ‘cost-effective’ nine times when declaring the criteria for 
strategies the City should adopt over the next five years (New York City Energy 
Policy Task Force, 2004). In 2005, the City Council considered a proposal requiring 
the City to buy only green power for City agency operations. In his testimony
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opposing the bill, the Mayor’s chief energy policy advisor noted that such power 
comes at a cost premium, which should be compared against alternative energy 
investments, such as energy efficiency technology and demand reduction efforts. 
Ultimately, he noted that “each dollar invested in energy efficiency upgrades will 
conserve more fossil fuel and therefore protect the environment more than the same 
dollar invested in renewable energy sources” (Quiniones, 2005). In Figure 7-1, these 
concerns manifest themselves at point ‘A’ as the City is self-censoring the options it is 
willing to pursue.
Looking beyond the policy arena, there have been many instances where proposed 
renewable power system installations in the city have been delayed, cancelled, or 
reduced in scope because the cost exceeded a certain price point. The decision to 
abandon the installation of solar panels on the Citicorp Tower back in the 1970s was 
based entirely on a cost comparison with power from the existing electrical grid 
(Tucker, 1977). The New York City Housing Partnership, a non-profit developer of 
low and middle-income housing, says the high cost of installing photovoltaic systems, 
when combined with strict limits on how much the units can be sold for, creates 
strong disincentives against their use on new Partnership housing construction 
projects (P. Noonan, pers. comm.). A proposed 72 kW installation on a new housing 
development in Brooklyn was cancelled once anticipated State subsidies failed to 
materialize, as the developer believed the cost of the system would not be fully 
recouped at the time the units were sold (L. Bluestone, pers. comm.)
Retum-on-investment considerations have historically been even more problematic 
for renewables projects on City-owned buildings, due to the below-market price the 
City paid the New York Power Authority for its electricity. On the one hand low 
prices were good news for local taxpayers, but it was bad news for renewables 
advocates because it extended the payback period of City-sponsored renewables 
projects by as much as several decades (J. Krieble, pers. comm.). When the NYPA 
contract was renegotiated in 2004, the rate the City paid for electricity increased 
dramatically (New York Power Authority, 2005), so some of the disincentive against 
renewables has disappeared. NYPA rates are still below the average market price in 
the city, however, meaning the disincentive has not disappeared entirely.
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A second key value shaping local energy policy-making is a preference for voluntary 
action on renewables deployment rather than the use of mandates. This policy 
preference has permeated the City’s approach with both the public and private sectors. 
Since 1999, City agencies have been encouraged to incorporate ‘high performance’
(or green) design principles into City-owned or financed construction projects. 
Renewables were one of many issues covered in the design guidelines prepared by the 
Department of Design and Construction (DDC). The guidelines were not intended to 
be prescriptive, however, but rather a menu of ideas that consultants and architects 
advising the City could voluntarily draw from when designing a new building or 
retrofit project (J. Krieble, pers. comm.)
Between 1999 and early 2005 DDC undertook 25 High Performance Design projects 
(New York City Department of Design and Construction, 2002, 2005); three of these 
projects have incorporated renewable power systems of some kind, generally solar 
PV. In 2005, the City changed course, agreeing to require Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) certification on all City-funded construction projects 
exceeding $2 million in value (Hu, 2005). Like the high performance design 
guidelines, however, LEED does not require renewables use to achieve certification, 
meaning the number of projects deploying renewables thanks to this policy may 
ultimately be negligible.
The City’s preference for voluntary renewables deployment and use extends to the 
residential and business sectors. EDC’s 2005 statement announcing the purchase of 
green power for the City-owned Brooklyn Army Terminal complex was the 
Bloomberg administration’s first public comment on the subject of green power. 
Because this purchase was touted as an example for others to follow, we can infer the 
Mayor prefers households and businesses to arrive at similar decisions on their own.
A more aggressive policy involving a mandate is unlikely, argued one Task Force 
member, as deployment mandates “have never -  and likely would never -  be 
considered acceptable policy” in New York City. Another Task Force member
32 LEED is an internationally-recognized set of green design protocols that focus on issues very similar 
to those covered by DDC’s High Performance Design Guidelines. Points are awarded for different 
green design elements; to achieve certification, some minimum point threshold must be achieved. On­
site renewables generation contributes points towards the overall score; high scoring building projects 
can achieve Silver, Gold, or Platinum status in recognition of their achievement.
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echoed this view, suggesting a proposal mandating renewables deployment on new 
construction projects would be “dead on arrival” at City Hall.
Noonan (pers. comm.) says such views stem from the fact the local real estate 
community already groans under the weight of construction costs 25% higher than 
those of neighboring communities. In her view, incentives like the Green Building 
Tax Credit or zoning bonuses would prove far more effective at inducing the real 
estate industry to act. It is worth noting, and somewhat ironic, that these views persist 
despite the success of a renewables mandate on new construction projects in Battery 
Park City, a waterfront development just blocks from City Hall near the old World 
Trade Center site. Battery Park City is managed by the Battery Park City Authority, a 
State agency, which in 2002 developed environmental guidelines that included a 
requirement that new commercial buildings generate at least 5% of their base load 
power from building integrated solar panels. At least 30% of the building’s power 
must be derived from renewable sources (Battery Park City Authority, 2002). Similar 
rules were issued in 2003 for new residential building projects (Battery Park City 
Authority, 2003). Two buildings have been built thus far using these guidelines, 
while more are planned.
A third societal value of critical importance in local policy-making regarding 
renewable power is a desire for high levels of electric system reliability. Over time, 
the city has developed in ways that make a consistent supply of power a virtual 
necessity. The city’s electric-powered subways run 24 hours per day, as do the 
elevators carrying tenants to the highest floors of the skyscraper apartment and office 
buildings that dot the city. Elsewhere around the world, the use of renewable 
resources has been criticized because electricity is only available when the wind 
blows or the sun shines. Excess reliance on renewable power has thus been 
characterized as jeopardizing the overall reliability of the power grid, because power 
may not be available when it’s needed (Massey, 2005). In New York City, the 
reliability debate has followed a different path, centered on the way interconnections 
of renewable power systems can reduce system reliability because the grid was not 
designed with distributed power sources in mind.
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In their interconnect guidelines, and in public presentations describing interconnect 
issues, Con Edison officials and other local experts therefore spend a great deal of 
time discussing ways to reduce any risks associated with interconnections (Con 
Edison, 2002; Cronin, 2004; Koenig, 2004). Con Ed’s emphasis on reliability is quite 
understandable -  their job is to deliver power wherever and whenever New Yorkers 
need it. This isn’t just a corporate mission statement, however -  it’s actually one of 
many Electric Service Standards formally imposed on Con Ed by the PSC (New York 
State Public Service Commission, 1991). Failure to achieve these standards can result 
in fines, such as the SI.9 million penalty imposed on Con Edison for a 1999 blackout 
in upper Manhattan (New York State Public Service Commission, 2002).
Electric system reliability is also of great interest to labor and real estate interests in 
the city, as their success is rooted in the success of the local economy. When 
electricity -  the life blood of the city -  stops flowing, the financial consequences can 
be huge (Healy, 2003), and businesses may think twice about staying, relocating to, or 
expanding their operations in New York City. These impacts ripple out, affecting the 
real estate and building trades sectors. Therefore, when Con Edison professes 
concern that the use of renewables and other forms of distributed generation can lead 
to reliability problems locally, those with a vested interest in electric system reliability 
pay attention . As one Task Force member noted, lacking the technical expertise 
sufficient to contradict Con Edison’s claims, New York’s real estate community 
“tends to acquiesce” to Con Edison’s preferred position on technical matters. This is 
because if Con Edison is forced to accommodate system changes proposed by 
outsiders, and the changes don’t work out as planned, the financial consequences to 
the real estate community could be disastrous.
The Electricity Outlook report’s emphasis on the need for additional large, central 
station power plant capacity in the city can thus be viewed as a form of technology 
Tock-in’ (Unruh, 2000), where we find it difficult to move beyond current technology 
because the design of the system itself (i.e., embedded assets like wires, relay 
switches, and substations) limits opportunities for change. This lock-in results from
33 We know that reliability has been a long-time concern of the city’s leading business interests by 
virtue of the fact that the Building Congress Energy Committee undertook a study comparing Con 
Edison’s reliability with utilities in other U.S. cities back in 1994 (R. Anderson, pers. comm.)
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the shared fears of powerful real estate interests that any attempt to dramatically alter 
the current system can potentially harm their short and long term economic interests. 
Thus, they prefer generation capacity that is readily compatible with the existing Con 
Ed network system design, and work to support policies that promote this type of 
technology. Because several of these same Building Congress Energy Committee 
representatives served on the Mayor’s Energy Policy Task Force, the Task Force’s 
conclusions may have been similarly influenced.
Conclusion
Although the renewables policy scene in New York may not represent the definitive 
example of an urban regime in action, the robustness and enhanced explanatory power 
of the modified regime model was validated in its application to this policy 
environment. There are clear links between who participates in local energy policy­
making, and the content of local policy. The Mayor’s decision to include Building 
Congress Energy Committee members on his Task Force was critical in this regard, as 
there is strong evidence that their participation steered policy towards maintaining the 
status quo electricity generation and delivery system design. There are also clear 
links between underlying values or formal rules and policy and behavioral outcomes. 
These links influenced whether local stakeholders tried to (or believed they could) 
exert leadership on an issue, or whether they let State policy-makers set the agenda.
It is still too early to know whether the Mayor’s Energy Policy Task Force has staying 
power on energy issues, or if it will survive another four years and be embraced by a 
new mayor once Michael Bloomberg is term-limited out of office in late 2009. 
Circumstances can quickly change in local electricity markets, and a decision to build 
or finance one or two large new power plants in the city could diminish Mayoral or 
stakeholder interest in the Task Force. Large new supply sources could also 
undermine interest in the wider electric policy agenda developed by this Task Force. 
Efforts promoting distributed resources, including costly clean on-site generation, are 
perhaps most vulnerable to a sudden change in the supply landscape. Task Force and 
other planning documents already assume these strategies will make less of a 
contribution to ‘solving’ the supply gap than large new in-city, central station power 
plants or new transmission lines bringing power from outside the city. Will the
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current Task Force consensus to support small distributed resource projects evaporate 
once larger projects win approval and are under construction? Or are current efforts 
promoting distributed resources just the beginning, and as these programs deliver 
results, support for them will grow even greater? Will renewables be part of this 
distributed resources equation, or will efforts focus on micro-gensets or energy 
efficiency programs? These are important questions that bear watching as they will 
only be answered with the passage of time.
In general, I believe the near term prospects for renewables in New York City appear 
rather dim. Deployment levels around the city are extremely low right now, 
particularly in comparison to overall electricity demand, and nothing in my research 
points to much momentum change in the near future. This is noteworthy primarily 
because there does seem to be significant policy-making activity underway in the city 
on electricity matters -  renewables simply aren’t part of the game plan. Cost is a key 
factor. As the City’s Chief Energy Policy Advisor noted in his testimony to the City 
Council in February 2005, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the City gets a bigger payback 
for money spent on energy efficiency or demand reduction programs than it does on 
renewables. To the extent we do see action on renewables, by either the public, 
commercial, or residential sectors, it will likely occur only when renewable power 
projects either become more cost-competitive, or because non-cost arguments (e.g., 
educational value, climate change benefits, etc.) are given extra weight in the 
decision-making process. The City does not appear engaged on this question, leaving 
it to the State to grapple with renewables cost issues.
One State-led solution worth watching will be the effect of the Renewables Portfolio 
Standard on New York City. Most of the RPS money can be expected to go to large 
projects constructed in remote areas of the state with good access to either biomass or 
wind resources. NYSERDA does have the option, however, of spending funds on 
‘behind the meter’ projects, displacing retail demand rather than delivering supply 
into the wholesale markets. Such funding could boost solar PV and small wind 
projects in New York City, as they provide both the climate change benefits sought by 
the RPS as well as some financial relief in load constrained areas. NYSERDA 
funding for the RPS will be sizable, and the Energy Task Force may wish to begin 
planning to ensure that the city gets its rightful share of these funds.
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Aside from these market implications, is there other information we can gleen from 
this case study? One thing we can now do is answer the three questions posed by 
Gibbs and Jonas designed to help us improve our understanding of how regimes work. 
First, there was the question whether regime behavior in a city can be linked to larger 
trends emphasizing local action on sustainability and/or climate issues. In New York, 
this doesn’t appear to be the case. The best example of an environmental regime 
policy agenda -  the 2004 Mayor’s Energy Policy Task Force report -  is not simply 
devoid of any discussion of these issues, it explicitly renounces any intention to do so. 
The 2001 and 2002 Electricity Outlook reports were similarly silent about larger 
trends, never once using the terms climate change, global warming, or sustainability. 
In all three documents the focus on local electricity market conditions was quite clear, 
as were the solutions required to address the city’s anticipated electricity shortfall. To 
the extent there was any discussion of environmental issues, they were raised in a 
strictly local context: for example, the ‘repowering’ of old power plants with newer, 
cheaper technologies meant “the city will enjoy the concurrent environmental benefits 
of reduced air emissions” (New York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004, p 11).
The City is developing a sustainability plan for its local government operations, but 
that process is moving slowly, and it is unclear how comprehensively the plan will 
address energy matters.
A second question posed by Gibbs & Jonas asked whether pro-growth regimes can 
simultaneously act as the local environmental/energy regime, or whether a separate 
coalition must address such issues. Assuming the Mayor’s Energy Policy Task Force 
will continue its work long into the future -  and given its record to date this appears to 
be a safe bet -  then we can conclude the pro-growth and energy regimes in New York 
City are one and the same. This is no real surprise given that energy can be a huge 
cost center for a business or real estate management firm. Businesses also care about 
high levels of electric service reliability because even short-term losses from a 
blackout can be costly (Teather, 2003). Finally, even though a landlord or building 
manager may not be directly responsible for a power outage, they will bear a 
disproportionate impact if unreliable electric service drives their tenants out of the 
city. All of these factors support the idea that energy is a fundamental element of a
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pro-growth policy agenda, deserving of significant attention by the local business 
community.
Looking beyond energy issues, however, it is not clear whether New York’s 
hegemonic regime exerts comparable influence over other environmental policy 
agendas. Early in the chapter I described how there was less unanimity among regime 
members on the broader set of environmental topics, with each group focusing on 
topics closely aligned with their core competency or sectoral interests. The more an 
environmental issue crosses sector boundaries and directly links to the core interests 
of multiple stakeholder groups, the more likely we are to see regime interest and 
activity.
Whether a coalition actually forms may also hinge on whether the business 
community sees an issue as purely a governmental function (e.g., sewage treatment). 
In this case, stakeholder groups may be silent or inactive until there is a problem or 
crisis that will adversely affect them. The decision to prepare the first Electricity 
Outlook report in 2001 was made for those very reasons. The city’s electricity 
situation was close to crisis, and the Building Congress Energy Committee felt 
compelled to act to ensure that local and state government were fulfilling their public 
responsibility in this policy area (R. Anderson, pers. comm.)
A third question posed by Gibbs and Jonas focuses on the underlying conditions that 
lead individual stakeholders to coalesce around environmental issues, and whether 
these conditions ultimately shape the character of the coalition. Just a few pages ago,
I noted this very point when discussing how -  thanks to electricity market 
restructuring -  the Mayor was essentially forced to convene a broad coalition of 
stakeholders if he had any hope of making progress on energy policy matters. One 
conclusion we therefore can draw is that regime formation is partly contingent upon a 
city’s capacity to act. Stone (2002) noted this phenomenon several years ago, when 
he said that if government alone can set and maintain a particular policy direction, 
then a regime won’t exist, as there is no need for collaboration with others. On the 
other hand, if there are policy or regulatory constraints imposed by the state or federal 
government that limit a city’s decision-making authority, or imbue certain non­
governmental stakeholders with specialized knowledge or assets, then regime
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formation is more likely because these are the groups government must partner with 
to ultimately deliver its agenda.
Besides creating the fundamental conditions that support regime formation, such 
constraints also influence how the regime operates. In this case study we saw 
situations where rules and values formed boundaries on stakeholder behavior: certain 
technologies were emphasized over others, and local decision-makers felt obliged to 
defer to state-level agencies rather than exercising independent decision-making 
authority. To advocates of renewable power use, these constraints can be seen as 
having a negative influence on the deployment of renewables around New York City. 
Policies limiting behavior are not necessarily unique to cities with a regime, however, 
as rules and values can constrain behavior in any municipality. What is important is 
that we recognize this situation can exist, and use tools like my modified regime 
framework to ascertain exactly how these constraints are changing behavior in a city.
In the next three chapters I turn my attention to London. Following the same format 
used here, I explore the policy and market context for renewables in Europe’s 
financial capital and largest city. There are many similarities between London and 
New York, although the policy environment is completely different, with London 
adopting a much more expansive view and aggressive tone with its recently released 
energy strategy. Renewables are also much more visible on London’s energy policy 
radar screen, making it an excellent choice on which to apply my modified regime 
framework a second time. In Chapter 111 will compare my findings from both cases, 
distilling general lessons about renewable energy policy-making in urban areas and 
offering concluding comments about the robustness of my modified regime model.
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CHAPTER 8
London case study: the Historical and Market Context
Introduction
London offers an interesting contrast to the situation in New York. Both cities have 
roughly the same population and share ‘world city’ status. Like New York, London 
was home to some of the earliest innovators in electric power system design, and the 
early electric power marketplace in both cities was quite chaotic. Today, the market 
fundamentals are again similar, with each city served by two regulated monopolies 
responsible for managing and maintaining the local electrical grid in geographically 
distinct areas of the city. Multiple firms compete for the right to supply power over 
these lines. Power demand in both cities is very high, although London’s demand 
peaks during the winter while New York City’s peaks during the summer months. 
Both cities also share a legacy of limited action on renewables in the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s, and as a total share of the city’s energy supply, renewable power plays 
only a minor role.
This is where the stories begin to diverge, however. Since 2001, London has seen a 
flurry of activity on energy issues, thanks to Central Government support of 
background research into the potential for renewables in London and efforts by Mayor 
Ken Livingstone and the Greater London Authority (GLA) to develop a 
comprehensive Energy Strategy for the city. As part of this strategy, the Mayor has 
developed explicit renewables deployment targets he hopes to achieve by 2010 and 
2020. Relying largely on funds from Central Government and the private sector, the 
Mayor has also created public-private partnerships he hopes will lead the city’s 
renewables deployment efforts and undertaken surveys on the public’s knowledge of 
and interest in renewable energy issues. In other words, unlike New York, London 
has an active interest in renewables issues, and appears poised to achieve real gains in 
their deployment and use around the city.
This story is explored over the next three chapters, following the same order as the 
New York case study. This chapter provides background information on the structure 
of London’s electricity marketplace, reviewing changes from its early origins through
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nationalization, market liberalization, and the current day. For contextual purposes, 
this chapter also includes information on how much electricity Londoners use, where 
it comes from, and how much it costs. The research that formed the basis for the 
Mayor’s renewables deployment targets is briefly reviewed, along with separate data I 
compiled examining the cost structure of different types of renewable technologies. 
This information all paints a rather bleak portrait of the current renewables market in 
London, with low deployment levels and high costs. Londoners do have several 
green power options available -  referred to in the UK as green tariff plans -  but as in 
New York, uptake appears low. The progress called for under the Mayor’s Energy 
Strategy therefore requires overcoming the obstacles that have impeded deployment 
and use to date.
This market data serves as a lead-in to Chapter 9, which examines the energy policy 
context at both the Central Government and local level. Finally, in Chapter 10,1 
apply my modified regime framework to these facts to attempt to explain why London 
has historically not seen a great deal of renewables use. Chapter 10 will also examine 
why the Mayor has structured his Energy Strategy in certain ways as he looks to 
increase renewables deployment levels in the future.
Electricity in London -  An Early History
Home of some of the earliest innovators with electricity and power generation 
technology, London swiftly took to the use of electric power. Just a decade after 
electricity was first introduced to the city, London had more than 473,000 
incandescent lamps lit by power from central power stations, more than six times the 
number in Berlin, and seven times the number in Paris, two cities noted for their 
electricity use (Hughes, 1983). In 1888, construction began at the Deptford electric 
power station alongside the Thames, featuring what was at the time the world’s 
largest electric generating equipment. Throughout London, scores of utilities 
operated, managed by both private entities and Local Authorities. Critics found much 
to complain about, however. The 1882 and 1888 laws authorizing electric utility 
franchises resulted in a plethora of small utilities that had little in common with each 
other, relying on different technologies and delivering electricity at different 
frequencies, voltages, and wildly differing prices. The “retrograde” (Hughes, 1983, p
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228) state of London’s electricity system alarmed the public, industry experts, and 
Government officials alike, who believed the system was unbecoming of London’s
tlitum-of-the-20 century status as the world’s largest and most important city.
Noted electric industry historian Thomas Hughes (1983) argued politics was the root 
cause of London’s problems, rather than technology issues. The power to grant utility 
franchises was shared between Local Authorities, the London County Council, and 
the British Parliament. The Institute of Electrical Engineers complained that 
politicians chose to follow “arbitrary boundaries, mostly of medieval origin” when 
establishing franchises, limiting the potential for rational decisions regarding the 
distribution and growth of electrical systems (Hughes, 1983, p 233). Rationality was 
also hampered by the fact that, although the sector was sizable, most of London’s 
manufacturing firms were small, lacking the big electricity-hungry machines that 
drove up demand and made utility consolidation necessary in other cities. The 
various underground transit systems in London were also slow to change over from 
steam to electric power, another critical factor driving industry growth in other cities.
In 1914, a new effort was made to consolidate utilities across Local Authority 
boundaries, but this proposal was strenuously fought by local officials fearful of 
losing control over the 65 electric utilities and 70 power generating stations then in 
operation around London (Hughes, 1983). After World War 1, concerns over limits 
the electrical system had placed on the wartime economy led to efforts to integrate 
electrical networks across the country. These changes came slowly, however. In 
1927, the Central Electricity Board was established, with new powers to develop 
larger power stations and a comprehensive transmission network across the UK. The 
CEB endorsed a proposal to build 118 large power plants and close hundreds of 
smaller, less efficient facilities. But when it came time to implement this plan in 
London, the CEB backed off, arguing that several smaller facilities that had recently 
been built operated almost as efficiently as the proposed larger facilities, so it didn’t 
make financial sense to shut them down (Hannah, 1979).
What the CEB failed to accomplish in London, however, private utilities began to do 
on their own. In 1935, six electricity distribution firms merged to form a new 
company, Central London Electricity, which would draw its power from the new
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Battersea power station under construction along the Thames (Hannah, 1979). The 
County of London Company, another large operator, purchased more than a dozen 
smaller electric supply undertakings to the south of the city, crossing geographic 
boundaries and giving it a large presence throughout the southeast of England. When 
the electric industry was finally nationalized in 1947, mergers such as these had a big 
influence on how the local regulatory scheme was structured. London was divided 
among four separate Electricity Boards, following the boundaries of the largest 
utilities operating in London prior to nationalization. The new Electricity Boards 
rationalized electricity services throughout their respective service territories, closing 
down small and inefficient generating stations and building larger and increasingly 
efficient facilities. By 1966, there were just 34 power stations in Greater London, at 
25 locations, which collectively supplied 85% of the city’s power needs. Over time, 
this number dropped dramatically. By 1978, there were just 11 power stations in 
operation (Greater London Council, 1981, pp 93, 99), and today, just two large power 
plans operate in the city: a 1000 MW facility at Barking in East London, and a 392 
MW facility at Enfield in North London (National Grid, 2004). Both plants are 
natural gas-fired.
Electricity Demand in London
With the exception of brief periods during the mid-1970s and mid-1980s when power 
demand leveled off, electric power use in London has increased annually for most of 
the past 50 years, as it has nationally. Figure 8-1 charts the total electricity demand 
(in gigawatt-hours, or GWh) in the central London area formerly served by the 
London Electricity Board for a thirty-year period ending in 199634. The peak 
electricity demand recorded each year is also noted; this typically occurs during the 
winter, reflecting high demand from electric heating systems. London Electricity 
Company, which took over the London Electricity Board’s grid operation post­
liberalization, reported demand took one of largest dips in the 1990s, likely a result of 
large commercial and industrial customers taking advantage of the opportunity 
provided by market liberalization rules to switch electricity service providers.
34 More recent data is not available, as this information is no longer reported to or tracked by the 
Government.
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The overall increase in demand occurred despite a dramatic drop in industrial power 
use in London. During the 1960s and 1970s, the city lost more than 600,000 
manufacturing jobs, a result of UK policies designed to shift these jobs from the 
capital to other parts of the country (Greater London Council, 1981). The decrease 
was more than offset by growing commercial and institutional power use, however, 
driven by the 1980 and 1990s boom in the financial services sector and the 
accompanying growth in large new office developments in the Docklands and the 
City of London (London Research Centre, 1993). No information was available 
which offered projections of future demand trends in London.
Power Sources
Over the last 25 years, there have been big changes in how the UK generates its 
electricity. As shown in Figure 8-2, today most power comes from natural gas-fired 
facilities, a trend that is expected to become more pronounced over the next 20 years 
(DTI, 2003a). The oft-characterized “dash for gas” (Helm, 2003, p 4) has been 
attributed to a variety of factors (Gorini de Oliveira & Tolmasquim, 2004; Helm, 
2003; Winskel, 2002):
Figure 8-1
Electricity Demand in Central London 1963-1996 
(London Electricity Board Service Territory)
Source: Extrapolated from London Electricity Board/London Electricity Annual Reports
4,400 t— 19,000
Peak Demand —*—10131 Electricity Demand
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• the Government’s efforts to force its use to help break the power of the coal 
unions;
• the comparatively modest cost of new gas power plant construction, along with 
lower supply and operating costs;
• concern over the environmental impacts of coal use;
• an interest by regional Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) in diversifying 
supply options; and
• aggressive efforts by new firms to enter the power supply marketplace.
Figure 8-2
UK Power Sector Fuel Mix 1990-2020 (DTI Projections)
Source: (PIU, 2002, p 58)
I  Im p o rts  I  R enew ables H  N uclear D  C as  B  Oil I  Coal
Coal has been the primary loser in this supply switch, dropping from a 74% share of 
power production in 1983 to just 35% in 2000 (Gorini de Oliveira & Tolmasquim, 
2004, p 1273). The increase in natural gas use has been so significant, however, that 
concerns are now raised over whether the UK is too reliant on this supply source.
Thus far, most of Britain’s natural gas supply has come from the North Sea gas fields, 
but they are now at peak production, and the UK is expected to become a net importer 
of gas by 2006, raising security of supply concerns. By 2020, more than half of UK 
gas imports are expected to come from Russia, where supplies are seen as highly 
vulnerable to disruption. Given that UK gas storage facilities only provide a 14 day
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supply buffer, electricity supply shortages could be quite severe (House of Lords 
Science and Technology Committee, 2004).
As power plants have closed around London, the supply gap has been filled by power 
imported from outside the city. In 1999, imports accounted for roughly 60% of 
London’s electricity supply (Greater London Authority, 2004a, p 12). As a result, 
London’s power supply sources now closely mirror national trends.
London also receives a portion of its electricity supply from a variety of smaller 
power generation plants around the city that are ‘embedded’ into the high voltage 
transmission system. These include a 5 MW diesel generator at BBC studios in 
London, a 17 MW gas-fired generator at NatWest Bank, and a 31 MW waste-to- 
energy facility in South London (National Grid, 2004). Many of these facilities, 
which collectively have a rated power generation capacity of approximately 480 MW, 
were originally built as back-up power supplies, but increasingly they are used as a 
primary power source for the host facility. Many also have excess capacity, meaning 
that in addition to covering the facility’s power load, they generate surplus power that 
can be fed into the grid. National Grid Transco estimates that during peak electricity 
demand periods, these embedded generators can export up to 141 MW of capacity. 
London also relies on electricity generated by Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
schemes operating around the city. The Greater London Authority (GLA) estimates 
there are approximately 140 CHP schemes in operation, with a combined electrical 
generation capacity of 175 MW of power (Greater London Authority, 2004a, p 14).
A small fraction of London’s power is currently derived from renewable sources. A 
study completed by the London Research Centre in 2000 estimated that 2.5% of 
London’s power was derived from renewables. However, that analysis included
 ^r
energy from solid waste and sewage sludge combustion as a renewable resource 
(London Research Centre, 2000, p 17); if one were to limit the calculation to the 
narrower definition of “new” renewables (solar, wind, small hydro, tidal, geothermal, 
landfill, and sewage gas), then only power obtained from a 6 MW landfill gas
35 There is historical precedence for this approach, as energy studies completed by the Greater London 
Council in 1978 and 1981 both characterized energy recovery from waste combustion as a renewable 
resource. (Greater London Council, 1978,1981)
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operation in East London and anaerobic digesters at several Thames Water sewage 
treatment facilities would qualify. In 2001, the Energy Technology Support Unit 
(ETSU) undertook a study of the current and potential deployment of renewable 
technologies around London (ETSU/AEA Technology, 2001a). This study was part 
of Central Government’s efforts to understand how different regions of the UK could 
contribute to the delivery of national renewable energy targets. ETSU found a very 
modest “new” renewables sector, made up of a small number of solar PV, small wind 
and hydro projects scattered around the Greater London area that were providing on­
site power to homes and businesses.
Table 8-1
Total Annual Energy Output from Renewable Energy Schemes in London
Sources: (ETSU/AEA Technology, 2001a; Greater London Council, 19 7 8 ,1 9 8 1 ; London R esearch Centre, 2000)
1978 1981 2000 2001
GLC study GLC study LRC study ETSU study
#of
sy stem s
Total
ou tpu t
# of 
systems
Total
output
# of 
sy stem s Total ou tpu t
# o f
systems Total output
Energy from Waste 1 15 0GW h 1
150
GWh 17
6 0  MW  
(installed 
capacity)
2 256 GWh
Sewage gas (includes 
both combustion of gas  
from anaerobic digester 
system + sludge 
incineration)
8
155
GWh 8
1 7 0  GW h  
(from estimated 
21 MW installed 
capacity)
7 94.9 GWh
Landfill gas 1
6  MW 
(installed 
capacity)
1 64 GWh
Solar PV ?
0 .2  MW  
(installed 
capacity)
50+ 0.39 GWh
Small wind turbines 5 0.0002GWh
Large wind turbines - -- - - - - --
Small hydro 1 0.044GWh
Since the ETSU report was completed, the number of new renewables projects in 
London has grown. Some of these, like the two large wind turbines installed at the 
Ford Estate in East London, have attracted considerable attention and now serve as 
energy icons in London (Brunton, 2004). The Beddington Zero Emission 
Development (BedZed) in South London is another well-known project that relies on 
solar photovoltaics and a biomass-based CHP system to provide electricity for the 82- 
home development. Table 8-2 lists many of the larger projects that have been 
installed or proposed in the Greater London area since the ETSU study was
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completed. Collectively, they have given London more than 4.5 MW of installed 
“new” renewables capacity.
Table 8-2
Recent or Proposed Large Renewable Power Projects in Greater London
Source: original research, October 2004
Project Name/Location Technology
Peak System 
Capacity
Actual/
Anticipated
completion
date
Beddington Zero Emission 
Development (Sutton)
Solar PV 
Biomass CHP
109 kWp solar PV 
135 kWp CHP
2002
2002
Ormiston Wire (Hounslow)
Solar PV 
Small wind turbine
10 kWp solar PV 
2.5 kW p wind turbine 2003
Center for Engineering and 
Manufacturing Excellence 
(Dagenham)
Solar PV 115 kWp 2003
Insolvency Services 
(Bloomsbury) Solar PV 25.4 kWp 2003
Shell Electric Storm 
(Southwark) Wind turbine 130 kWp
2003 (temporary 
installation only
Trinity Buoy W harf Solar PV 15.4 kWp 2004
Ecotricity/Ford (Dagenham & 
Barking) Wind turbines 3.6 MWp 2004
Eastlea Community Center 
(Newham/Westham/Plaistow) Solar PV 12.5 kWp 2004
Thames Valley University 
(Ealing) Small wind turbines
Two 2.5 kW p wind 
turbines 2004
Vauxhall Cross Transport 
Interchange (Lambeth)
Solar PV 30 kWp 2005
London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority (Richmond 
fire station)
Solar PV 23 kWp 2005
London Science Museum 
(Kensington)
Solar PV 25 kWp 2005
Spitalfields Bishops Gate (City 
of London) Solar PV 20.9 kWp 2005
Clapham Park Estate 
(Lambeth) Solar PV 100 kWp Unknown
Vauxhall Tower (St. Georges 
Wharf)
Building integrated 
wind turbine
Unknown 
(total generation = 
16-20,000 kWh/year)
Unknown
Mile End Park Solar PV 100 kWp Unknown
Ladbrook Green/Canalside 
(Kensington/Chelsea)
Solar PV 200 kWp Unknown
Actual deployment trends have generally matched recent analyst projections of what 
is economically and technically feasible in London. In the late 1970s, the only 
renewable technologies seen as having significant prospects in London were solar 
thermal systems to provide water and space heating in domestic buildings, offices,
198
and schools (Greater London Council, 1978). Over the next fifteen years, many other 
schemes involving renewable technologies were put forward, but little was actually 
implemented, so in 1993 the London Research Centre suggested research should be 
undertaken to rigorously examine the potential for renewable energy in London 
(London Research Centre, 1993).
Two such studies were completed in 2000 and 2001. The first, by the London 
Research Centre offered general commentary on different technologies considered 
most appropriate for London, based on experience gained deploying these systems 
elsewhere. The electric power technologies considered included solar PV, wind 
power, geothermal power, energy crops, landfill and sewage gas systems, small hydro 
systems, and Energy-from-Waste (EfW). The latter was by far the most preferred 
option of the authors, who argued it was a plentiful resource and a proven and cost- 
effective technology.
The prospects for other technologies were described in sweeping, less optimistic 
terms. For instance, “there is no prospect of PV becoming economic.. .in the UK in 
the foreseeable future” but it could find a potential fit at prestige offices, displacing 
other forms of exterior cladding (London Research Centre, 2000, p 18). The report 
lacked depth, however, offering no comparison of the costs of different cladding 
materials, providing no data on how much prestige cladding was used in London each 
year, and making no inquiries into how likely developers and architects would be to 
use this type of material. In a similar vein, small wind schemes were dismissed as 
being “visually intrusive,” with no significant potential, while large wind schemes 
were seen as difficult to accommodate in densely populated urban areas (London 
Research Centre, 2000, pp 31, 33). The report did note the potential for an increase in 
the number of landfill gas schemes and small hydro projects around London, but saw 
energy crops as having limited applicability locally, given the lack of land on which 
such crops could be grown. The report concluded that London could generate 10% of 
its power from renewables by 2010, although it offered no clear path for how to get 
there, other than to say more EfW was both necessary and achievable.
The prospects for other technologies were described in sweeping, less optimistic 
terms. For instance, “there is no prospect of PV becoming economic.. .in the UK in
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the foreseeable future” but it could find a potential fit at prestige offices, displacing 
other forms of exterior cladding (London Research Centre, 2000, p 18). The report 
lacked depth, however, offering no comparison of the costs of different cladding 
materials, providing no data on how much prestige cladding was used in London each 
year, and making no inquiries into how likely developers and architects would be to 
use this type of material. In a similar vein, small wind schemes were dismissed as 
being “visually intrusive,” with no significant potential, while large wind schemes 
were seen as difficult to accommodate in densely populated urban areas (London 
Research Centre, 2000, pp 31, 33). The report did note the potential for an increase in 
the number of landfill gas schemes and small hydro projects around London, but saw 
energy crops as having limited applicability locally, given the lack of land on which 
such crops could be grown. The report concluded that London could generate 10% of 
its power from renewables by 2010, although it offered no clear path for how to get 
there, other than to say more EfW was both necessary and achievable.
The ETSU study (ETSU/AEA Technology, 2001a, 2001b) was more systematic in its 
approach, compiling data on how much renewable power generation already occurred 
in London, and then predicting how this would increase by 2010 under three 
alternative scenarios. Hard data, such as how much recoverable wood was available 
from manufacturing and tree trimming operations around London, was used to flesh 
out alternative power generation scenarios, each of which made differing assumptions 
about how much of this wood could actually be recovered, and how many wood-fired 
CHP systems could be supported by this quantity of material. In the end, ETSU 
projected that by 2010, London would generate 0.88% of its power from new 
renewable technologies deployed within the Greater London region. This figure 
increased to slightly more than 2% if Energy from Waste was added to the mix. Solar 
PV, wind turbines, small wind, biomass, and sewage gas systems were seen as having 
the greatest potential in London of the various new renewable technologies.
Local Grid Management and Supply Functions
Operational control of London’s electrical system has changed several times over the 
last century. Prior to nationalization, utilities holding exclusive franchises had 
jurisdiction over all electricity supply and distribution grid management issues in a
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given geographic area. After 1947, the four Regional Electricity Boards covering 
different portions of the Greater London Area were responsible for managing the 
generation of power in London, as well as operating the local distribution network. 
When the market was restructured in the 1990s, the Regional Boards were privatized 
and the network operation functions converted into regulated monopolies. London 
Electricity took over the network functions of the London Electricity Board, servicing 
central London, while SWEB, SEEBOARD, and Southern Energy were responsible 
for managing the network grid in London’s outer ring. Due to recent mergers, a 
French company, EDF Energy, now owns London Power Networks, the Distribution 
Network Operator responsible the grid in over 75% of the Greater London area. 
Scottish and Southern Energy serves as the DNO for southwestern London.
Although the DNOs manage the network grid, customers are free to choose from 
among many different electricity suppliers, who pay the DNO for the right to deliver 
power over that grid to their customers. In general, Londoners may select from 
among seven or eight different firms for their electric power supply; if they are dual­
fuel customers, that is, someone requiring electric and gas service, their options may 
be slightly different, as not all electricity suppliers provide gas service. Customers 
seeking the best pricing for their energy services can utilize websites such as 
www.energywatch.org.uk. which provide real-time comparisons of the prices charged 
by different suppliers for different categories of customers in a given postal code.
Electricity Prices in London
As with the rest of the UK, electricity prices have come down in recent years. Figures 
8-3 and 8-4 track the retail price of electricity in London since the markets were fully 
liberalized in 1998, as reported by the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
Although price decreases have occurred across the board, some customers have 
enjoyed greater cost savings than others. Pre-payment customers, who traditionally 
represent lower-income households unable to pass the up-front credit check required 
by utilities (Greater London Authority, 2004a), have historically paid rates up to 20% 
higher than those charged other customers, although this gap now appears to be 
narrowing.
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Figures 8-3 and 8-4 
Electricity Prices in London by Customer Class
Source: (DTI, 2004a)
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The drop in prices has been welcomed by local policy-makers concerned about the 
incidence of ‘fuel poverty’ around London. Because many low income households 
live in poorly insulated homes, and because many cost-containment rules promoted 
the use of electric heating systems in council housing schemes in the 1970s (Greater 
London Council, 1978, 1983), high electricity prices eat into the funds that 
householders have for other necessities. Under London Mayor Ken Livingstone’s 
definition, which categorizes fuel-poor households as those spending more than 10% 
of the household’s disposable income on all forms of energy, 34% of all London 
households meet this criterion36 (Greater London Authority, 2004a, p 27). To help 
alleviate fuel poverty, many London boroughs participate in Central Government- 
funded energy conservation projects targeting low-income households.
Householders or businesses interested in deploying renewable power systems on or 
near their property also will pay a premium for their power. High up-front capital 
costs are slowly paid back, as power generated on site using “free” natural resources 
displaces power purchased from the grid. The cost of the system, the amount of 
power generated, and the cost of the power that the new system displaces all are 
important elements in determining how quickly the investment will be paid back. 
Large scale wind turbines, such as those deployed at Ford’s Dagenham site in East 
London, are believed to have a relatively short payback period, just 4-5 years
36 The UK government uses a different definition, based on total rather than disposable income. Under 
the UK government definition, 17% o f London households are considered fuel-poor
202
(Dodsen, 2003). At the other end of the spectrum, photovoltaic systems in London 
are projected to have payback periods of between 40-100 years (Broer & Why, 2004; 
Inman, 2004; Solstice Energy Ltd., 2004).
Table 8-3
Cost per kilowatt (installed) of Renewable Technologies in London
Technology £/kW installed Data source
■ 1 kW solar PV £6,600-7,000 (estimate) (Solstice Energy Ltd., 2004)
2 kW solar PV £5,950-6,000 (estimate) (Solstice Energy Ltd., 2004)
10.2 kW solar PV £4,534 (actual)
(Energy Savings Trust, 
2004b; Ormiston Wire Ltd., 
2004)
“Small” horizontal axis wind 
turbine (no size given)
£3,000-6,000 (estimate) (Broer & Why, 2004)
2.5 kW wind turbine £14,000 (estimate) (Architects' Journal, 2003)
Enercon E66 1.8 MW wind 
turbine (Hammersmith)
£694 (estimate) (Dodsen, 2003)
Enercon E66 1.8 MW wind 
turbines (2 @ Dagenham)
£778
(Brunton, 2004; TLT LLP, 
2004)
Small hydro £1,000-3,000 (estimate)
(London Research Centre, 
1998)
These high costs may be dissuading installations (Broer & Why, 2004; Brook 
Lyndhurst, 2003a; ETSU/AEA Technology, 2001a, 2001b; London Research Centre, 
1998). According to a survey conducted in 2003, one in four Londoners is willing to 
consider installing a PV system on their roof, if cost is not a factor. When cost 
considerations are taken into account, however, just 4% of respondents report they are 
very likely to follow through on such installations. Subsidies can therefore play in 
important role in bringing down costs, a sentiment agreed to overwhelmingly by 
Londoners, 93% of whom see them as “important” factors in the decision to install 
renewable schemes (Brook Lyndhurst, 2003a). One PV system installer notes that 
with subsidies currently available from DTI, the payback period on solar PV systems 
can be reduced to 15 years (Quinn, 2004), and there has been interest from Londoners 
in this program. As of 2004, there were 49 London applications for funding under 
DTI’s Stream 1 (Small Scale PV) program, of which 39 received funding . Under
37 These 39 projects amounted to 10.3% of all projects funded to date.
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the Stream 2 (Medium and Large Scale PV) funding scheme, covering projects of 5 
kW-100 kW, 31 applications were received for London projects, 19 of which were 
funded38 (Energy Savings Trust, 2004c).
Net-metering offers another way to bring down the cost of PV projects. In 2000, the 
Managing Director of one of London’s leading solar installation firms reported 
earning four pence for each kilowatt-hour of power that he exported back into the grid 
from a PV system installed on his home in South London (London Research Centre, 
2000). Net-metering payments in London are higher today, as shown in Table 8-4. It 
is interesting to note how different electricity suppliers are approaching the net- 
metering issue. EDF Energy offers two alternatives, one with an export meter -  
which tracks how much power the system exports to the grid (and which the customer 
must pay to install) -- and one without. Because the average 1 kW photovoltaic 
system in London generates roughly 750 kWh of power each year (ETSU/AEA 
Technology, 2001b, p 8), it is not clear which approach is more advantageous. This 
will depend on how power generated by the system matches the load on the building 
at any given point in time. nPower approaches the equation completely differently, 
paying customers 5p/kWh for all power generated by their PV system, not just power 
exported (Gunning & Davidson, 2004). Although they have been unable to formalize 
the approach thus far, nPower hopes to eventually lay claim to the Renewable 
Obligation Certificates (ROCs)39 earned by the PV systems participating in this 
program. The 5p/kWh payment is essentially equivalent to the current value of the 
ROCs earned and power exported by these systems (N. Riley, pers. comm.).
Table 8-4
Electricity Net-metering Schemes Available to London PV System Owners
Source: original research, November 2004
Company Net-metering payment for exported power Conditions
EDF Household receives £10/year per kW  installed No export m eter installed
EDF Energy 7.64 pence/kW h Export m eter reguired
Powergen 6.19 pence/kW h —
nPower
5 pence/kW h for all power 
generated, not just exported
No export m eter required. Must be 
Juice (green tariff program) subscriber
38 The 31 applications represent 18% o f all applications received, while the 19 funded projects 
represent 21% o f  all projects funded, indicating London is doing well compared to other regions o f  the 
UK.
39 See page 213 for an explanation o f  the ROC program.
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Green Tariff Programs in the UK
Consumers seeking to use renewable power without deploying these systems on their 
homes or businesses can subscribe to a Green Tariff program, offered by many 
different suppliers. These programs tend to follow two basic formats. The first is 
known as a ‘green fund’ or ‘eco-fimds’ tariff (Energy Savings Trust, 2004a; National 
Energy Foundation, 2004). Under this approach, customers pay a small premium 
over the price they would ordinarily pay for power, and this premium is then used to 
subsidize or fully fund new renewable power system deployment. For example, 
London Electricity customers subscribing to the company’s Green Tariff program pay 
a premium of 0.42 pence for every unit of electricity consumed. This money is 
deposited in a Green Energy Fund, which pays for small solar PV and rooftop wind 
systems on schools and non-governmental organizations in the London Electricity 
service area. London Electricity pays all administrative costs for this program, so all 
of the funds raised from customers go to support actual deployment projects (London 
Electricity, 2004). In 2002, London Electricity’s and SWEB’s combined green 
energy fund raised £450,000 from subscribers, which was given out to projects 
costing between £5,000-£50,000 (London Electricity, 2002).
The second type of Green Tariff plan is known as a ‘green supply’ or ‘renewable 
tariff fund. Under these plans, customers specify that some or all of the power they 
purchase must come from renewable sources (Energy Savings Trust, 2004a; National 
Energy Foundation, 2004). Suppliers may vary the percentage of renewable power 
they use, helping them target different market niches. Green Energy (UK) PLC, for 
example, has both the Green Energy 10 and Green Energy 100 plans, where the 
number indicates the percentage of power that is actually derived from renewable 
sources. Northern Ireland Electric is another firm that offers consumers plans 
featuring varying levels of renewable power. Plans are priced differently, reflecting 
the different input prices, and appealing to customers with different budgets or depth 
of conviction about how ‘green’ their power must be.
The two Green Tariff approaches have been the subject of much scrutiny by the 
environmental organization Friends of the Earth (FOE), which recommended that
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customers select the green supply approach (Glasgow, 2004). At the heart of FOE’s 
advocacy is the belief that a Green Tariff plan must promote ‘additionality’, or the 
development of new renewable power sources above and beyond that already being 
developed to comply with the Renewables Obligation, a statutory requirement 
described in depth in the next chapter. Some of the suppliers criticized by Friends of 
the Earth were selling plans featuring only RO power40, pitching them as if they were 
the equivalent of supply offerings from firms going far beyond their Renewable 
Obligation (Friends of the Earth, 2004). By encouraging consumers to support tariff 
schemes that result in significant new power generation capacity, FOE hopes to 
supplant power generation from non-renewable or nuclear sources. FOE does include 
a list on their website offering opinions about which Green Tariff plans consumers 
should purchase, but this information has become somewhat dated, and FOE does not 
plan to keep it up-to-date because of the difficulty in verifying the claims made by the 
different energy companies (Jones, Brignal, & Collinson, 2004).
Uptake of Green Tariff plans is still quite low around the UK. Local Authorities have 
been some of the largest Green Tariff customers thus far (GreenPrices, 2004), 
purchasing power for their own operations and for use in social housing and other 
community facilities under their control. On the residential side, however, fully eight 
years after the first Green Tariff plans appeared on the market, just 60,000 to 90,000 
homes have enrolled, or barely 4% of the total UK market (Dunn, 2004; Energy 
Savings Trust, 2004a). No comparable data is available for London. Low 
subscription rates may be attributable to the price premium, but this is by no means 
clear. On average, subscribers to Green Tariff programs in London pay slightly more 
for their power, totaling roughly £2-£4 per quarter (Green Electricity Marketplace,
2004). This is well within the willingness-to-pay range of the average Londoner, who 
in general is willing to spend up to £2.34 extra per month41 to have a green power 
supply (Brook Lyndhurst, 2003a, p 23). Another possible explanation is a lack of 
consumer familiarity with these programs. The same survey investigating
40 The RO applies to the entire amount of electricity sold by an electricity supplier; it does not require 
that each and every supply plan offered by a supplier contain some minimum proportion of renewable 
power. A firm can thus advertise a 100% renewable power plan and be factually correct, because they 
are indeed selling renewable power. FOE makes the point this is nothing more than a marketing ploy, 
providing no environmental benefit beyond that already achieved by the RO.
41 This figure, estimated based on the results of a 2003 survey conducted by the research firm MORI, 
includes all Londoners, including customers unwilling to pay more for green power.
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willingness-to-pay queried Londoners on their familiarity with Green Tariff programs, 
and the results were not promising. Fully 74% of those surveyed said they had not 
heard of this option from their current supplier or others; just 1% had heard a “great 
deal” about these types of programs.
Conclusion
This chapter about London’s energy marketplace highlights several important 
considerations we’ll need to keep in mind in the next two chapters. First, the 
underlying market conditions for renewables are slightly less supportive than they 
were in New York. The UK’s “dash for gas” ironically improves the plight of 
renewables, as it has resulted in a situation where energy security is now a growing 
concern among government policy-makers. Home-grown renewable power is thus 
one potential solution to this problem. Electricity demand in London is steadily 
growing, but because London gets the majority of its power from sources outside of 
the city, and because electricity transmission capacity coming into London appears 
plentiful, there is little pressure to deploy new power sources (including renewables) 
within the city to meet the growing demand for power. Electricity prices have also 
steadily declined since the markets were first liberalized back in the late 1990s, and 
there has been little price volatility, two factors that might otherwise push the market 
towards alternative power sources like renewables.
Second, as in New York, the higher cost of renewably generated power does appear to 
have adversely influenced the level of deployment around the city. Technologies like 
wind are increasingly proving themselves competitive with fossil fuel based sources -  
even in crowded London -  but analysts reviewing London’s situation are fairly 
unanimous that high renewables costs have inhibited deployment and likely will 
continue to do so in the future. It thus bears watching how the Mayor addresses cost 
issues in his energy strategy. Does he see a role for price subsidies or other incentives 
to encourage deployment? Net-metering is one cost-related strategy that appears to 
help in New York, but the program there applies to all installations meeting certain 
qualifications. In the UK, there are no such rules, and suppliers are free to sponsor 
net-metering programs or not. Is this a concern of the Mayor’s?
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There is also the interesting question of why we have not seen local government 
deploying these systems in large numbers. Particularly after looking at the situation 
in New York, where most of the installed capacity is on public facilities, it is striking 
that in London the vast majority of installed renewable power schemes are at private 
companies. Of course, one key difference is the fact that water systems in the UK are 
privately owned, and Thames Water is deploying biogas power systems at their 
sewage treatment facilities just as the DEP does at the City-owned facilities in New 
York. But what about other local government facilities? Is there some fundamental 
obstacle to deployment on GLA or Transport for London buildings, or is it simply a 
matter of cost? This issue will be directly taken up in Chapter 10.
Finally, there is the question of how the Mayor has chosen to exploit the knowledge 
gained from the ETSU and other studies looking at renewables potential in London. 
The LRC study was rather optimistic, arguing that up to 10% of the city’s power 
could come from renewables; that study was weak on how the city could deliver on 
such potential, however. The ETSU study was far more systematic in its approach, 
discussing supply chain issues and assessing in great detail the opportunities available 
for each type of new renewable technology. Its conclusions were rather gloomy, 
however, concluding that new renewables can ultimately only deliver less than 1% of 
London’s energy needs. In Chapters 9 andlO, I’ll discuss how the ETSU work has 
been taken up by the Mayor’s Energy Strategy, and how ironic it is that a strategy that 
contains many bold initiatives may ultimately deliver only a fraction of the city’s 
power needs.
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CHAPTER 9
London case study: State and Local Electricity Regulation 
And the Renewables Policy-Making Environment
Overview
Chapters 1 and 2 provided considerable background information on the development 
of the UK electricity marketplace from its origins in the 1880s to the current day.
That history -  the early market chaos and slow industry consolidation -  set for stage 
for nationalization of the industry, a regulatory and market structure that lasted for 
roughly 50 years. Market liberalization changes that went into effect in the 1990s 
thus had profound impacts on how power was generated, distributed, and purchased 
by consumers and businesses around the UK. At the same time these dramatic 
structural changes were occurring, efforts were also underway to move the electricity 
market in a more environmentally sustainable direction. These changes started 
modestly, with most policy initiatives having only an ancillary impact on how the 
market worked. Today, however, environmental considerations are core policy 
drivers, lying at the very heart of UK energy policy (Wolfe, 2003), and bringing about 
fundamental changes in electricity market operations. All of these issues are 
discussed in this chapter.
One thing I point out both here and in Chapter 10 is how certain policies intended to 
promote green power production have ironically had the opposite effect, inhibiting 
renewables deployment around the UK and in London. This is similar to what we 
saw in New York, where the way rules were written or programs were designed 
advantaged certain players or technologies and disadvantaged others. In the UK, such 
problems historically arose because of rules associated with the planning system, 
which while superficially supportive of renewables, didn’t give local authorities the 
guidance they needed to ensure equal application of these policies across the UK.
The rules renewable power systems must abide by to earn Renewables Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs) have also been problematic, as they were designed primarily for 
large installations that generate lots of power on a monthly basis, not small scale 
schemes more likely to be deployed in cities. Both topics are taken up in this chapter.
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London’s 2004 Energy Strategy is also reviewed in detail. This document, which 
architects the GLA’s approach to energy efficiency and renewable power deployment 
and use over the next 10-20 years, builds on earlier policy documents developed by 
the Greater London Council (GLC), London Research Centre (LRC), and London 
Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC). The Mayor was not statutorily required to 
develop an energy strategy, but did so voluntarily because he saw one as an important 
and natural complement to the policy documents called for by the Greater London 
Authority (GLA) Act 1999. The Mayor’s Energy Strategy places a big emphasis on 
renewable power generation, establishing deployment targets and a lengthy list of 
strategies designed to boost public awareness and deployment levels. Worth noting 
are the various policy mechanisms the Mayor intends to employ to implement the 
strategy, as they speak volumes about the powers and resources available to the 
Mayor, and where policy and regulatory constraints imposed by others influence his 
capacity to act. These topics are discussed at considerable length in Chapter 10, and 
ultimately serve as key lessons from this thesis that hold great relevance to energy 
policy-makers in other cities.
Slowly Turning Green
The first significant UK Government policy measures on renewable energy were 
linked to research and development (R&D) efforts. In 1982, the Government 
Advisory Council on Research and Development (ACORD) established a 
methodology to evaluate Government spending on renewable power technologies that 
had begun several years earlier. ACORD categorized technologies as “strongly 
placed; economically good; promising; or long shots” (Mitchell, 1996, p 166). Based 
on their ranking, technologies were either supported with more R&D money or their 
funding was curtailed. In 1988, the now-defunct Department of Energy issued 
Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward. This document committed the 
Government to a sustained renewables R&D agenda, and for the first time articulated 
the Government’s view that renewables were a viable source of future power 
production (Connor, 2003).
The UK moved beyond R&D support with the Electricity Act 1989. Its most well- 
known provision gave the Secretary of State the ability to require the twelve regional
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electric companies42 to secure power generation capacity from non-fossil fuel sources. 
This Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation, or NFFO, was a “market-pull” support mechanism 
(Mitchell, 1995, p 1079) designed to both prop up the ailing nuclear power industry 
(Elliott, 1994) and provide a “guaranteed, premium market” in which the renewable 
power industry could develop (London Research Centre, 2000, p 8). Under the 
NFFO, the Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency (NFPA) solicited bids for power 
generation capacity from a range of different power generation technologies. 
Contracts were originally offered for terms of eight years; later tranches of funding 
offered commitments of up to fifteen years. DNOs then purchased electricity from 
these contracted entities, and were reimbursed by the NFPA for any price premium 
using funds raised by a small Fossil Fuel Levy imposed on all electricity customers.
Much has been made of the fact that the NFFO was principally a mechanism to 
support the nuclear power industry (Connor, 2003; Elliott, 1994; Mitchell, 1995). 
NFFO was much more than that, however. It can reasonably be argued that NFFO 
helped build the UK’s ‘new’ renewables industry. Before NFFO, the total amount of 
power obtained from ‘new’ renewable sources (i.e., wind, tidal/wave, small hydro, 
solar PV, biomass, landfill gas, geothermal) deployed around the UK totaled roughly 
150 MW of installed capacity. By 2000, this had increased to approximately 1,265 
MW of capacity, most of which involved large wind and landfill gas projects (DTI, 
2004b). NFFO also helped bring down the price of renewable power to a more cost- 
competitive level. In the first round of bidding (NFFOl), the price premium paid for 
power from wind farms was £80/MWh, compared to £45/MWh for power from 
landfill gas. By the fifth round of bidding in 1998 (NFF05), the price premium had 
dropped to £30/MWh for wind power and £25/MWh for power from landfill gas 
(House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2004).
Not all NFFO projects succeeded, however, despite the prospect of guaranteed 
income. Some endured long delays in the planning approval stage, ruining the 
economics of the project given the time-limited nature of the contract. Other projects 
were rejected altogether by local planning officers (Mitchell, 1996). In 1993 the 
Deputy Prime Minister issued new guidance for local planning officers to remedy the
42 These are known today as Distribution Network Operators, or DNOs.
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planning problems. Planning Policy Guidance (PPG) 22 -  Renewable Energy offered 
local authorities basic information about renewables and advice on how to factor 
Government policy towards renewables into local planning decisions. In particular, 
PPG 22 focused on Development Plans, which set the framework for all development 
control decisions in a community (ODPM, 1993). By incorporating renewable energy 
policies into these Plans, it was hoped that local planning officers would be more
inclined to approve these projects.
?
During roughly this same period the Government was also implementing other 
initiatives aimed at the larger issue of climate change. In 1994 and again in 2000, the 
Government laid out comprehensive Climate Change Programs to help the UK 
achieve greenhouse gas reduction commitments made at the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992 and under the Kyoto accords in 1997. These plans included the Government’s 
renewables projects, as well as energy efficiency, demand reduction, and fuel source 
conversion initiatives. In 2000 the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP) called for even more dramatic reductions than those required under Kyoto, 
suggesting the UK should cut CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050 (Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, 2000a, p 28). Other RCEP recommendations focused on 
how the UK could achieve this goal, including introducing a carbon tax, establishing 
carbon sinks to sequester CO2 , increasing funding on energy research and 
development, and changing government policies to promote energy efficiency.
The RCEP’s carbon tax recommendation was suggested as an alternative to a Climate 
Change Levy (CCL), which the Chancellor of the Exchequer first proposed in March 
1999 and which went into effect in April 2001. Under the CCL, a small tax of
0.43p/kWh is assessed on electricity derived from fossil-fuel based sources that is 
sold to industrial and commercial users. Domestic consumers are exempt from the 
Levy. The CCL is also assessed on natural gas, petroleum, coal, and lignite sales, 
with different rates applying to different fuel sources. To ensure revenue neutrality, 
mandatory national insurance contributions by businesses were reduced by 0.3%. The 
RCEP preferred a carbon tax to the CCL because carbon taxes are based on the 
carbon content of a fuel source (rather than the CCL’s focus on the energy content), 
thus more accurately targeting contributors to global warming (Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, 2000b).
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New Policies for a New Millennium
In February 2000, dissatisfaction with the pace of progress made under the NFFO and 
its general incompatibility with the free market principles of the UK’s electricity 
market liberalization efforts led the government to scrap NFFO43 and replace it with 
another type of procurement requirement known as the Renewables Obligation 
(House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2004) . Under the Renewables 
Obligation (RO), licensed electricity suppliers must procure a specified proportion of 
their electricity supply from designated renewable sources of energy. Unlike the 
situation under the NFFO, any extra costs incurred by suppliers are passed directly 
onto consumers. To ensure prices do not increase too dramatically, the RO imposes a 
price cap, giving suppliers an incentive to find the cheapest forms of renewable power 
available in the marketplace. The supply obligation also increases over time, from a 
March 2003 starting point of 3% of all power supplied to a minimum of 15.4% by 
March 2016 (PIU, 2002; Vaughan-Adams, 2003). The 15.4% threshold stays in 
place until 2027, ensuring markets stay robust for an extended period of time.
Compliance is demonstrated through the use of Renewables Obligation Certificates,
* individually numbered certificates that represent power production at specific, 
renewably-powered generating facilities during specific time periods (Connor, 2003). 
Electricity suppliers must deliver the required number of ROCs to Ofgem each year, 
or pay a “buyout” price as a penalty. The buyout price started at £30/MWh and by 
2004-2005 stood at £31.39/MWh, increasing annually at a rate tied to the Retail Price 
Index (OFGEM, 2004b). Electricity suppliers are free to pick their sources of 
renewable power, so long as the technology used by the suppliers qualifies for 
ROCs44. Suppliers can purchase ROCs directly from accredited generators or from 
other ROC holders. Thus far, ROC prices have been the same as the buy-out price, 
although this may change as the buy-out price continues to rise and the cost of power 
production declines. Suppliers are encouraged to use ROCs to demonstrate
43 Under the terms of the Utilities Act 2000, all existing NFFO contracts would be honored until their 
intended expiration date. No new tenders seeking renewables supply capacity would be issued, 
however.
44 As of 2004, ROC-eligible technologies include landfill and sewage gas projects, small hydro 
systems, on- and off-shore windfarms, systems burning agricultural and forestry residues and energy 
crops, wave and tidal power plants, and solar PV systems.
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compliance rather than simply paying the buyout price by a provision in the law 
which redistributes buy-out payments to electricity suppliers in proportion to the 
number of ROCs that they hold (Connor, 2003). Such an approach further decreases 
the cost of the ROC.
Most observers expect the RO to increase electricity prices throughout the UK. In 
2004-2005 alone, achieving the 4.9% RO requirement will cost consumers an extra 
£500 million, and over the life of the RO, an average of £1 billion/year more than if 
the RO were not in place (House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2004, 
p 43). Higher costs are attributed both to the current higher cost of renewably- 
generated electricity, and to the fact that renewable power sources tend to be more 
intermittent and unreliable, forcing suppliers to pay balancing cost penalties under 
NETA45 (DTI, 2003a; Reuters, 2002).
In 2002 and 2003 the Government released two new reports with major implications 
for UK policy. The Energy Review, carried out by the Performance and Innovation 
Unit (PIU), looked at trends in energy demand, supply, and costs; problems with the 
marketplace; and options for the future. The PIU report made several important 
observations and recommendations (PIU, 2002):
• UK dependence on foreign gas suppliers was growing, but was not yet cause for 
concern
• The UK should be wary of making large expenditures on carbon emission 
reductions if other countries are not also doing the same
• Immediate priorities should focus on energy efficiency and expanding the role of 
renewables, although new investment in nuclear power and clean coal should 
remain as open options
• The government should target a 20% improvement in energy efficiency by 2010 
and a further 20% in the following decade
• The proportion of electricity generated from renewable sources should be 
increased from the RO’s target of 10% by 2010 to 20% by 2020.
45 Recall from Chapter 1 that NETA was designed to improve the efficiency o f electric transmission 
markets by requiring generators and users to more accurately forecast their supply and demand. 
Balancing cost penalties are assessed those missing their projections.
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Because it was a report to Government, rather than a report by Government, these 
recommendations did not have the force of policy. That was the purpose of the 2003 
Energy White Paper, which articulated the Government’s 10-year policy vision. The 
White Paper both agreed with and broke with the recommendations of the Energy 
Review. The White Paper agreed that energy security was an important issue to 
monitor, and formally adopted the RCEP’s 60% CO2 reduction target 
recommendation. The White Paper disagreed with the PIU’s call to set a new, higher 
target for renewable power, instead calling the 20% figure an “aspiration” to be 
achieved by 2020 (DTI, 2003a, p 46). To ensure planning approval does not 
inappropriately inhibit renewables deployment, the White Paper announced that the 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister would soon publish an update to PPG22, which 
ultimately was released in 2004. Finally, the White Paper announced that carbon 
emissions trading would be a central element of the UK’s carbon reduction efforts.
Although the White Paper drew praise from several quarters, it attracted criticism for 
its mixed messages about the future direction of UK policy. By calling emissions 
trading the ‘central plank’ of the UK’s emissions reduction efforts (DTI, 2003a, p 29), 
the Government implied that energy efficiency and nuclear power schemes could 
supplant renewable power projects as the preferred way to achieve emission 
reductions. When coupled with the Government’s announced intention to formally 
review the Renewables Obligation in 2005-2006, and the fact that the 20% 
renewables target was considered merely an “aspiration,” industry watchers say 
investors grew nervous, fearing their stake in renewables projects could be 
undermined by policy shifts occurring before their investment returns are fully 
achieved (Gow, 2003; Wolfe, 2004).
Investments in Energy
Direct financial support for various aspects of the energy industry has long been a key 
element of UK policy. When electricity markets were nationalized in the 1940s, this 
support took the form of requirements that power plant operators buy British coal, 
both to promote self-sufficiency and to help placate a powerful labor union (Helm, 
2003). Almost since the day the nuclear power industry was first created,
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Government support has been sizable. Originally these investments were for the 
purpose of building the industry; in the last 30 years, it has been to help the industry 
stay afloat in an increasingly competitive marketplace.
In the area of renewable power technologies, Government financial support has also 
been significant. Between 1975 and 1993, more than £232 million was spend on 
R&D and demonstration projects (Elliott, 1994, p 1067). Much of that money was 
directed at the fledgling wind and tidal power industries in a “technology push” 
approach, with the expectation that British firms and investors would build on the 
Government’s early financial support in these technologies. When commercialization 
did not turn out as planned, the Government pulled its support using the ACORD 
assessments as its justification (Meek, 2001). Renewables research and development 
expenditures continued to decline into the 1990s (Runci, 2000), hitting their low point 
in 1997-1998 when £5.5 million was spent on early-stage renewables R&D programs 
(House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2004, p 29). Because of the 
NFFO program, however, total expenditures on the renewable power sector actually 
increased during that same period. In the period between 1990 and 2001, UK 
government expenditures due to NFFO contracts for renewable power totaled £714 
million.
With the shift away from the NFFO in 2000, the Government moved to support the 
RO by increasing energy R&D budgets and capital grants supporting renewables 
projects (PIU, 2002). In that year, Prime Minister Tony Blair authorized an additional 
£100 million for renewables support. In their review of how to allocate that money, 
the PIU concluded off-shore wind and energy crop projects offered the best near and 
medium-term prospects. By 2003, Government commitments to renewable 
technology deployment and research had climbed further, totaling over £500 million, 
with wind and bioenergy projects each earmarked to receive more than £100 million 
over a several year period (Mitchell & Connor, 2004). In 2004, the Government 
announced a new £50 million investment in wave and tidal technology, with the 
intention of making the UK a global leader in this sector (Bowker, 2004).
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Table 9-1
UK Installed Capacity of New Renewable Technologies (in MW)
Source: (DTI, 2004b)
Wind and 
W ave Solar PV
Small S ca le  
Hydro Landfill g as S ew a g e  G as O ther(1)
Total installed 
capacity (MW)
1990 (2) 10 - 48 18 73 0.1 149
1991 (2) 14 - 69 32 91 0.3 207
1992 50 0.2 73 57 91 14 286
1993 131 0.3 77 87 88 52 436
1994 153 0.3 77 94 87 52 464
1995 200 0.4 88 105 87 52 534
1996 238 0.4 175 162 87 52 715
1997 322 0.5 163 188 87 52 812
1998 331 0.6 171 245 90 108 946
1999 357 1.2 177 343 91 108 1,078
2000 412 2.0 184 425 85 157 1,265
2001 428 2.8 189 465 85 157 1,326
2002 535 4.1 194 473 96 177 1,479
2003 743 6.0 203 619 101 184 1,855
(1) Includes the use of farm waste digestion, waste tyres, poultry litter, meat and bone, straw 
combustion and short rotation coppice
(2) Estimated
The payback from the UK’s investment in new renewables can be seen in Table 9-1, 
which demonstrates deployment trends for different technologies. As I had noted 
earlier, the NFFO deserves credit for gains achieved during the 1990s, when new 
renewables deployment jumped by 800%. The impact of the RO can also be seen, 
particularly in 2003, when total deployed capacity jumped by 25% in a single year. In 
the next few years, these trends are expected to continue, with on- and off-shore wind 
projects leading the way. Based on the number of projects currently seeking funding, 
planning approval, or already under construction, the total installed capacity of wind 
projects is expected to exceed 1,500 MW by the end of 2005 (BWEA, 2004). Wind is 
a popular technology choice because of the relative maturity o f the industry, and 
because the UK has some of the best wind resources anywhere in the world (DTI, 
2004a). Deployment of wave and tidal power systems is expected to occur in the long 
term, as is growth in solar photovoltaic systems. The Government’s optimism in PV 
technology is tempered, however, by the belief that some type o f “3rd Generation” 
technological breakthrough is necessary before costs decline enough to lead to 
widespread market acceptance (DTI, 2003b).
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Renewable Power -  A Wise Policy Choice?
Since the Energy White Paper was released in 2003, there has been much debate over 
the UK’s ability to achieve its various renewable power and climate change targets. 
(For example, see House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2003; and 
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2004.) Some criticism stems 
from a fundamental skepticism about the wisdom of placing so much emphasis on 
renewable power technologies, at the expense of other “climate-friendly” approaches 
such as promoting energy efficiency or nuclear power. Countryside groups concerned 
that large swaths of land will be turned into wind farms have been particularly vocal, 
arguing that nuclear power can achieve the same greenhouse gas reduction goals in a 
less visually intrusive manner (Vidal, 2004). Other questions have focused on the 
sheer logistical difficulty of deploying large quantities of renewable power technology 
in such a short time, given issues related to planning permission, inadequacies of the 
transmission and distribution grid system, and other regulatory obstacles. This 
skepticism is not without merit. Figure 9-1 vividly shows the dramatic increase in 
renewable power generation rates that must be achieved to meet the UK’s 2010 
targets.
Figure 9-1
UK Progress Against Renewables Targets
Source: (H ouse of Com mons Environmental Audit Committee, 2003, p 11)
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The issue of nuclear power’s role in the UK energy picture is a complex one. The
sector has long been on the ropes financially, forcing the Government to repeatedly
bail it out so the badly needed generation capacity would not be jeopardized (Helm,
2003). For some time, however, the expectation has been that the industry would
recede into history when the last nuclear power plants closed, approximately 20 years
from now. Whether this will actually occur is now a subject of considerable debate.
Although the Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003a) explicitly stated the Government had
no plans to call for the construction of new nuclear power plants any time soon, it did 
*
not shut the door on this option completely, much to the chagrin of advocates who 
have been fighting the industry for many years (Friends of the Earth, 2003; 
Greenpeace, 2003). Then-Energy Minister Brian Wilson amplified this point when, in 
releasing the White Paper, he gave renewable power and energy efficiency efforts just 
five years to ‘prove’ themselves, after which time he suggested the UK might need to 
reexamine its position towards nuclear power (Gow, 2003). Similar points were made 
by Prime Minister Tony Blair and his chief scientific advisor in September 2004 
(Cowell, 2004).
Nuclear power advocates have been emboldened by these statements, and steadfast in 
their efforts to both criticize the renewables industry and call for nuclear power’s 
inclusion in any low- carbon energy portfolio. Former nuclear industry officials have 
been linked to studies criticizing wind farms, and there have been rumors that the 
industry secretly supports community and countryside groups fighting large 
renewable power projects (Vidal, 2004). Self-interested nuclear power advocates are 
not alone in making these calls to support the industry. The influential Royal Society 
sees nuclear power as filling an important near and medium-term role in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Ian Fells, Chair of the New and Renewable Energy Centre 
and a well-known figure in the UK renewable power industry, has called for an 
immediate resumption to the construction of nuclear power stations. Fells argues it is 
time to end the “wishful thinking” over how much of a contribution renewable power 
sources can make to the UK’s energy supply (Jameson, 2004).
Recent and potential investors in renewable power projects have thus been left 
confused and nervous over the direction of the UK’s energy policy (Wolfe, 2003). No 
policy changes appear imminent, but given the lead time that is necessary to plan, win
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approval for, and construct a nuclear power plant, the clock is ticking, and resolution 
on this issue must come before too much more time passes.
Overcoming Barriers to Renewables Deployment
For more than a decade, trade groups, academics, and Government agencies have 
examined factors known or perceived to have inhibited renewable energy project 
development decisions around the UK, and designed specific policies to remedy these 
problems:
• Planning system barriers -  The planning system was first identified as an obstacle 
to renewables deployment during the NFFO era, when many NFFO-sponsored 
wind farm projects had difficulty obtaining planning approval from local 
authorities (Association of Electricity Producers, 1996; Mitchell, 1996). In 2003, 
a study sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) found 
planning obstacles were problematic, particularly for wind farms, but they were 
unlikely to prevent the UK from deriving 10% of its electricity supply from 
renewable sources by 2010. As supply targets increase beyond that level, 
however, the report suggested some fundamental changes to the planning system 
would be necessary (Brook Lyndhurst, 2003b). The first of these changes 
occurred in 2004, when ODPM replaced PPG22 with a new Policy Planning 
Statement (PPS) 22—Renewable Energy. PPS22 includes a call for the 
development of regional renewable energy targets; states that renewable energy 
should be a ‘material consideration’ when planning applications are considered by 
local authorities; and sanctions the use of mandates requiring new construction 
projects to generate power on-site from renewable power systems (ODPM,
2004a). The ‘material consideration’ concept is an important development 
because this makes renewable power a fundamental issue on which planning 
decisions can be based. Some are already suggesting that PPS22 will dramatically 
change the way planning officers must view their job, creating a presumption in 
favor of renewables that will place local planners on the front line of the UK’s 
efforts to facilitate renewables use (House of Lords Science and Technology 
Committee, 2004).
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• Interconnection costs -  A second key barrier to renewables deployment relates to 
interconnections between the electrical grid and the renewable power generator. 
Unlike in New York, however, where technical issues were treated as virtually 
insurmountable, in London interconnections are treated as a regular part of the 
business, with the key concern being who pays for any necessary upgrades, and 
how much these upgrades cost. Traditionally, interconnections that require 
system upgrades incur costs, known as deep charges, which are borne fully by the 
supplier connecting into the grid, under the logic that absent this new power 
source, no changes would be necessary. In 2002, however, Ofgem determined 
that deep charges could reasonably constitute a barrier-to-entry into the electricity 
marketplace, thus violating a provision of the Utilities Act 2000 requiring equal 
grid access for all suppliers (OFGEM, 2001,2002a). To remedy this problem, 
Ofgem is conducting a formal Price Control Review, seeking to determine ways to 
fairly allocate connection charges between electricity consumers (who presumably 
would benefit from a more vibrant marketplace), DNOs, and electricity suppliers. 
The results of the Price Control Review were expected in April 2005.
• NETA closure requirements -  By their very nature, renewable power technologies 
are subject to the vagaries of the natural forces underlying the technology. Only 
when the wind blows, the water flows, or the sun shines do these systems generate 
power. Because NETA prizes certainty, however, renewables projects get 
penalized when plant operators fail to accurately predict how much supply they 
will generate during some future time period. Under the old Power Pool system, 
these predictions had to be submitted 24 hours ahead of time, a huge burden for 
many renewable technologies. NETA first reduced this gate closure requirement 
to just 3 hours, and most recently, to just one hour ahead of when the power must 
actually be delivered, dramatically reducing the risk of financial penalty.
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Energy Policy-making in London
Prior to 1947, individual London boroughs and the London County Council46 were 
actively involved in energy policy matters, issuing franchises to private firms or 
directly managing electricity supply and distribution utilities themselves. After the 
industry was nationalized, local government was largely removed from the picture as 
electricity planning, power generation, and transmission and distribution 
responsibilities were handed over to the CEGB and the various Regional Boards.
This changed in the late 1970s, when as a result of the UK Government’s response to 
the mid-1970s oil crisis, local government began to reengage on this issue out of 
concern over the high cost they were paying for energy. Since then, various entities 
have established working groups to look at electricity issues in London, quantified 
energy use in the Greater London region, and developed locally-oriented action and 
policy plans they believed were necessary complements to Central Government 
policies.
The first real stab at a comprehensive energy policy for London was made by the 
Greater London Council47 in 1978, when it issued a report examining the impact of 
UK energy policies on London. Prior to that, the GLC’s primary interest in energy 
matters was limited to coordinating the in-house use of energy by GLC functional 
bodies and local authorities. This latter work was managed by the GLC Energy 
Policy Steering Group, which despite its name had little expertise considering “big 
picture” energy policy matters. The report Energy Policy and London (Greater 
London Council, 1978) attempted to change that. Although hampered by a lack of 
data on energy use in London, the report recommended a series of wide-ranging steps 
the GLC and others should take to ensure that London’s future energy needs and 
interests were adequately addressed. These included promoting the broader 
deployment of combined heat and power and district heating schemes; the 
development of in-fill land-use policies that would reduce auto use and promote 
bicycle use around the city; and emphasizing the role that energy conservation should
46 The London County Council was a precursor to today’s Greater London Authority, responsible for 
regional governance over London boroughs.
47 The Greater London Council replaced the London County Council in 1965.
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play as part of a broad energy strategy. The report also highlighted areas where more 
research was necessary before policies could be developed.
Following the report’s publication the GLC established a new Energy Policy Group, 
chaired by the GLC’s Chief Planner, and began to collaborate with the Central 
Electricity Generating Board and London Boroughs to collect local energy supply and 
use data. This work culminated in the 1981 report Energy Use in London (Greater 
London Council, 1981), which presented data on the status of London’s current 
energy supply and future supply options; the use of energy by the domestic, 
commercial, and industrial sectors in London; transport-related energy use; the 
geographic distribution of energy use around London; and energy prices. The study 
included no policy recommendations, as it was intended to serve as the foundation on 
which future policy could be developed. In 1982 the report was supplemented by a 
series of working group reports designed to help the GLC, London Boroughs, and the 
CEGB assess the impacts of current energy use, project future supply and demand, 
and consider where new supply and energy transmission facilities should be sited 
around the city (Greater London Council, 1982a, 1982b). In 1983 the GLC Economic 
Policy Group published The Energy Economy (Greater London Council, 1983), 
repeating many of the concerns raised by the various working groups, and noting that 
-  if properly developed -  the London market for energy conservation products and 
services could approach £20 billion in value over the next decade. The report also 
renewed the call for strategic energy planning for London, noting that Government 
policies failed to sufficiently account for local concerns.
Central Government’s breakup of the GLC in 1986 brought energy planning efforts in 
London to a standstill for several years. In 1993 the London Research Centre and the 
London Planning Advisory Committee renewed the discussion, issuing companion 
documents updating the 1981 energy data study and offering 66 different policy 
recommendations targeting London Boroughs and Central Government. The LRC 
report echoed many themes previously developed in the old GLC studies, such as the 
need for greater CHP/District Heating scheme use in London, but it was also notable 
for its new emphasis on environmental issues. For the first time, linkages were made 
between London’s energy use and global climate change, and there was a greater 
focus than in past documents on the role renewable power schemes could play in
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London. The report did not make explicit recommendations as to which energy 
technologies should be pursued, but instead issued a new call for Government to 
examine which were most appropriate for London , and how the planning system 
could be used to facilitate their use (London Research Centre, 1993). The LPAC 
study picked up on the planning theme, analyzing the role that planners could play in 
influencing energy use and energy supply decisions in London. The study also issued 
a call for changes in Borough Unitary Development Plans (UDPs) so energy and 
environmental impacts were more explicitly factored into local planning approval 
decisions (London Planning Advisory Committee, 1993).
The GLA Ushers in a New Energy Policy Era
When the Greater London Authority was established by an act of Parliament in 1999, 
the authorizing legislation required the new Mayor to develop eight strategic plans for 
the city, on topics ranging from biodiversity to culture to land use to transportation 
(HMSO, 1999a). Ken Livingstone, who served as leader of the Greater London 
Council when it was disbanded by the Thatcher Government in 1986, was elected 
Mayor of London in May 2000. Upon taking office in July, he vowed to voluntarily 
develop a ninth strategic plan, focusing on energy use in London (Greater London 
Authority, 2000b). In developing his energy plan, the Mayor laid out three 
overarching objectives (Greater London Authority, 2004a, pp 39-40):
1. Reduce London’s contribution to global climate change
2. Help eradicate fuel poverty
3. Contribute to London’s economy by delivering sustainable energy and improving 
London’s housing and building stock
It took nearly four years to develop and refine the Energy Strategy. The task of 
authoring the first draft was completed by an in-house Energy Team, managed by one 
of the Mayor’s principal environmental policy advisors, and staffed by civil servants 
and political appointees, several of whom had a background on local energy issues. 
Two of the GLA staff members contributing to the Strategy were Matthew Chell and
48 The ETSU study Development o f a Renewable Energy Assessment and Targets for London was 
Government’s response to this plea.
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David Hutchinson, the principal authors of the 1993 London Energy Study. Joanna 
Dawes, the Mayor’s Principal Energy Advisor, was a co-author of the 2000 LRC 
report Renewable Energy in London49, along with David Hutchinson. Outside support 
and feedback came from a 13-member Energy Strategy Advisory Group, consisting of 
academics, Local Authority representatives, developers, and energy and public health 
experts.
Public input into the content of the first draft was invited via a daylong consultation 
event held in November 2000. 500 invitations were sent out to representatives of the 
energy industry, Central Government and Local Authority officials, businesses, trade 
groups, and housing associations, academics, and special interest groups. More than 
120 people attended the event, which focused on clarifying the overall purpose of the 
Energy Strategy and obtaining suggestions on specific actions that should be included 
(Greater London Authority, 2002). The Energy Team took these comments and over 
the course of the next year developed a 204-page draft that was presented to the 
London Assembly and GLA functional bodies in March 2002 for their consultation 
and review. The Draft Strategy covered many topics:
• An overview of UK energy policy
• Energy use and supply in London
• Links between land use in London and energy consumption
• Transport-related energy use
• New policy and programmatic proposals the Mayor wished to implement or 
promote
• Techniques the Mayor would use to implement the Strategy
In January 2003, the GLA released a second draft of the report intended to serve as a 
public consultation document. The second version was considerably longer than the 
first (Assembly) draft, growing to 373 pages in length. Whereas the Assembly draft
49 This report was one o f five reports issued by the LRC between 1998 and 2000 related to renewable 
energy: Exploiting Renewable Energy in London: An overview o f renewable energy technologies 
(1998)\ Auditing local renewable energy resources: A guide for local authorities (1999); Model 
planning policies on renewable energy for London’s unitary development plans (1999); Incorporating 
passive solar design into the design process: Briefing notes on non-domestic buildings (1999); and 
Incorporating passive solar design into the design process: Briefing notes on housing 1999).
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had 34 policy statements and 83 proposals, the Public Consultation draft had 41 
policy statements and 134 proposals. Most of the increase was attributable to a jump 
in the number of transport-related proposals and the structure and process to be 
followed by the new London Energy Partnership. To solicit public input on this new 
draft, the GLA took several steps between February and April 2003. The report was 
posted on the GLA website, along with a summary document and leaflet. Copies of 
these documents were mailed and e-mailed to thousands of stakeholders around the 
city, representing different racial, ethnic, religious, industry, and environmental 
organizations. Questionnaires were posted on-line and distributed via e-mail; written 
copies of the questionnaire were distributed at libraries and shopping malls around the 
city. In total, the GLA reported receiving more than 330 statements and questionnaire 
responses about the draft Energy Strategy from different individuals and groups.
In February 2004 the GLA released the final draft of its Energy Strategy, entitled 
Green Light to Clean Power. The final draft was much shorter, 260 pages in length, 
with 33 distinct policy statements and 70 programmatic proposals.
Breaking New Ground or More of the Same?
Green Light to Clean Power is remarkably reminiscent of the overall direction and 
recommendations put forth by the London Research Centre and the London Planning 
Advisory Committee in 1993. The 2004 strategy adopts a more aggressive stance 
than the 1993 policy proposals by announcing energy management and supply 
standards that must be met by GLA functional bodies and large new development 
projects in London. The 2004 strategy also has a ‘greener’ tint to it that the 1993 
reports, benefiting from recent research on the potential for renewable energy in 
London. This research gave the Mayor the ammunition he needed to establish targets 
for renewable power and other forms of ‘clean energy’ systems, including combined 
heat and power projects. Green Light to Clean Power also benefited from the 
statutory requirement that the GLA develop other strategic plans that have energy 
components to them, including the spatial development strategy (the London Plan), 
the air quality strategy, the biodiversity strategy, the waste strategy, and an economic 
development strategy for London. These reports were produced during roughly the
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same period, providing the Mayor with ample opportunity to employ cross-cutting 
strategies.
Policies endorsed in both the GLC’s 1993 and the GLA’s 2004 energy documents 
include:
• The expanded use of CHP/district heating in built-up areas of London
• Energy recovery from the waste stream
• Address fuel poverty in London by expanding energy efficiency and energy 
conservation programs
• Adopt land-use policies that result in increased public transport and bicycle use 
and pedestrian access to shops and businesses
• Promote energy-related business development in London
• Convert Transport for London’s vehicle fleet to cleaner power sources
• Use the planning system to promote change by incorporating policies in UDPs 
that lead developers to consider the environmental impacts of their projects
• Use the planning system to help educate the public and developers
• Train planners at Local Authorities so they are more aware of energy issues and 
the energy implications of their decisions
• Establish a public-private partnership to guide action on energy issues in London
• Expand the use of hydrogen as a clean-burning fuel source in London
• Promote power production using sewage gas as a fuel
Energy-related concepts endorsed in other GLA strategic plans that were mentioned 
in 1993 include an endorsement of Crossrail, a major new rail transport project in 
London, and a proposal that Central Government examine the potential impact of a 
congestion charging scheme on traffic levels in London.
Green Light to Clean Power does break new ground in several areas, primarily as an 
outgrowth of how the Mayor proposes to implement his plan. To begin, the Mayor 
proposes to use all available Mayoral powers to help implement the Energy Strategy. 
One power stems from the fact that by statute, certain types of development projects 
must obtain Mayoral approval, in addition to approval from the Local Authority with
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planning jurisdiction over the project.50 In his Energy Strategy, the Mayor explicitly 
states projects seeking his approval must abide by certain design and energy 
standards, such as generating at least 10% of the site’s power and heat needs on site 
from renewable power sources (Greater London Authority, 2004a, p 107).
The Mayor also intends to lead by example. In Proposal #43, the Mayor calls on the 
GLA to explore the feasibility of installing a fuel cell at City Hall to provide both heat 
and power, and encourages the functional bodies to do the same at their own facilities 
(Greater London Authority, 2004a, p 176). Because there are currently no large-scale 
fuel cells operating in London, these installations could serve as highly visible 
examples other building owners, managers, and developers could visit and then 
replicate at their own site.
A third technique proposed by the Mayor is to use his statutory powers and highly 
visible pulpit to draw attention to energy issues in London and lobby for policy 
changes and funding from Central Government. One example is the Mayor’s 
development of renewable energy targets for London. Although the GLA does not 
have the funds to meet these targets on its own, the Mayor can nonetheless draw the 
public’s attention to the fact that London is actively promoting the in-city deployment 
of renewable power technologies; that funding is available from Central Government 
to subsidize the cost of these installations; and report on how well London is 
achieving its targets. Similarly, the Mayor has issued a call for the construction of 
one “zero-carbon” development in each London borough to show the public, Local 
Authority planners, and real estate developers that building homes and businesses that 
do not contribute to global warming is not science fiction, but rather an achievable 
goal. The ‘Bed-Zed’ development in Sutton is one of the few developments of this 
type anywhere in the world (Bill Dunster Architects, 2004; Dyckhoff, 2004), and the 
Mayor is anxious to show that it need not be an anomaly.
50 The Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order 2000 states that the Mayor of London 
has significant powers in relation to individual planning applications o f “strategic” importance to 
London. These include large scale developments (which are defined based on the number of square 
feet in the development and its location in London), developments in close proximity to the River 
Thames, major infrastructure projects, and developments that may otherwise affect strategic policies in 
London. Boroughs receiving planning applications meeting these criteria must notify the Mayor, who 
has the option of deciding whether to comment on and support these applications, or, if he deems it 
necessary, direct the London Borough to refuse planning permission. The Mayor cannot direct 
Boroughs to approve applications otherwise opposed by the Borough. Source: (GOL, 2004b)
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The final two implementation strategies proposed by the Mayor, establishing energy- 
related public private partnerships and promoting energy-related business 
development, also echo techniques called for in the 1993 London Energy Study.
A Renewables Strategy for London?
The 2004 Energy Strategy is the first attempt to lay out a coherent plan to promote the 
use and deployment of renewable power across London. Back in 1978, Energy Policy 
and London briefly mentioned the need to provide guidance on solar thermal 
installations, and expressed concern that solar access rights may need protection 
(Greater London Council, 1978). In 1993, the London Research Centre called on 
Government to examine the contribution renewables could play in London, and 
suggested London would benefit from a high profile solar PV installation that could 
serve as a model for local developers (London Research Centre, 1993). The five- 
report series developed by the LRC between 1998 and 2000 laid out how certain 
renewable technologies could contribute to London’s energy supply, and explained 
which changes would help facilitate their deployment, but these reports did not 
constitute formal policy.
In the 2004 Energy Strategy, the leap from concept to policy was finally made. Six of 
its 33 policies specifically reference renewable energy or some type of renewable 
power generation technology, as do 21 of the 70 proposals found in the document. 
These cover a wide range of suggestions and mandates directed at Government, Local 
Authorities, private developers, and the GLA and its functional bodies. (A complete 
list of Energy Strategy policies and proposals related to some aspect of renewable 
power can be found in Appendix 4.) Three elements of the plan are of the greatest 
significance:
• Targets’. Proposal #6 calls for London to generate 665 GWh of electric power51 
(and 280 GWh of heat) from renewable power schemes by 2010. To achieve this,
51 To put this in context, Figure 2 on page 7 of the Mayor’s Energy Strategy indicates that Londoners 
use approximately 30,000 GWh of electricity per year.
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the Mayor established the following deployment targets (Greater London 
Authority, 2004a, p 71):
- 7,000 (or 15 MW peak capacity) domestic solar PV installations
- 250 (or 12 MW peak capacity) commercial and public building solar PV 
installations
- 500 small wind generators on public or private sector buildings
- 25,000 domestic solar water heating schemes
- 2,000 solar water heating schemes associated with swimming pools
- “More” anaerobic digestions plants with energy recovery and biomass-fueled 
CHP plants.
By 2020, the Mayor believes London should triple these figures.
The targets proposed by the Mayor in the 2004 Energy Strategy are similar to 
those suggested by ETSU in their 2001 assessment of the viability of renewable 
power in London. The number of domestic PV systems has been reduced to 
7,000, down from 10,000 in the ETSU report, but the number of larger 
commercial system installations has been increased from 100 to 250 making up 
the difference. Importantly, the Mayor’s total renewable energy production target 
of 665 GWh remains the same as ETSU’s. The Energy Strategy makes no 
specific projections of how many total megawatt-hours or gigawatt-hours of 
electricity would be achieved annually by each type of power technology, but 
given the similarity of the numbers, we can presume it follows the ETSU 
estimates. This means a substantial amount of power must come from waste 
incineration, pyrolysis, gasification, and anaerobic digestion facilities, as was 
called for in the Mayor’s Municipal Waste Strategy (Greater London Authority, 
2003d).
In establishing the targets, GLA staff said they faced a balancing act. In their 
public consultations, the reaction they heard was that these were extremely 
challenging targets, and the difficulty was compounded by the fact the Mayor 
doesn’t have the power to implement them. According to one key staff member,
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“Where does that leave us? Do we set targets that are easily 
implemented by others? Or do we set targets that are extremely 
challenging to try, which we couldn’t be held to? On balance, the 
comments that we were getting was that we have to provide 
leadership, we have to go for challenging targets, and we have to 
do as much as possible to meet them. So that that was the 
direction we went in.”
The irony of this statement, of course, is the fact that although 7000+ installations 
is a very bold gesture when compared to the few dozen installations currently in 
London, ETSU estimates these targets will still only result in a supply capacity of 
less than 1% of London’s total electricity demand.
• Use o f the Planning System: The Mayor calls for active use of the planning 
system to promote renewable power in London. Two different proposals are 
particularly relevant. Proposal #12 requests London Boroughs to establish their 
own renewable energy targets and incorporate them in the Borough’s Unitary 
Development Plan. The Mayor also hopes that Boroughs will then “use their 
planning powers, land and property control, and awareness-raising activities to 
meet them” (Greater London Authority, 2004a, p 106). Proposal #13 is more 
aggressive, announcing that the Mayor expects the approximately 250 planning 
applications referable to him for approval to generate at least 10% of the site’s 
energy needs (both heat and power) from renewable sources generated at the site, 
where feasible (Greater London Authority, 2004a. p 107).
• Energy Hierarchy: The Mayor established an energy hierarchy intended to guide 
the GLA and its functional bodies as they implement energy initiatives at their 
own facilities and in regeneration projects involving the London Development 
Authority (LDA). It is also intended to serve as guidance for private developers, 
building managers, and the general public. The hierarchy is structured as follows 
(Greater London Authority, 2004a, p 41):
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Table 9-2 
Mayor’s Energy Hierarchy
1 Be Lean -  use less energy
• Reduce consum ption through behaviour 
change
• Improve insulation
• Incorporate passive heating and cooling
• Install energy e ffic iency lighting and 
appliances
2
Be Green -  use 
renewable energy
• On site -  install renew able  energy 
technologies, such as so la r w ater heating, 
photovolta ics, b iomass, w ind turb ines
• O ff-site  -  import renew able  energy 
generated e lsewhere
3
Be Clean -  supply 
energy e ffic iently
• Use com bined heat and power, and 
com m unity heating
• C ut transm ission losses through local 
generation
The hierarchy is useful both for educational purposes -  it is an intuitively easy-to- 
grasp concept -  as well as for the direction it offers to those responsible for 
designing or permitting new and existing government facilities, or regeneration 
projects sponsored by the LDA.
Implementation Efforts
Even before the London Energy Strategy was finalized in early 2004, the GLA began 
to implement many different aspects of the plan. The London Hydrogen Partnership 
was established in April 2002, with a very broad mandate to help create a hydrogen 
economy in London and throughout the UK (London Hydrogen Partnership, 2004). 
Projects to be promoted by the Partnership include both stationary and transport- 
related applications.
In 2003, the GLA, the Association for London Governments, and the Government 
Office for London received funding to create London Renewables, a public-private 
partnership designed to promote the uptake of renewables in London. From early 
2003 through the summer of 2004, London Renewables engaged in a variety of tasks 
to establish a foundation on which the renewables portion o f the Energy Strategy 
could be constructed. Several important reports and guidance have been produced 
thus far. The first, Attitudes to Renewable Energy in London: Public and Stakeholder
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Opinion and the Scope o f Progress (Brook Lyndhurst, 2003a), was the first survey 
research to focus on what Londoners, developers, and other stakeholders have to say 
about renewable energy in London. The research examined the participant’s 
familiarity with and support for renewable energy, their views on what deployment 
targets should be set in London, and what they see as the major issues related to 
renewables deployment in London. The report found Londoners overwhelmingly 
support the use of renewables in London, but have a limited willingness-to-pay to 
purchase green power or deploy them directly on their homes and businesses.
The majority of London Renewables’ time and energy has been spent developing 
guidance for a variety of audiences, including Borough Councilors and planners, 
architects, developers, and housing associations. Each document is highly tailored, 
reflecting information that will be of greatest use to the reader. Councilors are given 
basic background information about which renewable power technologies are 
appropriate for London, the local and UK policy context, and finally, lists of questions 
to ask planners and energy managers at their Borough. These questions focus on the 
content of the local UDP, whether planners are aware of energy issues, and energy 
management practices at Council-owned buildings (London Renewables/London 
Energy Partnership, 2004b). The guidance for developers offers case studies of clean 
energy projects already underway in London, hoping to show that such projects can 
prove effective locally (London Renewables/London Energy Partnership, 2004c). A 
sixth guidance document, Integrating Renewable Energy into New Developments: 
Toolkit for Planners, Developers and Consultants, provides detailed information 
about different renewable technologies; issues to consider when considering planning 
applications that incorporate one or more of these technologies; and how to assess or 
challenge a developer’s claim that these technologies are technologically or 
economically infeasible (London Renewables/London Energy Partnership, 2004a).
DTI funding for London Renewables ran out in August 2004, and this group has since 
been subsumed into the London Energy Partnership (LEP), an even larger public- 
private partnership the Mayor has characterized as central to the success of the Energy 
Strategy (Greater London Authority, 2004d). The LEP was established in January 
2004, and spent much of the first six months developing a business plan so it can be 
self-sustaining financially, establishing sub-task working groups, and prioritizing
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tasks among the dozens of proposals made in the Energy Strategy (Greater London 
Authority, 2004c).
Although the LEP has a steering group designed to represent a cross-section of 
government agencies, academics, industry, and trade organizations, the Strategy also 
created the London Energy Forum to invite broader public participation in the work of 
the LEP and on citywide energy issues. Membership in the Forum is open to all 
Londoners, businesses, and other stakeholders who wish to contribute or simply 
monitor what is happening locally on energy policy issues. Figure 9-2 describes how 
the Forum is intended to function.
F igure 9-2
L inks B etw een  th e  S tra te g ic  F ram ew ork  of th e  M ayor’s  E nergy  S tra te g y  
an d  th e  L ondon  E nergy  P a r tn e rsh ip ’s  W ork
Source: (Greater London Authority, 2004a, p 224)
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What is not yet clear is where the new London Climate Change Agency fits into this 
picture. The Climate Change Agency was first proposed by Nicky Gavron in her 
short-lived run for Mayor in the 2004 elections , and then taken up by Ken
52 Nicky Gavron served as Deputy Mayor to Ken Livingstone between 2000-2003. Because 
Livingstone left the Labour party in 1999 to run as an independent, it was not clear who would run as 
the Labour Party candidate in the 2004 Mayoral election. Nicky Gavron assumed this mantle in 2003, 
and stepped down as Deputy Mayor. In 2004, Livingstone was welcomed back into the Labour Party, 
and Gavron stood down as the official Labour Party candidate, in deference to the sitting Mayor. 
Gavron was re-elected to her London Assembly seat in 2004 and reappointed Deputy Mayor shortly 
thereafter.
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Livingstone as part of his 2004 re-election campaign manifesto. According to 
Gavron, the agency will focus on a subset of Energy Strategy projects, including 
managing the energy efficiency of old and new buildings, focusing on bigger projects 
such as commercial clusters and public sector housing, and working with the LDA. 
The GLA has also suggested that a key aim of the Agency is to work with the private 
sector to establish an enhanced energy infrastructure in London (Greater London 
Authority, 2004f; London Energy Partnership, 2004b).
The London Development Agency has undertaken several projects aimed at 
supporting the Energy Strategy. In January 2004 the LDA released Green Alchemy: 
Turning Green to Gold, a report examining the economic development potential of 
the waste recycling and sustainable energy sectors. The energy section concludes that 
deploying the technologies called for in the Strategy could result in 5,000-7,000 new 
jobs and a market worth £3.35 billion by 2010 (London Development Agency, 2003. 
p 2). This is markedly less than the £20 billion market valuation made by the GLC 
Economic Policy Consulting group back in 1983 (Greater London Council, 1983), but 
sizable nonetheless. The LDA has also been actively engaged in examining the 
energy infrastructure of East London and the Thames Gateway, ascertaining what 
type of infrastructure is necessary to support the level of development proposed in the 
London Plan.
Conclusion
Modified regime analysis looks to the policy backdrop in a city or nation for factors 
that have influenced local policy decisions. London is rich in this regard as there are 
an incredible number of different research paths we can look to for insight. At the 
Central Government level, there have been efforts to link climate change concerns 
and the direction and content of national energy policy since the early 1990s. The 
renewables sector generally has done well as a result, thanks to the subsidies offered 
under the NFFO and more recently, under the Renewables Obligation and various 
small-scale installation incentive programs. Research and development funds are on 
the upswing again, with the UK trying to position itself as a global leader on certain 
renewable technology issues. In Chapter 10, I’ll describe how Central Government’s 
funding preferences have exerted a clear influence on actions taken by the GLA.
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By itself, London also has a rich energy policy history, but one needn’t look too hard 
to see there was historically more talk than action. This is logical -  don’t forget that 
until the 1990s, the industry was nationalized, and Central Government was 
essentially responsible for all aspects of planning delivery. There was really no need 
for a municipality to engage on this issue, except when they had concerns about the 
quality or type of service delivered by the state-run utilities.
Times have changed, however. Mayor Ken Livingstone and the GLA appear fully 
engaged on energy issues, and this time city policy-makers are trying to walk the talk. 
Thus, much of the new Energy Strategy is taken up with specific steps the Mayor 
plans to take to effect change within the GLA itself, at Local Authorities, in homes 
and businesses, and in new development projects. The Energy Strategy is ambitious 
in its scope, covering a wide range of topics, and inviting accountability by 
establishing vehicles for public and stakeholder involvement and concrete targets that 
can be monitored to assess progress. Some of the most interesting facets of the 
energy strategy are its goals, which are vastly different from the narrowly crafted 
policy goals in New York City. Reducing London’s contribution to global climate 
change is explicitly mentioned, while the other two reasons focus on household levels 
concerns (rather than New York’s macro-level economy focus) and the fact that 
energy is seen not just as a means to an end (i.e., the lifeblood that supports the vast 
real estate and construction sectors), but rather as the foundation of an independent 
services and technology sector with strong growth potential of its own.
There are two other key themes we can distill from this chapter that will be an 
important part of my modified regime analysis. Both are reminiscent of issues 
highlighted in the New York case study. First, we again see that the cost of energy is 
important to policy-makers. We know from Chapter 1 that Margaret Thatcher 
justified the restructuring of electricity markets out of a belief that the private sector 
could provide electric service at a lower cost than government. In this chapter we saw 
that the NFFO was designed in a way that would ultimately drive down the cost of 
renewable power. Cost considerations are also fundamental to NETA’s operation, 
which is predicated on reducing inefficiencies in the power supply and transmission 
system. They also explain why the RO includes a buyout clause, ensuring that the
236
pursuit of renewable energy doesn’t drive overall electricity prices through the roof. 
In other words, in all of these examples, least-cost pricing was an implicit or explicit 
priority of Central Government policy-makers. This explains the need for Central 
Government’s R&D and subsidy programs. To the extent they want the renewables 
sector to compete, they believe steps must be taken to make them more cost 
competitive in the short run. Interestingly, the London Energy Strategy is largely 
silent on this subject, apparently willing to defer to the deeper pockets of Central 
Government. This last subject is taken up in Chapter 10.
The other key theme of this chapter reflects the influence of Government-level 
policies and decision-making on local authority and market behavior. One of the 
clearest examples of this occurs when we consider the wealth of local energy policy 
documents prepared during the 1990s but the dearth of any programs to implement 
these policies around London. In Chapter 10, I’ll also discuss how the decision to 
dissolve regional government meant there was an energy leadership gap during this 
period, with no citywide entity capable of moving any energy agenda forward. 
Renewables system developers have also been affected by the way Central 
Government-led programs have been structured: ROC rules disadvantaged smaller 
renewable power systems with minimum monthly power generation requirements, 
while for a time NETA rules increased the likelihood wind system operators would 
face stiff penalties for inaccurate supply projections. Companies seeking to deploy 
new systems also suffered from the vagaries of well-intentioned but ill-defined 
planning rules allowing considerable agency on the part of local planning officers. 
Planning applications in one community were handled completely differently than 
applications in another, and delays and rejections of project applications ultimately 
contributed to the demise of the entire NFFO program.
Given this broad set of circumstances, it is now time to turn our attention to examine 
how these facts contribute to the logic of policy and program decisions in London. 
The larger political environment will also be woven into the analysis to develop a 
comprehensive portrait of the factors shaping the London Energy Strategy and the 
deployment and use decisions of other stakeholders around London.
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CHAPTER 10
London Case study: Policy and Politics -  A Modified Regime Analysis of 
Renewables Decision-making in London
Introduction
In the last chapter, I described what London proposes to achieve in terms of 
renewables; in this chapter, I focus more on how the Mayor proposes to implement his 
strategy, and why he has structured his plan in a certain way. My modified regime 
framework provides the analytical approach undergirding this chapter, providing key 
insights into which rule- or value-based influences are most relevant, and which 
stakeholders enjoy positions of privilege when it comes to local energy matters.
The previous chapter noted there is considerable evidence that new institutional 
factors have shaped the direction of London’s strategy towards energy and climate 
issues. Many formal rules that exert the greatest influence emanate from Central 
Government, and as will be made clear in this chapter, this is to be expected because 
Central Government is an inescapable part of policy-making life in London. This 
situation was first alluded to back in Chapter 3, when criticisms were levied at urban 
regime theory for its failure to adequately account for the strong role central 
government plays in the life of many European cities. On the ground in London we 
see Central Government influence manifest itself time and again. Funding 
preferences by DTI and DEFRA shape which issues the GLA takes on, while 
Parliamentary rules establish limits on the powers available to the Mayor in the areas 
of budget and planning.
Because of the tremendous amount of policy activity occurring at City Hall, however, 
it is not always apparent that such limitations exist, or that they have much influence. 
Unlike in New York City, where the fact that most renewable energy planning occurs 
at the State level appeared to limit the willingness to undertake renewables planning 
at the local level, in London the Mayor and his team have seamlessly woven these 
circumstances into their policy approach, identifying where they can exert strong 
independent leadership, and where they must call on Central Government to intercede 
or act. By parsing the past five years of policy work by the GLA, however, Central
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Government’s web of influence becomes quite clear, affecting the direction, tone, and 
level of assertiveness found in Mayoral strategies. Other new institutional factors, 
such as value preferences related to least-cost, also carry considerable influence over 
policy and program decisions made by the GLA and other stakeholders.
As with the New York case study, I begin this chapter with a standard regime analysis 
of London, exploring the extent to which a small cadre of decision-makers holds sway 
over the local policy agenda. I then move on to the energy and environmental policy 
landscape in London, discussing evidence that shows stakeholder involvement is 
critical in explaining local renewables policy. Finally, I weave in new institutionalist 
threads to bolster my assessment of which factors best explain local decision-making, 
resulting in a quite robust explanation of the logic behind renewables policy-making 
and deployment levels in London.
PART 1: Who Runs London? 
The Power(s) of Central Government
Regime analysis focuses on who is engaged in local policy-making, reasoning that 
who is involved ultimately influences the direction and shape of policy and 
implementation efforts. As originally conceived, urban regime theory argued the 
local business community enjoys a privileged status in setting (or shifting) the local 
government’s policy agenda, because it has many essential resources (e.g., money, 
knowledge) that local government lacks. In the UK and many other countries, 
however, national-level government plays a similar role, meaning to carry out a 
proper regime analysis one must first appreciate how local context can change the 
nature of the regime.
In the UK, Central Government power manifests itself in many different ways:
• Land owner: Central Government own large swaths of land in many 
communities, giving it leverage in deciding whether (or what type of) 
development or regeneration may occur in that community.
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• Source o f funds'. The vast majority of a UK Local Authority’s budget comes from 
funds allocated to it by Central Government. In the UK, local borrowing is also 
tightly controlled by Central Government (Harding, 1994).
• Deliberate attempts at promoting private sector partnerships: In the UK, “new 
urban governance” policies by Central Government have either required local 
authorities to contract out for a good or service or partner with a private firm to be 
eligible for regeneration project funding, national lottery monies, City Challenge 
funds, etc. (Newman & Thomley, 1997; Rydin, 1998).
Central Government has even more fundamental powers that over the last 150 years 
have proven particularly important in London: the power to establish, or abolish, 
regional government and borough-level government; and the power to assign each 
body very specialized responsibilities. These powers have been exercised several 
times since 1855, a result of struggles between Central Government and local officials 
over who should control the destiny of the UK’s capital city (Travers, 2004). The 
most recent change occurred in 1999 when Parliament reconstituted regional 
government in London for the first time since 1986. Composed of a publicly-elected 
Mayor and Assembly, the Greater London Authority is the latest in a long line of 
attempts to provide essential public services, strategic vision, and civic leadership to 
the 600+ square mile area known as Greater London. This area now extends far 
beyond the borders of the original ‘City of London’, the one-square mile area where 
the city was first bom.
Prior to the formation of the GLA, the last form of regional government was the 
Greater London Council, which governed from 1965-1986. Almost from the start, the 
GLC’s efforts were criticized, as “it did the things it was supposed to do badly or not 
at all, and tried to do too many things it should never have tried to do” (Pimlott &
Rao, 2002, p 39). After 1983, when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister, the 
battles between the GLC and Central Government became pitched, with then-GLC 
Leader Ken Livingstone using “the wealth of County Hall and its location beside 
Westminster Bridge as a political platform to challenge and tease the Government” 
(Hebbert, 1998, p 115). Thatcher vowed to abolish the GLC, a goal she achieved in 
1986.
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Following the GLC’s demise, governmental powers and responsibilities in Greater 
London were split among Central Government, the thirty-three boroughs, and a web 
of quangos and joint arrangements that developed over time among and between 
different levels of government. London governance during the 14-year period 
following 1986 has been characterized -  mostly negatively -  as an “uncoordinated 
mess” and a period when the capital suffered from the lack of any formal vision for 
the future of the city (Pimlott & Rao, 2002; Rydin, Thomley, Scanlon, & West, 2004, 
p 55). There were several attempts to bring order to this situation. The thirty-three 
London boroughs banded together to form the Association of London Governments 
(ALG) and the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC), giving the boroughs a 
stronger, more coordinated voice on issues of common concern. In 1994, Central 
Government established the Government Office for London (GOL) to streamline 
interactions between the boroughs and various Central Government ministries; it was 
led by a Government-appointed Minister for London.
However, these efforts did little to stave off calls for some new form of regional 
governance, a stance that was a key platform position of the Labour party in the 1997 
elections. When Labour took power, they set to work crafting Green Papers and 
White Papers on the subject, putting the issue to a public vote, and finally passing the 
GLA Act in 1999 (Pimlott & Rao, 2002). Compared to governance structures in other 
parts of Britain, the GLA broke new ground. The new London mayor is both the 
formulator and executor of most policy decisions, while the Assembly was given 
weak “junior partner” powers related to the budget and an ability to scrutinize 
mayoral appointments and policy decisions (Loveland, 1999, p 93). On its own or 
through four different ‘functional bodies,’ the GLA’s remit includes managing public 
transport in London, major roads, taxi and minicab regulation, traffic regulation, 
police/fire/emergency management issues, economic development, and strategic 
planning. The second tier of government in London -  the thirty-three Local 
Authorities that were first established around 1899 -  are responsible for schools, 
social housing, local transport and roads, refuse and recycling services, street cleaning 
and lighting, local economic development, and local planning decisions (Fuchs & 
Travers, 2000). The budget controlled by the GLA is quite large, but as previously 
noted its budgetary powers are quite weak. Most GLA funds come from grants by
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Central Government, and ultimate control over both the GLA and borough budgets 
rests with Central Government, which can intervene to ensure that spending is not 
excessive (Loveland, 1999).
A Role for Others in London’s Agenda-setting?
The three levels of government in London (i.e., central, regional, and local) do not 
have exclusive claim to local political and policy agenda-setting powers, however. As 
in New York, London’s business community also holds considerable sway, filling in 
many of the gaps created by the uneven (and occasionally absent) regional 
governmental structure. Ironically, the abolition of the GLC in 1986 is given much 
credit for this situation. The business community, concerned that London was falling 
behind other cities in its economic competitiveness, banded together both to highlight 
the need for some new form of London-wide governance and to directly promote 
inward investment (Newman & Thomley, 1997). London First, the most notable of 
the private sector initiatives, was created in 1992, the outgrowth of a collaboration 
between leading private sector interests, the voluntary sector, and the London 
boroughs (Pimlott & Rao, 2002). It operated as a wholly private entity, focusing on 
strengthening the skill base of London’s workforce, campaigning for transport system 
improvements and expansion, and positioning east London as the primary area where 
growth should occur.
The run-up to the formation of the GLA in the late 1990s offers more evidence of the 
business community’s influence. First, in 1998, several leading businesses 
approached Central Government offering assistance in laying the groundwork for a 
new London Development Authority, which was to be the GLA’s new economic 
development arm. Government quickly agreed, and the London Development 
Partnership (LDP) was formed, lead by representatives of London First, the London 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Corporation of London, and the London 
region of the Confederation of British Industries, a manufacturing trade group. The 
LDP developed a draft economic development strategy in January 2000, greatly 
influencing the economic development strategy delivered by the LDA later that same 
year (Thomley, Rydin, Scanlon, & West, 2002). Many of the LDP board members 
have since gone on to serve on the Board of the LDA.
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Second, the management consulting firm KPMG was actively involved in the debates 
over how to structure the GLA. KPMG staff were seconded to the GLA early on to 
help smooth the transition, including one person who was responsible for appraising 
the “business-friendliness” of the various mayoral strategies (Pimlott & Rao, 2002; 
Travers, 2004; West, Scanlon, Thomley, & Rydin, 2002, p 18). Their work 
culminated with the publication of the KPMG-drafted report The Mayor and 
Relations with the Business Community. Issued by the Mayor just one month after the 
election, the report describes the Mayor’s intention to follow a ‘consultancy model” 
whereby “outside expertise will be drawn as early as possible into the formation of 
policy, and execution will, in the maximum number of cases, also be carried out by 
bodies outside of the Mayor’s Office/GLA -  with the Mayor’s Office/GLA playing 
primarily a co-ordinating and monitoring role” (Greater London Authority, 2000a, p 
1).
This statement echoed many themes raised by the London Business Board in their 
1999 report Business Manifesto for the Mayor and Greater London Authority. One of 
the manifesto’s recommendations was the need to “closely liaise and consult with 
business -  appointing business representatives to work with the mayor and contribute 
to all GLA policies at an early stage” (London Business Board, 1999, p 4). Seven 
months later, the Mayor’s statement said roughly the same thing. Following the 
election, the Mayor set up bi-monthly meetings with the London Business Board, 
coordinated by the Mayor’s principal economic advisor John Ross. Business 
interaction with City Hall was far more frequent than that, however, with one business 
group claiming they were in contact with John Ross on a “weekly, if not daily” basis 
(Thomley et al., 2002, p 7).
Political parties have also had long-standing influence over the governance of 
London. This was of course seen in the Tories’ decision to abolish the Labour- 
dominated GLC, and more recently in Labour’s efforts to reconstitute regional 
government yet limit the extent of its powers. Party allegiance does not appear to 
have played a major role in the operation of the London Assembly, which thus far has
53 The Business Board was made up of three of the groups in the London Development Partnership -  
CBI London, the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and London First.
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been characterized as a relatively harmonious body (Travers, 2004). At the borough 
level, political battles between parties are still de rigueur. (For example, see Myerson, 
2004). After the 2000 elections, the Labour party controlled seventeen of London’s 
thirty-two borough councils54, while the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties 
controlled four and three borough councils respectively. Eight borough councils are 
split (House of Commons, 2000, p 10). These political debates can intrude on policy 
discussions in many different realms, including revisions to local Unitary 
Development Plans and other policies the GLA may need to rely on to foster change 
at the borough level. According to one local political observer, the Mayor’s policy 
agenda could suffer if Local Authorities defy his call for cooperation. “For instance, 
take Westminster Council -  which is Tory -  they’ve been a steady thorn in [the 
Mayor’s] side, and wouldn’t think twice about telling him to sod off.”
Environmental and Energy Politics in London
An energy regime analysis must account for local environmental politics, which in 
London involves many sources, ranging from national and local ‘green’ groups, 
businesses and business groups, political parties, and all levels of governmental 
organizations. Given the large size and range of geography covered by Greater 
London, the issues taken up by these groups is quite diverse, ranging from groups 
opposed to trains carrying nuclear waste through London to groups focused on 
preserving gardens and open spaces.
Like New York, London is home to two of the world’s most well-known 
environmental groups, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Greenpeace is highly 
selective about the issues it takes up, with most having a national or international 
focus rather than a local orientation. Greenpeace is quite active on UK energy issues, 
promoting renewables deployment and enrollment in Green Tariff plans. Friends of 
the Earth engages on a much wider range of issues, although it too has been active on 
climate change matters. FOE is also unique in its setup, with a central office staffed 
by full-time professionals, supplemented by an extended network of volunteers who
54 In the City of London, Greater London’s 33rd borough, all candidates agree to serve as independents 
with no political party affiliation.
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operate through affiliate chapters around the UK. The affiliates rely on information 
and strategy from the professional staff, and then develop their own advocacy 
campaigns targeting their Local Authority, members of Parliament, or Central 
Government. In London, FOE has fifteen chapters, and a central staff liaison 
dedicated to providing support and eliciting feedback from these groups. Two other 
national green groups with a London presence are the Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds (RSPB) and the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE). Both groups 
have been very active on issues related to the on-shore deployment of wind turbines 
(CPRE, 2004; RSPB, 2004).
Three important organizations with a citywide focus include London21, the London 
Wildlife Trusts, and the London Sustainability Exchange (LSx). Both LSx and 
London21 act as a clearinghouse for information on local environmental issues. 
Because both groups adhere to a broad definition of “sustainability,” their remit also 
covers issues related to social exclusion and economic development. LSx has had a 
particularly high profile in recent years through its participation in many different 
GLA-led commissions and advisory bodies. LSx is policy neutral, and their role is 
largely one of ensuring that information is widely disseminated to groups that play an 
advocacy role.
There was an attempt made by several green groups to develop an environmental 
agenda in the run-up to the GLA election in 2000. In this election manifesto, Making 
London Work: Gaining Economic and Social Advantage from a Better Environment, 
the Sustainable GLA Coalition55 explored how “an environmental approach to 
economic development” could bring jobs and wealth creation opportunities to London 
(Sustainable GLA Coalition, 2001, p 3). The report examined urban regeneration, 
transport, energy, waste, eco-technologies, and biodiversity, advocating specific 
policies and programs the Coalition believed could improve the quality of life in 
London, create jobs, lower the cost of doing business, and address social exclusion. 
Another election manifesto, Creating a Sustainable London was developed by the 
Sustainable London Trust, a group instrumental in establishing the London21 
network. Creating a Sustainable London addressed issues of London governance,
55 The Coalition included Forum for the Future, London Cycling Campaign, London Wildlife Trusts, 
CPRE London, RSPB, and Friends of the Earth.
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how the GLA should operate, which sustainable development issues were most 
critical in London, and how sustainability principles could be incorporated into GLA 
policies (Sustainable London Trust, 1997).
Political parties and business groups have also been vocal on environmental topics in 
London. Nearly 40% of the local Green Party’s 2000 GLA election manifesto dealt 
with environmental topics (Green Party, 2000), with transport issues earning the 
lion’s share of the attention. The Greens even claim credit for portions of Ken 
Livingstone’s 2000 election manifesto, although others attribute its ‘greenish tint’ to 
the involvement of Friends of the Earth (Thomley et al., 2002). During the first year 
of Livingstone’s administration, Green party mayoral candidate Darren Johnson 
served as the Mayor’s Environmental Advisor, and was appointed Chair of the 
Mayor’s Policy Commission on the Environment.56
Among business groups, London First has the strongest record of action on local 
environmental policy matters, publishing reports on the mayor’s congestion charge 
plan (London First, 2002b); publishing local environmental quality data (London 
First, 2003) and a ‘footprint’ study examining London’s global environmental impact 
(London Remade/London First, 2003); providing feedback on all of the Mayor’s 
strategies (for example, see London First, 2002a, undated); and partnering with 
London Renewables to launch the release of new guidance documents for developers, 
consultants, Local Authority planners, and Councilors (London First, 2004). The 
London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the other leading business group in the 
city, is far less engaged on local environmental issues. They have been a vocal 
opponent of the Mayor’s congestion charging plan, claiming it hurts local business 
(London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2004), but other environmental issues 
do not appear to be a priority focus of the group.
Within the energy arena, there are several groups of note in London. At the Local 
Authority level, there are three organizations supporting the work of Borough 
employees working on energy issues (London Assembly Environment Committee, 
2002b, p 25):
56 Johnson left this position after one year, and currently serves in the London Assembly, where he 
holds the position of Chair of the Environment Committee.
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• London HECA Forum -  a network of borough government employees involved in 
implementation of the Home Energy Conservation Act (HECA)
• London Borough Energy Manager’s Group -  a network of borough government 
employees and others responsible for energy management within public buildings
• London Utilities Consortium -  a network of borough-level purchasing managers 
who have consolidated their energy service contracts to obtain better pricing.
There are also a handful of NGOs that specialize in providing assistance on energy 
matters to Local Authorities, businesses, and the general public. Many of these 
groups were active participants in the development of the Energy Strategy, either 
early in the development phase or later in the public consultation process. These 
groups include Creative Environmental Networks (CEN), the Greater London Energy 
Efficiency Network (GLEEN), Sustainable Energy Action, and Energy Solutions. All 
four groups regularly work with Local Authorities around London, advising them on 
energy matters, providing hands-on technical assistance to borough residents or 
Council housing developments, or assisting with the development of supplemental 
planning guidance for use by borough planning staff.
If we move away from who engages in local environmental policy debates to what are 
the key issues, transport-related matters -  including congestion, transport-related air 
quality, and the perceived poor state of London’s public transport system — are far 
and away the most significant environmental issues in the minds of the public, the 
business community, and local policy-makers. This was true before the GLA was 
established (Pimlott & Rao, 2002), in candidate manifestos during the 2000 election 
(Green Party, 2000; Travers, 2004), and it has been bome out in opinion surveys of 
the public and business community since then (Greater London Authority, 2003b; 
London First/London Remade, 2003). Among other types of environmental issues, 
air quality, litter and waste disposal, and water pollution are seen as the most pressing 
problems facing London. (See Figure 10-1.) None of the categories respondents 
could check off in the GLA survey readily lend themselves to climate change or 
renewable power concerns, so it is hard to know where these issues rank as a priority 
for Londoners. The Managing Director of one local energy group suggested that in
247
general, “Energy is not a very high profile public issue here in the U K .. .you’ll find a 
lot more interest in waste or street graffiti than there ever will be in energy.”
Figure 10-1
Most Important Environmental Issues Facing London
Source: (Greater London Authority, 2003b)
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The Politics and Process of Renewable Energy Agenda-Setting in London
Transport issues were very much on the mind of Mayor Ken Livingstone once he was 
elected, and have been a major focus of his administration, particularly among his 
closest advisors. The decision to emphasize transport matters was deliberate, a 
calculation by the mayor that his 2004 re-election prospects would be enhanced by 
tackling those issues most “salient to the electorate and where the results of mayoral 
action could be directly demonstrated” (Rydin et al., 2004, p 66). Other 
environmental issues fell into a second tier of less urgent “Big Tent” agenda items, 
and were handled by others in the GLA Policy and Partnership directorate. Many of 
these GLA staff members had worked on related issues in the past (West et al., 2002), 
and their ideas may have influenced the content and direction of the environmental 
strategies the Mayor was statutorily required to prepare (Rydin et al., 2004).
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Because the mayor was not required to develop an Energy Strategy, understanding its 
genesis is important. Parentage is shared -  or claimed -  by many. Several energy 
advocates around London interviewed for this thesis report lobbying for the 
development of an Energy Strategy both before and after the GLA elections, arguing 
that because many of the statutory strategies had an energy component, it made sense 
to consolidate all of the policies in one place. Top mayoral advisors attribute the idea 
to a longstanding interest in the issue by Ken Livingstone, something evidenced by 
the Mayor’s installation of a solar thermal system on his own house in Cricklewood 
(Sawer & Bar-Hillel, 2004). Deputy Mayor Nicky Gavron, characterized by one local 
energy expert as the “green arm of Ken”, was also credited by many in City Hall for 
her early and ardent advocacy of an Energy Strategy.
Once the development of an Energy Strategy was agreed to by the Mayor, it then 
became a matter of determining what it should say. In the previous chapter, I 
discussed the overlap between the old LPAC and LRC energy policies and reports and 
Green Light to Clean Power. I raised the question whether these historical 
documents, or the GLA’s reliance on staff who had worked on the old studies, 
somehow influenced the new Strategy. GLA Energy Team members insist this was 
not the case, claiming they began the process with no preconceived notions about 
what it should include. Instead, they explained the Team went out and solicited input 
from a range of stakeholders around London, looked at current and anticipated 
policies flowing down from the EU and Central Government, and examined the role 
Local Authorities would play in implementing any strategy. Finally, the team looked 
at the GLA Act to review the powers at the Mayor’s disposal. According to one 
advisor, these factors all “shaped the direction of policy and how the Mayor proposed 
to deliver them.”
The task of drafting the document fell to the GLA’s small Energy Team, led by 
Joanna Dawes, a former LRC staff member. Several internal drafts were developed 
before the Assembly draft was publicly released in March 2002. As part of the 
drafting process, the Team would meet with Dr. David Hutchinson, Environmental 
Policy Manager within the Policy and Partnerships Directorate; John Duffy, the 
Director of Environmental Policy at the GLA; and Darren Johnson, the Mayor’s then- 
Environmental Advisor, on an as-needed basis to review each draft. Unlike the
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internal battles that were reportedly fought over the content and direction of the 
London Plan (Rydin et al., 2004), GLA staff reported there were no major internal 
differences over the content and direction of the Energy Strategy. Half-day and day­
long meetings were scheduled to review the entire report, and provide feedback to the 
Energy Team on the preferred wording of policies and proposals to be incorporated 
into the draft. GLA legal staff was also regularly consulted on the extent and limits of 
mayoral powers, to help guide the Team on the final wording of the various proposals.
Table 10-1
Key Events -  London Energy Strategy 2001-2005
Source: Original research June 2005
2001 GLA Energy Team solicits ideas on what should go into Mayor's Energy Strategy and prepares first draft
Feb 2002 ETSU study Development of a Renewable Energy Assessment and Targets for London is released
Mar 2002 First (Assembly/Functional Bodies) draft of Mayor's Energy Strategy released
Apr-Jul 2002 London Assembly scrutiny of first draft Mayor's Energy Strategy
Jan 2003 Second (Public consultation) draft of Mayor's Energy Strategy released
Feb - Apr 2003 Formal public consultation on Mayor's Energy Strategy occurs
Feb - May 2003 London Assembly scrutiny of second draft of Mayor’s Energy Strategy
Mar 2003 London Renewables launched
Dec 2003 London Renewables report Attitudes to Renewable Energy in London is released
Jan 2004 London Energy Partnership launched
Jan 2004 LDA's Thames Gateway Energy Infrastructure study released
Feb 2004 Green Light to Clean Powe r released
Sep 2004 London Renewables/London Energy Partnership report Skills and Jobs from Renewable Energy is released
Sep 2004 London Renewables/London Energy Partnership Toolkit for Planners, Developers and Consultants released
Jun 2005 London Climate Change Agency formally launched
The first (Assembly and Functional Bodies) draft of the Strategy was released in 
March 2002. In July 2002, the London Assembly Environment Committee released a 
report summarizing three formal scrutiny hearings and a series of scrutiny workshops 
involving various energy stakeholders from around London. Generally, reaction to 
the draft Strategy was quite favorable, although there were many suggestions offered 
as to how it could be improved (London Assembly Environment Committee, 2002b). 
Much of the Assembly scrutiny hearings were taken up with discussions about the 
lack of any clear renewable power targets in the Strategy. In his appearance before 
the Committee, the Mayor explained targets were an issue on which he was seeking 
feedback from the business community (London Assembly Environment Committee, 
2002a), a task he assigned to the London Sustainable Development Commission.
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When the second (Consultation) draft of the Energy Strategy was published in 
January 2003, targets were in place, along with a requirement that planning 
applications referable to the Mayor generate 10% of the building’s heat and power 
needs on-site from renewable sources (Greater London Authority, 2003c, pp 86,120). 
In establishing the renewable power targets, the Mayor essentially accepted the 
deployment targets laid out in the 2002 ETSU study, despite the fact that he had 
expressed disappointment with these targets when the ETSU study was first released 
(ETSU/AEA Technology, 2001a). The Mayor’s criticism was based on his 
disappointment at the fact these deployment levels would satisfy less than 1% of 
London’s overall power needs. The 10% on-site generation requirement was an 
outgrowth of UK Planning Minister Keith Hill’s ruling in October 2003 upholding the 
right of Merton Council to impose such a mandate on large new development projects 
in the borough. In the first (Assembly) draft of the Energy Strategy, the requirement 
had been more nebulous, requiring only that new developments generate a 
“proportion of the site’s energy needs (electricity and heat) from renewables” 57 
(Greater London Authority, 2002, p 92). Another significant change between the first 
and second drafts was the addition of dozens of new policies and proposals dealing 
with issues the Mayor wished the London Energy Partnership to take up. At their 
scrutiny hearings in 2002, Assembly members had expressed concern about the lack 
of clarity on the structure and priorities of the partnership, and changes in the second 
(Consultation) draft may have been intended to address those concerns.
The majority of the comments received during the formal public consultation process 
on the second (Consultation) Draft were again favorable (Greater London Authority, 
2003a). One City Hall observer said that “... of all of the Mayor’s strategies, this is 
the most agreed upon. There wasn’t any major barrier or idea that was seriously 
challenged -  something that was definitely NOT true for some of the other [GLA] 
strategies, particularly the waste and transport plans.” Not all the comments 
submitted in the public consultation process were ringing endorsements, however.
The comments of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA), a 
GLA functional body, highlighted difficulties the LFEPA would face in trying to 
procure green power and deploy renewables on LFEPA buildings, policies called for
57 As previously noted, the term ‘proportion’ was also used in the version of this proposal appearing in 
The London Plan.
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in the Strategy (Lightbown, 2003). London First (undated) offered highly skeptical 
comments, endorsing the draft Strategy in principle while simultaneously questioning 
the wisdom of many proposals. In particular, the group:
• Called the renewable energy targets “unrealistically high within some of the time 
scales suggested”, thus jeopardizing the strategy in its entirety.
• Criticized the proposal to develop Supplemental Planning Guidance that might 
place London at an economic disadvantage to other areas of the UK, thus 
discouraging development in the capital.
• Noted that the 10% on-site generation requirement may not be viable in all cases 
in the short term for both logistical and reliability reasons. As an alternative, 
London First suggested establishing a “realistic” target date for its deployment, 
although nothing was offered as to when such a date might be.
The consultation process itself was criticized by other observers, including one who 
argued it was handled in a far more ad hoc fashion than the GLA will publicly 
acknowledge:
“I was appalled at how it was done. Anyone who wanted to could 
call up the GLA and say we want Nicky Gavron or someone else to 
come talk to us.. .the GLA would comply, and then convince itself 
that it was engaging in a very broad consultation, when in reality, the 
GLA was only hearing from those groups that took the initiative to 
call City Hall.”
In their review of the second (Consultation) draft, the Assembly Environment 
Committee focused almost exclusively on the Mayor’s proposals for the London 
Energy Partnership. Although the Committee had been hungry for Partnership details 
in the prior year’s scrutiny, this time around they said the Mayor had gone too far, 
prescribing a work plan and operating structure that threatened the independence of 
the Partnership (London Assembly Environment Committee, 2003).
The final version of the Energy Strategy, known as Clean Light to Green Power, was 
finally released in April 2004. With the entire document shrinking in size from 373 
pages to 260 pages, there were substantial changes made between the consultation and 
final drafts of the Strategy, although most were cosmetic in nature rather than
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fundamental changes in direction. Twenty three of the proposals included in the 
consultation draft that didn’t make the cut in the final version dealt with the London 
Energy Partnership.
Implementation -  Another Opportunity for Influence?
Beyond considering agenda-setting, we also need to examine implementation issues. 
There are two obvious areas in which to do this -  the work of the Mayor’s energy- 
related public-private partnerships (London Renewables and the London Energy 
Partnership) and the GLA’s handling of planning applications requiring Mayoral 
approval.
London Renewables got underway in early 2003. The GLA invited eleven 
organizations to join in its work:
• Government agencies (ALG, GOL, and the LDA)
• Business/Trade groups (London First, Renewable Power Association, London 
Environment Coordinators Forum)
• Energy firms (Solar Century, EDF Energy)
• Academia (Imperial College), and
• NGOs (LSx, Creative Environmental Networks)
The group engaged in discussions about which tasks it should take up, but much of 
the remit was determined by the UK Department of Trade and Industry, which 
provided match funding for the group. GLA staff report the DTI strongly encouraged 
London Renewables to examine planning-related issues in London, and this was 
clearly a recurring theme in the group’s work. London Renewables’ first report spent 
a great deal of time examining the status of the planning system in London, and 
recommending how to make it more renewables-ffiendly (Brook Lyndhurst, 2003a). 
In 2004, in conjunction with the London Energy Partnership, London Renewables 
published several more documents providing specific planning and policy guidance 
on renewables for Local Authority planners, real estate and renewable power scheme 
developers, architects, Borough Councilors, estate agents, and housing associations 
(London Renewables/London Energy Partnership, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c).
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The London Energy Partnership’s first year proceeded more slowly, with much of its 
early work focused on developed a business plan for the organization, and more 
recently, an Energy Action Plan laying out the Partnership’s agenda through 2009.
The steering group responsible for setting this agenda has a larger and more diverse 
set of members than London Renewables, although there is overlap between the two. 
The most significant difference is the inclusion of representatives from the finance 
and construction sectors, and the appointment of a Chair from outside the GLA. (By 
contrast, London Renewables was entirely managed by GLA staff.) Representatives 
from several groups involved in the Strategy development process have expressed 
concern about the makeup of the Partnership, and the fact that they’ve been relegated 
to ‘observer’ status rather than a full voting member. Said one, “.. .we’re worried we 
might be sidelined, particularly because it’s [groups like ours] that have the biggest 
chance of implementing something. We’re worried we had good input all the way 
through, but now when it comes to delivery, we’re put on the sidelines...”
Two program areas are priorities for the Partnership over the next year. The Energy 
Efficiency Task Group was the first one established by the Partnership, with a goal of 
providing focus, publicity, and additional funding for existing energy efficiency 
initiatives around London (London Energy Partnership, 2004a). Energy Action areas 
are to be the other early focus of the Partnership. Although the definition is still under 
development, Energy Action Areas are intended to be a specific location, 
neighborhood, or large development site where some type of high profile energy- 
related project will occur. The project may emphasize a single technology or the 
marriage of multiple energy technologies into a single project. The Partnership’s 
Energy Action Area Task Group is currently working to define its first set of projects.
One will likely be in the East London/Thames Gateway area, which is a key focus of 
the London Development Agency. In January 2004 the LDA released the results of a 
study examining the current and anticipated energy infrastructure requirements of the 
region. Because the area will potentially experience the construction of up to 93,000 
new housing units during the next 12 years, the analysis focused on both the capacity 
of the current energy infrastructure, and what might be necessary under different 
development scenarios (Sinclair Knight Mertz, 2004). Several large projects intended
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for the area, such as the 5,000+ home Stratford City development in the Borough of 
Newham, have already received planning permission from the Mayor. Over the year­
long period during which planning permission was negotiated, there was considerable 
back-and-forth between the GLA and the project developers that resulted in 
significant changes in the energy systems planned for the site.
Under the terms of the final agreement, the Stratford City developer will “use 
reasonable endeavours to achieve a minimum of 2% of the energy requirements of the 
development... from locally resourced renewable energy either on or off-site.”
Should more funds become available from government sources, the developer agreed 
to increase this percentage rate. The developer also agreed to establish a renewable 
fund of up to £3 million to be used to deliver renewable energy generation within the 
development or in the local vicinity. 70% of the development’s power will be derived 
from combined heat and power installations, and one of the buildings will be designed 
as an “exemplar building” delivering at least 10% of its power from on-site renewable 
sources (Greater London Authority, 2004g).
The Stratford City project is just one of many development projects in which the 
Energy Strategy played an important role in shaping the outcome of the project. This 
was not always the case, particularly soon after the Strategy was finalized in February 
2004. GLA staff report their attention to energy issues in planning applications was 
spotty early on, as they lacked the staff to follow through on these matters. This 
changed in early summer, when the GLA Planning Unit hired an experienced planner 
to focus solely on an applicant’s compliance with Energy Strategy policies. He liaises 
with the project applicant to discuss energy considerations, and develops a response 
noting strengths or deficiencies in the applicant’s approach. (For example, see page 
23 of the Planning Report on the Kings Cross development scheme at 
http://www.london. gov.uk/mavor/planning decisions/strategic dev/2004/oct2704/kin 
gs cross report.pdf.) As appropriate, he consults with GLA Energy Team members 
to discuss individual projects and ascertain the appropriateness of applicant claims 
regarding the feasibility of renewable energy schemes at the project site. Ultimately, 
however, it is up to the Mayor to decide how aggressively to press Energy Strategy 
requirements on any individual application. According to GLA staff, these decisions
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are made in regularly scheduled meetings between the Mayor and his planning staff 
where all planning applications referable to the GLA are reviewed.
A Regime for London?
Given this evidence, can we conclude that urban regimes have existed, or currently do 
exist in London? Several studies assert they are present in some London boroughs, 
but the results are contradictory, and regimes are clearly not a citywide borough 
phenomenon. Saunders’ (1979) analysis of the London borough of Croydon was the 
first to identify a regime-type entity anywhere in London. Twenty years later, 
Dowding et al (1999) found this characterization was still accurate. Dowding also 
found regimes in the boroughs of Wandsworth and Islington, although they differed 
from the Croydon version in that both were local service delivery-focused rather than 
growth-oriented. The staying power of the Wandsworth and Islington regimes was 
deemed questionable, as they appear to be heavily reliant on the Labour party 
retaining control of Central Government and/or the local borough council. Regimes 
were not found in Westminster, Lambeth, or Tower Hamlets, despite the distinctive 
political agenda in each borough, as each of the dominant coalitions had difficulty 
delivering on their agenda. Buck et al (2002) contradicted these earlier studies, 
arguing that with the possible exception of Wandsworth, there is little evidence that 
regimes exist in London. In Buck’s analysis, several boroughs display one or more of 
Dowding’s key regime characteristics, but none satisfy all eight test criteria. Long 
(2000a) tried to characterize a tourism partnership in Islington as a regime, but his 
analysis lacks rigor and the partnership he scrutinized would fail most regime tests.
The absence of any regional governmental structure in the post GLC-era made it 
difficult to conduct a regional regime analysis during that period (Thomley et al., 
2002). Some have claimed London First displays the characteristics of a business- 
centered regime, given its distinctive and long-lasting policy agenda. However, 
London First was historically fostered and supported not by local political elites, but 
rather Central Government, making it a variation on the traditional urban regime 
model (Newman & Thomley, 1997). The City of London Corporation and the 
London Docklands Development Corporation are other business-led groups identified 
as having regime-like characteristics that focused on regional policy aims during the
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1986-2000 period (Thomley et al., 2002). Rydin et al (2004) conclude that with the 
creation of the GLA, and clear evidence that business groups have gained the ear of 
Mayor Ken Livingstone, London may soon be home to an identifiable region-wide 
regime. Conclusive evidence will hinge on whether the regime can mobilize 
resources and the participation of both London Boroughs and Central Government to 
fulfill its agenda and gain a position of stability.
A very similar statement could be made about the existence of an energy regime in 
London, although I believe some telling results are already known. There clearly has 
been a spate of energy-related activity since 2001, catalyzed by the GLA, and 
involving a broad coalition of stakeholders. The key players involved in this work are 
known:
• Central Government is a crucial player. Its policies set the ground rules for the 
national electricity marketplace, while locally it has been very supportive of the 
GLA’s Energy Strategy development process. Because success in London is 
important to the attainment of national renewables deployment targets and other 
climate change goals, we can expect to see continued, active participation by 
Central Government.
• The private sector is an equally important coalition partner. The energy 
marketplace is now structured so the involvement of suppliers and DNOs is 
critical when discussing or designing new supply or delivery schemes. The GLA 
actively sought the participation of real estate developers and other business 
interests to insure Mayoral policies would not alienate these groups or otherwise 
harm their business interests. Both groups responded willingly, providing 
information vital to the crafting of the first draft strategy, and then providing 
feedback as subsequent versions were produced. Through their participation in 
the London Energy Partnership, and through the key role real estate developers 
will play in constructing new energy-efficient or energy-generating buildings, the 
business community can be expected to maintain some type of on-going 
interaction with GLA staff.
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• Non-profit energy agencies and green groups made valuable contributions to the 
strategy development process, and will continue to play an important role in the 
delivery of the Strategy. Groups like Energy Solutions, Creative Environmental 
Networks, and the Greater London Energy Efficiency Network have tremendous 
hands-on experience working with the public on energy issues, giving them 
knowledge highly valued by the GLA and Local Authority policy-makers and 
planners seeking to devise effective rules and programs. Advocacy groups will be 
much less involved in implementation efforts, although they are in a position to 
mobilize public support for or against the GLA should implementation falter.
• Travers (2004) believes Local Authorities represent the most powerful tier of 
governance of London, and such a claim holds some truth in the energy realm as 
well. Thanks to Central Government policies, Local Authorities have an 
independent power base over which the GLA has little leverage. The GLA’s 
Energy Strategy is thus heavily reliant on the willingness of Local Authorities to 
buy green power or establish planning policies supportive of renewables. The 
planning policies are particularly crucial, as the Mayor passes judgment on fewer 
than 1% of all planning applications filed in London; Local Authorities are 
responsible for approving or denying the rest. To the extent they promulgate 
policies encouraging or requiring renewable power on more of these projects, the 
increase in deployment levels could be significant.
Less clear is the role of the London Assembly. Many commentators have noted the 
impotence of this body (Loveland, 1999; Pimlott & Rao, 2002; Travers, 2004), and 
this was true early on as GLA staff reported the Assembly had no role in the 
formation of the first draft of the Energy Strategy. Their scrutiny hearings did make a 
contribution in shaping subsequent versions, but the Mayor and GLA staff were under 
no statutory obligation to take any of the Assembly’s advice. Ultimately, it is unlikely 
that the London Assembly will play a key role in any London energy regime other 
than as an observer and commentator.
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Table 10-2
Tests for Presence of an Energy Regime in London
Commentator Key criteria Commentary
S ton e, 2 0 0 2
“no strong capacity  to 
govern  in a direction setting  
m an n er ...o u ts id e  regim e 
arrangem ents
YES -  this group rep resen ts all the important 
stak eh o ld ers in setting local energy  policy
Clark, 2001; 
G ladstone & 
Fainstein, 2001
O u tcom es are key  
determ inants o f regim e  
p resen ce
YES -  this group h a s sh a p ed  both the a g en d a  and how  
im plem entation is occurring
Distinctive policy a g en d a YES -  th e  Mayor’s  Energy Strategy co n so lid a tes all 
other en ergy  policies germ a n e  to London into a single, 
com p reh en sive , direction-setting d ocu m ent
Long-lived policy a g en d a UNCLEAR -  m any a sp e c ts  of th e  current local energy  
ag en d a  d ate  back  to old GLC/LRC/LPAC policies, but 
im plem entation is relatively recent. M ust b e  m onitored  
further.
Coalition o f in terests that 
are not institutional in 
nature
YES -- b e c a u se  three levels o f governm ent are involved  
in the regim e, there are formal structures relating o n e  
level o f governm ent to another. H ow ever, until the  
London Energy Partnership w a s created , there w a s no  
statutorily form ed en ergy  com m ittees or b o d ies driving 
work on this issu e .
M em ber in terests should  
c r o ss  sectoral or 
institutional boundaries
YES -  m em bersh ip  reflects a w ide range of 
governm ent, private sector , and NGO in terests.
Dowding, 2001
A gen d a m ust survive  
c h a n g e s  in political 
leadership
UNCLEAR -  M any id ea s  in the GLA's Energy Strategy  
reflect p o licies first prom oted in th e  pre-GLA period. 
Im plem entation h a s only occurred under th e  GLA, 
h ow ever, m ean ing  until w e  o b ser v e  trends in a post- 
L ivingstone era, w e  can n ot b e certain.
i
S u c c e s s  d ep en d s on  
mobilization of non­
governm ent resou rces
YES -- Although Central G overnm ent w a s key in 
providing fun d s for the early work of London  
R en ew a b les and the London Energy Partnership, 
private funds will ultimately b e critical to  city-wide 
im plem entation of different renew able en erg y  sc h e m e s .
H as strong, visionary  
leadership
YES -  T hey M ayor’s  en ergy  a g en d a  is o n e  o f th e  m ost 
wide-ranging and far-reaching en ergy  p lans in all of the  
UK.
E m p h asizes public-private 
partnerships that bridge 
institutional and com m unity  
in terests
YES -  th e  London Energy Partnership ea s ily  fits this 
description, but th e  broader en ergy  coalition in London 
includes a  w id e range o f p layers drawn city-wide.
On just about every level, this GLA-led coalition ‘tests’ well as a regime, as shown in 
Table 10-2. The only areas where problems arise are the two timing-related 
questions. The ideas that form the heart of the Energy Strategy are not necessarily 
new ones -  many date back to policy documents prepared more than a decade ago by 
the LRC and LPAC. It is only recently, however, that real progress implementing 
these and several newer ideas has occurred. Will this momentum last? If the Labour 
party lost power, or if  Ken Livingstone was no longer Mayor, would work on 
London’s Energy Strategy continue unabated, or dramatically change direction? Until
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more time has passed, we cannot answer this question with any great certainty. As a
result, if we accept Dowding’s strict constructionist approach, then we must
(
characterize what is occurring in London as an early stage energy regime. If we use 
the less time-sensitive definitions suggested by Stone, Clark, and Gladstone & 
Fainstein, the answer appears far more conclusive.
Part 2: The Modified Regime model -  Improving our Understanding of the 
Logic of Local Action
This lengthy discussion of stakeholder influence on local policy-making provides 
important insights into specific policy decisions by the Mayor, but it is by no means 
the only set of factors we must consider. In particular, knowing that Central 
Government is involved is rather meaningless, because their intervention takes the 
form of specific funding sources, policies, or rules. The Modified Regime model 
(Figure 10-2) is thus useful in helping to clarify the three broad categories where 
influence occurs:
• influences affecting regime membership
• influences affecting agenda setting, and
• influences affecting policy and program outcomes.
Two groups in particular amplify the first point about how institutional influences
beget privileged status, a situation represented by Point A in the schematic: Local 
Authorities who gained strength as a result of planning powers granted them by 
various acts of Parliament, and the London Assembly, whose powers were severely 
circumscribed by the Greater London Authority Act 1999. Had the Assembly been 
given strong legislative powers, they might now be seen as a group that belongs in the 
local energy regime. Because of restrictions on their powers, however, their ability to 
gain a seat at the regime table is greatly diminished.
Factors that influence agenda-setting exert their power at either Point B or C on the 
diagram. Whether the influences occur before or after the agenda-setting or 
negotiation process depends on whether the institutional influence is known or 
acknowledged in advance. In such situations, stakeholders may self-censor their 
advocacy agenda, knowing certain policy options simply will not survive the
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negotiations with others involved in the process. At other times, formal rules only 
become known during the agenda-setting process, at which point they influence which 
options are considered or selected (i.e., Point C).
Figure 10-2
Modified Regime Framework -  Observations from London
Regime Agenda
Broader Urban Agenda
Policy & 
program  
ou tco m es  
(behavior)
Policy
Soup
Agenda 
setting process
New Institutional influences
(values, norms, formal and 
informal rules, history)
Regime
membersNew Institutional influences
(values, norm s, form al and 
informal ru les, history)
Local
Stakeholders
There are at least five examples where formal Central Government rules have 
significantly influenced the development of local renewable energy policy and 
deployment decisions being made in the field; each is described below. The influence 
of another important factor, the value-based societal preference for least-cost energy, 
is also discussed as it too forms the basis of rules limiting either the options 
considered or selected by decision-makers:
Formalized Regional Government Leadership Gapj * ,
The GLC’s 1978 energy study made a very brief mention of renewable energy, but 
the topic didn’t really emerge as a major policy issue regionally until the late-1990s, 
when the London Research Centre published a series of reports examining all facets 
of renewable power deployment in London. [See footnote 49 for a complete list of 
these publications.] However, even those documents did not represent “official” 
policy in London; in the absence of the GLC or other overarching local government
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structure in London, only policies emanating from Central Government and from 
Local Authorities carried any statutory weight. The closest London came to having a 
strategic energy policy at this time was the one page-long section on energy in 
Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) 3, issued by the Government Office for London 
in 1996.
That document offered little in the way of any grand vision, however. In one 
paragraph it summarized the current sources of London’s energy and explained how 
CHP and energy from waste could contribute to sustainable development in London. 
The second paragraph suggested renewable power sources also held potential for 
London, and explain how guidance was already available in several different Policy 
Planning Guidance documents, including PPG22—Renewable Energy. The section 
concluded by making several recommendations (GOL, 1996):
-  In their UDPs, boroughs should identify opportunities for power generation from 
renewable sources
-  Potential sites within the borough should be identified, or an explanation given 
why no suitable sites are available
-  The criteria by which renewable power projects would be evaluated in the 
planning process should be articulated, and
-  Boroughs should develop Supplemental Planning Guidance that addresses energy 
use in buildings.
Five years later, as part of their analysis of the potential for renewable energy in 
London, ETSU reviewed the 33 borough UDPs to ascertain their comprehensiveness 
and how supportive they were of renewable power. UDPs were judged against nine 
separate quality indicators, assessing whether they reference official Government 
guidance like PPG22; whether they expressly support renewables use; and whether 
the guidance is broadly applicable to many renewable technologies, or just a few. 
ETSU concluded that while a majority of UDPs did a “good” or “satisfactory” job, 
none could be considered “excellent” and fully one-third rated poorly (ETSU/AEA 
Technology, 2001b, p 45).
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The inadequacy of these UDPs not only reflects the inadequacies of RPG3 and 
PPG22, but also the fact that, because of the abolition of the GLC, London lacked a 
body focused on formulating and implementing a strategic vision for the city (Pimlott 
& Rao, 2002). There were, of course, institutions created to try and fill that gap, such 
as the London Planning Advisory Committee, but as their name says, this was simply 
advisory in nature. Only the Government Office for London had powers of much 
consequence, but because renewable power was not yet a high priority of 
Government, GOL appears to have accorded it a low level of importance when 
examining borough UDPs.
In terms of our modified regime framework, the lack of regional leadership manifests 
itself most directly at Point C, in that a pro-renewables agenda had been established 
but there was no one available to push the agenda towards fruition.
ROC eligibility and the buy-out price under the Renewables Obligation
Although the large wind turbines at the Ford Estate in East London show large-scale 
renewables can find a home in London, earn ROCs, and generate electricity at a 
competitive price, the majority of the installations anticipated under the Mayor’s 
renewable energy targets are small-scale solar PV systems will do neither. Until this 
happens, developers will have limited incentive to install them. A contributing factor 
is the fact that until recently, ROC eligibility was conditional upon the system 
exceeding a 0.5 MWh/month minimum power output threshold (OFGEM, 2004a).
For most solar PV systems, this will only happen during the summer months.
The problem is made clear in Figure 10-3, which tracks the power production of a 
typical solar panel in London over the course of the year. During the winter months, 
the power output drops precipitously, meaning the system would have to be quite 
large to meet the minimum output threshold required to earn ROCs. The situation has 
improved now that new rules issued in 2004 allow systems to consolidate their output 
over a one year period of time, rather than one month. It will still take longer to 
accumulate ROCs during the winter months, but small systems are no longer 
precluded from ROCs funding as they were under the old rules. This factor again
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manifests itself at Point C in the diagram because of the way the rules are influencing 
deployment decisions.
Figure 10-3 
Typical Solar Panel Output in London
Source: (DTI, 2003b)
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Limits on GLA Financial Powers
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The Greater London Authority is structured unlike any other Local Authority in 
Britain (Fuchs & Travers, 2000). Under terms laid out in the Greater London 
Authority Act 1999, the Mayor has both representative and executive functions, 
establishing the budget and making policy over economic development, environment,
i
public safety, transport, culture, and public health issues. Compared to the ‘strong 
mayor’ system of local government commonly found in the US, however, the London 
Mayor’s powers are quite weak, largely limited to the powers of “patronage, 
persuasion, and publicity” (Travers, 2004, p 68). The GLA’s fiscal powers are 
particularly constrained, having only the capacity to raise funds through a precept 
charged to Local Authorities, through miscellaneous service charges, and through 
direct grants from the government. The GLA does not have the powers to directly 
levy income, property, or sales taxes on London residents or businesses (Loveland,
1999). Even the size of the precept charges can be constrained, if  Government sees 
them as excessive (HMSO, 1999a). Travers (2004) attributes this situation to the 
work of Whitehall bureaucrats who, while crafting the GLA Act, deliberately tried to 
limit the amount of power shifting from Central Government to the GLA.
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The bottom line is the GLA has little of its own funding available to spend on 
renewable energy issues. The Mayor could propose to allocate funds to renewables 
projects directly out of the general GLA budget, but such funds would displace 
funding for other GLA activities and services and be subject to Assembly scrutiny, 
where its value would be compared to other worthy expenditures. This is likely the 
reason the London Energy Strategy makes no firm commitment of GLA funds to any 
renewable energy systems or projects, and why we don’t currently see large 
installations on GLA or functional body properties. In a few instances, the Mayor
co
does impose different renewable energy requirements on the GLA functional bodies , 
but more often than not his proposals use exhortatory language (e.g., ‘The Mayor 
encourages the GLA functional bodies.. ‘The Mayor requests.. etc.) rather than 
outright mandates. In Figure 10-2, this influence manifests itself at Point B.
The new Climate Change Agency may present the Mayor with one way around this 
funding problem, through its capacity to provide direct energy services delivery. The 
most well-known UK model for this approach was championed by new Climate 
Change Agency Development Manager Allan Jones, who created such a business 
while he was with Woking Borough Council. The Council-owned energy services 
company known as Thamesway provides electricity, heating/chilling, energy 
efficiency and energy conservation services to its customers. On projects targeting 
energy use at Woking Council-owned buildings, the budget savings from reduced 
energy use were reinvested in new projects, creating an on-going capital finance fund. 
The first such investment, which cost the Council £250,000 in 1991, has been 
parlayed into £2.7 million of investments in new energy systems around Woking, and 
the annual energy cost savings to Woking Council total approximately £885,000/year 
(Thamesway Energy Ltd, 2004). The financial benefit of a comparable GLA- 
affiliated ESCO in London could be much greater, given the large number of 
buildings owned by the GLA, the various functional bodies, and the 33 Local 
Authorities around London.
58 For example, see Proposal 38 on page 171 of the Energy Strategy, which calls on Transport for 
London and the LDA to power all their buildings from renewable electricity by the end of 2005.
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Limits on mayoral authority over borough decision-making
Central Government rules also restrict Mayoral powers over borough decision­
making. These limits have shaped the format of several Energy Strategy proposals, 
particularly where the Mayor announces that on planning applications referable to his 
office, he will hold applicants to strict design and technology standards. Several of 
these are listed below in Table 10-3, including the 10% on-site rule, which was 
previously referenced.
Table 10-3
Expectations on Projects Referable to the Mayor for Planning Permission
Source: (Greater London Authority, 2003c)
Proposal # London Energy Strategy Proposal
Reference to Local 
Authority responsibility?
10 
(P 103)
“Wherever lighting is proposed in developments referable to 
the Mayor, this should be energy efficient, minimizing light 
lost to sky.”
“Boroughs should expect the 
same.”
13 
(P 107)
“To contribute to meeting London’s targets for the generation 
of renewable energy, the Mayor will expect applications 
referable to him to generate at least ten percent of the site’s 
energy needs (power and heat) from renewable energy on 
the site where feasible."
“Boroughs should develop 
appropriate planning policies to 
reflect this strategic policy.”
15 
(P 110)
“The Mayor requires planning applications referable to him to 
incorporate passive solar design, natural ventilation, borehole 
cooling and vegetation on buildings where feasible.”
“Boroughs should expect the 
same."
17 
(P 113)
“The Mayor requires all planning applications referable to him 
to incorporate solar water heating and photovoltaics, where 
feasible. Developments not initially incorporating solar 
technologies should, where practicable, be of suitable design 
to support them later. Applications considering prestige 
cladding should incorporate photovoltaics where feasible. 
Applications including new street appliances (eg., bus 
shelters, bus stops, parking ticket machines and road signs) 
should incorporate solar Dower where feasible."
“Boroughs should apply the same 
policies.”
18 
(P 127)
“The Mayor requires planning applications referable to him to 
include combined heat and power and community heating 
where feasible. Applications for electricity generating plant 
referable to the Mayor should use the heat, where feasible, 
even if that means distrbuting it to other buildings nearby."
“Boroughs should expect the 
same.”
The Mayor’s ability to impose these requirements on planning applications stems 
from powers granted him under the Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) 
Order 2000 which specifies the type of development projects referable to the Mayor. 
In 2003, approximately 250 planning applications, or 0.3% of the 84,600 planning 
decisions made by London Boroughs that year, ended up in front of the Mayor, 
roughly in line with what was originally expected (Greater London Authority, 2004h; 
ODPM, 2004b; Pimlott & Rao, 2002).
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On the one hand, because these projects are the largest development schemes in 
London, imposing on-site power generation and other green design standards can 
result in a sizable impact on local energy use, amounting to hundreds of thousands of 
kilowatt hours of power generation each year. On the other hand, if the Mayor had 
the ability to impose similar requirements on all planning applications in London, the 
impact would be exponentially greater. As the last column in Table 10-3 implies, 
however, this is not the case. The Mayor cannot order the 33 boroughs of London to 
do things (Travers, 2004) like follow the GLA’s rules on planning applications -  all 
he can do is ask. Hence, in the various strategy documents prepared by the GLA, 
there is a considerable emphasis on partnerships with Local Authorities, and frequent 
use of exhortatory language: ‘Boroughs should...’ or ‘Boroughs are encouraged... 
etc. These restrictions on mayoral powers show up at Point B in the modified regime 
diagram, influencing the way the Mayor has framed his renewables policy agenda.
The Mayor can shape borough-level planning behavior regarding renewables through 
the content of the Spatial Development Strategy (SDS) for London, more commonly 
known as the London Plan. The SDS provides “a common spatial framework” for all 
of the Mayor’s strategies, as well as for land use policies in each of the 33 boroughs 
(GOL, 2000, p 6). At the borough-level, the equivalent of the SDS is known as the 
Unitary Development Plan, or UDP. Under the GLA Act, borough UDPs must be in 
“general conformity” with the London Plan, and boroughs must submit a copy to the 
Mayor prior to its adoption so he can offer an opinion on whether it satisfies this 
requirement (HMSO, 1999a, p 215).
Of the various strategic planning documents mentioned in the GLA Act 199959, the 
SDS is the only one that has this general conformity power. Therefore, to the extent 
the Mayor wishes boroughs to implement key ideas of his other eight strategies, he 
must weave these ideas into the SDS. In many cases, the linkages between the 
various strategies and the SDS are readily transparent, such as when the SDS tries to 
improve air quality and reduce energy use by encouraging new developments near
59 The eight strategies listed in the GLA Act cover Spatial Development, Transport, Economic 
Development, Culture, Biodiversity, Ambient Noise, Municipal Waste Management, and Air Quality. 
The GLA was also obliged to “contribute towards the achievement of sustainable development in the 
UK,” and the Mayor has explained his pursuit of sustainable development was a central factor in his 
decision to voluntarily develop a ninth strategy examining energy supply, demand, and the impact of its 
use on London and the global environment (Greater London Authority, 2003c; HMSO, 1999a)
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public transport hubs. Renewable energy use is tied into the SDS through several 
renewables-ffiendly policy statements and paragraphs, which for the most part closely 
track recommendations made in the Energy Strategy.60
Whether these policies will ultimately be reflected in borough UDPs is not clear. A 
significant obstacle is the fact the concept of general conformity carries little clout, 
thanks to a 2004 ruling by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister clarifying the 
definition of this term. Put simply, ODPM believes general conformity does not 
equal absolute conformity. Thus, a borough’s failure to take up all of the SDS’ 
renewables requirements in its UDP is of consequence only if this omission causes 
“significant harm to the implementation of the SDS” (GOL, 2004a). Whether 
ignoring a requirement about on-site renewable power generation rises to the level of 
significant harm is an open question that only the ODPM Planning Inspectorate can 
answer. The Mayor can weigh in on this subject, but his opinion is just that, an 
opinion that carries no statutory weight.
Circumstances surrounding this issue have changed somewhat, thanks to passage of 
the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act in 2004, which eliminates UDPs and 
replaces them with Local Development Frameworks, or LDFs. LDFs are slimmed- 
down documents with clearer policy direction that will be easier to keep current. The 
Planning Act, which went into effect in September 2004, gives boroughs three years 
to develop a new LDF. Boroughs that are in the process of updating their UDP will 
be allowed to complete that process, after which the three-year clock starts ticking. In 
other words, it may be some time before all 33 boroughs have new LDFs in place.
The LDFs will operate under the same general conformity requirement as the old 
UDP, but the key here is the timing. Some Boroughs may be early adopters61, but
60 One rather noticeable exception is a change in the proposal that buildings generate power on-site 
from renewable sources. In the Mayor’s Energy Strategy, Proposal 13 states that 10% of the building’s 
power should come from on-site renewable power generation; in the London Plan, the policy has been 
changed so that a “proportion” of the site’s electricity or heat needs comes from renewables (Greater 
London Authority, 2004a, 2004e).
61 For example, as of November 2004, ten London boroughs (Barking & Dagenham, Bromley, 
Croydon, Ealing, Lambeth, Lewisham, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, and Westminster) 
have moved to modify their UDPs or develop Supplemental Planning Guidance to require planning 
applications involving buildings larger than 1000m2 to generate 10% of their anticipated energy 
demand on-site from renewable sources. Three other boroughs (Corporation of London, Greenwich, 
and Havering) are considering such a move. This policy was originally adopted by Merton Council in 
2003.
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many will not, meaning we won’t see a significant change in borough-level policies 
until after 2007.
Changing Definitions of ‘Renewable’ Power
Although it is difficult to definitively state that local policy-maker interest in energy- 
ffom-waste has diverted London from making progress on non-waste-related 
renewable power system deployment, there is no question that rules promulgated by 
Central Government related to EfW have influenced London’s renewable energy 
policy-making behavior over the years. The story begins in 1978 when the GLC 
energy study first concluded “the recovery of energy-from-waste must be regarded as 
a significant aspect of energy policy for London,” a much stronger endorsement than 
it gave to energy from what we would now consider ‘new’ renewable resources 
(Greater London Council, 1978, p 81). In 1992, the South East London Combined 
Heat and Power Plant (SELCHP) was constructed, built largely because of the receipt 
of a NFFO contract for its power. (Recall from Chapter 9 that NFFO was designed to 
promote renewable power and nuclear technologies, meaning at that time Central 
Government recognized EfW as a qualifying technology.) The following year, the 
LRC and LPAC energy policy studies both supported the development of additional 
energy-from-waste plants in London.
Ironically, both of these documents (and the 1978 GLC study) differentiated energy- 
from-waste from renewable energy, as each topic was covered in different sections of 
the report. In 1998, however, a new LRC report examining renewable energy 
technologies for London re-categorized waste-to-energy as a renewable technology, 
calling waste a “resource that cannot be ignored if 10 percent of UK electricity is to 
be generated from renewables by 2010 at acceptable cost” (London Research Centre, 
1998). The LRC offered an even stronger endorsement of energy-from-waste 
schemes in 2000, arguing that “if London is to contribute its share towards meeting 
national targets for renewable electricity production ... and for reduction in CO2 
emissions ... London’s political leaders will have to give a strong push to the 
exploitation of MSW and other waste resources through the capital’s waste 
management strategy and planning policies” (London Research Centre, 2000, p 17). 
These reports both mentioned more nuanced waste processing techniques such as
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anaerobic digestion in passing, but did not differentiate among them when assessing 
the overall potential of energy-from-waste systems.
When the NFFO was replaced by the Renewables Obligation, Central Government 
policy towards energy-from-waste changed, as did the GLA’s approach towards these 
technologies. Today, the GLA discourages the deployment of mass-bum incinerator 
facilities in London, preferring these nuanced systems targeting specific elements of 
the waste stream (e.g., anaerobic digestion of food waste) that are eligible for 
Renewables Obligation Certificates. The GLA could have continued to endorse mass- 
bum technology, but recognized such projects will have difficulty obtaining financing 
because the marketplace now prefers RO-eligible projects that can deliver this second 
revenue stream. In modified regime terms, RO eligibility has changed both how local 
policy-makers define their policy options and the value that they place on them.
The influence of values: Least-cost preferences in London’s renewable energy
policy-making and deployment decisions
In Chapter 8 ,1 noted the high cost of electricity from renewable power sources 
compared to grid-based power from fossil and nuclear-based power sources. Survey 
results discussing the average Londoner’s limited willingness-to-pay for renewables 
were also presented. These facts are of interest because of the societal value 
emphasizing the importance of least-cost pricing, a value shared not just by 
Londoners, but by consumers and policy-makers across the UK. As in New York, 
government policy-makers have codified this value into a multitude of policies.
While the electric industry was nationalized, a least-cost pricing policy governed the 
power dispatch mles used by the Central Electricity Generating Board (Gorini de 
Oliveira & Tolmasquim, 2004). Years later, one of the primary arguments made in 
favor of electricity market liberalization was the expectation that electricity prices 
would fall thanks to market competition (Helm, 2003). In the 1990s, the Non-Fossil 
Fuel Obligation was created to address the price gap between fossil- and non-fossil 
fuel based power. The NFFO covered any price differential so utilities would be 
indifferent as to the power source. Even so, the NFFO had an explicit goal of 
reducing the cost of renewable power over time, and one of its successes was the fact 
that succeeding procurement rounds kept contracting for renewable power at lower 
and lower prices (House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2004;
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Mitchell, 1995). Most recently, the Renewables Obligation was implemented with a 
price cap to ensure that the price premium borne by consumers is not excessive.
Local Authorities, who have been free to shop around for new electricity service 
providers since 1994 (ETSU/ESD Ltd, 1999), may have been influenced by least-cost 
preference rules that date back to 1972. As early Green Tariff plans typically 
involved some type of cost premium (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999), 
subscribing to these plans would have violated the ‘value for money’ procurement 
rules used by most Local Authorities to comply with the Local Government Act 1972 
(ODPM, undated). The Local Government Act 1999 offered more wiggle room with 
its introduction of the concept of Best Value. This made it a duty for Local 
Authorities to “secure continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are 
exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness” 
(HMSO, 1999b). In other words, Local Authorities were given the latitude to define 
the services they procure or provide in much broader terms. Croydon Council has 
done just that with their Environmental Procurement Policy, passed in 2002. In the 
preamble to the policy, the Council notes:
“Ensuring ‘value for money’ involves much more than ‘lowest upfront 
cost’. It involves considering ‘whole-life’ financial costs (e.g., with 
respect to energy savings, durability, reduced maintenance, and waste 
reduction), and reducing environmental (and other) risks. The concept 
that environmental benefits are worth paying for, provided the financial 
cost is not excessive, is also implicit” (Croydon Council, 2002).
In the case of energy procurement, Best Value provisions allow Local Authorities to 
explicitly state a preference for purchasing renewable power, and then judge once the 
bids are received whether the offerings also satisfy a preference for cost-effectiveness. 
Southwark’s energy procurement policy, passed in October 2001, calls for the 
Council to seek green electricity supplies and accept the bid “providing it costs no 
more than 5% higher than the best standard electricity supply offer” (London Borough 
of Southwark, 2004). Half of the Borough’s large electricity contracts now purchase 
green power thanks to this provision. Lewisham currently powers 100% of the 
Council’s operations through green power, purchasing more than 54 GWh of green 
electricity each year, making it one of the largest green power users in all of the UK. 
Other London boroughs purchasing large quantities of green power each year include
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the Corporation of London, Greenwich Council, and London Borough of Redbridge 
(GreenPrices, 2004).
On a citywide level, it is somewhat surprising how little the Mayor’s Energy Strategy 
talks about the higher cost of renewable power. Although the Strategy acknowledges 
this is a problem, the Mayor offers no real solution to this issue beyond encouraging 
functional bodies, Local Authorities, and private developers to seek financial support 
from programs operated by Central Government and the EU. In other words, the 
Mayor is essentially saying I want you to deploy more renewable power, but how you 
pay for it is your responsibility. The Strategy makes no pronouncement about the 
availability of funding from the GLA for renewables projects, but does accept that “in 
the future.. .the Mayor and Partners may wish to become involved in procuring and 
coordinating funds from a range of sources for energy projects” (Greater London 
Authority, 2004a, p 183). The Strategy is also silent about the issue of net-metering. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, net-metering is available to renewable power system 
owners on a very limited basis, on terms unique to each energy supplier. There is no 
national net-metering policy, and it is somewhat surprising that the Mayor makes no 
mention of advocating for a more uniform policy as a means of providing additional 
financial support for small-scale renewables projects in London.
Conclusion
This is an interesting time to focus on energy policy-making in the UK. Within 
Central Government, concerns over climate change receive attention at the highest 
levels, and this attention has been translated into policies delivering real impacts on 
the ground. Renewable power schemes have done well as a result, thanks to the 
subsidies offered under the NFFO and more recently, under the Renewables 
Obligation. Research and development expenditures are on the upswing again, with 
the UK trying to position itself as a global leader on certain renewable technologies.
A similar story is occurring in London. Although not required by statute, Mayor Ken 
Livingstone and his team have developed a comprehensive strategy they believe will 
make London an urban showcase on energy issues. The research carried out in 
support of the strategy and the work underway for the last four years to help design
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and deliver the plan, -follow a thoughtful but logical path. The lone exception appears 
to be their strategy for dealing with the higher cost of renewables, which to date has 
essentially told developers ‘You’re on your own’.
The modified regime framework was again helpful at revealing the logic behind 
London’s approach. Regime theory was helpful at elucidating the influence the 
business sector had on the terms of the on-site renewables mandate, allowing 
developers wiggle room to ensure the requirement did not become financially 
onerous. Focusing on the key staff people involved in the development of the strategy 
helped us draw links to policy documents they had worked years earlier that possibly 
influenced the range of issues targeted by the new strategy. Finally, there is the issue 
of Central Government’s influence on the direction of London’s renewables policies.
It is not enough to merely state that Central Government is a key regime member, 
because its presence is manifested by specific policies and programs. Thus, our logic 
study benefited from a review of where the Mayor has statutory powers, and where 
his hands are tied by Central Government policies. The decision to emphasize the 
tactics of persuasion and education when dealing with Local Authorities is readily 
understandable, for instance, when we account for the fact that Central Government 
policies give boroughs more direct planning control powers than the Mayor. By 
developing guidance documents targeting Borough Councilors and local planners, the 
Mayor makes it easier for Local Authorities to deliver on renewables. The energy 
policy agenda also becomes more understandable if we can link it to forces at the 
Central Government level that deliberately or unconsciously steer London’s policies 
in a certain direction. DTI’s influence over the work of London Renewables was one 
such situation, as was the GLA’s decision to emphasize ROC-eligible combustion 
technologies in the city’s waste and energy plans. Similarly, there is no need for the 
GLA to worry about the cost of renewable power so long as EU and Government 
subsidies are currently available.
The modified regime model also helps us clarify the logic of which stakeholders are 
included or excluded from key policy-making circles, because it emphasizes the new 
institutional foundations of each group’s unique privilege. The London Assembly 
loses out because of statutory restrictions limiting its ability to deliver any specific 
policy agenda. Local Authorities have a seat at the table because within the planning
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realm, they are responsible for the vast majority of planning applications filed each 
year. Central Government is at the table because it decides when the GLA lives, and 
when it dies; how much money the GLA has to work with; and frequently, how this 
money must be spent. Non-profit energy agencies are at the table because they 
receive funding from Central Government to implement energy efficiency programs, 
and this knowledge has value when designing regional energy policies.
Looking at the London case study from a practical rather than theoretical perspective,
I believe the situation in London should give supporters of renewable power reason 
for cautious optimism. Central Government has been very supportive of London’s 
efforts, and the Mayor and his team have crafted policies that leverage the full range 
of his statutory and persuasive powers. The Mayor’s personal interest is also 
noteworthy, and he remains engaged, participating in the final decision on whether 
individual planning applications referable to the Mayor should be approved. As part 
of these discussions, a review of each project’s energy plan is included, which means 
the Mayor’s familiarity with the on-going progress of the Energy Strategy will remain 
very high. That said, even with the Mayor’s close attention to this matter it bears 
watching how rapidly deployment levels ramp up in London. In sheer numbers, the 
Mayor’s deployment targets are ambitious, totaling 7000+ individual installations. To 
achieve such progress by 2010 will require the installation of thousands of systems 
per year. The Mayor has direct planning control over just 250-300 projects per year,
ff)however, so whether this many systems will be deployed is not clear.
Because of this, the level of cooperation provided by Local Authorities is critical. 
Several Boroughs have already proven themselves to be leaders on renewables, 
purchasing green power for their own operations, developing guidance for local 
developers, or imposing their own mandates for on-site renewables deployment in 
new development projects. Merton was the leader on this third policy, and as of 
September 2004, fifteen other London Boroughs have begun or completed work on 
related policies (Hewitt, 2005). It is not clear how many of London’s thirty-three 
boroughs will ultimately follow suit, what policies they will pursue, or what 
timeframe they will follow. Political differences between Borough Councils and the
62 The fact that the Mayor passes judgment on larger projects may help because one large housing 
development project can involve the deployment of dozens or even hundreds of individual systems.
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GLA may come into play. There is also the question of where energy ranks among all 
of the other policy priorities the Mayor has asked each Local Authority to implement 
as part of his other strategic plans. Some Boroughs have significantly more resources 
available than others, but none will likely have enough to do all of the things the 
Mayor is asking of them.
Second, there is the issue of the new London Climate Change Agency (LCCA). 
Charged with replicating the nearby village of Woking’s Energy Services Company 
model on a grand scale, the LCCA has the potential to completely change the face of 
London’s energy marketplace. By marrying alternative power generation 
technologies, energy efficiency, and energy conservation schemes together into a 
single business model, ESCOs are a cost-effective way to reduce the environmental 
impacts of local electricity production and use. Woking began by establishing a 
system that served Council-owned or operated facilities, and then slowly expanded it 
to serve nearby residential and commercial buildings, recycling any cost savings into 
new technology investments. In London, each Local Authority could conceivably 
implement a similar model, but the logistics of working with thirty-three sets of 
decision-makers means progress will not come swiftly. The LCCA can also 
collaborate with the London Development Authority and private developers on large 
new development schemes around the city, working towards the day when disparate 
schemes begin linking together all around the city. Because the opportunities are so 
immense, London is fortunate to have one of the pioneers of the Woking system 
involved with the LCCA, but only time will tell how quickly this model can succeed, 
or whether new obstacles arise that are unique to London’s complex energy 
landscape.
Finally, although it may take years for the issue to play itself out, London’s success 
on renewables may partly hinge on the role nuclear power plays in the UK’s energy 
future, as it will profoundly affect the markets for renewables around the UK, 
including any large deployment scheme in London. Because of the long lead time 
required to build a nuclear power plant, renewables project developers may find it 
difficult to forecast where electricity prices will be in the future, and as a result, what 
the long term financial prospects are for their own installations. A nuclear-centric 
policy may jeopardize R&D funding for renewables, and market support programs
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like the Renewables Obligation, both of which influence the rate at which large and 
small deployment schemes occur.
These conclusions about London’s energy prospects are just some of the insights we 
can gain from this case study. This research also helps shine a light on some of the 
mechanics of how regimes operate, answering the questions posed by Gibbs and 
Jonas. The answers are often reminiscent of New York, although there is one 
important difference.
Take the issue of links between regime behavior and larger trends emphasizing the 
localization of environmental policy activity. Whereas New York was very focused 
on short term, parochial concerns, it’s very clear that London has responded to these 
calls since the early 1990s, when Local Agenda 21 and other urban-focused initiatives 
first gained prominence in European policy circles. I noted this in the previous 
chapter, when I differentiated the energy policies first crafted in London in the late 
1970s and 1980s with the documents prepared by the LRC and LPAC in the 1990s.
In the later documents, environmental concerns enjoyed greater prominence, and 
linkages between London’s emissions and global climate change were expressly 
drawn. This trend has grown even more pronounced under the GLA, with the Mayor 
explicitly stating that his strategies are intended to improve London’s sustainability 
and minimize it’s contribution to climate change. The GLA has received considerable 
support from Central Government to support this work, because of the recognition 
that the UK’s attainment of its climate change and renewable energy obligations 
under the Kyoto accords and various EU directives is highly contingent on success in 
London.
Where does London stand with regards to Gibbs & Jonas’ second question, about the 
correlation between hegemonic regime interests in the city and those stakeholders 
most active on energy and environmental topics? As in New York, there is significant 
overlap, with business regime interests again seeing energy costs as an important 
consideration worthy of their attention. London First thus worked to attenuate the on­
site power generation requirements of the Mayor’s plans so the financial burden on 
new development schemes would not be too onerous. London First also partnered 
with London Renewables on the release of guidance documents for the real estate
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community, clarifying what the renewables requirements call for, and how developers 
and real estate managers can reduce their long-term operating costs by designing 
projects with energy conservation in mind. To the extent London has a regime, it 
involves than just business interests, however, and it is clear there is broad support 
and interest among other stakeholders for London’s energy planning efforts. Central 
Government’s financial and policy support for the Mayor’s various environmental 
strategies has been critical. Grants have supported baseline research important to the 
development of these plans, and now government funds are being directed at its 
implementation. Local Authorities were vocal contributors during the policy 
development process, but whether they will play a supportive role during the 
implementation stage is not clear. Several boroughs have begun to embrace the ideas 
put forth in the various mayoral strategies, while others have been less active.
Finally, we have Gibbs & Jonas’ third question, inquiring about the underlying 
conditions that lead local stakeholders to mobilize around local environmental issues. 
As in New York, the situation in London is explained by the larger institutional 
environment. The history of London over the past 20 years is very telling in that 
regard, for it was during the period 1986-2000, when London lacked any regional 
government, that the energy policy documents prepared by the LRC and LPAC were 
prepared. These reports were underwritten by the EU, but in the absence of any 
coordinated leadership by a regional form of government, very little progress was 
made on local energy matters. Fast forward to today: a new governance structure is 
in place, and strong regional leadership on energy issues is provided by the GLA, 
although ironically, the energy strategy developed by the Mayor looks remarkably 
similar to the old LRC plan. Given constraints on his powers, however, the Mayor 
still needs the support of others to deliver results. This time, willing partners are 
available who share the Mayor’s general policy preferences, but are not afraid to 
leverage the strength of their own bargaining position to serve their own self-interest, 
influencing the direction or details of the city’s energy policy.
In other words, comparing the differences between the two time periods, we can see 
that the underlying conditions supporting regime formation around environmental 
issues involve an institutional framework that thrusts one group or individual into a 
position of leadership acknowledged by others, yet does not provide them with the
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full resources to deliver on a plan. As a result, others participating in the process do 
so from a position of greater strength, and for success to be achieved, their 
preferences on this issue must be accommodated.
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CHAPTER 11
The Interplay of Policy and Politics in Urban Renewable Energy Policy-Making: 
Conclusion and Lessons from the Empirical Research
This thesis examining renewable energy policy-making and deployment in two world 
cities certainly fulfilled my desire for an interesting and rich analysis. New York and 
London were both central to the early story of electric power generation, exhibiting 
market behavior that gave rise to the regulatory systems that have dominated the
tVisector in each country for the better part of the 20 century. Both cities have 
voracious appetites for electricity, and in the coming years, demand is expected to 
grow. As New York and London begin to plan for their energy futures, however, we 
see them following different policy paths. Neither route is expected to result in more 
than a small amount of renewable power being generated over the next 10-15 years, 
although London will likely end up with far more installed capacity than New York.
Indeed, New York City’s future electricity path looks very much like its current one, 
almost totally dependent on large central station power sources. The primary goals of 
New York’s new plan are cost containment and energy reliability. Renewable power 
sources barely register on the current supply meter, and this is unlikely to change any 
time soon because the City’s new energy plan is almost totally silent on the subject. 
By contrast, London is adopting a more proactive perspective, looking to change the 
way local residents view and use energy. Leaner, greener, and leader are good terms 
to characterize the new London Energy Strategy, with the Mayor focused on reducing 
power consumption, using cleaner power, and establishing London as a global leader 
on urban energy issues. New renewables enjoy greater prominence in London’s 
strategy, with the Mayor aiming to generate just under 3% of the city’s electricity
/ r i
supply from in-city based renewable power schemes by 2020.
My idea of blending new institutionalism and urban regime theories as the best way to 
capture the ‘logic’ of local policy-making also proved appropriate, as in both case
63 Recall that although full attainment of the Mayor’s renewable energy targets would produce 
approximately 2.2% of London’s power needs by 2010, the majority o f this power would be derived 
from energy-from-waste schemes. ETSU calculated that only 0.88% would be derived from ‘new’ 
renewables. The 3% figure here reflects the Mayor’s goal of tripling the 2010 targets by 2020, and 
could theoretically amount to hundreds of megawatts of installed renewables capacity, a massive 
amount compared to where London is today.
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studies regime theory’s traditional explanatory powers were enhanced by accounting 
for the policy and regulatory constraints influencing policy and system deployment 
decisions at the local level. In New York and London, there are clear rule-based 
drivers shaping the local energy agenda. Deployment decisions by project developers 
have been both impeded and encouraged by national, state, and local governmental 
policies, while officials in both cities have made agenda-setting decisions based on 
their often-constrained capacity to act. A new institutionalist approach proved very 
valuable in explicating these circumstances. The influence of key stakeholders has 
also been clear, affecting the energy policy direction each city intends to follow over 
the next 5-10 years. The makeup of the energy coalition differs slightly in each city, 
and with time, there may be compelling evidence that each group constitutes an 
energy ‘regime,’ as defined by criteria established by Stone, Clark, Dowding, and 
other urban regime theorists. For the time being, however, we can only state each 
coalition displays clear regime tendencies, strongly influencing the direction and 
content of each city’s electricity and renewables policies.
In this chapter, I briefly expand on these findings, and discuss how my blended model 
-  which I shall now term a “constrained” regime model -  offers a clear window on the 
policy-making practices in each city. In constructing the model, I offer guidelines 
other researchers can use should they wish to apply it to their own empirical work. I 
conclude this chapter by addressing several issues raised by Gibbs and Jonas (2000), 
the first researchers to broach in a comprehensive way the idea that urban regime 
theory can be applied to local environmental policy-making and governance. I also 
highlight several areas where I believe further research is needed, both as it relates to 
my suggested theoretical approach, and to the larger issue of renewable energy 
policy-making in urban areas.
New York City: Staying the Fossil Fuel Course
The New York case study juxtaposes two very different dynamics -  it is a city whose 
market conditions appear renewables-ffiendly, yet current deployment levels are 
extremely low.
The fundamental marketplace conditions supportive of renewables are rather clear:
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• New York City has some of the highest grid-based electricity prices in the U.S., 
meaning those installing renewable power systems will fully recoup their 
investment faster than those installing comparable systems in other cities with 
similar wind/sun/tidal characteristics.
• Demand for power in New York City is steadily increasing, while the available 
supply of power has remained relatively flat for many years, and may soon decline 
as power plants around the city close due to advanced age. At the same time, New 
York City is a notoriously difficult place to site new fossil-fuel fired power plants, 
meaning it is unlikely we will see any significant replacement supply capacity in 
the near future.
• New York City is a load pocket, and under state rules, the vast majority of the 
city’s power must be derived from in-city power plants.
• Although it’s not the windiest or sunniest area in the state, New York City is 
blessed with sufficient natural resources to support a fairly robust renewables 
sector. Because of the large amount of flat roof and south-facing building facades 
available around the city, the theoretical amount of PV system potential is 
extremely high, amounting to nearly half of all power consumed in the city during 
peak demand periods.
• The State of New York has been quite supportive of renewable power, ensuring 
that renewables system operators have open access to transmission and 
distribution grids around the state; providing subsidies to varying types and sizes 
of renewables installation projects; and driving up demand for renewable power 
schemes through the establishment of a statewide renewables portfolio standard.
Despite these facts, the city is currently home to less than 3 MW of deployed 
renewable power schemes, and policy-makers in New York City have been slow to 
embrace renewable power as a potential supply source that can reduce the anticipated 
supply gap. Indeed, the most important energy policy document issued by the City in 
recent years is largely devoid of any discussion of how renewables can contribute to 
the city’s overall supply picture. Instead, the 2004 Mayor’s Energy Policy Task Force 
report emphasized staying the course, pushing for more new large fossil-fuel fired 
central station power plants.
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The logic behind this policy approach stems from a confluence of factors. To begin, 
more than half of the Mayor’s Task Force involved representatives from many of 
New York City’s hegemonic regime interests -  real estate developers, managers, and 
builders. Several years before the Task Force was established this group, operating 
under the auspices of the New York Building Congress Energy Committee, released 
two reports drawing many of the same conclusions subsequently reached by the 
Mayor’s Task Force: that an electricity supply shortfall was imminent, and that large 
new generation or transmission capacity was necessary to stave off this problem.
That Building Congress Energy Committee members advocated for the Task Force to 
adopt similar conclusions is hardly surprising. Their preference for this policy 
approach, rather than a focus on renewable power sources, can also be linked to some 
of the new institutional explanations driving local energy policy-making:
• Reliability concerns -  because unreliable electric service can harm the long term 
economic interests of Building Congress members, the group has historically been 
concerned about this issue, and they listen closely to Con Edison’s claims 
regarding system changes that could threaten the grid’s integrity. Con Ed enjoys 
considerable repute on this topic by virtue of their privileged position as the 
operator of the local grid, and their detailed and proprietary knowledge of the 
system makes it difficult for outsiders to challenge their claims. For several years 
now, Con Edison has raised questions about the risks that the interconnection of 
renewable power schemes present to the local grid, and occasionally they have 
imposed technical requirements on renewables installations that some claim harm 
the economic viability of these projects. Developers can counter with their own 
analysis and/or appeal to the State regulator, the Public Service Commission, but 
this can dramatically add to the overall cost of an installation. In the case of long­
term policy, it appears that Con Edison’s reliability concerns have become 
Building Congress Energy Committee concerns, ultimately influencing the type of 
policies the Mayor’s Task Force members were willing to support.
• Policy-making powers -  the same regulatory schema privileging Con Edison has 
left the City of New York in a policy-disadvantaged position. One of the most
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vivid examples of this occurred when several Task Force members reported they 
deferred policy action on renewables because the State Public Service 
Commission had yet to complete its work laying out the operating parameters for 
the Renewable Portfolio Standard. Rather than take action, Task Force members 
reportedly felt it was more prudent to wait until the RPS proceeding had 
concluded before making any attempt to develop a local renewables policy.
• Cost -  the current high cost of renewably generated power is another key obstacle 
to its use in New York City, violating least-cost preferences held dear by New 
York City consumers and policy-makers alike. Over time, these preferences have 
made their way into official City policy and deployment decisions. We saw an 
example of this in the City’s official comments decrying the RPS’ potential to 
increase local power rates; in comments made by the City’s chief energy advisor 
arguing that renewables currently aren’t a cost effective investment; and in 
decisions by developers to abandon renewables installation projects when subsidy 
applications to the state are rejected. The high cost of renewables was also cited 
by researchers as the principle reason why very little of the theoretical potential 
for solar PV in New York will ultimately be realized.
These circumstances conspire to make the future prospects for renewables in New 
York City appear rather bleak. Deployment levels are low now, and given the lack of 
policy focus by the City, nothing seems to point toward any significant change in the 
near or medium term.
London: A Greener Energy Vision
London provides an interesting contrast to New York City because although we see 
market conditions that are slightly less favorable for renewables, the policy 
environment is far more supportive, particularly at the local level. London also has a 
very low amount of deployed renewables capacity, leading to the obvious question of 
how we explain these contradictions.
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Like New York, London is experiencing a growing demand for electrical power, but 
because the electricity transmission infrastructure into London is more extensive than 
New York’s, there is no pressure to develop new power supply capacity within the 
Greater London region itself. The cost of renewably generated power is 
approximately the same as in New York, but with slightly lower electricity costs (and 
because there is far less sun in London in the winter months), the payback period for 
renewable power projects can be quite lengthy. Subsidy programs maintained by the 
EU and the UK government thus play a big role in incentivizing installations in 
London, and are emblematic of the strong policy support that both levels of 
government provide to renewable power. The Greater London Authority is also 
extremely interested in renewable power use, seeing it as one of the key strategies that 
can reduce London’s contribution to global climate change. As part of his Energy 
Strategy, the Mayor imposed renewables deployment mandates on development 
schemes requiring his approval, and he established what he saw as ambitious citywide 
targets for renewables deployment so the public can gauge the level of progress 
occurring over time. The renewables sector is also one area where the Mayor sees 
strong job growth potential, linked to the fabrication, installation, and maintenance of 
these systems. The Mayor also hopes London’s financial markets can exploit local 
renewables sector opportunities, developing financial instruments that support green 
power deployment, or underwriting business and household investments in these 
systems.
Several factors are at play which helps us understand the logic behind London’s 
deployment and policy situation. Some have links to regime behavior elements, while 
others are more institutional in nature:
• Strategic planning opportunity -  we cannot escape the fact that although the
Mayor’s decision to develop an Energy Strategy was voluntary, he was leveraging 
the fact energy considerations cut across many of the eight strategic plans he was 
required to develop by the GLA Act 1999. Voluntarily developing this ninth 
strategy allowed him to consolidate these ideas in a single document that greatly 
strengthens the GLA’s grasp of and control over these issues. Developing an 
energy strategy also allowed him to hone in on the best opportunities to take
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action, which he then wove into the London Plan, the only strategic plan with 
statutory powers, and the one which all Local Authorities must conform to when 
drafting their own local development frameworks.
• Least-cost pricing -  the language employed in the Energy Strategy speaks 
volumes about limits placed on the GLA by various Parliamentary laws. These 
limits, including those constraining the GLA’s ability to influence local planning 
decisions or development frameworks, are made visible through the Mayor’s 
extensive use of language beseeching others to act. In areas where the Mayor has 
more direct authority, such as over the GLA’s functional bodies or on planning 
applications referable to the Mayor, much stronger language is employed, 
requiring action rather than simply encouraging it. In the GLA Act 1999, 
Parliament also constrained the Mayor’s budgetary powers. We saw evidence of 
the impact of this in the work of London Renewables, much of whose agenda was 
dictated by the funding preferences of Central Government.
Least-cost pricing preferences are the final important factor explaining past 
deployment and use decisions. Government purchasing rules required Local 
Authorities around the UK to purchase least-cost energy sources, effectively 
eliminating any opportunity to procure green power given its slightly higher cost. 
Since purchasing rules were changed to allow Local Authorities to seek out ‘Best 
Value’ purchases, and giving them flexibility in how they define ‘value’, boroughs are 
queuing up for green tariff programs. Some Local Authorities in London are going so 
far as to procure 100% green power for their local government operations. At the 
GLA level, the London Climate Change Agency is the vehicle the Mayor will likely 
use to address the higher cost of renewable power. By attempting to access 
Government subsidies; by creating investment opportunities for private sector 
partners; and by recycling cost savings achieved by other LCCA projects, the Mayor 
will be following the successful model established by Woking’s ESCO Thamesway, 
the model on which the entire LCCA is based. Woking has been extraordinarily 
successful at leveraging all of these funding sources, and despite its higher cost, the 
village is now is home to approximately 10% of all of the solar PV deployed around 
the entire UK.
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In sum, the future prospects for renewables in London look pretty good when 
compared to New York. The Mayor and Central Government have clearly created a 
platform on which renewables can thrive, although to the extent cost continues to be a 
barrier, deployment levels may remain low. There also remains the fact that current 
deployment is so low, and electricity demand so high, that it will take some time, and 
thousands upon thousands of individual installations, before renewable power 
becomes a prominent part of London’s electricity supply picture.
A Preview of Things to Come?
London and New York City represent interesting case studies on their own, but there 
are larger lessons to distill from these analyses that can apply to other cities as well.
In doing so, however, we are reflecting on a question raised in the Introduction to this 
thesis. I had pointed out that renewables bring the energy discussion back to a very 
local context, harkening back to when the first electric utilities were essentially 
neighborhood operations, and cities regulated utilities operating within their 
geographic jurisdiction. Given that most urban-scale renewable power schemes will 
also be capable of satisfying the energy needs of only a relatively small service 
territory, are policy-makers re-crafting their policy approach and re-orienting their 
regulatory systems to accommodate this new/old operating paradigm?
The answer is fairly clear. We’re not seeing any shift whatsoever at the state or 
national levels in terms of regulatory approaches. Both New York State and the UK 
government have done much to advance the renewables industry, but they are still 
clearly wedded to the regulatory model crafted long ago. Even during the 1990s, 
when the opportunity arose to rework the system to adapt to new power generation 
methods, policy-makers simply treated them as new technologies plugging into the 
same old wiring scheme, meaning regulatory fundamentals didn’t change. Looked at 
purely from a practical perspective, this makes sense. Which state or national-level 
regulatory responsibilities should be devolved to cities? Power plan emission limits? 
The ability to determine how much utilities charge customers? Interconnection rules 
or other technical standards for grid operations? The granting of franchises? Having 
been out of the regulatory business for so long, few cities would be immediately adept
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at the oversight of such issues. Many local politicians may also prefer to maintain an 
arms-length relationship with such responsibilities, as it shields them from blame if 
anything goes wrong.
Aside from the lack of change in the overarching regulatory framework, we see a 
mixed set of results in how state and national policy-makers are approaching city- 
level action. In the UK, Central Government has been quite forthcoming with funds 
and assistance to the GLA as part of the energy strategy-development process, 
recognizing that success at the national level on climate change agreements or 
renewables deployment targets to some extent hinges on what happens in London. By 
contrast, we do not see the State of New York offering -  or New York City seeking -  
significant State-level assistance in the local energy planning process.
London’s approach to this entire energy/renewables planning business can therefore 
be seen as a textbook example of a city making the most of the circumstances in 
which it finds itself. Because the Mayor’s Energy Strategy is based on a 
comprehensive assessment of the GLA’s capacity to act, it is difficult to think of a 
policy stratagem that the GLA does not rely on in some form or another to implement 
its energy policy. The GLA does not employ every strategy on behalf of renewable 
power, but it clearly uses a wide range of techniques intended to advance the cause of 
renewables around the city. For the most part, these strategies maximize the GLA’s 
powers, reflecting the various policy-making constraints imposed on the city by 
Central Government.
Other cities can learn from London’s policy approach, but as New York City clearly 
shows us, having the capacity to act is one thing, but having the desire to act is 
another. Indeed, New York City could easily employ London’s basic approach 
towards renewables, setting renewables targets or mandates, developing renewables 
guidance documents for local developers and planning staff, or establishing 
partnerships with local businesses to foster the development of a local renewables 
industry. For their own reasons, however, New York City’s policy-makers have 
chosen an entirely different energy policy path that downplays renewable power use.
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Cost may well be the reason, and the question again becomes one of what cities can 
do about it. In Chapter 2 I noted how some cities -  generally those with their own 
municipal utility -  were offering their own installation subsidies on top of or in lieu of 
those offered by state or national government sources. To the extent a city can afford 
such a strategy, this can indeed be an effective mechanism of facilitating deployment. 
As New York City’s chief energy policy advisor noted, however, comparable energy 
benefits can be achieved for less money by pursuing energy efficiency or demand 
reduction. This means local officials choosing to implement a renewables subsidy 
plan of their own could take political heat for overspending scarce tax dollars. Cities 
can also attempt to work with state or national officials to develop funding sources 
dedicated to in-city renewables deployment, arguing that deploying such resources 
where the power is needed most can bring greater overall benefit (in terms of 
localized health benefits, decreased transmission losses, etc.) than expenditures on 
renewable power schemes located outside of the city.
London’s new Climate Change Agency provides another interesting cost-reduction 
model cities may wish to examine further. The original Thamesway operation on 
which the LCCA is based began with a grant from Woking Council to invest in 
energy-efficient technologies (A. Jones, pers. comm.). When the borough’s energy 
costs declined, these cost savings were then recycled -  again and again -  in additional 
energy efficient equipment and renewable power generation schemes. Over time, the 
Council’s initial several hundred thousand pounds investment has paid off many times 
over. The ESCO model also allows local authorities to spread the investment risk 
among other partners, and in some cases, capitalize on state or federal tax credits for 
which local government-funded projects are normally ineligible.
Worth commenting on but ultimately not clarified by my research is the question of 
whether London’s comprehensive approach is truly necessary, or whether a city’s 
efforts are better spent identifying or developing the cheapest green energy program 
available, relying primarily on power sources located outside of the city. There are 
very few things on which cities are fully self-reliant -  cities import the vast amount of 
the food consumed in the city, and many cities export waste to disposal facilities 
located outside of the city. Is it reasonable to expect that cities should be more self- 
reliant when it comes to energy generation, particularly when an approach like
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London’s imposes additional cost and logistical burdens on developers and city 
agencies responsible for monitoring compliance? New York is one city where more 
in-city generation from renewable sources actually does make sense, because of its 
situation as a load pocket and because current in-city electricity generation imposes 
emission burdens on neighboring communities with high asthma rates. London is 
another matter entirely, as it can very easily benefit from the large amount of wind 
power schemes being deployed in Scotland or out in the North Sea. London Mayor 
Ken Livingstone has decided he prefers local deployment because it can jumpstart the 
creation of a new renewables-related business sector, but other cities may ultimately 
decide London’s complex and comprehensive approach is too difficult to carry out 
given their available staff, knowledge, or financial resources.
The “Constrained” Regime Model
Turning back to more abstract lessons, we must also revisit the theoretical model 
employed in this thesis. Regime theory is premised on the idea local agenda-setting is 
dominated by a coalition of stakeholders who dominate the local agenda-setting 
process. Both of my case studies showed this to be the case, with the energy policy of 
London and New York clearly linked to the actions of a small group of stakeholders 
acting in concert. What is missing from standard regime analysis, however, is a 
formalized way of reflecting the influence of any structural forces that can shape 
implementation decisions or the agenda-setting process itself. As was made clear 
above, these forces can be extremely powerful, and they must be accommodated 
within the analytic model. The case studies showed these forces tend to exert the 
greatest influences at three different points in the agenda-setting process: influencing 
who’s in the regime, the agenda they pursue, and the implementation decisions that 
are made in the field. Figure 11-1 is a modified version of the schematic introduced 
earlier in the thesis. In it, I now show that new institutionalism’s rules, informal rules, 
and values most commonly manifest themselves as some type of constraint on regime 
participation and behavior. My modified regime framework should thus more 
accurately be characterized as a “constrained” regime model, a term I shall use 
henceforth. In using this terminology, I acknowledge that although constraints are 
often interpreted as having a negative connotation, I am using a less normative 
definition which simply implies a capacity to direct action in a specific manner.
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In this section, I’ll focus on why this is an appropriate refraining of the model I first 
introduced in Chapter 3, after which I’ll focus on how others might employ my new 
model in their own research. Much of what I’m presenting below synthesizes points 
made earlier in Chapters 7 and 10.
• Constraint #1 -  Who’s in the Regime: One question of interest to researchers is 
why certain stakeholders are part of the regime while others are excluded. Politics 
may be one reason -  a Mayor may anoint participants for no obvious reasons, with 
no explanation necessary. Structural explanations are more readily 
understandable, however, as certain stakeholders bring assets to the table 
considered desirable by others. The explanatory value of the regime model is 
improved if it can somehow account for these structural factors. For example, 
recall the earlier discussion of how the regulatory schema ‘privileges’ Con Edison, 
by virtue of the fact that as the builder and operator of the local electric 
distribution grid, they must be involved in decisions affecting the current or future 
operation of that grid. In this example, formal documents -  franchises issued by 
both the State Public Service Commission and the City of New York -  convey the
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regime privilege. In London, we see the same phenomenon. The GLA Act placed 
strict limits on what the London Assembly can and cannot do. As a result, the 
Assembly has little to offer other stakeholders interested in setting or 
implementing policy, and any possibility the Assembly might be part of a regime 
is greatly diminished. Conversely, Local Authorities enjoy tremendous privilege, 
thanks to various laws passed by Parliament granting Boroughs significant 
planning powers. As the Mayor hopes to employ planning controls as one means 
of promoting renewables deployment, he must seek the cooperation of Local 
Authorities, and by doing so he acknowledges their seat at the regime table.
• Constraint #2 -Agenda-setting impacts: Stakeholders entering an agenda-setting 
or policy-making process generally do so bearing fundamental principles that 
guide their behavior or with prescriptive actions or policies they wish to pursue. 
Often, their approach has been influenced by external rules, values, or events and 
their behavior will reflect these influences. In New York, several participants 
suggested the Task Force’s hands-off approach towards renewables was partly a 
reaction to the formal Renewable Portfolio Standard proceeding underway at the 
State Public Service Commission. There are logical reasons for waiting to see 
how the PSC would rule, but from a more theoretical perspective, this strategy is 
also an indicator of New York City’s disadvantaged status under the State’s 
official regulatory schema.
In London, the GLA’s approach towards energy-from-waste reflects the influence 
of Central Government’s rules on which technologies qualify for Renewables 
Obligation Certificates. During the 1990s, Central Government treated mass-bum 
plants as a subsidy-eligible renewable power technology, and regional groups like 
the London Research Centre followed suit in endorsing this type of renewable 
energy. Under the Renewables Obligation, however, Central Government 
changed the rules so only certain types of combustion technologies qualify. The 
GLA’s waste and energy policies, both of which were prepared after the RO 
guidelines were published reflect these new priorities. Another example of this 
agenda-setting influence is the work of London Renewables, whose research work 
was largely dictated by the availability of monies focused on planning issues.
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In examining the role new institutional influences have on stakeholder agenda 
setting or the agenda-setting process, we must consider whether the influences 
were overt -  as they apparently were in the case of the GLA’s energy-ffom-waste 
policy -  or whether the influences were more subtle, representing what Bachrach 
and Baratz (1963) characterized as non-decision-making power. This means 
certain influences are so pervasive stakeholders self-censor their policies and 
programs, believing themselves incapable of challenging or changing these 
underlying influences. One potential example is the extent to which Con Edison’s 
concerns about interconnections threatening grid reliability resonated with other 
stakeholders. Repeated often enough, these concerns may have subtly shifted 
stakeholder perceptions to such an extent that they became less willing to 
contemplate a renewables strategy as a serious policy option.
• Constraint #3 -  Implementation impacts: New institutional influences constrain 
outcomes by affecting either how stakeholders value certain outcomes, or by 
limiting the range of implementation options open to these stakeholders. Values 
are a particularly important influence. Take least-cost preference, a societal value 
that pervades much individual and public sector decision-making. In New York 
City, the Mayor’s Chief Energy Advisor has been very dogmatic about least-cost 
issues, speaking out against a proposal calling for 100% green power purchases, 
arguing the City can ill-afford the added expense at this time. Least-cost values 
thus narrow the policy options the City is willing to consider. In the UK, the 
London Borough of Southwark has tried to strike a balance, purchasing green 
power so long as the price does not exceed a 5% premium over the best market 
rate available for non-renewable power. In other words, Southwark is honoring 
the spirit of least-cost, while still seeking to achieve some renewables use.
A desire for high levels of electric system reliability is another societal value that 
can have serious implications for renewables projects. Homeowners and 
businesses interested in deploying renewable power systems in New York City 
may find Con Ed wants to impose additional network protection equipment 
requirements on their project, forcing them to pay more or abandon the project
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altogether. The GMDC project is one case where decisions made by Con Ed in 
the name of system reliability after the project had begun resulted in lengthy 
installation delays and significant additional costs.
In elucidating these constraints, I caution the reader to remember that for more than 
two decades, researchers have satisfactorily applied the standard regime model to 
explain the logic of policy-making behavior in different cities around the world. My 
conclusions here in no way invalidate the findings of these researchers. What I am 
trying to do, however, is show that there are a myriad of ways institutional influences 
can affect regime behavior and implementation outcomes, particularly in the area of 
environmental policy-making. Reflecting these constraints in the regime model is an 
important change enhancing this analytic technique’s overall explanatory powers, thus 
representing an important new contribution to the literature on urban policy-making.
Characteristics of a Constrained Regime
In Chapter 3, Stone’s claim that regimes only tackle high priority issues led me to 
posit the need for two spheres in which all direction-setting policies in a city were 
considered and ultimately acted upon. In the schematic model that I first introduced 
in that chapter, a hegemonic regime operates within one sphere, tackling the “big” 
issues facing the city, while within a second sphere lesser issues are addressed that do 
not -  or will not -  make their way onto the hegemonic regime’s radar screen. My 
research in New York and London leads me to believe this is still an accurate portrait 
of reality, although some minor tweaking of that schematic model is now in order. 
What’s new is, as has just been discussed at length, the idea that institutional 
influences explicitly constrain various aspects of a regime’s makeup and behavior. In 
Figure 11-1 on page 290 these influences are now manifested as gateways through 
which stakeholders and ideas must pass. New institutional influences dictate when 
the gate is open or closed. Different closure rules may apply for different 
stakeholders, reflecting the varied nature of the new institutional environment.
Although Central Government’s role as a key member of London’s energy regime is 
more easily explained under this approach than it is in a traditional regime model, the 
constrained model should not be construed as requiring the involvement of state or
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federal government agencies or officials within the regime. (Some might believe this 
to be the case because these entities generally create the formal and informal rules that 
open or close the gate.) The real determinant of federal or state government’s role in 
any regime is whether their behavior actively and continuously endeavors to influence 
local policy behavior. For example, in London, Central Government plays a much 
more substantial and vibrant role in local decision-making than the State of New York 
does in New York City. Funding has been provided by DTI specifically for the 
purpose of steering London’s energy policy-making efforts in a certain direction. The 
decision by Planning Minister Keith Hill to allow Merton Council to require power 
generation on-site from renewable sources meant the GLA could follow suit in its 
citywide Energy Strategy. In New York, on the other hand, while State officials have 
developed funding programs that local policy-makers can exploit, state-level 
stakeholders are much less focused on monitoring or steering decision-making in the 
city so it follows a pre-determined policy path. Thus, we would not consider State 
government to be an active part of an energy regime in New York City.
Constrained regimes are unlikely to be a phenomenon unique to the area of energy or 
environmental policy-making, where command-and-control approaches -  the source 
of many important constraints -  are commonplace. Education, public health, public 
housing, transportation, and immigration are other policy spheres that rely on 
statewide or federal mandates or standards to ensure some uniform level of 
performance, behavior, or activity across localities. For example, because there are 
more than 350,000 refugees and asylum seekers living in London (Greater London 
Authority, 2001), the Mayor has noted that national immigration and asylum policies 
are something about which he must pay careful attention (Greater London Authority, 
2004b). One can easily imagine the Mayor working with a business-led regime on 
strategies designed to house this large group or put them to work to help grow 
London’s economy. Such discussions may be constrained, however, by broader 
national goals promoting the dispersal of refugees to other parts of the UK, or rules 
designed to discourage refugees who might impose a “burden” on British society from 
settling in London in the first place (Home Office, 2005).
Researchers seeking to apply the constrained regime model to their own empirical 
work will generally do so because they have identified other policy-making situations
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that share common structural characteristics. In particular, the regime must operate in 
an environment where state or federal government policies specifically seek to foster 
certain types of local-level behavior or policy outcomes. The mere existence of a 
restrictive mandate on local government is not enough, as depending on how the 
requirements are written, local government may have tremendous latitude in selecting 
a policy path to achieve that mandate. In the case of a constrained regime, however, 
certain paths are definitively foreclosed or available options are clearly specified. 
Least-cost purchasing requirements, imposed on UK local authorities back in 1972 to 
promote fiscal responsibility, are one example of a constraint limiting a Local 
Authority’s options.
Policies imposing these constraints may be city-specific, as was the case with the 
GLA Act, which overtly minimized the powers of the Mayor and the Greater London 
Authority. Alternatively, they may be broadly applicable to all local authorities in the 
state or country, as in the case of New York’s utility regulation law designed to 
eliminate all local-level oversight of electric utility activity. The constraints may also 
have been designed to be policy-area specific -  the case of electric utility regulation is 
again the obvious example here -  or they may have impacts transcending many 
different policy areas, as in the case of limits placed on a mayor’s ability to impose 
taxes.
Clark (2001) has posited that outcome-based characteristics, such as campaigns 
against corporate welfare and high environmental group membership, may indicate 
the presence of a certain type of urban regime. I believe that outcome-based 
characteristics may similarly tip off a researcher to the presence of a constrained 
regime, although with less certainty than structural evidence. Outcome-based 
characteristics can include mayoral statements acknowledging the lack of any 
substantive role in a particular policy area, or mayoral or city-led campaigns to 
actively lobby the state or federal government to take action on behalf of the city.
Responding to Gibbs & Jonas
In examining where my analysis fits within the larger set of literature on urban regime 
theory, it is worth revisiting issues highlighted by Gibbs & Jonas (2000) in their path-
295
breaking article examining the role regime analysis can play in explaining local 
environmental policy-making. Although they pose a range of interesting questions in 
their article, my empirical analysis and theoretical conclusions are most applicable to 
three specific questions (Gibbs & Jonas, 2000, pp 301, 306):
1. To what extent has the process of policy localization activated processes of regime 
formation around environmental policy?
2. Can policy regimes for the environment exist and operate separately from 
entrepreneurial or pro-development regimes?
3. Under what conditions do local interests mobilize around local environmental 
policy and how does this process shape the character of a governing coalition or 
partnership?
I will address each question in turn.
The first asks whether regime-type policy activity in each city is an outgrowth of 
larger trends such as Local Agenda 21 or national or EU policy mandates, whereby 
municipalities are required or encouraged to tackle issues such as climate change. In 
London, there is clear evidence this is true. The Mayor’s Energy Strategy explicitly 
states London has a responsibility to reduce its local environmental impacts and 
overall contribution to global climate change (Greater London Authority, 2004a). 
Moreover, the Mayor’s Energy Strategy is predicated largely on what the GLA can do 
to effect change, thus serving as a model for other cities. A role is seen for Central 
Government, with the Mayor repeatedly mentioning steps the Government can take to 
augment or facilitate efforts by the GLA, but Green Light for Clean Power is 
principally a document where Mayor Ken Livingstone accepts responsibility for 
identifying where changes should occur, and how they should be achieved. Part of 
the strategy emphasizes coalition-building to deliver the plan.
In New York, the situation is very different. The Mayoral Task Force Report (New 
York City Energy Policy Task Force, 2004) explicitly states that it will not take up 
larger issues such as sustainability or climate change. It does not create any new 
partnerships to tackle larger issues. Instead, the report focuses on localized concerns 
-  the risk that the city will run short of power -  and sets out a strategy designed solely
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to address that problem. Certain solutions, such as renewable power systems or 
energy conservation programs are thus touted not for their climate change benefits, 
but rather because they move the city closer to specific power targets. Even when 
explicit environmental benefits are acknowledged -  such as reducing emissions from 
local power plants by “repowering” them with natural gas as a fuel source -  they are 
defined in local rather than global terms: particulates rather than carbon dioxide 
reductions. In sum, environmental regimes can be linked to trends towards policy 
localization, but this will not always be the case.
As regards to Gibbs and Jonas’ second question -  whether environmental regimes can 
operate independently from pro-growth regimes in the city -  the answer is a bit 
muddled because of the lack of clarity over whether energy regimes exist in each city. 
There is clear movement in that direction, and any lingering doubts should be 
resolved with time. To answer Gibbs & Jonas, however, we do know hegemonic 
regime interests play a key role in each city’s dominant energy coalition. In other 
words, a separate and distinct policy regime does not exist, likely because energy 
policy matters are inextricably linked to the interests of the hegemonic regime.
Energy may not sit at the top of their agenda, but it is an issue on which they take an 
active interest to ensure that energy does not become too costly or unreliable, 
damaging their parochial development interests or the overall economic prospects of 
the city. In New York, this means real estate developers and construction interests 
downplay or ignore renewable energy, possibly out of a concern that its use will be 
detrimental to the broader business community’s interests. In London, groups like 
London First similarly softened the Mayor’s proposals so they accommodate 
renewables without jeopardizing the financial viability of new real estate development 
projects.
Whether hegemonic regimes will focus on a wider range of environmental agendas is 
debatable. Air quality concerns, traffic congestion concerns, and the adequacy and 
quality of the local water supply could be other fundamental considerations 
influencing business location or investment decisions, and thus be of interest to a pro­
growth regime. On the other hand, open space is likely to be seen as a nicety that 
increases a city’s attractiveness relative to another location, but it may not be a key 
issue around which regime interests will mobilize.
297
The third question inquires as to the conditions under which local interests mobilize 
around local environmental policy and how this shapes the governing coalition. My 
analysis in both London and New York lead me to believe there is nothing inherently 
unique about energy and environmental issues that predisposes a regime to form or be 
active on such issues. In New York, hegemonic regime interests have latched onto 
local energy policy as an important issue because they see an electricity shortfall as a 
condition threatening to their short and long-term financial interests. To the extent 
there are any ‘green’ aspects to New York City’s Energy Task Force plan, it is 
because regime interests do not see them as conflicting with their primary goals of 
long term economic growth in the city. Sustainability or climate change concerns 
were not, however, fundamental issues driving regime involvement or interest. The 
situation is basically the same in London. The Mayor’s Energy Strategy is much, 
much greener, than New York’s plan, but it was primarily the Mayor leading on these 
issues, rather than other regime members. Its many green provisions have been 
embraced by the larger group of stakeholders, however, thanks to a willingness on the 
part of the Mayor to ensure that the strategy’s provisions did not seriously harm the 
interests of key regime stakeholders. To the extent specific policy provisions ever 
were in conflict, these problems appear to have been smoothed over during the draft 
strategy development process.
One open question worth considering is whether local regimes would have been 
similarly consulted or involved if the Mayor of London or New York had a markedly 
different capacity to act. This question arises because of the very different situation in 
cities like Los Angeles, Seattle, and Austin, where a municipally-owned electric 
utility operates some or all of the local electric grid and supply system. Municipal 
ownership vests local officials with more direct control over supply choices, 
interconnection rules, and renewables subsidy levels, meaning there may be less need 
for coalition formation to deliver on a pro-renewables strategy. Because my research 
focused on two cities that are both reliant on privately-owned utilities for the bulk of 
the city’s power needs, this is one area that could benefit from further research, as it 
may shed insights on the broad applicability of my model to other urban settings with 
different energy contexts.
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Looking to the Future
There are several other issues arising out my research that would also benefit from 
follow-on work. My research focused on energy policy-making in two of the most 
highly developed cities in the western world, so environmental policy literature would 
also benefit from comparable research examining urban energy regime activities in a 
developing nation context. Moving beyond alternative urban contexts, another area 
ripe for research is my contention that a constrained regime holds applicability to 
policy areas such as education and public health, where state policies and programs 
can be similarly restrictive or directive. To date, I am not aware of any regime 
analyses investigating education policy-making at the local level, although one 
researcher has examined a local regime’s involvement in public health policy-making 
in Christchurch, New Zealand (Brown, 1999). That analysis glossed over the issue of 
how central government policies constrained the behavior of or options considered by 
local policy-makers, and it could be worthwhile to revisit this situation using my 
alternative research paradigm.
From a strict policy-making, rather than theoretical perspective, my research has also 
raised several compelling issues worthy of further study. First, my fundamental 
research question was interpreted by several policy-makers that I interviewed as 
presuming there is an inherent advantage to the deployment of renewable power 
schemes within the city limits. There are several reasons why this could be true, all of 
which have been previously cited: distributed power located near the point of use can 
increase energy security at that location; in-city renewables deployment can eliminate 
the majority of the power losses that occur during the transmission of electricity over 
long distances; in-city deployment can provide local air quality benefits, etc. There is 
also the question of fairness, as under the current system, rural and suburban 
communities must bear the cost of New York and London’s energy profligacy by 
hosting power plants that impose adverse emission or visual impacts on the area. An 
interesting analysis, therefore, would consist of a comprehensive assessment of the 
true economic impact of on-site renewable power generation in New York City, 
examining whether reductions in local air quality emissions produce comparable 
reductions in health care expenditures or other cost savings sufficient to justify the 
higher cost of renewable power. The analysis must by necessity make assumptions
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about how much new in-city generation capacity (of any type) will actually be built 
over the next sevpral years, and the role that local distributed power sources can play 
in providing peak use period energy cost savings.64 A comparable analysis in London 
would presumably provide very different results, because London does not suffer 
from the limits on transmission capacity that currently plague New York.
Finally, perhaps the greatest contribution to the current literature on energy policy­
making in urban areas will come through monitoring the implementation of the 
Energy Strategy in London, tracking how well it accomplishes its many goals and 
where the greatest obstacles lay. The sheer breadth of the plan and its ambitious goals 
contrast starkly with the Mayor’s capacity to act, both financially, and in terms of the 
powers he can deploy to deliver on this agenda. Because London is such a high 
profile city, however, the success or failure of this plan will be watched closely by 
other cities. Understanding what London did right, and where it fell short, could be 
tremendously important if more cities agree it is time to join London in taking up 
arms to combat global climate change.
i
\
1
64 The assumption here is that absent significant new capacity deployment in New York City, peak 
period pricing will increase dramatically, as local users will be willing to endure higher rates than users 
in other parts of the state to ensure that demand is fully satisfied. According to the NYISO, the 
location-based marginal price for electricity in the New York City marketplace during peak afternoon 
demand periods can be two to twenty times as expensive as power prices in upstate and western New 
York. (For a real-time display of location-based marginal power pricing in New York, see: 
http://www.nviso.com/oasis/oasis zonemaps.htm) The strategic use of renewably-generated power 
could, during peak demand periods, result in sizable cost savings far exceeding the cost of a renewable 
power system’s installation.
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APPENDIX 1 
List of Important Research Contacts and Affiliation
New York City
# Name Title Organization
Type of 
Interview
1 Florence Adu A ssista n t V ice  P resident
NYC E conom ic D evelopm ent 
Corp. In-person
2 Terry A griss
V ice President, Energy  
M anagem ent
Con E dison C om pany of N ew  York In-person
3 Richard A nderson E xecutive Director N ew  York Building C o n g ress In-person
4 Harvey Arnett
Chief, R ates & Retail C hoice, 
O ffice o f Electricity and  
Environm ent
NYS Public S erv ice  C om m ission T elep h o n e
5 J a so n  Babbie Energy Policy A nalyst
N ew  York Public Interest R esea rch  
Group
In-person
6 P eter Blom Project M anager Con E dison Solu tions T elep h o n e
7 L es B lu eston e P resident MCII T elep h o n e
8 T hom as B ourgeois Sr. E conom ist P a c e  Energy Project In-person
9 C athleen  Breen
Alternative Energy Project 
C oordinator
N ew  York Public Interest R esea rch  
Group
In-person
10 David Buckner P resident Solar Energy S y ste m s T elep h o n e
11 Scott Butler V ice  P resident NYC E conom ic D evelopm ent 
Corp. In-person
12 Marcia Bystryn E xecutive Director
N ew  York L eagu e of C onservation  
V oters
In-person
13 Tom C asten Chairm an/CEO Primary E nergyV entures LLC In-person
14 Colin C h en ey
G reen  R oof Initiative 
Coordinator
Earth P le d g e In-person
15 Tim D aniels
V ice  President, Energy  
D epartm ent
NYC E conom ic D evelopm ent 
Corp. In-person
16 Marolyn D avenport Sr. V ice P resident R eal E sta te  Board of N ew  York T elep h o n e
17 Larry DeWitt Sr. Policy Advisor P a c e  Law S ch o o l Energy Project In-person
18 R uben Diaz Jr. A ssem b lym an N ew  York S ta te  A ssem b ly T e lep h o n e
19 David Eisenbud
Project D evelop m en t  
M anager, N ortheast R egion
Pow erlight Corporation T e lep h o n e
20 A shok Gupta
Director, Air and Energy  
Program
Natural R e so u r c e s  D e fe n se  
Council
In-person
21 Bill Harkins C onsultant T elep h o n e
22 David Jehn
D eputy E xecutive Director, 
Division of F ran ch ises, 
C o n c e ss io n s ,a n d  C o n se n ts
NYC D epartm ent o f Transportation In-person
23 A nne K oenig
E xecutive Director, Division of  
F ran ch ises, C o n c e ss io n s , and  
C o n se n ts
NYC D epartm ent o f Transportation In-person
24 Matt Koenig Network D esign  Unit Con E dison  C om pany of N ew  York T e lep h o n e
25 John Krieble
Director, O ffice o f S u sta in ab le  
D esign
NYC D epartm ent o f D esign  and  
Construction
In-person
26 Robert Kulikowski Director
NYC O ffice o f Environm ental 
Coordination & Chair, Mayor's 
Sustainability T ask  F orce
In-person
27 J o e  Littman M anager, NYC R egional O ffice
NYS Energy R esea rch  and  
D evelop m en t Authority T elep h o n e
28 David Manning S en ior  VP, C orporate Affairs K eyspan Energy Corp. T e lep h o n e
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New York City (cont’d)
# Name Title Organization
Type of 
Interview
2 9 Richard Miller
form er Sr. VP, Energy  
D epartm ent
NYC E conom ic D evelopm ent  
Corp. In-person
30 Carol Murphy E xecutive Director
Independent P ow er P roducers of 
N ew  York T e le p h o n e
31 Patty N oonan VP, R esea rch  and Policy Partnership for N ew  York City In-person
32 Jeff Oldham C onsultant
R eal G o o d s D esign  & C onsulting  
Group
e-m ail
33 Neil Pariser Sr. V ice P resident
South  Bronx Overall E conom ic  
D evelop m en t Corp.
In-person
34 Paul Parkhill Project M anager
G reenpoint M anufacturing and 
D esign  C enter In-person
35 A nthony Pereira P resident A ltPower In-person
36 Richard P erez R esea rch  P rofessor
SU N Y  A tm ospheric S c ie n c e s  
R esea rch  C enter T e le p h o n e
37 Jeff P eterson
Program  M anager for Energy  
R eso u r c e s
NYS Energy R esea rch  and  
D evelop m en t Authority
T e le p h o n e
38 Rob Pirani
Director, Environmental 
Program s
R egional Plan A ssociation In-person
39 C harles Puglisi
C hief o f Distribution S erv ices  
and E ngineering
NYS D epartm ent o f Public S erv ice T e le p h o n e
40 Gil Q uin iones
Sr. V ice P resident, Energy  
D epartm ent & Chair, N ew  York 
City Energy Policy T ask F orce
NYC E conom ic D evelopm ent  
Corp. In-person
41 Ariella R osen berg
Project M anager, Energy  
D epartm ent
NYC E conom ic D evelopm ent  
Corp. In-person
42 Ira R ubenstein E xecu tive Director
N ew  York S ta te  Environmental 
B u s in e ss  A ssociation
In-person
43 R osem ary  Scanlon C onsultant In-person
44 L ee Smith M anaging Director
National Photovoltaic Construction  
Partnership/International 
Brotherhood o f Electrical W orkers
T e le p h o n e
45 D eborah Taylor
E xecutive Director, T echnical 
C om pliance Unit
NYC D epartm ent o f Buildings In-person
46 Trey Taylor P resident V erdant Pow er T e lep h o n e
47 Tom  T hom pson form er VP, S u sta in ab le  Energy 1 st R och d ale Energy C ooperative In-person
48 Jim Tripp G eneral C ou n sel Environm ental D e fe n se In-person
49 Marcia Van W agner
D eputy R esea rch  
Director/Chief E conom ist
Citizen's B udget C om m ission In-person
50 Andrew W hite
Director, C enter for N ew  York 
City Affairs
N ew  S ch oo l University In-person
51 Fred Zalcm an E xecutive Director P a c e  Energy Project In-person
52 Allan Zerkin Adjunct P ro fessor
W agner G raduate S ch oo l o f Public  
Affairs, N ew  York University
T e lep h o n e
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London Interviews
# Name Title Organization
Type of 
Interview
1 Jen n y  B a tes
London C am paigns  
Coordinator
Friends of th e  Earth In-person
2 M ide B eaum ont London Planning Unit G overnm ent O ffice for London In-person
3 S e b  Berry C onsultant R en ew ab le  P ow er A ssociation T e le p h o n e
4 B en  Cartmell Director, S u sta in ab le  D esign W hitby Bird In-person
5 M atthew Chell S en ior  Policy Officer
London S u sta in a b le  D evelop m en t 
C om m ission
In-person
6 Arthur C ook e
Distributed G eneration  
Coordinator
OFGEM In-person
7 Belinda Davis S u sta in a b le  D evelop m en t Unit G overnm ent O ffice for London In-person
8 J oan n a  D a w es Sr. Policy Advisor G reater London Authority In-person
9 G iles Dolphin Planning D ec is io n s M anager G reater London Authority In-person
10 John Duffy Director o f Environm ent G reater London Authority In-person
11 Chris Dunham Director S u sta in a b le  E nergy Action In-person
12 Gareth E vans T echnical Advisor OFGEM In-person
13 Gary F reedm an Partnership M anager Ecotricity In-person
14 Nigel French Marketing M anager EDF T e le p h o n e
15 D om inic G ooding Director C reative Environm ental N etw orks In-person
16 L eonie G reen Political A dvisor G reen p ea ce In-person
17 D aniel Harrison Environm ental Policy Officer
A ssociation  of London  
G overnm ents In-person
18 Adrian Hewitt
Principal Environm ental 
Officer, Environm ent & 
R egen eration  D epartm ent
London Borough of Merton In-person
19 Richard Jack son
Project M anager -  
Environm ent and S u sta in ab le  
Energy
London D evelop m en t Authority In-person
2 0 Darren J o h n son
M em ber and Chair, 
Environm ent C om m ittee
London A ssem b ly In-person
21 Allen J o n e s Energy S erv ices  M anager W oking Borough Council In-person
22 R oger Kelly Director Energy Solu tions In-person
2 3 J a n e  Kendall Sustainability Unit London First In-person
2 4 S u za n n e  LeM iere Advisor London R en ew a b les In-person
2 5 Anna M alos
Scrutiny M anager, 
Environm ent C om m ittee
London A ssem b ly In-person
2 6 R u ssell M arsh H ead o f Policy
B u s in e ss  C ouncil for S u sta in a b le  
Energy
In-person
2 7 Mark Nutley Partner Max Fordham In-person
2 8 Ed Parry
Energy and Environm ental 
M anager
London Borough of H am m ersm ith  
& Fulham
In-person
2 9 N icola Riley
R en ew a b les Product 
D eveloop er
n Pow er T e le p h o n e
3 0 Scott R ichards D evelop m en t M anager London Energy Partnership In-person
31 Tony R o se Director GLEEN In-person
32 Gary S h an ah an
R en ew a b le  Energy Industry 
D evelop m en t D irectorate
UK D epartm ent of Trade and  
Industry In-person
3 3 John Sinclair
Network O perations and  
D esign  Engineer E nergy N etw orks A ssociation In-person
3 4 Paula Smith Project M anager London Sustainability E xch an ge In-person
3 5 G eorgina W ong Planning A dvisor British Wind E nergy A ssociation T e le p h o n e
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APPENDIX 2 
Confidentiality Statement
the London School of Economics
and Political Science
Note on Audio Taping and Information Use
Stephen A. Hammer 
PhD candidate in Urban and Regional Planning 
Department of Geography and Environment 
Academic Supervisor: Prof. Yvonne Rydin (y.rydin@lse.ac.uk) 
(Prepared September 2003)
To facilitate data collection during the interview phase of my research, I 
may request that you allow me to audio record our interview. Because I 
respect the confidential nature of the information and opinions you are 
sharing with me, I am committed to maintaining your individual and 
organizational confidentiality when this information is published in my 
dissertation, or in any other article or book I may prepare in the future 
based on my dissertation research.
In the event I believe it is important to attribute a quote to you or your 
organization, I will therefore:
1) Notify you of my intent to directly quote information 
provided by you in our interview
2) Provide you with a copy of the written text I have 
prepared that incorporates your quote and how it is 
attributed.
3) Provide you with a written transcript of the portion of the 
interview containing the information on which my 
written text is based.
If you believe that my written text distorts or otherwise misinterprets your 
views on this subject, your organization, or your organizational role, I am 
happy to accept your comments in this portion of my writeup and will 
make all appropriate revisions. To ensure that my research and writing 
can continue in a timely fashion, I request that comments be submitted to 
me as soon as possible after the information is first sent to you.
If you have any questions about my audio taping policy or my research, 
please contact me at s.a.hammer@lse.ac.uk or at:
(contact information deleted)
LSE
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APPENDIX 3 
Sample Questionnaires
Talking Points/Questionnaire for 
former NYC Policymaker
Who are the leaders on energy policy making in NYC?
How does their leadership manifest itself?
Slightly different question -  who has the biggest impact on energy policy 
making in NYC? (alternatively, where does power lie?)
How can you tell?
How does the State Energy Plan affect NYC energy policy making?
What is the City’s perspective on its role in energy policy decisionmaking?
• Pre- de-regulation
• Post de-regulation
What administrative structure is in place to do that?
• Department of Energy pre-Dinkins
o How long did such an office exist?
• DTE under Giuliani
• EDC under late Giuliani, then Bloomberg
• Given the way the office was structured, how has power/visibility
changed over time?
• What issues did you emphasize at Energy Dept? How differ from 
your predecessors?
History of recent NYC energy policy
• Koch, Dinkins, Giuliani
• What were their major initiatives?
o Previous plans I can examine? (Haven’t found any to date)
• Consultant (Resource Insight) developed City Energy Plan (draft 
only)
• Mid-summer Bloomberg energy plan announced with little fanfare 
(according to Observer article)
• July roundtable meeting
• Energy Plan task force
• Comments on these/other issues?
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Former NYC Policymaker questions (cont’d)
Where does energy lie on Bloomberg’s radar screen?
Do you think Bloomberg has a pre-disposition to certain types of 
technologies or policy solutions?
Genesis of Roundtable Meeting
• Who initiated?
• If EDC, why was NYBC Energy Committee the right forum?
• Who determined attendance?
• How did it progress from Roundtable to a full-blown task force?
Energy Task Force
• How was subcommittee structure of task force decided?
• What were parameters of policy/mandate given to task force?
• Do you think EDC is by necessity “guiding” them in certain 
directions?
• In your view, what will be a successful outcome for this task 
force/Energy Plan?
• Failure?
Misc questions:
Who or what is to blame for NYC being a load pocket?
Renewable power project developers tell me that commercial project 
interconnections have faced major stumbling blocks in the form of Con Ed
• Can you enlighten me about this issue?
Other than this, what are the key factors affecting renewables deployment in 
NYC?
• Are there specific steps you think City should be taking?
Rate the status of the Building Congress Energy Committee on energy 
policymaking in NYC 
i • Authored key reports
• Attendance at critical meeting with Bloomberg
• Lots of representation on Task Force
If they had not been active participants in the Task Force, would the outcome 
be very different?
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Talking Points/Questionnaire for 
Local Energy Agency in London
Describe what your group does, history, etc.
Enviro/Energy politics
Before the Mayor issued his Energy Strategy, was there an energy agenda in 
London?
What did it look like?
Who provided vision to this agenda and who was responsible for 
implementation?
What are the big differences between the old energy agenda, and the 
Mayor’s new strategy?
What/who caused the change?
Who/what exerted the most influence in setting the direction of the Mayor’s 
new energy strategy?
If not mentioned, stakeholders to inquire about include:
■ Ken Livingston?
■ Central government
■ Local authorities
■ Business groups
■ Green groups
■ London Assembly
■ European Union
Can you identify any significant changes (good or bad) between the first two 
drafts and the final strategy?
■ What/who caused these changes?
■ How can you tell? Are there any obvious fingerprints on the plan?
Do you feel the GLA was open to new ideas/changes from the first drafts?
Do you feel like the public consultation process was effective at changing 
the direction/scope of the strategy, or do you think the outcome was 
predetermined?
If central government continued to “run” London, do you think we’d see an 
energy strategy like this?
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Local Energy Agency Questions (cont’d)
Now let’s think about implementation of the plan.. .what will be the most 
important factors in implementing the energy strategy?
Who will play the most important roles when it comes to implementation?
If not mentioned, stakeholders to inquire about include:
■ Central government
■ Local authorities
■ Business groups
■ Enviro groups
■ London Assembly
■ European Union
Renewables
In terms of comparison with other major foci of Strategy, where do 
renewables stand? Biggest priority, etc.?
Are targets reasonable/achievable?
Will green power be easier/harder than direct deployment?
What are biggest impediments to successful or widespread deployment of 
renewables in London?
How amenable will Local Authorities be to Mayor’s call to mandate 
renewables deployment in local building projects?
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APPENDIX 4
Policies and Proposals in the 2004 London Energy Strategy 
That Have a Clear Relevance to Renewable Energy
POLICY 1 The Mayor considers that London should take a proactive approach to ensure that 
it meets or exceeds its fair contribution to national targets for carbon dioxide emissions, 
renewable energy, combined heat and power, and eradicating fuel poverty.
POLICY 9 The Mayor considers that London should seek to maximise its own generation of 
renewable energy through developing urban renewables, and use its considerable purchasing 
power to support renewable energy across the rest of the UK.
POLICY 10 The Mayor encourages the mutually supportive link between the use of 
renewable energy technologies and hydrogen as a fuel in London, as part of a move to 
establish widespread use of low and zero-emission sources of heat and power.
POLICY 16 The Mayor opposes the development of any new nuclear power capacity in the 
UK, and wishes to see energy efficiency, renewable energy, combined heat and power, and 
other low-carbon energy technologies replace nuclear capacity when nuclear power stations 
are decommissioned from 2005 onwards. To reflect this, nuclear power is placed at the 
bottom of the Mayor’s Energy Hierarchy.
POLICY 18 Through the London Plan, planning referrals, and consulting on borough UDPs, 
the Mayor will encourage and facilitate an accelerated rate of deploying renewable energy to 
meet London’s targets.
POLICY 23 As part of the London Development Agency’s work to promote the growth of a 
distinct environmental business sector, the Mayor requests strong support for the sustainable 
energy industry, and particularly renewable energy technologies, where opportunities can be 
identified.
PROPOSAL 6 London should generate at least 665GWh of electricity and 280GWh of heat, 
from up to 40,000 renewable energy schemes by 2010. This would generate enough power 
for the equivalent of more than 100,000 homes and heat for more than 10,000 homes.
To help achieve this, London should install at least 7,000 (or 15MW peak capacity) domestic 
photovoltaic installations; 250 (or 12MW peak capacity) photovoltaic applications on 
commercial and public buildings; six large wind turbines; 500 small wind generators 
associated with public or private sector buildings 25,000 domestic solar water heating 
schemes, 2,000 solar water heating schemes associated with swimming pools, and more 
anaerobic digestion plants with energy recovery and biomass-fuelled combined heat and 
power plants. London should then at least triple these technology capacities by 2020.
PROPOSAL 11 The Mayor urges English Heritage and the boroughs as planning authorities 
to look actively for ways to reconcile the need for energy efficiency and renewable energy 
with conserving character. To inform negotiations on individual schemes, boroughs should 
promote and share experience and expertise on the successful incorporation of energy 
efficiency and renewable energy in areas of heritage.
PROPOSAL 12 The Mayor requests boroughs to set targets, consistent with London’s 
targets, for the generation of renewable energy in their areas, to include them in their Unitary 
Development Plans, and to use their planning powers, land and property control, and 
awareness-raising activities to meet them.
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PROPOSAL 13 To contribute to meeting London’s targets for the generation of renewable 
energy, the Mayor will expect applications referable to him to generate at least ten per cent of 
the site’s energy needs (power and heat) from renewable energy on the site where feasible. 
Boroughs should develop appropriate planning policies to reflect this strategic policy.
PROPOSAL 14 The Mayor expects those presenting planning applications for renewable 
energy schemes referable to him to conduct best practice in public consultation where 
relevant, particularly in the case of highly visible schemes, such as wind turbines.
PROPOSAL 16 The Mayor expects consideration to be given to the effects of proposed new 
developments on existing renewable energy schemes, for example by overshadowing, and 
reasonable steps to be taken to minimise any such negative impact.
PROPOSAL 17 The Mayor requires all planning applications referable to him to incorporate 
solar water heating and photovoltaics, where feasible. Developments not initially incorporating 
solar technologies should, where
practicable, be of suitable design to support them later. Applications considering prestige 
cladding should incorporate photovoltaics where feasible. Applications including new street 
appliances (eg bus shelters, bus
stops, parking ticket machines and road signs) should incorporate off-grid solar power where 
feasible. Boroughs should apply the same policies.
PROPOSAL 21 As part of its work to improve the environment, the Mayor requests the 
London Development Agency to monitor and report annually on how it has sought to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions and use renewable energy through its regeneration work.
PROPOSAL 28 The Mayor will work with the London Development Agency to investigate the 
barriers and opportunities for supporting and accelerating the growth of the sustainable 
energy sector as part of its green business strategy. This work will include addressing the 
skills shortage for installing renewable energy technology.
PROPOSAL 34 The Mayor will work with relevant organisations towards meeting a significant 
and growing proportion of power for the Underground from renewable sources during the next 
ten years. To achieve this, the Mayor encourages London Underground Ltd to investigate the 
possibility of entering into a long-term relationship with one or more renewable electricity 
suppliers.
PROPOSAL 38 The Mayor expects Transport for London and the London Development 
Agency to seek to power all their buildings from renewable electricity by the end of 2005. The 
Mayor requests the Metropolitan Police Authority and London Fire and Emergency Planning 
Authority to do the same.
PROPOSAL 39 The Mayor requests all the functional bodies to investigate the feasibility of 
employing renewable energy technology in their buildings. To facilitate this, the Mayor 
encourages the functional bodies to conduct surveys of their building stock with a view to 
identifying those buildings most appropriate for renewable energy installations.
PROPOSAL 40 The Mayor requests that Transport for London reviews operational design 
guidelines and project appraisal methods to ensure that it assesses energy use and considers 
the use of renewable energy.
PROPOSAL 41 The Mayor requests Transport for London to install photovoltaics to power 
street applications, such as street lights, bus shelters and bus stops, where viable, to avoid 
costly connection to the national grid and disruption to the roads. All new street lights should 
be energy efficient and minimize light pollution. The Mayor will work with Transport for London 
towards powering the street furniture that is not powered by solar from green electricity supply 
by 2005.
PROPOSAL 42 The Mayor requests Transport for London to investigate the potential for 
high-profile schemes integrating photovoltaics into noise barriers along arterial road and rail
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networks. Partnerships should be sought with utilities, energy companies and advertising 
agencies.
PROPOSAL 51 The Mayor encourages boroughs, other public sector organisations and the 
business community to use their purchasing power to stimulate demand for energy-efficient 
buildings and renewable energy, for example through leasing arrangements and design 
specifications for buildings.
PROPOSAL 52 The Mayor requests each borough to seek to establish at least one well 
founded ‘showcase’ renewable energy project in their area, to raise the profile of renewable 
energy best practice and help to bring it to the mass market.
PROPOSAL 55 The Mayor will invite the London Energy Partnership to adopt the objectives 
and targets in the Mayor’s Energy Strategy. The Mayor suggests that the Partnership takes 
forward the key issues of energy services, fuel poverty, energy efficiency in housing and 
commercial and public sectors, renewable energy, combined heat and power and community 
heating, and hydrogen and fuel cells, by implementing major projects, securing project 
funding, and effective communication.
PROPOSAL 65 The Mayor urges the Government to use the next review of the Building 
Regulations to improve energy efficiency standards in line with the best in Europe and to 
include renewable energy.
PROPOSAL 66 The Mayor urges the Government to include the contribution to furthering 
renewable energy deployment as a criterion in the assessment of applications for a range of 
project grants, such as regeneration funding or lottery funding for community projects.
PROPOSAL 67 The Mayor strongly urges the Government, Ofgem and electricity supply 
companies to ensure that the green electricity purchasing system is simple and transparent 
and to ensure that any possible double counting of carbon dioxide savings is avoided.
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